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A bstract
WitWn recent political tlieory, political liberalism has answ ered tire question of how 
to deal w ith  pluralism  in  contem porary society largely in  term s of tolerance. 
P rom pted by tire sam e question, agonistic political theory has been iir search of a 
w ay to m ove beyond liberal invocations of tolerance to a deeper celebration of 
difference. Tliis project tells the story of the m ove w ithhr political theory from 
tolerance to difference, aird the concom itant m ove from  epistem ology to ontology, 
tlrrough an  exposition of the w ork  of liberal Hreorists Jolm Rawls and  Richard Rorty 
and  of agonistic, or post-Nietzschean, political theorists Chantai Mouffe and  William 
Comrolly. From  a theological perspective, the ontological tu rn  w ith in  recent tlreory 
cair be seen as a welcome developm ent, as cair tire desire to expand our capacity to 
engage witlr difference aird to augm ent our current political im agination given 
contem porary conditions of pluralism . Yet the sufficiency of the answ ers and 
ontology p u t forw ard by both  political liberalism  aird post-N ietzschean political 
tlrought needs to be seriously questioned. Indeed, the ontological tu rn  in  political 
tlreory opens tire w ay for a theological turn , for tlreology is equally concerned w ith 
questions of hum an  being and  'w hat there is' m ore generally. To m ake this 
'tlreological turn,' I look to Scdnt A ugustine, and the ontology disclosed th iough  his 
writings, to see w ha t theological resources he offers for an  engagem ent w ith 
difference. T luough this discussion we re-discover A ugustine's Heaveirly City as the 
place in  w hich uirity and  diversity, harm ony and  plurality can come together in  ways 
that aie n o t possible outside of participation in  the Triune God. Yet this does not 
m ean that the H eavenly City is to take over the earthly city. By pu tting  Augustine 
into conversation w ith  m ore recent theologians such as Jolm M ilbank, Karl Barth, 
and W illiam C avanaugh, w e consider the relationship betw een Üie Heavenly City 
and die earthly city and  w e offer a picture in  w hich renew ed and  expanded 
conceptions of 'public' and  'conversation' open the w ay for rich engagem ent between 
die m any different particularities tiiat constitute a pluralist society.
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C h a pter  O n e  
In t r o d u c t io n
Plurality, diversity, heterogeneity, and  difference help constitute the realities 
tliat compose contem porary W estern society. M ultiple cultures, various 
philosophies of life, conflicting belief systems, and  m anifold lifestyles are b u t some of 
die distinct types of difference d ia t co-mcide w idiiii single political societies. The 
obvious question raised by such conditions is w hat it looks like to live together in die 
m idst of difference. One answ er, that w hich has been predom inant in  liberal 
democracies, offers a p icture based in  toleration: w e live together by tolerating die 
differences w e find around us. That is to say, w e m ay disapprove of others' beliefs 
and choices, w e m ay have deep-seated reasons for diinking diose beliefs an d  choices 
are m orally deficient, b u t w e nevertheless m ake die decision n o t to repress dieir 
differences. While various strands of contem porary liberal political d iought provide 
different argum ents in  defence of toleration and  offer varied nuances in  dieir 
descriptions of w hat tolerance is and  entails, die legacy of liberal toleration lies in die 
Enlightenm ent and  certain beliefs about die nature of know ledge and reason.^ In 
other w ords, liberal invocations of tolerance have dieir roots in  a very distinct 
epistemology, one d iat believes d iat d irough the use of reason all people can be 
unified around a body of com m on ti uths and morals, regardless of dieir odier ' 
differences. The goal is a un ity  d ia t can stand despite and  independent of difference, 
so that com m on life togedier, 'public' life, engages only w id i d iat w hich is held  in 
common, wliile 'divisive' differences are left m  die 'private' sphere.
Early liberalism  sought this unity based on w hat, following political 
philosopher Jolm Rawls, we will call a com prehensive philosophical doctiine. Tliis 
doctrine held  as a basic tenet d iat if all people accepted dieir duty  to exercise reason, 
dieii all could be united  around  a body of m oral ti udis, to which reason h ad  led 
diem , d iat w ould  serve as die basis of public life. More recent liberalism, having 
recognised d ia t such Enlightenm ent-based dream s have n o t come h  ue and  having 
accepted d ia t the use of reason does no t guarantee agreem ent on philosophy or way
1 Throughout diis project, terms such as 'die Enlightenment' and 'liberalism' are used to try to 
capture die heart of movements and ways of diinking diat are in reality comprised of 
disparate and diverse approaches. WliÜe not ignoring diis diversity or diinking that these 
movements can be simply grasped, diese terms are neverdieless used to draw attention to die 
commonalities that bind certain hues of tiiought and beUef togedier.
of life, seeks to find a new  m eans of unity. This involves adapting  liberal concepts to 
a genuinely p luralist society, seeking to find w ays to agree on those concepts that do 
n o t require adherence to the fuller Enlightenm ent project. The quest, as taken up  by 
John Rawls, is for 'freestanding' conceptions w itli w hich all people, regardless of 
tlieir com prehensive doctr ines, belief systems, or ways of life, can agree, so long as 
tliey are 'reasonable.' The problem , as articulated by a  num ber of recent theorists, is 
that no concepts are 'freestanding'; all concepts have tlieir roots in  som e w ay of 
view ing die w orld, some ontology, h i light of this insight, it becomes clear d ia t even 
the concept 'reasonable' is defined in  a very particular way, and  its definition makes 
it neither as inclusive nor as tolerant as diose w ho offer it d iink it to  be. Furtherm ore, 
such political liberalism  assum es diat difference cannot be engaged in  die public 
realm, believing, it seems, d ia t such engagem ent w ould  inevitably resu lt in conflict. 
In die face of difference, dien, tiuough  appeals to reason and tolerance, political 
liberals seek unity.
M uch recent scholarship has raised considerable questions about die 
sufficiency of this approach to difference. For w id iin  political liberalism, as 
articulated by Rawls, difference is seen as a fact or a problem  to be dealt w id i radier 
d ian  a p art of life and  identity to be acknowledged, em braced and  celebrated. In 
contiast to diis view , som e dieorists argue d ia t such differences are n o t incidental 
and d ia t it is problem atic to assum e d ia t diey cem and should be left in  die private 
realm. The scholarsliip m ost commonly associated w id i such a position recom m ends 
w hat has come to be know n vaiioiisly as the politics of difference, die politics of 
recognition, and m ulticulturalism . Yet anotiier group of political diinkers operating 
in  die nam e of difference goes even furdier than w h a t w e com m only associate w ith 
the 'politics of difference'; for diese theorists, difference is to be celebrated because it 
lies a t the very h eart of die w ay die w orld  is and our identities are constituted. From 
this perspective, liberal tolerance is no t sufficient because it  still, by definition, 
involves disapproval rad ier d ian  embrace of difference and, to w ork, it requires d iat 
differences not be recognised in any public way. By assum ing d ia t it is possible to 
keep difference and  condict ou t of our com m on political life, it overlooks reality's 
confiictual, agonistic nature. The chaotic nature of reality and  die presence of conflict 
and pow er in  all aspects of life, relationships, institutions, and  str uctures m ean that 
attem pts to find unity  or to develop political dieories in the nam e of unity always 
suppress or do violence to difference. Unity camiot, according to tiiese agonistic or
post-N ietzschean political theorists, be the goal, nor tolerance the w ay to get there. 
Instead, tliese theorists search for a w ay to m ove beyond tolerance and  unity  to a 
deeper and richer em brace of difference. For the sake of diversity, tliey relinquish 
the hope of unity.
To sum m arise, liberal tolerance involves tlie quest for unity, w hile agonistic 
difference prioritises diversity. Each can be accused of pursu ing  the one a t tire 
expense of tlie other, for pushing  to um iecessary extiem es the dicliotomies of the 
universal and  tire particular, the one and  tire many. Wlrile agonistic political tlreory 
helpfully involves 'an ontological turn,' in w liich m ore explicit engagem ent w ith  
beliefs about tire nature of hm nan  being and 'w hat tlrere is' m ore generally is 
undertaken, its ow n ontology is so rooted m  coirdict curd chaos tlrat it has to entirely 
relinquish hope for uirity aird harm ony betw een differences. A t the end  of the day, 
despite its rhetoric, a surprising num ber of the 'differences' tlrat achially com prise 
contem porary W estern political societies have to undergo significant alterations to be 
included iir the political societies it pictures. Despite its attem pts to expand respect 
for difference, it is ultim ately no m ore tolerant or embraciirg of difference tlran tire 
liberals it decries.
These two 'schools' of political tlreory represent recent prom inent attem pts to 
use political and  tlreoretical im agination to offer pichires of w hat it could look like to 
live together in  the m idst of difference. As tire cultural an d  intellectual clmrate of 
W estern society has changed, so has political tlreory. Yet none of the theories and 
practices tlrat have em erged has yet provided sufficient or adequate pictures of w hat 
our collective life can be m rder conditions of extreme diversity. This is, of course, 
due in large p art to tire com plicated irature of tlrese issues; botlr tlreoretically aird 
practically, questioirs related to differeirce aird tolerance, to tire organisation of 
political society in times of h igh pluralism , will have no easy answers. But it m ay 
also be due to our ow n im poverished political im agination. Perhaps answ ers, or 
hints tow ards answ ers, m ay be formd in areas that are no longer considered helpful 
or plausible from  tire perspective of political theory, indeed from  one of tire very 
quarters that is m ost often blam ed for tire rise of and perpetuation of intolerance, 
nam ely Christiairity. A radical ontology offered by C hristian theology m ay provide 
an alternative to botlr political liberalism and  post-N ietzschean political though t tlrat 
points tow ards a w ay ou t of our current m orass, by helping us to tlrhrk m ore 
creatively about tire relationship betw een tire uiriversEil and tire particular, betw een
uirity and  diversity, that does no t leave us stranded  in  uirhelpful bifurcations. 
Perhaps m ore im portantiy, from  tire perspective of theology, tire theological 
investigation of political theory in  term s of difference and the articulation of a 
C luistian ontology that m ight serve as an  alternative w ay of view ing tlrese m atters 
m ight be of benefit to tire C hurch and  to Christians w ho currently find them selves 
faying to navigate tire tricky w aters of tolerance, differeirce, liberalism, aird pluralism . 
It m ight, indeed, serve as a  rem inder to Christians th a t they have a crucial role to 
play in the developm ent of com m unities in  wlriclr unity  and diversity can come 
togetlrer th rough  participation in  tire recondliirg w ork of tire Triune God. To that 
end, tlris w ork, despite its engagem ent w ith  political theory, is unapologetically 
tlreological.
To say tlrat this w ork  is tlreological is no t to say, I hope, tlrat it has nothing to 
offer to those w ho do no t share its Cluistiair theological presuppositions. O n the 
contrary, tire project is undertaken  because of the belief that theology aird political 
theory (and, for th a t m atter, m ost other disciplines) have overlapping fields of 
interest and  concern, aird th a t genuine conversation betw een them  needs to happen 
for the sake of both. Nonetheless, I do hope in  this w ork to w rite tlreologically about 
issues far too long left to non-theologians and to explicate the im plications of 
C hristian theology for the situation of plurality and 'tolerance' in  wlriclr w e find 
ourselves today. Tlris is indeed b u t to be faithful to the ow n inirer Üremes of 
Christianity, w hich have to do witlr iroüring if no t commmrity, unity, diversity, 
difference, and  harm ony .2 It is also to help expand our current political im agination 
as w e seek answ ers to contem porary problem s, and  this should be of relevance to all 
w ho share W estern political arrangem ents. My goal in  writing, how ever, is neither 
to convert to C hristianity those w ho do no t yet believe its trutlrs, nor to provide an  
apologetic for tire ontology, political society, or 'social usefulness' of C hristianity .3 I
2 As Oliver O'Donovan puts it in tlrese oft-cited sentences, "...tlreology is political simply by 
responding to tire dynamics of its own proper themes. Christ, salvation, lire church, tire 
Triirity: to speak about these has involved theologians in speaking of society, and has led 
Üreiir to formulate normative political ends....It is not a question of adapting to alien 
requirements or subscribing to external agenda, but of letting tlreology be true to its task and 
freeing it fronr a forced and mmatural detachment" (Oliver O'Doirovan, The Desire of the 
Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theology [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996], p. 3).
3 In otirer words, tlris work is more concerned with providing tlreological reasons for 
Christians to think about political societ)f aird tireir role tlrerein than with fmrrislring practical 
reasons for non-Clrristiairs to accept tire benefits tlrat Cluistians and Christiarrit}'^ may or may 
not bring to civil society and the public square. Here I agree with Charles T. Mathewes on the
leave the w ork of conversion, to tire Spirit of God, as tire project itself should  m ake , 
abmrdcurtly clear.
Before m oving on to introduce m  m ore detail tire contents of this project, it 
m ay prove helpful to step back to consider tire concept of toleration, bo th  in  its ow n 
right and  in  term s of its relationship w ith  liberalism, for toleration and  liberalism  are 
crucial characters iir tire intellectual story I am  w eaving and  the theological critiques I 
am  offering. Tire complexity of defiirition and discussion surroundiirg  botlr prohibits 
tire possibility of either one being covered sufficiently, b u t even a brief m hoduction  
to these complexities w ill help elucidate some of tire key issues a t play. After tlris 
brief inhoduction, the m ove withiir political theory from  tolerance to difference, and 
from epistem ology to ontology, w ill be described a little m ore fully, along w ith  the 
ways tlris ontological h im  opeirs tire door for a tlreological tu rn  witlrin political 
theory. Fiirally, a description of tire contents of tlris project, chapter by chapter, is 
given.
A  Brief In t r o d u c t io n  to  T olera n ce  a n d  Liberalism
As long ago as 1689, Jolm Locke told tire English readers of Iris letter 
conceririirg toleration th a t "there is no nation under heaven in  wlriclr so m uch has 
already been said upon  tlrat subject as ours."^ Yet m ore than  tirree h u n d red  years 
later, contribution after contribution continues to be m ade to the subject. Some 
contiibutions take as tireir starting assum ption tlrat tolerance is tire rightful reigning 
'value' of our day; som e view  tolerance as tire necessary culmiiration of centuries of 
liberal political tirinking, theorising, and im plem entation; others decry tire 
intolerairce and  repression of difference that they see as veiled concom itants of so- 
called liberal tolerance; and  otirers yet raise sigirificairt philosophical questions about 
tire very definition of toleration, as w ell as how  attainable or desirable it is as air 
ideal.
dangers of instrumentalising religion if one focuses primarily on the good of Christianity for 
tiie sake of civil or political life (A Theology of Public Life During the World [fortircoming], 
inhoduction). Nancy Rosenblum offers a nice summary of tlrese approaches in her 
mhoduction to Obligations of Citizenship and Demands of Faith: Religious Accommodation in 
Pluralist Democracies (Prmceton: Prmceton University Press, 2000), pp. 15-21.
 ^Jolm Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. Mario Montuori (The Hague: Martinus. 
Nijhoff, 1963), p. 3.
Toleration m ay, indeed, be am ong the m ore com plicated 'virtues' of our time, 
in  term s of its origins, its conceptuality, its merits, and its entailm ents. Its complexity 
is increased because it is of relevance to botlr informal, 'um egulated ' life and  legal 
and institutional aspects of political life.s As a 'virtue,' it is certainly am ong the m ost 
controversial. Perhaps evaluations of toleration are best view ed along a specti'um. 
On one end  are tlrose w ho laud  the accom plishm ent tlrat tolerance represents, aird 
w ho w ould  agree w ith  W illiam Galston tlrat, "in the real w orld, there is nothing 
'mere' about toleration."6 In  the m iddle are tlrose concerned witlr w h a t toleration is 
and is not, the paradoxes it raises as a m oral concept, mrd tire potential im possibility 
of its realisation.2 Aird a t tire other end  are those w ho, for a variety of reasons that 
w ould keep tlrem from  being happily  grouped together, regard tolerance as 
repressive, discrimiiratory, pretentious, a ird /o r dangerous.» Regardless of the 
evaluation, one w ould  be hard-pressed to deny the central role that toleration has 
played and  continues to play  in  political theory and  practice. Tlris m akes it all tire 
m ore m teresting that, as A ndrew  M urphy writes, "the m eaning of tire term  contiirues 
to elude us."^ D avid H eyd concurs on the elusive nature of tlris virtue:
5 So David Lewis, after noting the importance of 'legal rights' of toleration, writes, "But legal 
rights are far from the whole story. The institutions of toleration are in large part informal, a 
matter not of law but custom, habits of conduct and thought" ("Mill and Milquetoast," in 
Papers in Ethics and Social Philosophy [Princeton, N.J.: Priirceton University Press, 2000], p. 159). 
 ^William A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory 
and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge Universit)^ Press, 2002), p. 120.
7 See, for example. Res Publica 7, no. 3 (2001), containing tire proceedmgs from the Annual 
Conference of tire UK Association for Legal and Social Philosophy on "The Culture of 
Toleration"; Susan Mendus, ed.. The Politics of Toleration: Tolerance and Intolerance in Modern 
Life (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Uiriversity Press, 1999); Susan Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of 
Liberalism (Atlantic Higlrlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1989); Susan Mendus, 
ed.. Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988); David Heyd, ed.. Toleration: An Elusive Virtue (Princeton, N.J.: 
Prmceton University Press, 1996). N.B. The volumes edited by Susan Mendus are products of 
The Morrell Studies hr Toleration Programme at tire University of York.
» See, for example, Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Herbert Marcuse, A  Critique 
of Pure Tolerance (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969); J. Budziszewski, True Tolerance (New 
Brmrswick, N.J.: Trairsaction Publishers, 1992); William E. Connolly, The Ethos ofPluralization 
(Mhmeapolis: University of Miniresota Press, 1995); William T. Cavanaugh, "'A F he Strong 
Enough to Consume the House:' The Wars of Religion and tire Rise of tire State," Modern 
Theology 11, no. 4 (October 1995), pp. 397-420; and A. J. Conyers, The Long Truce: How 
Toleration Made the World Safe for Power and Profit (Dallas: Spence PubHshhrg Company, 2001).
5 Andrew Murphy, "Tolerance, Toleration, and the Liberal Tradition," Polity 29 (1997), p. 594. 
Part of Murphy's way out of this 'defmitional morass' is the proposal of a distinction between 
tolerance and toleration: toleration refers to social and political practices, while tolerance has 
to do with attitudes. Michael Walzer also makes a disthrction between the practical nature of 
toleration and tire attitudinal nature of tolerance (see Michael Walzer, On Toleration [New 
Haven: Yale Uiriversity Press, 1997], p. xi). Because tlris distinction is not uniformly followed
Tolerance is a philosoplrically elusive concept Indeed, in the liberal ethos of the last 
tlu ee centuries, it has been hailed as one of the fundamental etloical and political 
values, and it still occupies a powerful position in contemporary legal and political 
rhetoric. However, our firm belief in the value of tolerance is not matched by 
analogous tlreoretical certitude.
O thers, like Bernard W illiams, are concerned tliat toleration is n o t only elusive but 
also impossible: "Toleration, w e m ay say, is required only for tlie intolerable. That is 
its basic problem , "n
M ost scholars of tlie subject agree tliat toleration by definition involves 
disapproval, so tliat the object of toleration is viewed as m orally w rong or 
undesirable even as tliose w ho offer toleration make the decision no t to interfere witli 
or repress tliat w hich Üiey have deem ed im m oral or objectionable. Toleration is not, 
Üien, equivalent to indifference or scepticism. Tolerance can tu rn  into indifference if 
one ceases to view  a  particular behaviour or belief w ith  disapproval, or into 
scepticism if one declines to pass any judgem ent on  another’s w ay of life or beliefs 
because one questions the existence of a right or a standard  by w hich to pass such 
judgem ents. True tolerance, how ever, depends upon a situation of diversity m arked 
by botli difference and  disapproval. A nd herein lies its paradox. As Susan M endus 
asks, how  can toleration be counted as a virtue w hen  it is based on m oral 
disapproval, w ith  the im plication tliat the thing tolerated is w rong and  ought n o t to 
exist? Wliy is it  good to toIerate?i2
Different justifications have been offered, liistorically and  m ore recently, for 
the good of toleration. The perceived need of tolerance arises, for obvious reasons, 
under conditions of p luralism  and  diversity w ith in  a given political society. The 
m ost com m only told story of the rise of tolerance links it directly and  inextiicably 
witli tlie diversity of post-Reforniation Europe that inspired the em ergence of 
liberalism.i3 In tliis story, liberalism  arises out of tlie w ars of religion of tlie sixteentli
in tlie literature, because keeping it does not particularly aid tliis investigation, and, finally, 
because it seems unlikely, as Edward Langerak has noted, that efforts to generalise this 
distinction will be successful, I have not chosen to differentiate between tlie two (see Edward 
Langerak, "Theism and Toleration," in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, ed. Plulip L. 
Quimi and Charles Taliaferro [Cambridge, Mass.; Blackwell Publishers, 1997], p. 519).
Heyd, Toleration, p. 3.
11 Bernai'd Williams, "Tolerance: An Impossible Virtue?" in Toleration: An Elusive Virtue, ed. 
David Heyd (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 18.
12 Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism, pp. 18-19.
13 So, for example, Andrew Hey wood writes, "The case for toleration first emerged during the 
Reformation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a time when the rising Protestant
and seventeenth centuries w ith  tolerance playing a leading role as tiie answ er to tire 
antagonism  and  bloodshed tliat m arked the prolonged religious conflicts of the day. • 
A nd so w e have Brian Barry's estim ation that toleration is a defining feature and 
perhaps even the core of liberalism, and Juditli Shklar's sense th a t toleration can be 
considered tlie core of tlie historical developm ent of political liberalism, and  W illiam 
Galston's opinion th a t die virtue of tolerance is a core attribute of liberal pluralist 
c i t i z e n s h i p . 2 4  Wliile some recent scholarsliip attem pts to expand curren t conceptions 
of tolerance, in  wliich tolerance is alm ost exclusively linked to liberalism, by finding 
examples of tolerant political arrangem ents and principled defences of toleration that 
pre-date the rise of liberalism,^» it seems safe to say th a t the tolerance that m arks 
contem porary W estern society has its roots in  liberalism.
Liberalism approaches toleration in  tlie complexity of defining and 
explaining it, in term s of either its historical origins or its contem porary 
articulations .36 The bread th  of opinion on w hat liberalism  has been and  continues to 
be, even betw een tliose w ho consider them selves contem porary liberal political 
theorists, plays no  sm all p a r t in this seeming complexity. Indeed, die com peting 
branches of liberalism  tiy  to convince odiers of their position by persuading  diem  to
sects challenged die audiority of the Pope and die established Catiiolic church" (Andrew 
Hey wood, Political Theory: An Intfvduction, 2d. ed. [Hampsliire: Palgrave, 1999], p. 268). And 
John Gray, "Contemporary liberal regimes are late dowerings of a project of toleration diat 
began in Europe in die late sixteenth century" (John Gray, Tzoo Faces of Liberalism [New York: 
The New Press, 2000], p. 1). And Jolm Rawls: ".. .one historical origin of liberalism is die 
Wars of Religion hi die sixteendi and seventeenth centuries followhig die Reformation; diese 
divisions opened a long controversy about die right of resistance and liberty of conscience, 
which eventually led to die formation and often reluctant acceptance of some form of die 
prhiciple of toleration" (Jolm Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erm Kelly 
[Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001], p. 1).
Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2001), p. 131; Judidi N. Sliklar, "The Liberalism of Fear," hi Liberalism and the 
Moral Life, ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), p.
23; Galston, Liberal Pluralism, p. 126.
•5 See Walzer, On Toleration, who describes and compares five 'regimes of toleration' from 
Western history, gohig as far back as the multinational empires of Persia, Ptolemaic Egypt, 
and Rome; Cary J. Nederman, Worlds of Difference: European Discourses of Toleration, C. 1100- 
C. 1550 (University Park, Penn.: The Peraisylvania State University Press, 2000), who argues 
diat as early as 1100 religious toleration was die subject of reasoned defence from multiple 
wi'iters hi Latin Christendom; and Cary J. Nederman and John Christian Laursen, eds.. 
Difference and Dissent: Theories of Toleration in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Laiiham, Md.: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996, a collection of essays discussing a range of conceptual 
positions diat were employed by medieval and early modern diinkers to support dieories of 
toleration.
36 As Mendus writes, "to give a coherent account of liberalism's commitment to toleration 
presupposes a clear understanding of what liberalism itself is. Yet such a clear miderstandhig 
is difficult to obtain" (Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism, p. 70).
accept tlieir ow n version of liberalism 's definition. As to the origins of liberalism, J.S. 
M cClelland w rites of tlie m odern  state th a t it "emerged from  die feudal order.
Beyond that notiiing is certain. There is no agreem ent about how  it happened  or 
w hen it happened  beyond saying that it happened a t different times in  different 
p l a c e s ." 3 7  This description applies equally well to liberalism. A lthough w e m ay not 
be able to successfully identify liberalism  w id i a particular date or site of emergence, 
w e do have some h in t of its origins. H ere w e again agree w idi M cClelland d iat 
"what does no t seem  to be in  doub t is that liberalism, as a set of ideas and  as a first, 
tentative approach to d ie treatm ent of political and social problem s, began in  die 
E n l i g h t e n m e n t . "38 To get a sense of w ha t d iat m eans, w e will look closely a t die w ork 
of Jolm Locke, w ho is com m only associated w ith  die earliest articulations of bodi 
liberalism and  toleration.39
John Locke plays a leading role in  die story of toleration, due to die 
influential publication of A Letter Concerning Toleration. W ritten in  1685 and  
published in  1689 (in four different languages d ia t very year), its enduring  legacy 
stem s no t from  it being die first w ork on toleration as such b u t instead from  it being 
die first w ork to use toleration as die basis for a different, lim ited role for die nation­
state. H e w as am ong the first to advocate tolerance on die political and  ecclesiastical 
level on the basis of principled philosophical argument.^» His justification for 
religious toleration is rooted in  his understanding  of die nature of salvation and die 
limits of hum an  know ledge, and  stems m ore from  his case for the irrationality of 
forced belief tiian from  a belief in  the inherent goodness and  desirability of 
d i f f e r e n c e . 2 3  This helps explcdn w hy he does not extend toleration to adieists and 
Roman Cadiolics: his concern for social cohesion allow ed toleration a t die private 
level so long as it d id  no t d isrup t order on the public level. Rom an Catholics w ould  
be m ore faidiful to die Bishop of Rome d ian  die civil m agistrate in  dieir ow n land.
32 J.S. McClelland, A History of Western Political Thought (London: Roudedge, 1996), p. 278.
38 McClelland, Western Political Thought, p. 428.
39 As Michael Sandel writes of liberalism, in its historic sense, "liberalism describes a tiadidon 
of diought that emphasizes toleration and respect for individual rights and that runs from 
John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill to John Rawls" (Michael J. Sandel, 
Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy, paperback ed. [Cambridge, 
Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998], p. 4).
20 Ian S.Markham, Plurality and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), p. 13.
23 This latter position is most often associated in early modern political drought widi John 
Stuart MÜ1. For more on die differences between Locke and Mill, see Mendus, Toleration and 
the Limits of Liberalism, esp. pp. 22-68.
while those w ho do n o t believe in  God w ould  no t have reason to upho ld  the 
"promises, covenants, an d  oaüis, w hich are the bonds of hum an  s o c i e t y .  "22
If Locke does no t m ake his argum ent for toleration from  a conviction of tlie 
iiilierent desirability of religious diversity, w hat is it that prom pts him  to w rite of 
toleration as "the chief characteristic m ark of the true chmch?"23 O f u tm ost 
im portance is his understanding  of the nature of salvation as such that it  cam iot be 
forced or coerced b u t m ust stem  from  individual choice. His em phasis on tlie 
ineffectiveness of coercion stems largely from  w h a t he believes to be the nature of 
reason, knowledge, and  faith. Though Locke retains a Christian belief in  the 
necessity of salvation, his understanding  of how  one epistemologicaUy acquires the 
faith that is necessary for salvation is as im portant to him  as tlie attaim nent of 
salvation itself. Religion is one of "tliose things tliat every m an ought sincerely to 
inquire into himself, and  by m editation study, search, and  his ow n endeavours, 
attain  the know ledge of;"24 in  such m atters no one can go against die dictates of his 
ow n conscience or fail to use his ow n reason. Locke argues for toleration in  m atters 
of religion n o t m erely for pragm atic reasons, no t merely, d iat is, to aid  die attainm ent 
of a modus vivendi th a t w ould enable die overcoming of bloodshed and  conflict 
(though he w as certainly influenced by a desire to overcome the violence d iat he 
associated w id i 'intolerance'), b u t because of his view  of die nature of belief: 
exhortations and argum ents are acceptable in  m atters of conversion w here coercion 
and force are no t because "nobody is obliged in  d ia t m atter to yield obedience unto 
die adm onitions or injunctions of anodier, furdier than  he liim self is persuaded. 
Every m an in  d iat has die suprem e and  absolute audiority  of judging for him self."2» 
This is in  keeping w id i Locke's thought m ore generally, specifically liis belief d ia t it 
is die du ty  of each person to examine all beliefs, religious, m oral, and  odierw ise, 
diereby individually arriving at a rational m orality and  rational religion as opposed 
to depending  upon  m oral and  religious tiad itions .26 This rational m orality could.
22 Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration, p. 93.
23 Ibid., p. 7.
2‘3 Ibid., p. 49.
25 Ibid., p. 81.
26 For more on diis aspect of Locke's diouglit, as well as a critique of it, see Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, "The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues," in Robert 
Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions 
in Political Debate (Lanliam, Md.; Rowman & Litdefield Publishers, 1997), pp. 80-90. Note diat 
diis aspect of Locke's diought is not unconnected with die religious diversity diat marked his 
time. In Wolterstorff's estimation, the main question of Locke's day, in light of die
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Locke hoped, provide a unified basis for political life that d id  no t depend  on  
revelation, religion, religious authority, or tradition.
Locke's support of toleration also depends u p o n  draw ing a clear distinction 
between the role of civil governm ent and the role of religion: civil goverm nent m ust 
concern itself only w ith  tilings tem poral because the com m onwealtli is by (Locke's) 
definition a society constituted to secure civil interests, by w liich he m eans "life, 
liberty, healtli, and  indolency of body; and  tlie possession of ou tw ard  things, such as 
m oney, lands, houses, furniture, and  tlie l i k e . "22 h i otiier w ords, interests tliat have to 
do w ith  tliis life, as opposed to  'the care of souls,' w hich is properly left to the church. 
Indeed, in Locke's view  tlie salvation of souls is the only business of tlie church.2» As 
he w rites, "tlie political society is instituted for no other end  bu t only to  secure every 
m an's possession of the things of this life. The care of each m an's soul, and  of the 
tilings in heaven, w hich neither does belong to tlie com m onw ealth no r can be 
subjected to it, is left entirely to every m an's s e l f . "29 h i Locke's view, an  acceptance of 
the delineation betw een tiiese tw o spheres is essential for the realisation of toleration.
C ontem porary questions related to w hat w e now  call the separation  of church 
and state have clear resonances w ith  tills line of thinking in  Locke's w ritings. One 
can begin to see w hat prom pted  Stanley Fish to w rite tliat Locke's "fram ing of tlie 
question, "How do we settle the just bounds betw een church and  state?" and  the 
com ponents of liis answ er.. .still preside over the discussion he initiated so long 
ago."3o Indeed, m any aspects of tiie philosophical liberalism articulated by Locke in 
his account of toleration and  liis otiier w orks on political society continue to 
influence political philosophy. Yet in  otiier w ays w e are far from  w here Locke was, 
certainly w hen  it comes to presuppositions about the use of reason and  the 
foundations of know ledge. Locke's defence of toleration is concom itant w ith  certain 
ideas about the nature of know ledge, conscience, the individual, an d  reason; it is bu t
fragmentation of tiadition tiiat had formerly resolved moral and religious quandaries, would 
have been "how should we form our beliefs on fundamental matters of religion and morality 
so as to live together in social harmony, when we can no longer appeal to a shared and 
unified tradition?" (Nicholas Wolterstorff, John Locl<e and the Ethics o/Belie/[Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996], p. x).
22 Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration, p. 15.
28 Ibid., p. 59. We will have plenty of reasons to revisit this assertion in later parts of oui- 
investigation.
29 Ibid., p. 85.
30 Stanley Fish, The Trouble xoith Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 
p. 175.
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one p art of a larger, com prehensive doctrine that carries w ith  it a distinctive, 
universalising epistem ology, anthropology, and  ontology.»! Tliis com prehensive 
doctr ine is generally associated witli Enlightenm ent liberalism.
According to m any recent liberal tlieorists, liberalism does n o t have to be 
associated w ith  tlie Enlightem nent, or w ith  any com prehensive philosophy of life. 
M ore tlian tliat, such scholars argue, to the extent that contem porary form ulations of 
liberalism are linked to or based in Enlightem nent ideals, tliey w ill fail.»^ The level of 
diversity and tlie b read th  of difference w ithin current society, a level and  breadüi 
that points to tlie vast heterogeneity of conceptions of the good, precludes the 
general acceptance of Enlightenm ent values or an  Enlightenm ent conception of the 
good life. A nd yet m any of the institutions and  values still present w ith in  
contem porary society—separation of church and state and  toleration, to nam e bu t 
tw o —have been inherited from  tlie Enlightenm ent, having been underg irded  by 
certain presuppositions about the nature of reason, knowledge, hum an  being, and  
tlie w orld m ore generally. The question, wliile no t original to this investigation, is 
nonetlieless pressing: can tliese institutions and  values be sustained if their original 
sources of sustenance have been largely discredited? That is to say, as J. Judd O w en 
writes.
The liberal institutions concerning religion—the separation of church and state, 
religious pluralism, religious freedom—were originally justified on the basis of a 
revolutionary comprehensive philosophic doctrine, covering human nature, tiie 
purpose of political society, and the proper domain of religious faith. The liberal 
doctimes concerning religion were tiie product of the Age of Reason, or the 
Enlightenment,.. .Today, belief in the comprehensive philosophic teaching of the 
Enlightenment appears to lie in ruins, and few hope tiiat any otiier comprehensive 
philosophy could successfully replace it. This despair is, to a considerable extent, due 
to a radical critique of reason as such.»»
»3 Tluoughout tiiis work 'ontology' is used to refer to an miderstandhig of the natiire of 
human being and what tiiere is more generally. This use of ontology will be explored hi more 
detail in the third chapter.
32 So, for example, Gray's comment that "...all schools of contemporary political thought are 
variations on the Enlightenment project, and...tiiat project, though irreversible in its cultural 
effects, was self-undermiiihig and is now exhausted. Fresh thought is needed on the 
dilemmas of tiie modern age which does not simply run the changes in hitellectual traditions 
whose matrix is that of the Enlightenment" (Jolm Gray, Enlightemnent's Wake: Politics and 
Culture at the Close of the Modern Age [London: Routledge, 1995], p. viii).
»» J. Judd Owen, Religion and the Demise ofLiheral Rationalism: The Foundational Crisis of the 
Separation of Church and State (Chicago: U n i v e r s i t } ^  of Cliicago Press, 2001), p. 1.
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To p u t tliis ill term s of toleration, toleration is a plausible option in  original 
conceptions of liberalism  because reason and  rationality are able to provide a  natural, 
universal basis for public (political) life wliile religion, and other divisive differences, 
can peacefully rem ain  in  the private sphere. The question today is w hether 
liberalism and  its solution to tiie problem  of tolerance rem ain viable options given 
recent critiques of Enlightenm ent rationalism  and  accusations of intolerance in tiie 
nam e of liberal etiuiocentrism. That is to say, if, as M endus w rites, "historically, 
discussions of toleration have often placed faitii in  tiie possibility of reasoned 
resolutions to intolerance," w hat support can liberalism  give to toleration if that faitii 
has been lost?»!
We have come this far in  our discussion w ithout even attem pting a definition 
of liberalism. The complexity of its definition is due in  no sm all p a rt to the question 
of tiie relationship betw een liberalism  and the Enlightenm ent, so that som e scholars, 
such as Gray, Galston, mid Nmicy Rosenblum, w rite of tiie tw o faces or concepts of 
liberalism. One face is liberalism  as a universal regime, as a m oral ideal tiia t all in  a 
given society could, theoretically, accept as the best w ay of life.»» G alston links this 
face to the ideal of autonom y, by w hich he m eans individual self-direction comiected 
w ith com m itm ent to sustained rational exam ination of self, otiiers, and social 
practices.»® This, in  tu rn , he links to an  historical im pulse associated w itii tiie 
Enlightemnent: "liberation tiirough reason from  externally im posed autiiority."»^ 
(This form  of liberalism  should  rem ind us of Locke; both Galston and  Gray m ention 
his nam e in  coraiection w ith  it.»») The other face of liberalism is m ore of a political 
modus vivendi that, rather than  trying to prom ote one ideal w ay or philosophy of life, 
accepts a diversity of forms of life.»9 Galston associates tliis face w ith  the principle of 
diversity; it has, he claims, m ore to do w ith  recognising legitim ate differences 
between individuals and  groups over questions of the good and  the true than  w itii
»! Mendus, Politics of Toleration, p. 2.
»5 Gray, Tzvo Faces, pp. 1-5; Nancy L. Rosenblum, introduction to Liberalism and the Moral Life, 
ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 5. Cf. John 
Gray, "Two Liberalisms of Fear," The Hedgehog Revieio 2, no. 1 (Spring 2000, pp. 9-23), in which 
he discusses these two concepts of liberalism as differing liberalisms of fear.
»6 Of course even this identification of liberalism wdtli autonomy is contested by other liberal 
theorists. See, for example, Barry, Cidtnre & Equality, pp. 118-123.
»2 Galston, Liberal Pluralism, p. 24.
3» See ibid., p. 21; Gray, Tzuo Faces, p. 2.
39 Gray, Tzuo Faces, pp. 5-6; Rosenblum, mtioduction to Liberalism and the Moral Life, p. 6.
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prom oting tiie ideal of liberal a u t o n o m y O n  tliis face, liberal toleration is, as Gray 
writes, "the belief that hum an  beings can flourish in  m any w ays of life."ü For the 
other face of liberalism, liberalism  as a m iiversal regim e or m oral ideal, liberal 
toleration is, according to Gray, "tlie ideal of a rational consensus on the best w ay of 
life."!2
Because of tliese tw o faces, it m ay be easier to speak of w ha t liberalism  
opposes than  w h a t i t  prom ises, as Rosenblum  suggests. Perhaps tiie m ost m inim al 
description tiiat can be offered of liberalism, in  its 'tiiin' version, is th a t it is a theory 
of lim ited goverm nent, concerned w ith  protecting tiie personal liberty and  private 
property of citizens from  political absolutism  and  arbitiariness.!» One of the m ost 
oft-cited recent prescriptions for liberalism  is offered by Judith  Sliklar, w hose 
'liberalism of fear' "has only one overriding aim: to secure the political conditions 
tiiat are necessary for the exercise of personal freedom." In other w ords, "every adult 
should be able to m ake as m any effective decisions w ithout fear or favor about as 
m any aspects of her or liis life as is compatible w itii tiie like freedom  of every otiier 
adult."!! Sliklar herself insists tiiat liberalism  is a "political doctrine, n o t a  philosophy 
of life."!» While recognising tiie existence of other articulations of liberalism, the 
liberalism that she believes in  is, she claims, independent of and com patible w itii all 
religious or pliilosopliical system s of tiiought so long as tliey do n o t reject toleration 
or refuse to recognise a difference betw een tiie spheres of public and  private. Her 
version of liberalism  has no  sum m um  honum  of its own, though it begins w ith  a 
sum m um  malum, tiie evil of cruelty and tiie fear it inspires. This, she m aintains, is tiie 
only universal claim that the liberalism  of fear makes.!® Gray and  G alston are 
likewise concerned w itii lim iting the miiversal claims of liberalism, for tliey object to 
the hom ogenising tendencies they see w ith in  certain conceptions of liberalism  and 
tolerance that are tied too closely to larger, Enlightem nent-based ideals of autonom y 
or reason.!2 Galston, for example, believes th a t "to tiie extent th a t m any liberals
!o Galston, Liberal Pbiralisni, p. 21.
!3 Gray, Tiuo Faces, p. 1.
!2 Ibid.
!» I have borrowed here from tiie clear, concise definition tiiat Rosenblum gives to liberalism 
in her mtioduction to Liberalism and the Moral Life, p. 5.
!! Shklar, "Liberalism of Fear," p. 21.
!5 Ibid.
!® Ibid., pp. 24, 29.
!2 And bo til propose solutions and adaptations to such conceptions of liberalism and 
tolerance tiuough a reappropriation of 'value pluralism,' drawn from tiie tiiought of Isaiah
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identify liberalism  w ith  the Enlightenm ent, tliey lim it su pport for their cause and 
drive m any citizens of goodw ill—indeed, m any potential allies—into opposition."!»
No political pliilosopher is m ore fam ous for liis efforts to m ove from  a 
universal doctrine of liberalism  to one tliat could be accepted by diverse constituents 
w ith in  a liberal political society than  John Rawls. As Locke is w idely considered the 
m ost influential political theorist of tlie seventeenüi century, so Rawls is considered 
the m ost influential political tlieorist of the tw entietli century. His A  TJteory o f Justice 
(hereafter Theonj) is argued  by some to be tlie greatest contribution to liberal theory 
in tlie last hm idred  years.!^ In m ost estim ations his w ork in  Theoiy b rough t life, 
vigour, and  debate back to the discipline of political philosophy th a t had  seen little 
or no im iovative w ork in  tlie preceding decades. Even those w ho m ost vehem ently 
disagree w itli Rawls cannot deny tliat he sets tlie term s of tlie debate to w hich  they 
m ust respond or w hich they m ust try to alter. A nd yet Rawls him self significantly 
changed his approach to liberalism  and tolerance in  tlie years after tlie publication of 
Theory, in  light of Ms grow ing sense of tlie pluralism  of contem porary society. 
W hereas his earliest w ork articulated a com prehensive philosopM cal doctiine of 
liberalism, along the lines of tlia t offered by Locke, his subsequent w ork  attem pts to 
lim it the com prehensive nature of Ms ideas tiuough  die developm ent of a liberalism  
that is, supposedly, "political, no t metaphysical."»» (Here w e are rem inded of 
Sliklar's liberalism  of fear that she describes as political ratlier than  a w ay of life.) 
This is his effort to distance his version of liberalism from  tlie Enlightem nent so diat 
it m ight stand despite the recent demise of belief in  die unifying natu re  of reason. It 
is Ms w ay of com ing to term s w itii tiie diversity of doctrines and w ays of life tiiat 
concurrently exist w itliin contem porary liberal society. It exliibits his belief tiiat tiie 
exercise of reason w ill not, as for Locke, lead us all to tiie sam e body of m oral truths, 
bu t w ill instead result in  "a plurality of reasonable yet incom patible com prehensive
Berlin. Despite certain kinsMps in tiien assessments of strands of liberalism and tireir appeal 
to value pluralism, in tiie end tliey reach different conclusions about what is necessary in our 
time. For Galston's own description of the differences between tiiem, see Galston, Liberal 
Pluralism, pp. 48-64.
!» Galston, Liberal Pluralism, p. 26.
!9 See, for example, Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), p. 119.
50 "Political not Metaphysical" is the title of a lecture written by Rawls in 1985 that became 
Lecture I of Political Liberalism. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, paperback ed. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 3-46, esp. p. 10.
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docü’ines."5i W ith this in  m ind, Rawls develops a theory that he believes can be 
neutral tow ards com peting conceptions of the good and thereby allows the 
flourislring of a diversity of com prehensive doctrines and philosophies of life. Once 
Rawls acknowledges tlia t such diversity will always be a p art of liberal society, he 
m ust give toleration an  ever-m ore central and im portant role w itliin Iris political 
theory. As Galston notes, contem porary liberal theorists like Rawls "have 
dram atically expanded the scope of t o l e r a t i o n . "52
Yet, as noted  earlier, tolerance itself has come under m uch scrutiny as of late, 
and no t just because of its comrection to tire Enlightenm ent. Entire conferences, 
journals, books, and  ed ited  volum es have been dedicated to the question of 
tolerance, its justification, and  its limits.ss So m uch so Üiat one scholar w rites, "the 
classical idea of toleration is now  under fire from every party  in  our c o m m u n i t y ,  "54 
anoüier that "toleration has lately fallen on  hard  t i m e s , "55 and  others tlrat tire tlieory 
of toleration "appears to have boxed itself into a c o r n e r ." 5 5  Here, so th a t w e have a 
feel for some of tire difficulties surrounding this ideal, w e raise a few of the questions 
that recent scholarslrip on tolerance ponders.
The w ritings of the earliest defenders of toleration, Locke included, do not 
provide principled positive argum ents for toleration, nor a case for w hy intolerance 
m ight be m orally w rong. Such tirmkers may support toleration because of a belief in 
rationality, as Locke does, or because of a com m itm ent to scepticism that calls for tire 
lim itation of iirtolerance for pragm atic r e a s o n s , 5 2  b u t they do no t provide reasons for 
tire virtue of toleration in  and  of itself, hr light of tire extiem e conditioirs of diversity 
that m ark contem porary society, doesn't toleration need a stronger, m ore positive 
basis? If so, w hat sources can provide tire support for such a virtue? Respect for 
persons, tire greater good of freedom , and the inherent w orth  of diversity are
54 Ibid., p. xviii.
52 William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 7.
55 For a sampling, see footnote 7 of tills chapter.
54 Steven Kautz, "Liberalism and the Idea of Toleration," American Journal of Political Science 37, 
no. 2 (May 1993), p. 610
55 Gray, Enlightenment's Wake, p. 18.
56 Dario Castiglione and Catiiona McKinnon, "Introduction: Beyond Toleration?" Res Piiblica 
7, no. 3 (2001), p. 224.
52 Quentin Skinner discusses the role of scepticism in early defences of toleration, particularly 
tirose of Jean Bodin and Sebastian Castellio, in The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. 
2, The Age of Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 246-249. This
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com m on answ ers to be p u t forw ard, b u t each has its ow n problem s w h en  discussed 
in  detail, and  none avoids tire question of w hat serves as its ow n source or 
grounding.58 G iven the seem ing incoherence of toleremce, nam ely th a t it  calls people 
to allow to exist that of w liich they m orally disapprove, it w ould  seem  particularly 
im portant to be able to provide a good justification for this v irtue of all liberal 
virtues, a strong second-order reason tliat w ould  provide sufficient m otivation to not 
act upon  a first-order m oral evaluations? Is it because of tliis lack of a strong positive 
support for toleration tlia t it  tends, at least on a popular level, to be conflated w iüi 
indifference, so that people tolerate not because tliey have a coim nitm ent to 
toleration as a virtue b u t because they no longer hold  their ow n beliefs and  w ays of 
life shongly  enough to have reason to judge or repress those of otlrers?
Even if a justification for toleration w ere to be formd, reason still exists to 
question whetlrer or n o t it is a w orthy  ideal. Is it perhaps better seen as a 
com prom ise, à best-case scenario in  light of conditions of pluralism , ratlier than  a 
good in its ow n right? By definition tolerance im plies m oral disapproval, no t 
acceptance. To live togetlrer u nder conditions of tolerance does n o t m ean to accept 
others' beliefs and  w ays of life; it  means, rather, to agree no t to repress tlie beliefs and 
practices w ith  w hich one disagrees. A nd yet surely, as Saladin M eckled-Garcia 
notes, "it is a valuable aim  that citizens accept each other's w ays of life." If this is so, 
tlren "tolerating each otirer does n o t represent political com m unity, b u t a 
com prom ise."50 This is furtlrer complicated by tire relationslrip betw een the 
'tolerator' and  tire 'tolerated'; do  certain relations of pow er em erge w hen  one person 
chooses to tolerate anotlrer?^: Is tire 'tolerator' d isplaying arrogance or condescension
"radical argument," as he describes it, "is based on tire assmirption not of an underlying mrity 
but raürer of an unavoidable mrcertainty at the heart of our religious beliefs" (p. 247),
55 As Mendus notes, in a discussion of the attempt to gromrd tolerance in respect for persons, 
"Despite its attempt to present toleration as good in itself and not merely a prudential policy, 
tire ar gument from respect must, ultimately, depeird upon an analysis of rights aird duties 
and we have seeir tlrat such analysis may ofteir simply take tire fornr of appeal to intuitioir, 
where intuitioirs differ from oire person to another aird from oire society to air other... The 
argunreirt fronr respect...inevitably geirerates the questioir, 'what gi'omrds tire wider 
priirciple?"' (Meirdus, JiistiJying Toleration, p. 14),
5? For the language of first-order aird second-order reasoning hr relation to tolerance, 1 am 
hrdebted to Saladhr Meckled-Garcia, "Toleration and Neuti'ality: Incompatible Ideals?" Res 
Pnblica 7, no. 3 (2001), pp. 296-297.
60 Ibid., p. 317.
64 Mendus answers yes to this question: "And it is. ..a necessary condition of toleration that 
tire tolerator should have the power to interfere with, hrfluence, or remove tire offendhrg 
practice, but refrain from ushrg tirat power" (Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism, p.
9)-
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tow ards the 'tolerated' w hen  he or she decides to tolerate ra ther than  to accept a 
certain position or w ay of life? Is A nna Elisabetta Galeotti righ t to suggest that 
tolerance is based on a social asym m etiy of pow er betw een '"virtuous" tolerators' and 
'"powerless" recipients'?52 Does it, as H erbert M arcuse m aintains, serve "tire cause of 
oppression" as it "favors and  fortifies Üie conservation of tire status quo of inequality
and  discrimination" ?53
Questions such as tlrese help  to Irighlight some of tire conceptual difficulties 
surrounding toleration as a  m oral 'virtue."54 W hen combiired w ith  the challenges it 
faces in  light of its historical corarections w ith  liberalism and  tire Enlightenm ent, it is 
no w onder that political tlreorists are trying to re-think and re-shape how  w e 
approach tolerance and  difference iir liberal political societies.
Fro m  T o ler a n c e  to  D ifference
One such theorist is W illiam Comrolly, a leading agonistic political theorist, 
w ho tries to articulate a political theory that m oves beyond tolerance in  the nam e of 
difference. W hile tolerance m ay acknowledge difference, it does n o t go far enough, 
according to Connolly, in recognising the degree to w hich all identities are im pacted 
and indeed constituted by the differences they encounter. Wlren one constituency 
tolerates anotiier, it often does so from  a position of hegem ony w itlrin a culhire, 
allowing tire recipient of toleration to do notlring m ore than  exist as an  enclave 
w ithin a dom inant cultural identity. Toleration itself does nothing to  break dow n 
barriers betw een differences and  enable difference to be ti'iily respected and  
embraced, hr short, Comrolly aird otirer agonistic or post-N ietzschean political 
theorists are in  search of a w ay to m ove beyond liberal invocatioirs of tolerairce to a 
deeper celebration of difference. These theorists rem ain unconvinced that liberal 
tolerance can ever sufficiently respect tire breadtlr and  depth  of diversity witlrin
62 Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, "Do We Need Toleration as a Moral Vir tue?" Res Ptiblicn 7, iro. 3 
(2001), p. 290.
65 Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Toleration" and "Postcript," in A Critique of Pure Tolerance 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 81,123.
64 The questions raised in this discussion were inspired by the articles already cited in tliis 
section, as well as the discussions of tolerance fomrd in Susan Meirdus, introduction to 
Justifying Toleration, pp. 1-19; Castiglione and McKiiuron, "Intr oduction: Beyond Toleration?" 
pp. 223-230; and Glen Newey, "Is Democratic Toleration a Rubber Duck?" Res Publica 7, no. 3 
(2001), pp. 315-336.
18
contem porary political society. Tlieir political tlrought is characterised by a belief 
tliat attem pts to create and  refine political societies tliat acknowledge difference smd 
particularity need to engage m uch m ore explicitly w ith  questions of ontology.
The prim ary  m otivation of such tlreorists is a concern for difference and  a 
desire to see society re-w ork and  expand its p luralist imagination. In one sense, this 
concern for difference is m erely a novel w ay of dealing w ith  tire sam e reality of 
diversity and plurality  th a t m otivates liberal tolerance. Yet the deeper ontological 
presuppositions entertained by these theorists as Ürey consider tire question of 
difference m ove them  far beyond tire invocation of tolerance in  m uch contem porary 
liberal thought. These thinkers, w ho can be roughly classed together un d er tire nam e 
agoiristic or post-Nietzscheair, represent w hat has been referred to as the ontological 
h im  w ith in  political theory. Tlris tu rn  to ontology is p art of a larger story: m  short, 
recent answ ers to the question of difference and diversity articulated w ith in  political 
tlreory are iirexhicably comrected to air iirtellectual story in  wlriclr ontology has 
replaced epistem ology as the leadm g character. Theorists have come to recognise 
tlrat procedm es aird nretlrods of knowledge are no t n eu h a l and  tlrat tlreories of 
know ledge rest up o n  or invoke deeper sets of presuppositions about the irahire of 
Irumair beiirg and  w h a t there is m ore generally. Tlris has been recognised to a 
lim ited degree witlrin political liberalism, by John Rawls, as w e have seen, and by 
Richard Rorty, w ho takes Rawls' project one step further witlr his 
'antifoundationalist' liberalism. Agonistic political theorists take a m ore fully 
developed ontological turn , recognising that their tlreories iirvoke deep eurd 
conhoversial beliefs about the irahire of hum an  being and the w orld  an d  explicitly 
articulating tlreir political tlreories in  term s of these beliefs, hr each case, recognition 
of pluralism  and difference is am ong the shongest m otivating factors for tire 
articulation of tire theory in  question.
Post-Nietzscheair tlreorists argue persuasively for conversatioirs abou t 
political life and  difference to be m oved to tire ontological level, presenturg pow erful 
cases against the exclusionary nature of political liberalism  in  its m any 'neutral' 
guises. Their ow n ontologies, how ever, rooted in  Friedrich Nietzsche aird Michel 
Foucault, em phasise power, chaos, aird conflict to such  air extent th a t all hope for 
harm ony or unity  w ith in  political society m ust be relinquished, by their ow n 
admission. They desire deep ethical sensibilities th a t enable us to respect aird 
celebrate ever-iircreasing difference, b u t significant questions m ust be asked of tire
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ability of their vision to sustain tire etlros they p u t forward. In other w ords, by so 
thoroughly ontologisiirg and  nahiralising conflict, agoiristic theorists m ay be guilty 
of the charge levelled against them  by Charles Matlrewes, nam ely th a t of "refusing all 
im aginative possibilities for som e sort of ideal absolute h a r m o n y . " 5 5  Theology m ay 
help open us to som e different w ays of pichiring the relationship betw een diversity 
and unity, difference and  harm ony, tire uiriversal and  the particular. If N.J. Rengger 
is right in his estim ation of the im portance of overcomiirg the strict dichotom isation 
tlrat seems to m ark contem porary political theory, if negotiating tire dichotom y of the 
universal and  the particular is "a central 'task' for contem porary political theory," 
tlren the rich Iristory of Clrristiair theology in  tlris area has m uch to offer in  helping us 
expand our curren t political i m a g i n a t i o n . 5 6
Indeed, the ontological h im  in political tlreory opens the w ay for a Üreological 
him ; theology offers nothing if n o t accounts of hum an  being and  w hat there is m ore 
generally, wlrile the questions of unity, diversity, aird com m unity w itlr w hich 
political theory is engaged are questions tlrat lie a t the very heart of theology. In 
contrast to the ontology of conflict offered by post-Nietzschean, agonistic political 
tlreorists, C hristianity offers, to borrow  the lémguage of Johir Milbank, a vision of 
'ontological peace' w hich provides us w ith  hope for peace on eartlr, rooted in  a 
divine, eternal source of plenihide. Christianity recognises tire hagic condition in 
w hich w e live b u t refuses to 'ontologise' it, view ing coirflict as a (contingent) result of 
tire fall w hile offering an  ontology of peace that enables us, as Milbairk w rites, to 
"untirhrk tire necessity of violence."52 If Augustine is right tirat peace is both tire true 
end  and tire precondition of justice, then  it  is of utm ost im portance tirat we think 
beyond tire ontology w ith  w hich our agonists rem ain  content.
The deeper aim  of tlris project is, tlren, to p u t tireology into conversation w ith  
political tlreory in  an  attem pt to re-think and expand our curren t political and  
p luralist imagination. Political tlreory is notlring if n o t an  exercise of im agination, 
offering new  or different pictures of collective life in  tire hopes of rem olding, 
refashioning, or altogetirer altering contem porary political arrangem ents. Indeed,
55 Charles T. Matlrewes, "Faith, Hope, and Agony: Christian Political Participation Beyond 
Liberalism," Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics 21 (2001), p. 137.
55 N. J. Rengger, Political Theory, Modernity and Postmodernity: Beyond Enlightenment and 
Critique (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 225.
52 Johir Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1990), pp. 411,390; John Milbank, "The Midwinter Sacrifice: A Sequel to 'Can MoraKtj^ be 
Chirstian?"' Studies in Christian Ethics 10, no. 2 (1997), p. 25.
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the success or popularity  of a political theory could be said to depend upon  the 
extent to w hich it offers a picture of political society and  life th a t is m ore attractive 
and persuasive Üran tlrat of the status quo. To take b u t one example, im agination was 
crucial in fosteritrg tire m ove to organise collective life into natioirs, for nations are, as 
Benedict A nderson shows, im agiired political communities.^^ Yet today tire concept 
of nationlrood is so entrenched tlrat, according to Michael H ard t and  A ntonio Negri, 
"tire nation becomes the only w ay to imagiire community! Every iirraginatioir of a 
conm runity becomes overcoded as a iration, and hence our coirceptioir of com m unity 
is severely im poverished."5? This is where theology can play a subversive role, 
challeirgiirg the givens of our curren t political sihiation by preseirting an  alternative 
pichire of political com m unity and social reality. This is to tlrink of im agination 
according to W alter Brueggemaim 's defiirition; im agination as "tire hum an  capacity 
to pichire, po rhay , receive, and  practice the w orld  in  w ays other th an  it appears to be 
a t first glance w hen  seen th rough  a donrinairt, Irabihial, unexam ined lens."20 By 
applying a C luistian  im agination tow ards tire question of difference, w e have an 
opportunity  botlr to be critical of social reality aird to undertake tire ethical task of 
creatiirg alternative pichires of com m unal aird political life. By ensuring tlrat tlris 
undertakiirg is prim arily  theological, w e offer, as WilHam C avanaugh pu ts it, "a 
different kind of political im agm ation, one that is rooted in  tire C hristian story,"2i but 
one that can nevertheless help augm ent the political im agination of contem porary 
political theory and  pluralist society.
A n  O verview
The intellectual story th a t tlris project tells begins w ith  the tlreory of Jolm 
Rawls, w hose political tlrought was deeply im pacted, as w e have seen, by 
contem porary conditions of pluralism . Because of tire role of his theory hr tire 
resurgence of contem porary liberalism, aird because m ost curren t liberal theorists
58 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1983), p. 7.
5? Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2000), p .  107.
20 Walter Brueggemann, The Bible and Postmodern Imagination: Texts Under Negotiation 
(London: SCM Press Ltd, 1993), p. 13
21 William T. Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination (London: T & T Clark, 2002), p. 1.
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base tlreir tlrought on Iris, even if they w rite in  reaction to it, w e w ill look to Rawls 
and his 'political liberalism ' as the best representation of liberal thought. The next 
chapter, tlrerefore, begins witlr his earliest w ork before discussing his later 
articulations of political liberalism, Irighlighting, th rough tire changes in  his thought, 
the degree to w hich political liberalism  recogirises th a t an Enlightem nent-based 
com prehensive liberalism  caim ot be acceptable to tire diverse com ponents of 
contem porary political society. Rawls hies, therefore, to articulate a liberalism  tlrat, 
by distancm g itself from  any conhoversial m etaphysical and  epistem ological 
foundations, could appeal to a bread th  of reasonable yet different constituents and 
com prehensive dochines. Tlris changed approaclr to political tlreory rooted in  
recognition of tire inevitable fact of pluralism  involves a concom itant prioritisation of 
tire value of tolerance. Richard Rorty shares this com m ihrrent to the prim acy of 
tolerance as a liberal value, wlrile m oving one step further tlran Rawls in  his quest to 
distance liberalism  from  tire Eirlighteirment. Indeed, he claims tirat Iris 
'poshrretaphysical liberalism,' precisely because it is 'postm etaphysical,' is m ore 
tolerant tirair any liberalism  to date. Rorty, then, represents tire next step iir tlris 
intellechial story in  w hich concern for diversity, com bined witlr changes in  our 
understandings of tire natu re of reason and knowledge, m akes tolerance an  ever 
m ore im portan t liberal value. Yet tire sufficiency of tire accounts of tolerance 
provided by botir Rawls and  Rorty needs to be questioned, as significant queries are 
raised about tire degree to wlriclr difference is achially recognised, respected, and 
included in tlreir supposedly  tolerant pictures of political society.
The th ird  chapter continues tiris line of questioiring tirrough a discussion of 
tire though t of agonistic or post-N ietzschean political theorists. D riven by a concern 
for difference, bu t w ith  a m ore developed sense of tire degree to wlriclr all tlreory is 
im pacted by ontological presuppositions, these tlreorists m ove tire conversation on 
tolerance and  difference to tire ontological level. The interests tirat tlrese theorists 
bring to political theory are m ti oduced tinough  a brief engagem ent w ith  the thought 
of Boiririe H onig and  W illiam C orlett before tiris tlreory is investigated m ore fully 
tirrough a discussion of tire w ritings of Chantai Mouffe and W illiam Comrolly. Tlris 
investigation reveals tire degree to wlriclr difference comes to replace tolerance as tire 
leading character in  tiris story of recent political tlreory, while, concomitairtly, 
ontology replaces epistem ology. Wlrile som e of tlreir critiques and  m oves are lauded 
for tlreir contribution to tire w ays w e imagiire and  conceive political life and  theory.
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serious questions are raised about tire degree to wlriclr tire ontology of post- 
N ietzschean political tlreorists can sustain the sti'ong ethos tow ards difference that 
Ürey com m end.
W ith tlris ontological tu rn  in miird, as w ell as tire inadequacies tlrat have been 
uncovered iir the ontologies openly articulated in post-N ietzschean tlrought aird 
ilriirly disguised iir political liberalism  w hen it comes to fiirdiirg w ays to sustam  
com m unities of difference, tire next chapter considers w hat a Christiair ontology 
m ight contribute to discussions of plurality, diversity, and  unity. To this end, the 
fourth chapter is air im m ersion into the thought of St. A ugustine of H ippo, as w e 
look to A ugustine's writhrgs, aird tire relationship betw een his theology and  political 
tlreory and  practice, to see w ha t tlreological resoiuces he offers for an  engagem ent 
witlr difference. As one w ho lived in a time of considerable plurality  and  w as keenly 
aware of dynam ics of pow er and  dom ination, wlrile operatiirg witlr a vastly different 
ontology tlran that w hich has predom inance in  contem porary political thought, his 
picture of reality mrd hum an  being m ight helpfully augm ent som e of the deficiencies 
in  prevailing attem pts to imagiire and live into com m unities of difference.
This encounter w ith  A ugustine's ontology represents the theological tu rn  of 
political tlreory, for A ugusthre's ontology suggests that it  is only in  the polis of tire 
Heavenly City tlrat differences can come togetlrer in  loving harm ony th iough  
participation in  tire Trimre God. Citizens of tire Heaveirly City come from  all nations, 
speak all languages, adorn  different dress and adhere to different m aim ers of life, 
they are um estiained  by conform ity of customs, laws, and  institutions, and  are free 
to have "tlreir im rum erable variety of desires aird tlroughts and everytlring else w hich 
m akes hum an  beings different from  one a n o t l r e r ." 2 2  A nd yet tirey are unified 
tirrough Jesus Christ, bom rd togetlrer in a fellowship of love. Tlris ontological picture 
and  its im plications for political tlreory iir the 'earthly city' are explored in  the fifth 
chapter, in  wlriclr A ugustine's ontology is placed into conversation w ith  
contem porary theologians and  w ith  the ontologies of political liberals and  post- 
N ietzscheans as tire different strairds of tiris project are draw n togetlrer. The drapter 
begins w ith  an  attem pt to discern w hat sort of ontological com m itm ents aird 
com m unity could sustam  a m ove beyond tolerairce to a fuller em brace of difference. 
If tire goal is a rich celebration of difference in a polis in  w hich diversity and  unity  can
22 Augustine, The Augustine Catechism: The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love XXVII, 103 
(Hyde Park, N.Y.; New City Press, 1999).
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be m utually  reinforcing, then  its realisation m ay only be possible in tire H eavenly 
City. Yet this does n o t m eair tlrat tire H eavenly City is to take over tire earthly city 
and  its realm  of the political, for tire political realm  is to be considered a  providential 
provision for handling life in  a fallen, div ided w orld, no t to be subsum ed un d er the 
operations of tire H eavenly City or the Church. This is explored iir tire next section of 
tire chapter, as tire discussion m oves from  a picture of difference in the H eavenly 
City to an  exploration of the relationship of the H eavenly City as it exists on eartlr in 
the form  of the C hurch to the earthly city, witlr particular reference to the political 
realm. This is done largely in  conversation witlr John M ilbank and  Karl Bartlr. The 
discussion then m oves from  this m ore general exploration of the relatioirship 
betw een the C hurch and  the political to a m ore focused consideration of w h a t it is 
about the contem porary political realm  tlrat m ight be problem atic for the 
particularity of Clrristianity. That is to say, if contem porary liberalism  is critiqued 
for its inability to acknowledge difference and  particularity, this im pacts and  Irinders 
tire particularity of the C hurch as well. Drawiirg on the recent w ork  of W illiam 
Cavairaugh and  others, w e discuss w ays in  w hich the Church has problem atically 
redefiired itself in  term s of liberalism  so that it is unable to exist w ith in  our pluralist 
society as its ow n public, social, em bodied reality. Fiirally, w e m ove from  tlris 
consideration of tire C hurch's particularity to how  the m any particularities of 
contem porary society m ight come togetlrer m ore honestly aird openly from  witiriir 
their differences through a  picture of rich and deep conversation.
The hope is tlrat this w ork of political im agination w ill contiibute som ething 
tow ards the creation of a p icture in  w hich Christianity and  tire otirer particularities of 
W estern society live and  converse togetlrer in w ays th a t are m ore tiu e  to tlreir 
identities and  differences th an  either political liberalism or post-N ietzschean political 
thought allows. Following Jean Bethke Elshtain, the goal is no t a tlreory of collective, 
political life tlrat is "an overarching W eltanschauung which, as Freud observed, 'leaves 
no question unansw ered  and  no stone unturned.'"25 It w ill be enough if our picture 
points tow ards w ays that differences can come together and  find space for genuine 
conversation, in  w hich beliefs and  w ays of life are n o t curtailed by either the 
'tolerance' of political liberalism  or the post-N ietzschean celebration of difference.
23 Jean Betlrke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought 
(Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981), p. 300.
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C h a pter  T w o  
Th e  Re c en t  Jo u rn ey  of  L iberal To l er a tio n
In t r o d u c t io n
Liberalism and  toleration have a decidedly close relationship, although each 
can exist and  has existed w ithou t the oilier. Jolm Locke is generally agreed to be tire 
earliest thinker to m ake explicit the connection betw een them , w hile today one 
w ould be hard-pressed to find a liberal theorist in  w hose though t toleration d id  no t 
feature strongly. Tliis m ay, indeed, be one of tire few com monalities th a t links 
contem porary liberal w riters, for though in  such w ritings toleration an d  liberalism  
seem  to go hand-in-hand, no  general consensus exists as to w h a t either one m eans or 
entails. Perhaps this is w hy tlie political liberalism  of John Rawls serves as the 
benchm ark of m ost curren t political thought, providing a com m on basis for 
discussion and  dissent. For liberalism  itself has undergone significant changes 
through the decades and  the centuries as intellectual and  political clim ates have 
shifted and  the b read th  of diversity and  difference w ith in  society has increased. This 
has led to significant changes in  Rawls' ow n versions of liberalism, as he attem pts to 
m ove aw ay from  a tlieory th a t resembles a universal or com prehensive, 
Enlightem nent-based liberalism  to one that is com patible w itli w ha t he calls the fact 
of reasonable pluralism . A nd it has contiibuted to tlie developm ent of other political 
theories tliat a ttem pt to m ove further than  Rawls in  term s of botli distance from  
Enlightenm ent liberalism  and  engagem ent w ith  and  recognition of the particularity 
of difference. Richard Rorty, for example, articulates a 'postm etaphysical liberalism '; 
others call for a 'politics of difference' or m ulticulturalism  that gives public 
recognition to different cultural and  group identities; and  otliers yet long to m ove 
altogether beyond the ontological presuppositions of liberalism  th a t h inder its ability 
to adequately engage w ith  the d ep th  of difference w ith in  our m idst. Each step along 
this recent journey w ith in  political tlieory, a journey tliat begins, for tlie m ost part, 
w ith  Rawlsian liberalism, involves a concom itant m ove for toleration. It is tlie story 
of the changes w ith in  liberalism  and  the journey th a t this has involved for toleration 
that this chapter tells, beginning w itli Rawlsian liberalism, m oving to Rorty's 
'redescriptive' liberal project, and  touching briefly on the politics of difference. By
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tlie time w e reach tlie end  of the chapter, w e shall begin to see w hy agonistic political 
tlieorists w an t this Journey to m ove beyond toleration altogether.
Ra w lsia n  Liberalism : Fr o m  C o m pr e h e n sw e  D o ctrin e  t o  P o litica l  
T o ler a tio n
John Rawls w as w ithou t doub t the m ost influential political tlieorist of tlie 
tw entieth  centm y. H is A  Theory o f Justice (hereafter Tlieory) renew ed the ailing 
discipline of political philosophy, sparking tlie conversations and  debates over 
contem porary liberalism  that have come to m ark the past thirty  years of political 
philosophy and  show  no signs of abating in  the near future.^ Yet in  Rawls liimself 
w e see an  interesting developm ent since the publication of Theory, a  developm ent 
tliat has prom pted  som e to  speak of tlie new  Rawls over against the old Rawls. 
Indeed, certain scholars have been left in  tlie strange position of defending tlie old 
Rawls against tlie changes he him self has m ade to his political theory, while others 
rem ain unconvinced tlia t liis alterations address any of the significant problem s tliat, 
in their estim ation, m iderm ined his original argum ent. Of w h a t does tlie change 
consist and  whence did it arise? It appears to stem  from  Rawls' realisation th a t his 
original theory overlooked 'tlie fact of reasonable pluralism .'
In Theory Rawls presented an  ideal w ell-ordered society in  w liich all citizens 
accept his idea of justice as fairness as a com prehensive philosophical doctrine. He 
now  identifies a "serious problem" w ith  this attem pt, nam ely tlia t "a m odern  
democratic society is characterized no t sim ply by a pluralism  of com prehensive 
religious, pliilosophical, and m oral dochines bu t by a pluralism  of incom patible yet 
reasonable com prehensive doctrines."^ The lectures and  writings of Rawls since the 
publication of Theory h y  to lim it the com prehensive nature of his original ideas by 
presenting tliem as political conceptions, and  political liberalism  is tlie nam e he gives 
to tills effort. Political liberalism  reflects the distinction he draw s betw een his earlier 
w ork of m oral philosophy and  his m ore developed w ork concerned w itli tlie strictly
* Meaning tlie tliirty or so years since die publication of Theory. See Jolm Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1972).
2 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, paperback ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 
p. xviii.
26
political i'ealm.3 The m ain problem  w ith  w liich politicEil liberalism  is concerned is, 
according to Rawls:
How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and 
equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, 
pliilosophical, and moral dochines? Put another way: How is it possible tliat deeply 
opposed though reasonable comprehensive doctrines may live together and all affirm 
the political conception of a constitutional regime? What is the structure and content 
of a political conception that can gain the support of such an overlapping consensus?^ 
This does n o t initially seem  tliat far rem oved from  Locke's concern for 
attaining and  m aintaining a political sihiation of toleration in  the m idst of religious 
diversity some tliree hun d red  years ago, Rawls him self haces the historical origin of 
political liberalism  to the Reform ation and  tlie conhoversies over religion th a t 
followed it.5 A t tlie sam e time, he h ies to distance liimself h o m  any connections one 
m ight draw  betw een liis philosophy and  "tlie so-called Enlightenm ent project of 
finding a philosophical secular doctrine, one founded on reason and  yet 
com prehensive."5 His version of political liberalism  has no such am bitions, and 
therefore should  be able to stand  despite the recent dem ise of Enlightenm ent 
rationalism . One is tem pted to  w onder how  m uch Rawls' rew orking of the ideas of 
Theonj is in fact a response to th a t very demise. A t the least it appears to reflect a 
m ove aw ay from  autonom y tow ards toleration as the fundam ental value of liberal 
tlieory.2
A  THEORY OF Justice
In spite of Üie differences betw een tlie old and  new  Rawls, enough continuity 
betw een tlie tw o exists that the ideas involved in Rawls' version of political 
liberalism are better understood in light of Üieir initial conception and  use in  Theory. 
Rawls w rote Theory against the backdrop of utilitarianism  in  an  attem pt to 
reconcephialise the traditional theory of social conhact found  in  Locke, Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, and hnm anuel K ant as a counter to the predom inance of utilitarianism  
w ithin  m odern  m oral philosophy. W hat tliis m eans conceptually is th a t Rawls uses
5 Ibid, pp. xviii-xix.
4 Ibid., p .  XX.
5 Ibid., p. xxvi 
5 Ibid., p. XX.
2 A point made by WiU Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, 2d. ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 229.
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the idea of an  'original position,' a hypotlietical initial situation into w hich people are 
placed in  order to generate fair principles of justice for the basic structure of society 
U nderlying and  m otivating the use of tire original position is a belief in  the prim acy 
of social justice and  the need to derive a tlieory of justice tliat is fair to  all participants 
in  a social system. The original position should ensure that the principles of justice 
people w ould  agree to w ould  be the fairest possible principles, wliich requires that 
certain conditions and  restraints be p u t on the original position and those w ho find 
themselves in  tlia t position. In  other w ords, only under certain conditions will the 
initial situation be fair and  yield principles tliat w ill result in justice as fairness, tlie 
crucial idea that rem ains cenhal th roughout Rawls' work.
The idea, then, is th a t the w ay to  determ ine fair principles of justice, given 
justice's role as tlie prim ary virtue of social institutions, is to liypoüiesise w ha t 
principles w ould  be agreed to by people w ith in  an original situation tliat is itself fair. 
The w ay to ensure tlie fairness of tlie original position is to insist that the principles 
of justice be chosen behind a  'veil of ignorance,' w hich m eans th a t no  know ledge is 
allow ed of one's place in  society, social or class status, natural assets and  abilities, 
intelligence, stiength , psychological propensities, or conceptions of tlie good. In  this 
w ay no one will be influenced to clioose principles that w ould  favour his or her 
particular position, talents, or beliefs. Persons in  tlie original position know  
Üiemselves and each otiier as nothing b u t free, equal, and  rational. As Rawls writes, 
"this initial situation is fair betw een individuals as m oral persons, tlia t is, as rational 
beings w ith  their ow n ends an d  capable, I shall assum e, of a sense of justice."? The 
result? That "tlie original position is, one m ight say, the appropriate initial status quo, 
and Ü 1U S  tlie fundam ental agreem ents reached in it are fair. This explains die 
propriety of tlie nam e 'justice as fairness."'i?
Rawls' assm nption of rationality on  the p art of tliose in  the original position 
also involves m utual disinterest betw een persons, w hich results in each person 
choosing principles that he or she tliiiiks w ill best advance liis or her ow n system  of 
ends, m eaning the attainm ent of the m ost prim ary social goods. P rim ary goods are
8 Rawls defines the basic stincture of society as "the way in wliich tlie major social institutions 
[i.e., the political constitution and tlie principal economic and social arrangements] disbibute 
fmidamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social 
cooperation" (Theory, p. 6). Included in this are such various tilings as liberty of conscience, 
heedom of thought, private property, competitive markets, and the monogamous family.
? Ibid., p. 11.
10 Ibid.
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understood to be goods tliat all rational people desire regardless of their particular 
life plan, and  they consist of such things as rights, liberties, opportunities, income, 
and wealtli.ii Self-respect is defined as the m ost im portan t prim ary good, w ith  
im plications tliat w ill be d raw n ou t in m ore detail below. For now  it  is enough to 
note that Rawls' definition of a person 's good as "the successful execution of a 
rational p lan  of life" is comiected w itli tliese prim ary goods since such goods are 
deem ed necessary for tlie realisation of one's rational plan. Furtherm ore, those in  the 
original position are assum ed to determ ine the fairest principles of justice w ith  this 
definition of tlie good, and  the concom itant desire for tlie m axim isation of prim ary 
goods, in mind.42
Wliat, tlien, are the principles of justice th a t em erge as "everyone's best reply" 
and serve to m ake this a tlieory no t m erely of justice b u t of justice as fairness? 
T hrough Theonj Rawls identifies tw o principles:
First Principle
Each person is to have an equal right to Üie most extensive total system of equal basic
liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
Second Principle
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that tliey are both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of tlie least advantaged, consistent with the just 
savings principle, and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity.
These principles also involve w ha t Rawls term s priority rules, such  th a t tlie first 
principle is lexically prior to the second principle and, w ith in  tlie second principle,
(b) is lexically prior to (a). This is to ensure, in  the first instance, th a t liberty always 
has priority, m eaning tlia t basic liberties can be restricted for tlie sake of greater 
liberty b u t n o t for the sake of, for example, greater economic equality. Likewise, 
w itliin the second principle it  ensm es tliat fair equality of opportun ity  retains 
priority over w ha t Rawls calls tlie difference principle, or the principle tlia t 
inequalities m ust benefit tlie least advantaged.
W e can now  see how  these principles relate to the veil of ignorance of the 
original position. If people are n o t aw are of their ow n conception of the good, tliey 
will surely be concerned to choose a first principle tliat provides equal basic liberties
44 Ibid., p. 54. 
42 Ibid., p. 380.
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so that tliey have the freedom  to pursue, and  change, w hatever conception of the 
good they have once they em erge from  tlie original position. Likewise, given tlieir 
lack of know ledge regarding their economic and  social status, Rawls assum es that it 
is m ost rational for those in  the original position to choose the second principle as it 
ensures that even tlie w orst position in  society benefits from  tlie inequalities tliat are 
in  place.45
The details of this tlieory are no t as im portan t as the principal concepts that 
em erge, both because tliese principal concepts are enough to  enable us to see w hy 
some of tlie m ajor criticisms of Theory have arisen and  because m any of them  
continue to play a role in  his m ore developed political liberalism. For m uch the same 
reason, a few further ideas contained in  Theory should be identified. Though Rawls 
does n o t initially m ention this w hen  he depicts the original position, he later writes 
tliat "equal liberty of conscience is tlie only principle tliat the persons in  the original 
position can a c k n o w l e d g e . " ! ^  Rawls, w hile view ing tlie question of tlie equal liberty 
of conscience as a fixed poin t in  judgem ents of justice, believes that it is generated 
naturally  by the conception of justice that results from  the original position rather 
tlian needing to be b rough t in  to  the theory as a natu ral righ t or as p a rt of a larger 
m etaphysical system. Again, because of the veil of ignorance, the only w ay persons 
in  tlie original position can guarantee that tlieir ow n belief system  will no t be 
suppressed or persecuted is to ensure equal liberty of conscience for all. This 
likewise applies to toleration:
Toleration is not derived from practical necessities or reasons of state. Moral and 
religious freedom follows from the principle of equal liberty; and assuming die 
priority of this principle, the only ground for denying the equal liberties is to avoid 
an even greater injustice, an even greater loss of liberty. Moreover, the argument 
does not rely on any special metaphysical or philosopliical doctrine.... The appeal is 
indeed to common sense, to generally shared ways of reasoning and plain facts 
accessible to all, but it is framed in such a way as to avoid Üiese larger
presumptions.!^
W hether or no t this is an  accurate interpretation by Rawls is a m atter to w liich w e 
will re tu rn  shortly.
!3 For a more detailed explanation of Üiis point, see Stephen MulhaU and Adam Swift, Liberals 
and Communitarians (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 8.
!4 Rawls, Theory, p. 181.
45 Ibid., p. 188.
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Elsewhere in Theory Rawls is m ore explicit about his reliance on broader 
pliilosophical doctrines, particular the philosophy of Kant. H e adm its th a t tlie 
principle of equal liberty can also have its source in Kant's in terpretation  of justice 
and his notion of autonom y. He writes that "the original position m ay be view ed, 
tlien, as a p rocedm al in terpretation of Kant's conception of autonom y and  tlie 
categorical im perative w itliin the fram ew ork of an  em pirical theory."!^ This 
recognition, w liich im plicates his m oral philosophy as p art of a w ider com prehensive 
doctrine w itli its roots in  K ant and  its affirm ation of the prim acy of the autonom y of 
persons, is p art of w h a t Rawls is trying to back aw ay from  in Political Liberalism, as 
w e shall see below.
The final aspect of Rawls' Theory w orth  noting  before w e m ove into m ore 
explicit criticisms is the distinction Rawls m akes betw een the public and  private 
realms. We see in  liis theory a continuation of tlie distinction of spheres suggested 
by Locke, tliough Rawls certainly has a m uch broader view  of w hich com prehensive 
doctrines are allow ed in tlie private realm  w ithout underm ining social cohesion. 
Rawls believes th a t society has no greater collective goal than  tlie realisation of the 
principles of justice, w hich enables individuals to pursue their private plans and  be 
involved in various associations w ith in  the larger fr-amework established by a just 
constitutional order. "Everyone's m ore private life is so to speak a p lan  w ith in  a 
plan, this superordiriate p lan  being realized in  the public institutions of society. But 
tliis larger p lan  does no t establish a dom inant end, such as tliat of religious unity  or 
tlie greatest excellence of culture, m uch less national pow er an d  prestige, to w hich 
tlie aims of all individuals and  associations are subordinate. The regulative public 
intention is rather that tlie constitutional order should realize the principles of 
justice."12 The sh ic t dem arcation betw een the public and  the private realm s comes to 
the forefront in  his later w ork, w hile his view  of the 'comm on good' rem ains 
restiicted to tlie idea of justice. Rawls has come under m uch attack on  both  of these 
counts.
The M a in  CRmcisMS; Metaphysics a n d  Ontology Revealed
H ie im portance of Rawls' Theory is reflected in the vast num ber of w orks 
w ritten  in  response to it, som e sym pathetically and  others ra ther critically. M any of
45 Ibid., p. 226. 
42 Ibid., p. 463.
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tlie criticisms levelled against Theory arose out of concern for its m etaphysical and 
'com prehensive' nature. The m ost w ell-know n response to tlie liberalism  articulated 
in Theory has come to be know n as 'comm m iitarianism .' The four thinkers m ost often 
associated w ith  com m uiiitarianism  are M ichael Sandel, Alasdair M acIntyre, Charles 
Taylor, and  M ichael W alzer, though these thinkers do no t w rite under or all accept 
the label.18 Despite the differences in  the em phases and nuances of their thought, 
w ha t unites them  is tlie com m on belief tliat liberalism  in its classical an d  its Rawlsian 
expression inadequately accounts for the role of com m unity and  society in 
constituting hum an  beings and  their conceptions of tlie good. The degree to wliich 
tliese com m unitarian critiques have influenced tlie direction of Rawls' w riting  since 
Theory is a m atter of som e dispute.^? Rawls liimself m ore explicitly acknow ledges a 
desire to m ove aw ay from  his tlieory as a com prehensive doctiine than  he does tliat 
his w ork is a response to such criticism, though the vigour and  quantity  of 
com m unitarian w riting  spaw ned by Theory could n o t b u t have im pacted him . M any 
of the concerns of the so-called com m unitarians have to  do w ith  the m etaphysical 
and  ontological presuppositions upon  w hich Rawls' Theory depends, so regardless of 
tlieir direct im pact u p o n  him , their thought helpfully illum inates the 'com prehensive' 
nature of Rawls' earlier tlieory. Because W alzer's critique is less relevant to tliis 
discussion tlian tliose of Sandel, M achityre, and  Taylor, tlie latter three will 
collectively provide tlie lens tlirough which w e can begin to see m ore clearly the 
large liberal suppositions upon  w hich Theory is based.
Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, often considered the m ost 
im portan t critique raised of Rawls' Theory, is particularly concerned w itli w h a t he 
identifies as die m etaphysical conception of the person that underlies Rawls' 
writings. H is w ork is m eant to be a challenge to 'deontological liberalism ,' a specific 
dochine of liberalism  w ith  its roots in  K ant that is concerned w ith  tlie prim acy of
48 The 'essential' comnimiitarian texts are usually identified as Michael Sandel, Liberalism and 
the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Alasdaii- MacIntyre, After 
Virtue: A  Study in Moral Theory, 2d. ed. (Notre Dame: University of Nobe Dame Press, 1984); 
Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A  Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); 
and Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985). For secondary sources on commmiitarianism, see 
MuUiall and Swift, Liberals and Communitarians and Amy Gutmaim, "Communitarian Critics 
of Liberalism," Philosophy and Public Affairs 14, no. 3 (Suiimier 1985), pp. 308-322.
4? Rawls himself denies that his work is a response to tlie conimmiitarian critique (see Political 
Liberalism, p. xix, fn. 6), wliile others remain unconvinced by his denials. See, for example, 
Mulhall and Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, pp. 167-226 and Kymlicka, Contemporary 
Political Philosophy, p. 229.
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justice and  individucil rights. This form  of liberalism  prioritises the righ t over the 
good, m eaning th a t tlie principles by w hich a society should be ordered and 
governed do no t rest upon  a particular conception of tiie good b u t supposedly  
conform  to tlie m orally independen t category of tlie right. A nd the righ t th a t has 
prim acy is justice, understood  as an  end  in  itself, serving to regulate all otiher ends 
and setting the boundaries of conceptions of the good. Sandel locates the origins of 
the priority  of tlie righ t in  Kant's though t and  notes how  it is concom itant w itli a 
particular conception of the hum an  person as a subject given prior to his or her ends. 
M oreover, tliis understanding  of the person as subject forms the basis for this entire 
branch of political tlieory: a society tlia t prioritises the right over the good is a 
necessary result of defining hum an  beings as autonom ous individuals w itli freedom  
of choice. W ere it to be otherw ise, w ere a society dependent up o n  principles tliat 
presuppose a particular conception of the good, its subjects w ould  no t be free to 
m ake autonom ous choices abou t their ow n conceptions of the good. Indeed, tliey 
w ould  be tieated  as m eans to som e greater good rather tiimi ends in  them selves .20 
This Kantian belief in  the im portance of treating people as ends ra ther than 
m eans underg irds contem porary expressions of deontological liberalism , particularly 
that of Rawls. Sandel, how ever, identifies a crucial difference betw een tlie projects of 
Rawls and  Kant. W liereas Kant's tlieory w as openly dependent upon  a m etaphysical 
fram ework, Rawls aim s to m aintain tlie priority of tlie righ t and  the priority  of tlie 
self w iü iou t relying up o n  a m etaphysical or tianscendental conception of the subject. 
Rawls instead believes that tlie original position can itself establish tlie necessary 
perspective and objectives w itliout reference to ti’anscendental deductions or 
presuppositions, that the original position can provide tlie A rchim edean poin t tliat 
provides a  foundation for Rawls' liberalism  w ithou t recourse to Kant's metaphysics.^^ 
T hroughout the rem ainder of the book Sandel attem pts to dem onstrate w hy  Rawls 
fails to distance him self from  certain m etaphysical and  m etaethical claims th a t serve 
as tlie foundation of liis tliought and are ultim ately m istaken, inadequate, and 
ultim ately inconsistent. Perhaps the single largest inadequacy Sandel finds in  Rawls' 
tliought is the idea th a t a person 's identity  is form ed independent of his or her 
conception of the good and  certain ends to w hich he or she is attached. As Sandel 
writes.
20 Sandel, Limits of Justice, pp. 1, 9. 
24 Ibid., pp. 23-28.
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If Üie deontological ethics fails to redeem its own liberating promise, it also fails 
plausibly to account for certain indispensable aspects of our moral experience. For 
deontology insists that we view ourselves as independent selves, independent in the 
sense that om- identity is never tied to our aims and attachments...But we cannot 
regard ourselves as independent in this way witliout great cost to those loyalties and 
convictions whose moral force consist partly in the fact that living by them is 
inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are—as 
members of this family or community or nation or people^z 
W hat ultim ately results from  tlie Rawlsian conception of the self as independen t and  
incapable of constitutive attachm ents is not, in  Sandel's view, "an ideally free and 
rational agent," b u t instead "a person w holly w ithou t character, w itliou t m oral 
deptli."23 In other w ords, Sandel believes th a t Rawls' conception of tlie person as an 
independent, autonom ous individual does no t allow for the possibility th a t the 
identity of a person m ay be partially defined by liis or her ends and  attaclunents, 
w liich therefore excludes the possibility that any coim nunal good m igh t be integral 
to a person's identity  .^ 4
This line of critique is somewhat similar to that raised by MacIntyre and 
Taylor, who argue in different ways for the primacy of the coimnunity and 
conceptions of tlie good in a person’s life. Machityre perhaps goes furtlier than 
Sandel in his emphasis on the role of the community, arguing not just tliat it can play 
some role in constituting a person’s identity but tliat community is botli essential to 
human identity and provides the hamework and origin for all human goods and 
ends, h i tliis respect, Rawls' form of liberaHsm with its asocial individuaHsm reflects 
tlie more general modern failure to recognise tiiat human goods are inseparable h om 
the communal practices and haditions in wliich tliey have their origin. Rawls' 
original position therefore excludes the possibiUty that society is not based on  
rational individuals deciding what social contract they should reasonably enter mto 
but instead consists of a community united by shared miderstandings of mdividual 
and collective goods.^s In later works, Machityre further critiques liberalism for 
embodying its ow n particular conception of tlie good, based on the Enlightemnent 
attempt to establish a tradition-ti'anscendmg, universal morality. This liberalism.
22 Ibid., p. 179.
23 Ibid.
24 For more on tliis point and its implications for the limits of Rawls' conception of tlie 
political community, see Mulhall and Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, pp. 66-69.
25 MacIntyre, After Virtue, pp. 246-252.
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carried forw ard by Rawls, has no t tianscended tiad ition  bu t has itself become a 
hadition , "tlie articulation of an  historically developed and  developing set of social 
institutions and  forms of activity."26 To p u t it differently, liberalism  claims to 
provide the fram ew ork for a political society in  w hich m em bers w itli different 
conceptions of the good life derived from  w hatever theory or trad ition  to w hich they 
adhere could co-exist, w itli one significant qualification, nam ely th a t th a t these 
conceptions of the good cannot be applied  to the com m m iity as a w hole. "And this 
qualification," M acIntyre w rites, "of course entails no t only tlia t liberal individualism  
does indeed have its ow n broad conception of the good, w hich is engaged in  
im posing politically, legally, socially, and culturally w herever it has the pow er to do 
so, bu t also tliat in  so doing its toleration of rival conceptions of tlie good in  the 
public arena is severely limited."^^
The conclusions reached in  Taylor's w ritings result in  critiques very m uch in 
the sam e vein as tliose of M acIntyre and  Sandel, though tlie w orks from  w hich his 
'com m uiiitarianism ' is d raw n tend to be m ore broadly philosophical in  natu re  rather 
than explicitly directed against liberalism. Taylor's philosophical argum ents lead 
him  to conclude, am ong otlier filings, tliat orientations tow ard the good are integral 
to the identity  of the self and  that every m oral and  political tlieory em bodies a 
conception of the good and  of tlie self, regardless of w hether or n o t such tlieories 
recognise tliese conceptions. Taylor believes tlia t hm nan  identity cannot do w itliout 
an  orientation to tlie good, w liich involves no t only a person's stand on m oral and 
spiritual m atters b u t also reference to a defining com m unity. Furtlier, according to 
Taylor, a person's sense of tlie good is inextiicably comiected to the fram ew orks of 
m eaning w ith in  w hich tliat person lives his or her life. Such fram ew orks are derived 
from  file narrative tliat inform s a person's life, even if implicitly, for Taylor believes 
tliat life is best considered as narrative in  nature. Tliis nairative and  the fram eworks 
that help constitute it are and  m ust be com m unal in nature, just as they m ust 
inevitably involve 'hypergoods.' By 'hypergoods' Taylor m eans liigher order goods 
w hich are incom parably m ore im portan t than  the otlier goods of a person 's life and 
tlierefore provide a standpo in t from  wliich tliese otlier goods are w eighed and
25 MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notie Dame Press, 
1988), p. 345.
27 Ibid., p. 336.
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judged.28 W ith this in  m ind, Taylor critiques Rawls' prioritisation of the righ t over 
the good, arguing that Raw lsian liberalism  rests upon  autonom y as a  hypergood and 
is tlius no t as n euh  al betw een different conceptions of the good as it appears to be 2?
These three tliinkers, then, d raw  attention to  tlie relationsliip of Rawls' theory 
to conceptions of tlie person and  of goods th a t are generally associated w ith  a 
Kantian m etaphysics, wliich, in  h im , is usually linked to the Enlightem nent. As 
S tephen M ulhall and  A dam  Swift w rite, sum m arising tlie com m unitarian critique,
"in order to defend its claim about tlie right w ay to organize tlie sphere of political 
life..., liberalism m ust draw  upon  tlie conceptions of hum an  good and  the general 
ontology of the hum an  tliat m ake u p  tlie broad liberal ethical h  adition of w liich this 
conception of politics is m erely a part."3? Rawls him self recognised the 
'com prehensive' and  tlierefore conhoversial nature of liis articulation of liberalism  in 
Theory. Tliis acknow ledgem ent prom pted  him  to considerably rew ork his initial 
presentation of justice as fairness under tlie term  political liberalism. H is concern is 
to present justice as a political conception, freed from  any m etaphysical or 
epistem ological presuppositions. It is to the m otivations behind and  the substance of 
political liberalism  th a t w e now  tm ii.
PoLmcAL Liberalism
We can now  begin to see w hy  'political' is such an  im portan t qualifier, as 
Rawls em ploys it in  his attem pt to delim it political liberalism over against liberalism 
as a com prehensive dochine. W riting in the inhoduction  to Political Liberalism, a 
com pilation of lectures and  articles w ritten  since tire publication of Theory iir 
attem pts to clarify and  address problem s in  that w ork, he em phasises the 
fundam ental distinction "between com prehensive philosophical and m oral doctrines 
and conceptions lim ited to tire dom ain of the p o l i t i c a l . T h i s  distiirction, he adm its, 
was no t m ade in  Theory, in  wlriclr he presented  an  unrealistic idea of a w ell-ordered 
society in  wlriclr all citizens w ere expected to accept tire concept of justice as fairness
28 These ideas are found in Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Maldng of the Modern Identity, 
Part One (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 3-107.
2? Ibid., pp. 88-89.
30MuUraIl and Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, p. 124. Their chaptei* on Taylor is 
particularly helpful for mrderstanding tire iirdirect implications of Taylor's writings for 
Rawlsian liberalism and its relationship with otirer conmrunitarian critiques, as well as 
Taylor's explicit criticism of Rawls (see pp. 101-126).
34 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. xvii.
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and its concom itant principles as p art of a com prehensive philosoplrical doctrine. 
Rawls now  identifies a "serious problem" intrinsic to this effort, nam ely that 
A modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a plur alism of 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of 
incompatible yet comprehensive doctrines. No one of these doctrines is affhmed by 
citizens generally. Nor should one expect that in tire foreseeable future one of them, 
or some other reasonable doctrine, wiU ever be affirmed by all, or nearly all, citlzerrs. 
Political liberalism assumes that, for political purposes, a plurality of reasonable yet 
mconrpatible compreherrsive doctrirres is the rrormal result of tire exercise of hrmran 
reasorr witirirr tire franrework of the free institutions of a constitutional democratic
regime.32
His thought as preseirted hr Political Liberalism recognises this fact of inevitable 
plurality  and  recasts justice as fairness as a political conception of justice ra ther tlran 
necessarily concom itant witlr a larger com prehensive dochine .33 This change 
requires the articulation of a new  family of ideas to m ake tlris political conception 
com prehensible and  coirsistent, and  to distance it from  the m etaphysical and 
epistemological foundations upon  w hich it w as originally conceived, tasks to w hich 
tire w ritings contained in  Political Liberalism are devoted.34
Rawls is concerned to  distance him self intentionally from  airy perceived 
attem pt to replace com prehensive religious dochines w ith  a com prehensive secular 
dochine associated w ith  the Enlightenm ent, a concern that leads J. Judd  O w en to call 
Rawls' political liberalism  "an antifoundationalist tlreory of l i b e r a l i s m .  "3s In otirer 
w ords, Rawls' aim  is n o t to supp lan t otirer com prehensive view s w ith  liberalism, nor 
to find a 'h u e  foundation' for liberal dochines, b u t rather to develop a conception of 
political justice tirat can be endorsed by tire p lurality  of reasonable com prehensive 
dochines tirat do, and  w ill inevitably, exist witiriir a given society. H e is concerned to 
airswer the question "how is it possible for tirere to exist over time a ju st an d  stable 
society of free and  equal citizens, w ho rem ain profoundly divided by reasonable
32 Ibid., p. xviii.
33 Rawls is not alone in this attempt to ar ticulate a 'political liberalism' tlrat is not 
comprehensive and is, therefore, supposedly more inclusive. See, for example, Charles 
Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1987) and 
"Political Liberalism," Political Theory 18, iro. 3 (August 1990), pp. 339-360.
34 This irew family of ideas is also helpfully discussed in Jolm Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A  
Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, Mass.; The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2001), esp. pp. 1-38.
35 J. Judd Oweir, Religion and the Demise of Liberal Rationalism: The Foundational Crisis of the 
Separation of Church and State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 105.
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religious, pliilosophical, an d  m oral d o c t r i n e s ? " 3 5  H ere w e begin to see w hy the issue 
of toleration is integrally connected to political liberalism, gaining m uch m ore 
prom inence than  it h ad  in his earlier writings. If tlie existence of a diversity of 
incom patible and  irreconcilable com prehensive dochines is tlie inevitable outcom e of 
hum an  reason at w ork, then  for obvious reasons the question of the grounds of 
toleration betw een tliese dochines is a fundam ental issue tliat needs to be addressed. 
W ithout toleration, how  w ould  a political society characterised by reasonable 
pluralism  be sustainable as a just and  stable democracy? We can see w hy Rawls 
considers toleration one of tlie tw o fundam ental questions w hich political liberalism 
seeks to answer.32
We can likewise understand  w hy Rawls is concerned to em phasise the 
practical goal of justice as fairness. It m ust be presented as a conception of justice 
that can be shared by citizens regardless of the different religious and  philosophical 
dochines to wliich they adhere. That is to say, it m ust express their shared and 
public political reason. This is w h a t leads Rawls to assert tliat
ill formulatiiig such a conception, political liberalism applies tiie principle of 
toleration to philosophy itself. The religious doctiines tliat in previous centuries were 
the professed basis of society have gradually given way to principles of constitutional 
government that all citizens, whatever tiieh religious views, can endorse. ...Thus, 
political liberalism looks for a political conception of justice that we hope can gain the 
support of an overlapping consensus of reasonable religious, pliilosophical, and 
moral doctiines in a society regulated by it.3®
This overlapping consensus is how  Rawls resolves the question of toleration. It 
serves as the basis of public reason, defined by Rawls as the reasoning of citizens in 
the public form n about constitutional essentials an d  basic questions of justice, and  
tire m eans w hereby justice can be seen as a freestanding, political conception tlrat can 
be endorsed by all citizens. In short, this political conception of justice is political not 
metaphysical.3?
W hat does Rawls' overlapping consensus involve? It is based iir the idea tlrat 
reasonable com prehensive doctrines, tirough m arked by differences and  
disagreem ents on  fundam ental m atters, can nevertlreless agiee on a public
35 Rawls, Politicnl Lihernlisni, p. 4.
37 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
38 Ibid., p. 10.
38
conception of justice that is independent of any particular com prehensive doctiine. 
This political conception can be supported  by and  fit into various com prehensive 
doctrines, each of w hich affirm s the conception on the basis of its ow n religious, 
moral, and  philosophical beliefs. To p u t it differently, a consensus on  a political 
conception of justice exists th roughout the reasonable com prehensive doctiines 
found w itlrin society, b u t tlris consensus does no t require tirat the g rounds each 
doctiine has for supportiirg tiris conception be tire same. W hereas the criterion used 
in Theory to devise a conception of justice w as fairness, here tire concern is to  develop 
a conception of justice that can gain an  overlapping consensus in  ligh t of tire fact of 
reasonable pluralism , and  Rawls presents Iris conception of justice as fairness as tire 
best candidate to gain such a consensus.
A political conception of justice is not, then, tire same as justice as fairness. It 
is used in  a broader seirse, w itlr justice as fairness rm derstood as one candidate 
am ong m any different, competiirg conceptions of justice found w ith in  liberal society. 
The content of tlrese conceptioirs is m arked by tirree m ain  features: first, the conteirt 
specifies certain  rights, liberties, and  freedoms; second, it assigns a priority  to these 
freedoms; and  tirird, it provides m easures that assure that all citizens, regardless of 
tlreir social position, have tire m eans to m ake effective use of tlreir liberties and  
opportunities.40 Different w ays of defining and specifying these conditions resu lt in 
different liberal conceptions of justice. Wlren it comes to explaiiritrg tire m eaning of 
the term  'political conception of justice,' Rawls identifies three characteristic features. 
The first is the subject w ith  w hich a political conception of justice is concerned, w hich 
Rawls refers to as tire basic structure of society. The basic structure includes a 
society's rrrairr political, social, arrd ecorromic mstitutiorrs, as well as how  tirey fit 
together into a rmifred systerrr of social co-operatiorr tirat m oves from  orre generation 
to the rrext. A  political corrceptiorr of justice is tirus developed to deal w itlr tire basic 
irrstitutiorrs of a society. Also of irrtegral importarrce to a political corrceptiorr of 
justice is its m ode of preserrtation, w hich w e have heretofore referred to as a 
freestandirrg view, rrreaning tirat a political conception m ust be preserrted as 
irrdeperrderrt of any particular com prehensive doctrirre. A lthough Rawls' hope is tirat 
it could be derived frorrr, justified by, and a p art of a range of reasorrable
3? "Political rrot Metaphysical" is tire title of a lectuie writteir by Rawls iir 1985 that became 
Lecture I of Politicnl Liberalism. See especially p. 10 on tiris point.
40 Ibid., pp. xlviii, 6.
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comprehensive doctiines, Rawls is careful to distinguish between how  a conception 
is derived and how  it is presented. In short, such a conception must not be presented 
as part of a larger doctrine but as its own freestanding view. H ie third and final 
characteristic of a political conception of justice identified by Rawls is that its content 
is expressed in terms of the fundamental ideas found within tlie public political 
culture of a democratic society. The tiadition of democratic tliought and the main 
institutions of a democratic society are thought to serve as "a fund of implicitly 
shared ideas and principles" which are familiar to the citizens of that society (or at 
least to tlieir "educated common sense") and in terms of which a political conception 
of justice should be framed.^i Rawls hopes that tliis public political culture will 
provide the source for a public justification for justice that would be impossible to 
establish on tlie basis of one particular comprehensive doctrine given the plurality of 
such doctrines within a s o c i e t y  .42
From  here Rawls goes on  to elucidate justice as fairness as a political 
conception of justice in  term s of tiie fundam ental ideas he identifies in  a  certain 
dem ocratic tiadition, nam ely society as a fair system  of co-operation over time, from 
one generation to the next, w itli tlie tw o com panion ideas of citizens, referring to 
tliose w ho undertake that system  of co-operation, as free and  equal persons and  well- 
o rdered  society as a society effectively regulated  by a political conception of justice .43 
The ideas of the original position and  the veil of ignorance that w ere initially 
presented in Theory as p art of justice as fairness are discussed again in  ligh t of 
political liberalism  and  reasonable pluralism . Rawls continues to  m aintain  that the 
original position is the best device to create an  adequate political conception of 
justice, though he is careful to specify th a t it is only a device of representation and, as 
such, does no t p resuppose a m etaphysical conception of the person.44 Instead, he 
em phasises, in  a now  fam iliar refrain, the political rather tlran m etaphysical 
conception of tire person upon  w hich his tlreory relies,45 a claim to w hich w e shall 
re tu rn  below.
44 Ibid., p. 14; pp. 11-15.
42 Ibid., pp. 150-151.
43 Ibid., pp. 14-46.
44 Note that here he appears to be responding to tire criticisms of Sandel, not by changing Iris 
position but by arguing that understood as a device of representation, the orighral position 
has no metaphysical implications. See ibid., p. 27.
45 For specifics of this conception, see ibid., pp. 29-35.
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Once Rawls has presented justice as fairness, and its principles of justice, as a 
freestanding political conception concerned witli tlie basic sti’ucture of society, he 
turns to tire question of tire stability of justice as fairness. Stability is a necessary 
criterion for a political conception of justice to be satisfactory so tiris question is of 
great importance in Rawls' investigation of justice as famress. The first part of the 
question of stability concerns whether citizens growing up mrder just institutions, as 
defined by tire political conception in question, acquire a sense of justice that is 
sufficient for tlrem to comply witir tirose institutions (i.e., to render tlrose institutions 
stable over time by inculcating an adequate conception of justice and allegiance to 
those institutions), and it is answered by lookitrg at the moral psychology by which  
people acquire a normally sufficient sense of justice. The second part of stability 
involves tire overlapping coirsensus mentioned previously, as it raises tire question of 
whether, given the fact of reasonable pluralism, tire political conception can be tire 
focus of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive dochines. Rawls 
notes that tlris kind of stabiliiy is based "on its beiirg a liberal political view, one that 
aims at being acceptable to citizens as reasonable and rational, as w ell as free and 
equal, aird so as addressed to tlreir public r e a s o n . T h e  terms used by Rawls iir tlris 
sentence refer to very particular ideas that are at the heart of Rawls' theory; a more 
focused look at how he uses tlrese terms will aid our understanding of his liberalism, 
as w ell as our later critiques of it.
Rawls identifies tire 'reasonable' and the 'rational' as independent but 
complementary ideas. Rather than defining them, he has his readers gather tlreir 
meaning from how they are used Emd the conhast between tirem.'^  ^ The rational 
refers to single, unified agents as tlrey seek, adopt, and prioritise tlreir ow n interests 
and ends, as well as the meairs to meet tlrose ends. The reasonable, by contrast, is 
more of a public conception because it is related to tire idea of society as a system of 
fair co-operation. Wlreir persons are concerned that tire standards and propositions 
of society be fair terms of co-operation tirat it is reasonable for everyoire to accept, 
tiren tlrese persons are reasonable. Reasonable persons "desire for its own sake a 
social world in wlriclr they, as free aird equal, can cooperate witir otirers on terms all 
can a c c e p t . "48 Integral to tiris is what Rawls calls the idea or criterion of reciprocity.
4Û Ibid., p. 143.
47 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 82.
48 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 50.
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nam ely that all w ho are involved in  social co-operation and do tlreir p a r t guided by 
tire necessary rules and  procedure should  benefit in  an  appropriate w ay as assessed 
by a suitable benclrm ark of conrparison.^c People w ho are reasonable, then, should 
desire the establishm ent of a fram ew ork for the public social w orld  th a t it is 
reasonable to expect everyone to endorse so Because of tire public role of the 
reasonable, it is, in  political liberalism, of m ore im portance to tire m atter of toleration 
tlran the rational.
Rawls acknowledges airother im portan t aspect to the concept of the 
reasonable, nam ely recognition of 'tire burdens of judgm ent' as tire source of 
reasonable d isagreem ents! The burdens of judgm ent are Rawls' a ttem pt to explain 
the fact of reasonable p luralism  by identifying some of the obstacles tlrat p reven t tire 
clear and conscieirtious use of reason an d  judgment.sz They represent his w ay of 
explaiiriirg how  disagreem ents betw een people exist even if cdl persons 
conscientiously attem pt to be reasonable, tlrat is to em ploy fair term s of co-operation 
and to be fully co-operatbrg m em bers of society. He m entions six sources of this 
reasonable disagreem ent, including, to give tw o examples, th a t the evidence bearing 
on a case m ay be coirflictiirg and  complex aird that because all concepts are vague 
and subject to hard  cases w e m ust rely on  judgm ent an d  interpretation, w hich may 
lead reasonable people to differ, aird concludes that "many of our m ost im portan t 
judgm ents are m ade under conditions w here it is n o t to be expected th a t 
conscientious persons w ith  fuU pow ers of reason, even after h ee  discussion, w ill all 
arrive at the sam e conclusion." Rawls believes that "these burdens of judgem ent are 
of first sigirificance for a dem ocratic idea of toleration. "^ 3
Rawls reaches this conclusion based on tire idea that reasonable people w ho 
recognise tire im plications of the burdens of judgm ent w ill m evitably endorse liberty 
of conscience and  freedom  of tlrought. Of crucial im portance here is Rawls' 
application of tire reasonable to com prehensive doctrm es, based on the assum ption 
th a t reasonable people w ill affirm  only reasonable com prehensive doctrines. A 
reasonable com prehensive doctrine is an exercise of tlreoretical an d  practical reason, 
m eaning tlrat "it covers the major religious, philosophical, and  m oral aspects of
49 Ibid., p. 16.
39 Ibid., pp. 48-58.
3! For a description of these burdens of judgment see ibid., pp. 54-57 and Justice ns Fairness, 
pp. 35-36.
32 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 34
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hum an life in a m ore or less consistent and  coherent m anner" and  determ ines w hich 
values and aspects should  have significance and  priority .54 A reasonable 
com prehensive doctrine will usually draw  upon  a tr adition of tlrought arrd doctrine, 
tlrorrgh it also changes arrd evolves over time. The implicatiorrs of tire burderrs of 
judgm ent are th a t reasorrable people adhere to a variety of compreherrsive doctrirres, 
others w ho affirm  com prehensive doctrirres tlrat differ from  our owrr are still 
reasorrable, curd it is tlrerefore mrreasorrable to use political pow er to  repress 
corrrprehensive dochirres m erely because they are rrot tire sam e as ours. In  other 
w ords, "reasonable persorrs see tlrat the burdens of judgm ent set limits orr w h a t carr 
be reasorrably justified to others, arrd so they errdorse some form  of liberty of 
corrscierrce arrd freedom  of thought. It is unreasorrable for us to use political power, 
should w e possess it, or share it witir otirers, to repress compreherrsive view s that are 
rrot urrreasorrable."55 Thus w e have the necessity belrind arrd basis for tolerahorr.
Rawls is careful to distarrce his urrderstarrdirrg of tire burdens of judgnrent 
arrd the corrcomitarrt rreed for toleration from  scepticisnr orr m atters of tr’utlr. This 
stenrs a t least partially from  tire practical need to avoid corrhoversial claims that 
w ould  preverrt the possibility of an  overlappirrg corrserrsus. That is to say, because 
marry reasorrable compreherrsive doctrirres w ould  no t affirm a political conceptiorr 
that involved scepticism about or irrdiffererrce to tru th , Rawls recogrrises the rreed to 
distarrce Irimself fronr such scepticism if tire goal of firrding arr overlapping 
corrserrsus is to be attairred.56 Political liberalism, accordirrg to Rawls, does no t 
questiorr the possibility of tr'utlr-claims, rror does it desire tlrat adherents of differerrt 
corrrprehensive doctrirres w ill relinquish their convictions in tire nam e of scepticism. 
Instead, it affirms th a t political arrd m oral judgmerrts carr be held u p  to differerrt 
criteria of correctrress arrd reasonableness arrd recogrrises tlrat people witlrirr varying 
compreherrsive doctrirres w ill hold to tlreir owrr beliefs as hue, or a t least reasonable. 
Irrdeed, tire goal of the overlappirrg corrserrsus is to firrd a political corrcephorr of 
justice tlrat carr be accepted as reasorrable or true by  a variety of reasorrable 
compreherrsive dochirres th a t exist witlrirr a giverr society.
53 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 58.
54 Ibid., p. 59.
55 Ibid., p. 61.
56 Ibid., pp. 62-63,150-151.
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Rawls identifies overlapping consensus as one of tw o key ideas th a t are no t 
presented in  Theory tlrat are needed to m eet the fact of reasonable p l u r a l i s m .57 Public 
reason is tire otirer, and  it m ay be tiris idea m ore tlran any otirer tirat Rawls has 
re tu rned  to aird refm ed since the initial publication of Political Liberalism, hr tire 
introduction to tire paperback edition  he m akes considerable revisions to som e of tire 
m ain ideas of his origmal articulation of public reason, wlrile tinee years later he 
includes "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited" in  his publication of The Law o f 
Peop/es.58 In  tiris latter w ork, Rawls identifies public reason as a basic feature of 
democracy tirat is necessary because of tire fact of reasonable pluralism . Wlreir 
reasonable citizens recognise tirat they cairirot reach agreem ent on  the basis of tlreir 
com prehensive doctr ines, they tu rn  instead to reasons tirat they m ight reasonably 
assum e others could adhere to, w hich is to say reasons that are independen t of any 
particular com prehensive doctrine. Rawls' proposal is "tirat in  public reason 
com prehensive doctrines of h titir or right be replaced by an  idea of the politically 
reasonable addressed to citizens as c i t i z e n s . "59 This conception of reason is deem ed 
public iir tirree ways: first, because it is tire reason of free and equal citizens it is to be 
considered tire reason of tire public; second, it applies to questioirs of tire public good 
concerning m atters of fm rdanrental political justice (m eaning questions of 
constitutional essentials an d  basic justice); and, third, as the expression of public 
reasoning tirrough a family of reasonable conceptions of political justice tirat satisfy 
tire criterion of reciprocity, its nature aird content are public.^»
It is im portan t to note, as Rawls is careful to, that public reason applies only 
to discussions tirat take place in  tire public political forum , w hich is separate from  
w hat Rawls term s tire background culture. The public political forum  consists of tire 
discourse of judges, governm ent officials, and  candidates for public office aird their 
campaigir m anagers (altirough Rawls applies tire idea of public reason differently m  
each of these three realms), w hile the background culture is tire cultm  e of civil 
society. Rawls defines this as "the culture of the social, no t of tire political," and  its 
consists of such agencies aird associations as churches, universities, clubs, team s, and
57 Ibid., p. xlvii.
55 Jolrir Rawls, "Tire Idea of Public Reason Revisited," in The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass. 
Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 129-180.
59 Ibid., p .  132.
69 Ibid., p .  1 3 3 .
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scientific societies tliat m ake up  daily life.6! Public reason, then, applies to m atters of 
the public political forum  rather tlran to discussions and  argum ents th a t m ight take 
place in  the background culture or personal deliberations about political questions. 
Furtlrermore, it  does n o t apply  to all m atters tirat arise hr the public political forum  
bu t only those involvm g constitutional essentials and  questions of basic justice, 
wlriclr involve fundam ental principles that specify the general shuctu re  of 
goverm nent and  the political process and  the equal basic rights and  liberties of 
citizens that are to be r e s p e c t e d . 6 2
Despite tlrese limits on the application of public reason, it still has relevancy 
for tire average citizen, m eaning tire citizen w ho is no t a judge, legislator, or political 
cairdidate. This is because "ideally citizens are to think of them selves as i f  th e y  were 
legislators and ask tlremselves w ha t statutes, supported  by w hat reasons satisfyhrg 
tire criterion of reciprocity, they w ould  think it m ost reasonable to enact."^^ That is to 
say, w hen citizens are m volved hr political activities hr tire public forum  an d  vote hr 
elections in  wlriclr m atters of basic justice and  constitutional essentials are a t stake, 
the ideal of public reason ratirer tlran personal or private convictions alone should  
govern them . Rawls bases tlris in  tire du ty  of civility, w hich requhes th a t citizens be 
able to explain to one another their decisions on m atters of principles, policies, and 
elections in  term s of the political values of public reason, as w ell as the w illingness to 
listen to otirers and  accoim nodate to  tlreir views w hen tlris is reasonable .64 This 
m oral du ty  is vital, Rawls believes, to the enduring strength  and  vigour of 
democracy .65 In Rawls' initial articulation of the ideal of public reason, he insisted 
that it required that citizens be able to explahr tlreir political decisions in term s of 
reasonable public political values, tlrough citizens recognise th a t each otirer's political 
values are underg irded  by different reasonable com prehensive doctr ines, h r other 
w ords, wlreir eirgaged hr public reasonhrg citizeirs could rrot offer reasoirs or 
argunreirts based hr their compreherrsive dochirres bu t had  to appeal to reasorrs to 
wlrich all reasonable people could reasorrably be assum ed to adhere. This is tire site 
of orre of Rawls' corrsiderable revisions. He now  believes in w ha t he calls a w ide
6! Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 14. Note tlrat Rawls also recognises, in a footnote hr his later 
essay, the media as iroirpublic political culture, serving to mediate between the public 
political culture and the background culture (Rawls, "Public Reasoir Revisited," p. 134).
62 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 227.
63 Rawls, "Public Reas orr Revisited," p. 135.
64 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 217.
65 Rawls, "Public Reason Revisited," p. 136.
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view of public reason as specified by tiie 'proviso,' nam ely th a t reasons based in  
reasonable com prehensive doctrines m ay be intr oduced in  public reason provided 
that a t som e poin t public reasons supported  by a reasonable political conception are 
offered as support to the initial reasons given.^s Though the details of tire proviso are 
rrot w orked out, tlris represerrts a ratirer sigrrificarrt charrge to his initial conceptiorr of 
public reasorr. Rawls rrow believes th a t positive reasorrs exist for the irrtroductiorr of 
com prehensive doctrirres iirto public debate, based orr the acknow ledgem ent th a t the 
political corrceptiorrs upon  w hich dem ocratic society relies firrd tlreh basis arrd 
str engtlr witlrirr various conrpreherrsive doctrirres .67 Nevertheless, eitlrer a t the 
beginrrirrg or alorrg tire w ay citizerrs m ust "preserrt to orre arrother publicly acceptable 
reasorrs for their political views m  cases raising fundam ental political questiorrs. This 
meairs tlrat our reasorrs should  fall m rder tire political values expressed by  a political 
corrcephorr of justice."68
We saw  above th a t Rawls appeals to the moral du ty  of civility in  Iris advocacy 
of public reasorr. A m oral elem ent is also irrvolved irr tire overlappirrg corrserrsus. 
Rawls is careful to arhculate this to distinguish his concephon of air overlappirrg 
conserrsus fronr a modus vivendi. Rawls borrows tire term  modus vivendi fr om 
irrterirational relatiorrs, in  wlrich corrtext it refers to a treaty betw een tw o countries 
that have competirrg irrterests arrd adhere to tire treaty orrly because it is to the 
advarrtage of each to do so. W hile recognisirrg tirat the hope of a political commurrity 
based orr a urrifying com prehensive doctrirre is no t a possibility m rder conditiorrs of 
reasorrable pluralism , a t least w hen the use of coercive state pow er on  such m atters 
has beerr rejected, Rawls wairts to m aintain tlrat m ore can be attained w itirin a society 
than  a m ere modus vivendi betweerr com peting compreherrsive doctr irres. Tlris is 
because the political coirception of justice w hich serves as tire object of an  
overlapping corrserrsus is a m oral conceptiorr tirat is affirm ed orr m oral grounds, by 
wlrich Rawls meairs tirat its corrterrt contairrs ideals, principles, and  starrdards that 
articulate certairr (political) values.69 To be m ore specific, tire political corrceptiorr of 
justice tirat Rawls hopes persorrs can affirm  from  witlrirr tireir owrr compreherrsive 
doctr ines includes corrceptions of society arrd citizerrs as persons, principles of justice, 
and an accourrt of political v irtues by w hich those principles carr be em bodied  and
66 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. li-lii.
67 Rawls, "Public Reason Revisited," pp. 153-154.
68 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 91.
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expressed. The overlapping consensus, then, is deeper than a modus vivendi, 
containing a moral conception wlrich persons from witirin a number of competing 
comprehensive view s can affirm for its own merit. As such, it is a political 
conception tlrat can be supported regardless of shifts in political power related to 
comprehensive doctrines, which means that it is a much more stable concept than a 
mere modus vivendi would provide.^»
Rawls, in fact, has Irigh hopes for what the discovery of an  overlapping 
consensus would accomplish:
Were justice as fairness to make air overlapping consensus possible it would 
complete and extend the movement of tlrought tirat began tirree centuries ago with 
the gradual acceptairce of tire prmciple of toleration and led to tire nonconfessional 
state aird equal Liberty of conscience. This extension is required for an agreement on 
a political conception of justice given tire historical aird social circumstances of a 
democratic societ)\ To apply the priirciples of toleration to philosophy itself is to 
leave to citizeirs tlremselves to settle the questions of religion, philosophy, and morals 
in accordance witir views they freely affirm.74 
As much as, accordiirg to Rawls, "political liberalism is sharply different from aird 
rejects Eirlighteirment Liberalism," w e see here that links continue to exist between 
earlier articulations of liberalism aird Rawls' political liberalism, particularly when it 
comes to the centiality of liberty of conscience and t o l e r a t i o n . 7 2  Rawls' ruliirg 
assumption is that every reasonable comprehensive doctrine accepts some form of 
the political idea of toleration. Witir 'reasonable toleration' in place, it is possible for 
tirose adlrermg to competing comprehensive doctiines to co-exist within a well- 
ordered constitutional democratic s o c i e t y ,73
69 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 11,147.
79 Ibid., pp. 146-148. It is worth noting that Rawls' insistence that liberalism be more tlran a 
modus vivendi creates a significant distinction between Irim and other liberal theorists, a 
matter to wlrich we will return below. Larmore, for example, believes that the attempt to 
create a non-comprehensive political liberalism will only be successful as a modus vivendi (see 
Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, p. 123), while William Galston and Jolm Gray offer 
more severe indictments of Rawls on this point (see, for example, John Gray, Tioo Faces of 
Liberalism [New York: Tire New Press, 2000], pp. 5-7,139 and William A. Galston, Liberal 
Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002], pp. 6-9).
71 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 154.
72 Rawls, "Public Reason Revisited," pp. 176,151-152.
73 Ibid., pp. 176-180.
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Rawls ' Toleration  Q uestioned
Or so Rawls' conclusion leads us to believe, yet the reasons for questioning 
Rawls' political liberalism  in  the nam e of toleration itself are m anifold. Of course, 
criticisms have been levelled against Rawls' form ulation of political liberalism  on a 
num ber of different issues, b u t for the purposes of this project w e m u st restrict 
ourselves to looking only a t those tlrat are m ost relevant for the questiorr of 
toleratiorr.74 Certairr adrrrissiorrs arrd assumptiorrs overtly m ade by Rawls leave orre 
worrdermg how  m uch legitimacy carr be giverr to his supposed corrcerrr that 
compreherrsive religious, m oral, arrd philosoplrical doctrines thrive w ith in  
dem ocratic society. Rawls openly adm its th a t political liberalism  deperrds uporr tire 
values of the political domairr outw eighing w hatever values m ight conflict w itir 
tlrem.75 This is possible because the values of the political are "very great values," 
goveririrrg the basic fram ew ork of our social lives .76 They everr, he w rites, serve as 
"tire very grourrdwork of our existerrce."77 For tlrose w ho strive to  m ake their ow n 
religious or philosophical view s the fram ew ork of their lives, these claims for the 
prim acy of political values nray be ratirer problerrratrc. John Gray arrd W illiam 
Galstorr botlr pick up  orr tlris area as a m atter of corrcerrr, based on their owrr accounts 
of liberalism  that are rooted irr value pluralism . Galstorr believes that Rawls has a 
'monistic' accourrt of value tlrat fails to recognise the gerruine heterogerriety of value 
tlrat will preclude arry orre accourrt of value, everr a 'political' accourrt, fronr being 
broadly accepted.78 Gray argues tlrat Rawls' belief in  tire possibility of firrdirrg orre 
set of comrnorr values arourrd w hich all people carr be mrited reveals liirks to the 
universal liberal regim es of Johrr Locke arrd Imnrarruel Kant, w hereas real accepteurce 
of pluralism  w ould  resu lt in  tire relinquislm rent of attem pts to associate liberalism 
w ith particular values, even those fourrd irr tlreories of justice.79 So, w here Gray 
believes tlrat a modus vivendi betweerr competirrg values and  w ays of life is the orrly 
w ay forw ard for a liberalism  tlrat recogrrises pluralism , Rawls maintairrs th a t a 
corrserrsus of value is rreeded to provide the rrecessary stability for a political liberal
74 For a smirmary of a nmirber of the nrajor critiques offered against Rawls' political 
liberalism, see Heidi M. Hurd, 'Political Liberalism (book review)," Yale Law Journal 105, rro. 3 
(December 1995), pp. 795-824.
75 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 139. Cf. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 37, in wlrich he 
appears to say the exact opposite.
76 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 139
77 Ibid. Here he is usirrg a phrase from J.S. Mill's Utilitananism.
78 See Galston, Liberal Pluralism, pp. 6-8.
society marked by pluralism. And here, in tire search for tiris "stable and enduring 
overlapping consensus," is where Rawls admits that his theory is significantly helped  
by the fact tirat m ost of tire comprehensive views found iir society are not fully but 
only partially comprehensive .8»
According to Rawls, m any citizens w ill n o t even tirink about how  their 
political aird com prehensive values relate to each otirer because m ost people do not 
actually view  tireir philosophical, m oral, and  religious doctrines as com prehensive. 
As a result, "there is lots of slippage, so to speak, m any w ays for liberal principles of 
justice to cohere loosely witir tirose (partiEilly) com prehensive v iew s.. .."8i Indeed, tire 
success of political liberalism  is to some degree dependent upon  tiris assum ption of 
slippage. Because citizens have no t usually w orked ou t fully com prehensive 
doctrines, political principles are able to w in tireir prim ary allegicmce. If a conflict 
later em erges betw een political priirciples and  tireir (partially) com prehensive 
doctrines, "tiren they m ight very w ell adjust or revise these doctrines ratirer than  
reject tirose principles."82 Further, "these adjustm ents or revisions w e m ay suppose to 
take place slowly over tim e as tire political conception shapes compreherrsive views 
to cohere witir it. "83 Rawls adm its tirat m any doctrines view such com prehensiveness 
as an ideal to be attained,8'i but, according to his ow n thinking on  the m atter, political 
liberalism m ight well be a t risk if such com prehensiveness occurred w ith  som e 
regularity. In  other w ords, the success of political liberalism  is u tterly  relian t on 
com prehensive dochines no t actually being com prehensive so th a t political 
liberalism can take priority  over and  even shape tire com prehensive dochines found 
witirin political liberal society.
Rawls speaks further about the revisions that should be made to 
compreheirsive dochines in the name of liberalism when writing on tire attainment 
of constihitional consensus. He openly admits that liberal principles of justice can 
and should alter citizens' comprehensive dochines so that tlrey can accept a liberal 
constihition. The existence of reasonable rather tlrair simple pluralism may achially 
depend upon the alteration of comprehensive doctrines into a reasonable (i.e..
79 Gray, Two Faces, pp. 5-6,138-139.
80 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 193. 
8! Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 160.
82 Ibid.
83 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 193.
84 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 175.
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liberal) form.®^ His w illingness to  see com prehensive doctrm es adap ted  so that 
political liberalism  can be attained leads to some obvious questions. H ow  m uch 
respect does Rawls extend to com prehensive doctrines in  their ow n right? H ow  
m uch space does Iris political liberalism  have for a genuine diversity of doctrines, 
values, aird w ay of life? H ow  well does political liberalism  tolerate com prehensive 
doctr ines th a t do  n o t already prioritise liberal principles of justice? Before turiring to 
this latter question m ore directly through a consideration of how  Rawls treats 
com prehensive docti ines that he does no t consider reasonable, let us refer once m ore 
to Rawls' ow n w ords to m ake sure w e understemd his position:
.. .marry if not most citizens come to affirm tire public political conceptioir without 
seeing any particular connection, orre way or the otirer, betweerr it and tlreir other 
views. Herrce it is possible for them first to affirm that conceptiorr orr its own arrd to 
appreciate the public good it acconrplishes irr a democratic society. Should arr 
incompatibility later be recogirized betweerr the political conception arrd their- 
comprehensive doctrines, then tlrey might very weU adjust or revise the latter ratirer 
tlrarr reject the public c o n c e p t i o n .  86 
Based on tlris line of tlrinking in  Rawls, it is easy for us to see how  O w en concludes 
that, in  Rawls' form, "liberalism depends on religion being substantively 
tr a n s f o r m e d . "87 Indeed, no t just religious b u t all types of reasonable com prehensive 
doctrines should  be concerned about how  welcome they are in  a liberal regim e that 
hopes they will prioritise liberal views and values over tlreir owrr.
The use of 'reasonable' to qualify tire compreheirsive doctrirres tlrat Rawls' 
theory adm its raises everr m ore questions alorrg this liire. Rawls firrds no space 
w ith in  liberal dem ocratic society for compreherrsive doctrines that ar e no t 
reasonable. Recall th a t in  Rawls' use of tire term , reasonable is related to  tire idea of 
fair social co-operatiorr, the use of term s tirat all citizens regardless of tireir 
compreherrsive doctrirres carr be expected to accept, and  satisfaction of tire criteriorr 
of reciprocity. Reasorrable doctrirres by defirritiorr support political corrceptiorrs of 
justice arrd coirstitutioiral democracies, w hile tirose that do rrot su p p o rt such 
principles or dem ocratic society are rrot coirsidered reasorrable. Furtherm ore, tlrough 
compreherrsive doctr irres m ay coirtaiir priirciples tlrat tlrey corrsider higher than 
political values, a reasorrable com prehensive doctr irre will rrot override political
85 Ibid., p p .  163-164.
86 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 193. See also Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 208-209.
87 Oweir, Demise of Liberal Rationalism, p. 117.
50
values in favour of its, for example, transcendent principles. If, however, a 
comprehensive doctrine does override tlrese political values, tiren it is, again by 
definition, mueasonable. Rawls gives fundamentalist religious doctrines, the 
doctrine of tire divine right of monarclrs, forms of aristocracy, and autocracy aird 
dictatorship as examples of mrreasonable comprehensive d o c t i i n e s . ^ s  The public 
reason of political liberalism "does not trespass upon religious beliefs and injunctions 
insofar as tlrese are consistent witir the essential constitutional liberties, including tire 
freedom of religion and liberty of c o n s c i e n c e . "89 Doctiines that do not affirm tlrese 
constitutional liberties, doctrines tlrat prioritise tire philosoplrically or religiously true 
over toleration or liberty of conscience, are "simply" labelled "politically 
unreasonable. Withiir political liberalism nothing more need be s a i d ." 9 o
Rawls' treatment of mrreasonable comprehensive doctrines does not depend 
upon his appraisal of how many such doctrirres exist within a given society. He 
openly admits tlrat every actual society contains numerous unreasonable doctiines, 
but his identification of such doctriires as a tlueat to democracy and the realisation of 
tire ideal of public reason are, to him, sufficient grounds for their exclusion from 
consideration. Rawls is careful to clarify that this does not mean that those who  
adhere to such doctrmes are not to be tolerated (in his most extended discussion of 
tire question of "toleration of tire intolerant," in his earlier Theory, Rawls writes that 
the intolerant should be curbed only w hen the security of the tolerant and the 
institutioirs of liberty are in danger9i), but it does mean tlrat they are unable to 
participate in tire democratic society his tlreory seeks to design. Owen notices tlrat 
"tire capacity of people to come to an agreement despite their supposedly profound 
differences is not so amazing, since Rawls has fi om the outset included as parties 
only tlrose liberals who do not differ on the crucial political question at i s s u e . " 9 2  
Indeed, many scholars view  tlris exclusion as evidence of intolerance within political 
liberalism itself.
H eidi H urd  w onders a t tire nature of Rawls' project w hen  he excludes from 
consideration tlrose very people w ho m ost need convincing. W hile she recognises 
tire difficulty Rawls m ay see iir tiy ing  to reason w ith  the unreasonable, she also
88 Rawls, "Public Reason Revisited," pp. 172-173.
89 Ibid., pp. 175-176.
90 Ibid., p. 178.
93 Rawls, Theory, pp. 190-194. Cf. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 178-179. 
92 Owen, Demise of Liberal Rationalism, p. 113.
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points ont tlrat his definition of the unreasonable includes a sti-iking portion of the 
population, including classical liberals, libertarians, act consequentialists and  
utilitarians, egoists, altruists. Catholics, Protestants, hedoirists, perfectionists, 
cominuirists, socialists, feminists, and  com m unitarians. She is, in fact, led to tire 
conclusion that tire purpose of Political Liberalism can oirly be descriptive, aim ed at 
describiirg the liberal principles of justice of fairness to those w ho, as liberals, already 
adhere to those principles.93 Placiirg his m vestigation of political liberalism  w ithin  
tire context of tire historical developm ent of toleration withiir political theory,
Andrew Murphy reaches an even stronger conclusion. He believes that the 
requirements of public reason, and the concomitant exclusion of arguments based in 
comprehensive doctrines aird unreasonable doctrines themselves, serve to restrict 
rather tlran protect liberty of conscience. He notes the irony of Rawls' claim that 
political liberalism represents the "completion and extension" of liberty of conscience 
when it actually involves the constr iction of what citizens are allowed to publicly 
affirm and abide by, whereas "historically, the expansion of liberty of coirscience has 
resulted in a steadily mcreasiirg sphere in which religious and conscientious concerns 
were removed as bases for puirislunent or tire denial of public benefits and 
citizenship rights."^! In short, he accuses Rawls of having developed a tlreory that, in 
its exclusion of unreasonable comprehensive doctrines, is far more repressive than 
everr marry legal prohibitions have beeir hr the past.
This discussioir of tire role of reasorr aird tire reasorrable within Rawls' theory 
leads to the obvious questiorr of how  Rawls defirres arrd uses these corrcepts. The 
observant reader w ill have noticed that w e used tire word reasonable everr as we 
hied to define what Rawls mearrt by tire term, implyirrg, perhaps, a certain level of 
vaguerress irr his descriptiorr. As Jean Hamptorr rrohces, one might thhrk tlrat Rawls 
uses 'reasorrable' as arr adjective to describe that wlrich is consisterrt witir public 
reasorr, yet the fact that the overlapphrg conserrsus of public reason m ust develop out 
of reasonable comprehensive doctrirres suggests that tire 'reasorrable' is somehow  
corrceptually prior to public reasorr. Irr an irrterestirrg expositiorr of lire burderrs of 
judgrnerrt, Hampton discloses how  Rawls' use of tire reasorrable implies tire existence
93 Hui‘d, "Political Liberalism (book review)," pp. 795-824.
94 Andrew Murphy, "Rawls and a Shrinking Liberty of Coirscience," Revieio of Politics 60, no. 2 
(1998), p. 274.
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of "a fact of the matter about what is reasonable and what is n o t . "95 Though Rawls' 
theory acknowledges that in certain matters the use of reasoning leads to a plurality 
of ideas, when it comes to tire reasonableness of disagreement and a concomitant 
policy of toleration, tlrey are seen as reasonable conclusions tlrat all reasonable 
people should recognise. This reliance on reason to reveal certain politically-relevant 
tr uths that can serve as tire basis of social harmony shows, according to Hampton, 
tlrat Rawls is just as conunitted to an Eirlightenment understanding of reason as any 
traditional liberal t l r m k e r .9 6
Hampton is not alone in  accusing Rawls of smuggling Enlightemnent 
conceptions into Iris tlreory. Nicholas Wolterstorff, in a similar vein to Hampton, 
argues that Rawls' reliance on common human reason is a carry-over from tire 
Enlightemnent ideal of removing ourselves from our compreheirsive doctrines and 
uniting ourselves tirrough tire use of our common reason, a notion which fails to 
recognise tire degree to wlrich human reason is always shaped by what w e already 
b e l i e v e . 9 7  He further maintains that precisely because of the influence of our 
particular belief systems on our reason and rationality, it is more reasonable to 
expect that dissei^us will be the result of the use of reason when it comes to political 
conceptions of justice, just as, as Rawls' admits, dissensus is the inevitable result of 
tire use of reason when it comes to comprehensive d o c t i i n e s  .98 Gray follows a similar 
line of thinking, asking "., .when society contains not one but many ways of life, each 
witir its own conception of tire good, will there not be as much divergence in views of 
fairness as there is iir understandings of tire good? When ways of life differ widely in 
tlreir view  of tire good, w ill tlrey not support different views o f  j u s t i c e ? "99 Wlrence, 
we might ask, comes Rawls' belief that w e catr be divided in our comprehensive
95 Jean Hampton, "The Common Faith of Liberalism," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1994), 
p. 203. For a different but likewise interesting discussion of Rawls' burdens of judgment, see 
Leif Wenar, "Political Liberalism: An biternal Critique," Ethics 106, no. 1 (1995), pp. 43-48. For a 
related critique directed at Rawls' public reason, see Benjamin Gregg, who argues that tlris 
"normatively loaded concept...seems to presuppose its own correctness in matters of justice" 
{Thick Moralities, Thin Politics: Social Integration Across Communities o/Beh’e/[Durham; Duke 
University Press, 2003], p. 7).
96 Ibid., pp. 186-216.
97 Nicholas Wolterstorff, "The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues," 
in Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious 
Convictions in Political Debate (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), pp. 98- 
99.
98 Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Religious Reasons, Liberal Theory and Coercion," unpublished 
paper, pp. 27-29.
99 Gray, Two Faces, p. 19.
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doctrmes with their competing conceptions of the good and yet be united around a 
political conception of justice? Part of the answer lies in his miderstanding of and 
belief in reason, while anoüier part lies in a classic liberal idea, namely a distinction 
between 'public' and 'private,
This distinction between public and private serves as the major emphasis of 
Jürgen Habermas' critique of Rawls' political liberalism !0! In short, Habermas 
accuses Rawls of making a neo-Kantian distinction between the sphere of the 
political and otirer cultural value spheres wlrich results in a divide within moral 
persons between tlreir public identity as citizens and tlreir nonpublic identity as 
private persons shaped by particular conceptions of the good. "But such an a priori 
boundary between public and private not only contr adicts the republican intuitioir 
tlrat popular sovereigirty aird Irumair rights are irourished by the same root. It also 
coirflicts witir historical experieirce, above all witir the fact tlrat the historically 
shiftiirg bouirdary betweerr tire private and pubhc spheres has always beerr 
problematic fr om a rrormative pomt of v iew ."!02 Wolterstorff likewise disagrees witir 
the strict demarcatiorr betweerr public and private advocated by Rawls. He points 
out tlrat tire rrecessary reliarrce on public reason wlrich Rawls posits goes agairrst the 
religious corrvictiorrs of marry people within democratic society tlrat tlreir decisiorrs 
orr such furrdamerrtal issues as justice should be based uporr tlreir religious 
convictions. Though Rawls' additiorr of the proviso, which allows citizerrs to 
irrtroduce reasorrs orr political matters based irr then comprehensive doctrirres 
provided that they later irrhoduce reasorrs based irr public reasorr, may appear to 
ameliorate some of the requiremerrts of tire strict divisiorr betweerr orre's private arrd
390 See, for example, Rawls, "Public Reasoir Revisited," p. 160-161.
391 The details of the differences between tire liberalisms of Habermas and Rawls are beyond 
tire scope of tiris mvestigation. See Jürgen Habermas, "Reconciliation Through the Public Use 
of Reason; Remarks on John Rawls's Political Liberalism," The Journal of Philosophy 92, rro. 3 
(March 1995), pp. 109-131. Rawls' response, originally published as pp. 132-180 of tire same 
issue, is iircluded hr the paperback edition of Political Liberalism, pp. 372-434.
392 Habermas, "Reconciliation," p. 129. Another large aspect of Habermas' critique has to do 
with Rawls' use of 'political coirstructivism' ratirer tirarr 'democratic proceduralism.' Rawls 
believes tirat the use of political constructivism, in which tire political prhrciples of justice are 
tire result of a certain procedure of constr uction (i.e., the origmal position), enables him to 
avoid reliarrce on a particular- corrceptiorr of truth. Habermas, orr tire otirer hand, does rrot 
believe tirat tiris corrstructivisnr errables Rawls to avoid engaging witir substarrtive (arrd 
corrtroversral) questions of truth. He advocates hrstead a 'purer' form of procedularism that is 
nrore reliant orr tire process of tire formatiorr of public reasorr, believmg that it avoids such 
errgagement. Rawls, hr turrr, mamtahrs tirat Habernras' proceduralisrrr is every bit as 
substantive as Iris owrr. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 89-129,421-433 arrd Haberrrras, 
"Recorrciliatiorr," pp. 109-131.
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public reasoning, in actuality it does not go very far towards allowing 
comprehensive doctiines into tlie public sphere (as Murphy writes, "the 'proviso' 
makes Rawls' exclusion of comprehensive doctrines from public life kinder and 
gentler, but no less real"!®). Furthermore, Wolterstorff argues, recognition of citizens 
in tlie particularity of their identities as adherents to particular comprehensive 
doctrines is what amounts to true respect, respect tliat is more substantive than that 
based merely on citizens as free and equal.!°4
These are important and worthwhile points, ones to which w e w ill have 
occasion to return in more detail below. As w e raise these criticisms related to public 
and private, however, w e m ust be fair to Rawls by pointing out that he does not 
believe his tlieory necessarily requires a sharp split between what citizens affirm in 
tlieii' political and Üieir nonpolitical l i v e s . ! ®  Rather, he hopes that each reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine will furnish its own support for conceptions of justice mid 
society tliat can sei-ve as tlie basis of an overlapping consensus between different 
comprehensive doctrines, even if the foundations of those conceptions differ. In 
otlier words, he hopes for convergence between citizens' comprehensive doctrines 
and society's reasonable political conceptions. Indeed, in his development of tlie 
wide view  of public political culture, of which tlie proviso is an integral part, he goes 
so far as to recognise that citizens' comprehensive doctrines provide the vital social 
basis for these political c o n c e p t i o n s . ! ^ ^  y/g must remember, however, the priority 
that Rawls places upon these political conceptions and liis willingness to see 
comprehensive doctiines adapted and altered so that tliey can accommodate the 
political conceptions necessary for a liberal society.
We m ust also remember tliat Rawls' understanding of tlie relation between 
public and private depends upon a particular conception of the person, for, as Jean 
Betlike Elshtain elucidates in relation to John Locke, one's view  of the individual is of 
significant importance for how  one ai'ticulates the relationsliip between public and 
private.!® Rawls' understanding of tlie person may not adequately account for tlie
103 Murphy, "Shrinkmg Liberty of Conscience," p. 269.
104 Wolterstorff, "Role of Religion," pp. 105,110-111.
3® In this respect Larmore may be more honest in his recognition of what political liberalism 
requires, namely the abandomnent of "the cult of wholeness" (Larmore, "Political Liberalism," 
p. 351).
396 Rawls, "Public Reason Revisited," pp. 153-154.
397 Jean Betlike Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought 
(Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981), pp. 116-120.
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degree to which people's comprehensive doctrines are intimately related to tlreir 
identity or sense of self and are therefore not easily separable from tlreir political 
views.!08 Rawls is careful, once again, to emphasise tlrat tire conception of the person 
upon wlrich his tlreory relies is political ratirer tlran metaphysical, and that tire moral 
psychology upon which his tlreory rests is likewise drawn from a political ratirer 
than psychological conceptionTo^ He recognises that a political conception of justice 
necessarily presupposes a theory of Irumair nature because it has to take into account 
tire feasibility of the ideas it presents iir terms of the capacities of human iratme aird 
tire potential mstability of democratic institutions.no At tire same time, he believes 
that a political conception of tire person must be distiirct from a conception of tire 
person found in a personal, associational, religious, or moral ideal, arguiirg that tire 
basis of toleration is at stake when tlris distiirction is not recognised. Tlris is because 
tire conception of tire person that applies to the political realm needs to be one which 
ensures tire basis of fair social co-operation, meairing one that could serve within an 
overlapping consensus, one tlrat is independent of and compatible witir a variety of 
compreheirsive doctiines' conceptions of the person.ü! Yet Rawls him self openly 
relies upon a Kantian view  of persons as free and equal moral persons, aird it is tlris 
view of citizens, as free and equal, that forms the basis of the political conception of 
tire person tlrat he puts forward in Iris political l i b e r a l i s m . ! ! ^  Leif Wenar points out a 
number of places in which Rawls is explicitly defending a Kantian moral psychology 
against otirer philosophical conceptions, and then goes on to list a range of 
philosophical positions that are excluded from the overlapping consensus on the 
basis of tlreir non-Kantian moral psychologies.!!^ Rawls also relies heavily upon a 
developmental theory of moral psychology that has its roots in Lawrence Kohlberg, 
Jean Piaget, and William McDougall; an extensive account of his theory of moral 
development is found in Theory, and, rather than distairchrg Irimself hom  it in  
Political Liberalism, he instead refers the reader to it.ü4 Such developmental 
psychological theories as those of Kohlberg and Piaget are not without their own  
substantive moral conceptions and secular psychological assumptions tlrat adherents
!98 See Murphy, "Shrinking Liberty of Conscience," pp. 260-261, 254-255. 
!99 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 29-35, 86-88.
!io Ibid., pp. 346-347.
11! Ibid., p .  369.
112 Ibid., pp. 280-281;
113 Wenar, "Political Liberalism," pp. 49-51.
114 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. Ixii; Theory, pp. 397-449.
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of many comprehensive doctrines would be loaüie to accept.^s Once again w e find 
evidence tliat Rawls' political theory contains many assumptions and components 
tliat maintain liis link to Enlightenment thought and tliat serve to exclude ratlier than 
include a considerable number of comprehensive doctrines.
The same could be said of tlie importance tliat Rawls attributes to what he 
calls tlie primary good of self-respect. Primary goods are miderstood to be goods 
tliat all rational people desire regardless of their particular conceptions of the good 
and they are, according to Rawls, necessary for the advancement of all reasonable 
conceptions of the g o o d .^ ^  of all the primary goods, Rawls assigns fundamental 
importance to that of self-respect, and he argues, in his earlier Theory as in  Political 
Liberalism, that the principles of justice as fairness provide the best basis for ensuring 
self-respect for all c i t i z e n s . H ow does Rawls define self-respect? "Self-respect is 
rooted in our self-confidence as a fully cooperating member of society capable of 
pursuing a wortiiwlrile conception of the good over a complete life."!!® Rs 
importance lies in tlie fact that "it provides a secure sense of our own value, a firm 
conviction that our determinate conception of the good is worüi carrying out. 
Without self-respect notliing may seem worth doing.. .."ü9 The upshot of die 
definition and role tliat Rawls assigns to self-respect is that public principles of 
justice must not allow citizens to question each oüiers' conceptions of tlie good. 
Because an essential element of self-respect is a "seciue sense of our ow n value 
rooted in the conviction tliat w e can carry out a worthwhile plan of life," and because 
"our sense of our ow n value, as w ell as our self-confidence, depends on the respect 
and mutuality shown us by others," citizens must recognise tlie wortli each citizen 
attaches to his or her w ay of life.i^o By defining self-respect in terms of life plans and 
comprehensive doctrines, Rawls eliminates the possibility that self-respect might be
!!5 Tills is a point well argued and documented by James Davison Hunter, The Death of 
Character: Moral Education in an Age Without Good or Evil (New York: BasicBooks, 2000). See 
esp. pp. 83-84,187-188.
!!6 One could raise questions about the primary goods more generally, as Keitli Graham does 
when he wonders how easy it is to substantiate Rawls' primary goods as universal 
preconditions of rational action, and fm ther notes the "cmious and unsatisfactory 
combination of local and general factors" that comprise Rawls' list (Keith Graham, "Coping 
witli the Many-Colored Dome: Pluralism and Practical Reason," in Philosophy and Pluralism, 
ed. David Archard, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 40 [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996], pp. 140-143).
i!7 Rawls, Theoiy, pp. 386-391,477-480; Political Liberalism, pp. 318-320.
!!8 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 318.
!!9 Ibid.
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based on, for example, an innate luimEin dignity or tlie imago Dei rattier tlian one's 
sense tliat one holds a worthwhile conception of the good. Furtlier, the link that 
Rawls draws between self-respect and tlie need to see one's own plan of life as 
worthy and valuable has ti'emendous implications for the ability of citizens to 
question and discuss with each other their different, often incompatible 
comprehensive doctrines and ways of life. Will not such discussions, rooted in one 
comprehensive doctr ine ratlier tlian another, be seen as questioning tlie worth of tlie 
other's way of Hfe Emd tliereby as undermining the primary good of self-respect?
Does tliat mecui tliat any genuine discussion that seeks to probe and question, 
understand and perhaps critique otlier conceptions of tlie good is ruled out a priori 
by Rawls' liberalism?
If such discussion is not ruled out by his conception of self-respect as a 
primary good, then it is by other aspects of liis liberalism. For the entire point of his 
tlieory is to find conceptions of justice upon which all people c e u i agree, that form the 
basis of a consensus, so tliat disagreement and dissensus can be kept out of the 
political reahn. N ot even tlie principles of justice tliemselves are the result of 
dialogue, as Seyla Benliabib and Romand Coles both note, for the 'rational selves' of 
tlie original position are prior to and uninterested in dialogue or eacli others' 
differences when they choose these first p r i n c i p l e s . ! ^ !  The emphasis throughout 
Rawls' political liberalism is not on what can be achieved as different comprehensive 
doctrines come together, but what can miify tliem despite their differences. The 
differences tliemselves are not considered appropriate material for the public realm, 
nor is tlie public realm particularly known as a site of deliberation. As citizens 
reason togetlier, they are best guided, according to Rawls, by a political conception of 
justice tliat they can all endorse and by public reason, which ensures tliat they only 
present ideas, concepts and reasons with wliich other people can agree. If they try to 
introduce reasons that are based in tlieir ow n comprehensive doctiines, parts of 
which will not be ti'anslatable into reasons to which people outside of tliose 
comprehensive doctrines would adhere, then tliey are likely to be labelled 
'unreasonable' and excluded from debate. Whereas, according to HEUiipton, a liberal
120 Ibid., p. 319.
121 Seyla Benliabib, "Liberal Dialogue Versus a Critical Theory of Discursive Legitimation," in 
Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. NcUicy L. Rosenblum (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1989), p. 144; Romand Coles, Self/Poioer/Other: Political Theory and Diaological Ethics 
(Wiaca, N.Y.; Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 5.
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following in the tradition of Mill could argue that a view  was wrong but not 
umeasonable, and then proceed to offer arguments in favour of his or her position, a 
liberal following Rawls seems able to dismiss tlie viewpoint as unreasonable and 
thereby dismiss it altogether in a rather illiberal fashioii.^^z Rawls seems to have no 
hope that anytliing positive or constructive could result from conversations tliat 
occtu as people speak from within tlieir different doctrines and ways of life; he seems 
to leave no space for what people can learn from each other and how  they might be 
persuaded by tlie merits of another's position, even if they are not presented in terms 
witli which tliey already have reason to agree. For tliis reason, his liberalism has 
little room for genuine political deliberation. As Gray writes, "in 'political liberalism' 
nothing of importance is left to political decision.. .The central institution of Rawls's 
'political liberalism' is not a deliberative assembly such as a parliament. It is a court 
of law. All fundamental issues are removed from political deliberation in order to be 
adjudicated by a Supreme C o u r t . " ! ®  This desire to limit the realm of political 
discussion, and to consti'ain whatever public discourse does occur by the parameters 
of public reason, reveals a fundamental pessimism about what can be accomplished 
tlirough conversation. It also discloses the inability of Rawls' theory to publicly 
recognise the different comprehensive doctrines emd ways of life of which the 
citizens of a liberal political society are constituted. Further, it brings to light a 
certain optimism regarding the possibility of attaining unity in and banishing 
disagreement from the public realm;!® the hope of this unity, based on 'political' 
values tliat supposedly stand apart from any one tradition or doctiine, is surely 
reminiscent of certain Enlightenment dreams and ideals.
Indeed, this investigation seems to liint at the conclusion reached by Will 
Kymlicka, namely that "the entire distinction between political and comprehensive 
liberalism is o v e r s t a t e d . " ! ®  Wenar likewise accuses Rawls of incorporating into 
political liberalism a partially comprehensive doctiine witli a decidedly Kantian 
emphasis, tliereby undermining tlie very overlapping consensus Rawls' theory was
!22 Hampton, "Common Faith," pp. 186-216, esp. pp. 203-214.
!23 Gray, Tioo Faces, p. 16.
!24 As Glen Newey writes, "Disagreement about public affairs is what constitutes politics and 
gives rise to it in die first place, so it is quixotic to think (as Rawls does) that 'political' 
principles are derivable from agreement or 'overlapping consensus' ("Is Democratic 
Toleration a Rubber Duck?" Res Ftiblica 7, no. 3 [2001], p. 333). The inevitability of conflict in 
poHtics will be a recurring theme of the post-Nietzschean political tlieorists to whom we turn 
in tiie next chapter.
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designed to create, for all recognisable comprehensive doctrines except a 
comprehensive Kantianism are, according to Wenar, excluded from his conception of 
justice.!® Owen offers a similar conclusion, drawing attention to tlie comprehensive 
and even tlieological nature of the liberalism Rawls is presenting. The 'political' of 
political liberalism does nothing to limit its comprehensive nature. Instead of finding 
an overlapping consensus that leaves competing comprehensive doctrines intact, we  
find tliat "toleration displaces all other doctrines as the core of tlie true religion. "!27 
Rawls rightly recognises the existence of competing religious, philosophical, 
and moral doctiines that makes die well-ordered society he depicted in A  Theory of 
Justice unattainable. He deserves much respect for seeking to revise and limit his 
dieory of justice as fairness so that it would adequately accommodate die deep 
pluralism found in democratic society. He acknowledges diat the solution to die 
problem of pluralism will not be found by "confronting religious and nonliberal 
doctiines w idi a comprehensive liberal philosophical doctiine," which leads him to 
ti’y to formulate a freestanding liberal political conception diat nonliberal doctrmes 
can endorse as die basis of a reasonable overlapping consensus.!® He limits die 
place of final ends and aims within political society so diat die competing ends and 
aims diat are concomitant w idi a variety of comprehensive doctrines w ill not result 
in unnecessary exclusion, recasting die common good of society as die pursuit of 
justice for all citizens in die hope diat it is an end upon which all citizens can agree .!Z9 
And he is surely sincere when he says, "I make a point in Political Liberalism of really 
not discussing anydiing, as far as I can help it, diat will put me at odds w idi any 
dieologian, or any philosopher."!®®
Yet w e have also seen the many ways m which Rawls explicidy and implicidy 
prioritises die values of political liberalism over diose of any comprehensive doctrine 
and die degree to wliich he smuggles in again and again assumptions and 
conceptions diat are deeply mimical to many, even 'reasonable,' religious, moral, and 
philosophical doctiines found in democratic society today. Ample evidence, beyond 
that which has been presented here, seems to support die conclusion that Rawls'
!25 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, p. 239.
126 Wenar, "Political Liberalism," pp. 58,59.
127 Owen, Demise of Liberal Rationalism, p. 122; see also pp. 121-128.
128 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. xlvii.
129 Ibid., pp. 41,109. See also Bernard G.Prusak, "PoHtics, Religion & die Public Good: An 
Interview widi Philosopher John Rawls," Commonweal 125, no. 16 (1998), pp. 12-18.
130 Prusak, "Politics, Religion & tiie PubHc Good," p. 16.
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political doctrine is much more comprehensive than he realises, while tlie parameters 
he establishes for inclusion in his political society in the name of toleration serve to 
exclude a vast number of comprehensive doctrines. For this reason, liberal theorists 
such as Gray and Galston continue to group Rawlsian liberalism and its view  of 
toleration w ith universal liberal regimes that hope for rational consensus, fail to 
recognise the (controversial and comprehensive) goods involved in tlieir theories, 
and, therefore, limit botli tlie breadtli of diversity and the recognition of particularity 
within contemporary society. Though Rawls recognises the inevitable existence of 
pluralism in contemporary society, though, with this recognition in mind, he h ies to 
move away from a comprehensive or universal dochine of liberalism, and though  
through this m ove he conies to give toleration ever-increasing prominence in order 
to protect tliis pluralism, w e have uncovered considerable reason to question the 
success of his efforts. Rawls' liberalism is neitlier as uiiconhoversial nor as tolerant 
as he would like it to be, as it continues to prioritise tlie universal over the particular. 
Is it possible to develop an account of either liberalism or liberal toleration that more 
successfully leaves behind liberalism's 'universal' Enlightenment roots and 
simultaneously allows space for die presence of difference in its particularity? 
Richard Rorty hopes to articulate just such a liberalism.
T o w a rd s  t h e  R e c o g n it io n  o f  D ifferen ce: Fr o m  t h e  U n iv ersa l  t o  t h e  
P articular
Richard  Rorty 's P ostmetaphysical Liberalism
Richard Rorty shares Rawls' concern to distance liberalism from any sort of 
comprehensive dochine or ' fo u n d a d o n a l i s m .L ik e  Rawls, he also places primacy 
on toleration, drawing explicit links between die realisation of this liberal ideal and 
die restriction of hutii-claims and conceptions of the good in the public sphere. Yet 
where Rawls is careful to distinguish his tiieory of liberalism h orn indifference or 
scepticism towards matters of huth, recognising diat die conhoversial nature of such 
positions w ould inhibit an overlapping consensus, Rorty views indifference as a
!3! Rorty understands fomidationalism as, to follow Owen's description, "die attempt to move 
beyond die world of inherited opinion and mere appearance to die 'true world,'" hi rejecting 
fomidationahsm, he is rejecting the idea diat another world exists, beyond diat of om' primaiy 
experience, diat supposedly serves as die basis/ foundation of all 'true' opinion and 
knowledge. See Owen, Demise ofLibernl Rationalism, pp. 48-51.
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necessary component of toleration. Indeed, Rorty believes w e w ould all be better off 
if w e would cease asking what is tr ue or what is universally valid Emd focus instead 
on what is most helpful. Wliere Rawls' project aims to establish political liberalism, 
Rorty hopes for a postmetaphysical liberalism (or, to use his term, a postmodernist 
bourgeois liberalism!®^) that, precisely because it is postmetaphysical, is more 
tolerant than any liberalism to date.
Rorty is explicit about his rejection of foundationalism, view ing his own  
project as one of "redescription," or "ti ying to reformulate the hopes of liberal society 
in a nonrationalist and nonuniversalist way."!®® xhe need for this redescription 
comes h'om Rorty's belief that "Enlightenment rationalism, altirough it was essential 
to tire beginnings of liberal democracy, has become Em impediment to the 
preservation Eurd progress of democratic societies."i®4 To put it differently, Rorty 
wants to preserve aird build upon the liberal tradition without retaining its 
coirmritment to such universal tiutlrs as reason, rationality, morality, or imrate 
Irumair dignity. This would be the culmmation of the liberation from religion and 
freedom from autirority that tire Enlightenment project began but only partially 
attEiined. The resultant culture of liberalism, or what he refers to as tire "liberal 
utopia,"
would be one wliich was enlightened, secular, thiough and tirrough. It would be one 
in wliich no ti ace of divinity remained, either in the form of a divinized world or a 
divinized self.... The process of de-divmization.. .would, ideally, culminate in our no 
longer being able to see any use for the notion that finite, mortal, contingently 
existing human beings might derive tiie meaning of tireir lives from anything except 
other finite, mortal, contingently existing human beings. In such a culture, warnings 
of "relativism," queries whether social institutions had become increasingly "rational" 
in modern times, and doubts about whether tire aims of liberal society were "objective 
moral values" would seem merely quaint.!®®
According to Rorty, tire search for absolute truth or uiriversal kirowledge is 
futile Emd serves only to distract us from matters that should be of concern, such as 
tire reduction of cruelty and suffering. More important than determining whetirer
132 por his explanation of this term, see Richm d Rorty," Postmodernist Bour geois Liberalism," 
in Objectivity, Relativism, and Tnith: Philosophical Papers, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), pp. 198-199.
133 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge Uiriversity Press, 
1989), p. 44.
!34 Ibid.
62
our beliefs are true in the sense of corresponding to a greater or transcendent reality 
is determining whether or not they are useful. His critique of absolutism and 
religious truth is offered not in tire name of an alternate truth or epistemology but 
ratirer on the basis tlrat religion often serves as a 'conversation-stopper,' preventing 
consensus witir those who do not share the religious beliefs in question and at times 
encouraging, as Owen puts it, "a spirit of absolutism tlrat lends itself easily to 
intolerance and even cruelty, tire opposition to which almost entirely defines 
liberalism.. .for Rorty."®® Likewise, tire redescription of liberalism offered by Rorty is 
not given because it more adequately corresponds to a truth or reality which  
liberalism seeks to express but because a newer vocabulary will be more helpful to 
tire realisation of liberalism's values. N ow  that science and rationalism have lost 
their primacy, liberalism will be more successful if it m oves beyond the vocabularies 
associated with them and instead associates itself witir the cultural developments 
and vocabularies that are replaciirg them (he identifies art and utopian politics as the 
two main replacem ents® ^). In short, "tr uth" should be fashioired arourrd whatever 
will be most useful for reachirrg liberalisirr's goals.!®®
What are tire goals of liberalism tlrat Rorty iderrtifies aird retairrs? Borrowiirg 
his defirritiorr from Judith Shklar, he thiirks of liberals as "people who think that 
cruelty is tire worst thirrg w e do."®9 He is coircerrred, however, rrot nrerely witir a 
description of liberals but witir sketclrirrg a figure of the 'liberal ironist,' one who  
recogrrises tire coirtirrgerrcy of his or her ceirtral beliefs arrd desires while irrcluding 
amorrg those desires tire "hope tirat sufferirrg will be diminished, tirat tire huirriliatioir 
of Irumair beirrgs by otirer humair bemgs may cease."®® In Rorty's liberal utopia, 
iroirism is universal and Freedom has replaced Truth as tire goal and purpose of 
society .!4! Liberal iroirists, recogirisiirg tire variety of vocabularies tirat exist arrd tire
®5 Ibid., p.45.
136 Owen, Demise of Liberal Rationalism, pp. 45,73 (Owen gets tire term 'conversatiorr-stopper' 
from Rorty, "Religion as Conversation-Stopper," Common Knozoledge 3 [1], pp. 1-6).
!37 Rorty, Contingency, p. 52. As he wr ites elsewhere, in postmetaphysical liberalism it is the 
poet, the novelist, and the journalist who are more effective than tire plrilosopher or 
tireologian in expanding our moral imagination to increase our willingness "to use tire ternr 
'we' to include more and nrore different sorts of people" (Rorty, "On Ethnoceirtrism; A Reply 
to Clifford Geertz," in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, vol. 1 [Cambridge: 
Cambridge Uiriversity Press, 1991], p. 207).
138 Rorty, Contingency, pp. 51-53.
139 Ibid., p . XV.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid., pp. XV, xiii.
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power of redescription to change tlie appearance of these vocabularies, hold their 
ow n final vocabulary, and tlius themselves, with a sense of contingency and 
fragility.142 Tliis sense tliat our final vocabulary does not correspond to a miiversal 
reality or truth decreases our need to impose our vocabularies on others, tliereby 
increasing our toleration.
Wliile Rorty's liberal utopia would consist entirely of liberal ironists, he does 
not intend to impose tlie inculcation of irony onto today's liberals, or even to argue 
for it.!43 Instead of providing argmnents, he posits the increased usefubiess such 
irony has for realising the liberal goals of tolerance, justice, and tlie reduction of 
suffering. And instead of advocating imposition, he thinks that integral to the 
definition of 'liberal' is a fundamental distinction between public and private that 
ensures that citizens have the freedom to be ironists or Kantians or Chiistians within 
tlie private realm. Indeed, one of tlie motivations behind Rorty's work seems to be 
tlie desire to correct the mistaken assumptions of such ironists as Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, and Michel Foucault that irony must play out at a 
public as well as a private level. Irony, when applied to tiie self, leads to a 
conception of 'self-creation': because the self is a product of contingency and social 
construction, tiie individual ironist can work towards redescribing and recreating 
him- or herself. Yet, Rorty argues, instead of looking for a comprehensive doctrine 
tliat can allow self-creation and justice to be combined within a single vision, we 
need to recognise tliat self-creation is necessarily private while justice is necessary 
public, and tiie two are combined only to the extent tliat the aim of a just society "is 
to let everybody have a chance at self-creation to tiie best of his or her abilities."444 
The public and private co-exist and tlieir concerns for solidarity and self-creation, 
respectively, have equal validity, but tiiey are not commensurable witiiin a single 
tiieory or vision. No consensus on conceptions of the good or tiie true is necessary, 
or even desirable, witiiin liberal society. Instead, public affairs need only be 
concerned with two matters:
(1) how to balance tiie needs for peace, wealth, and freedom when conditions 
require tiiat one of tiiese goals be sacrificed to one of tiie others and
442 Ibid., pp. 73-74.
443 As Rorty writes, "But 'argument' is not tiie right word. For on my account of intellectual 
progress as tlie Hteralization of selected metaphors, rebutting objections to one's 
redescriptions of some things will be largely a matter of redescribing otlier things..." (ibid., p. 
44).
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(2) how to equalize opportunities for self-creation and then leave people alone to 
use, or neglect, their opportunities.
In Rorty's emphasis on the distinction between public and private w e see definite 
continuity with liberal political theories of tlie past, mcluding those of Rawls and 
Locke. Indeed, Rorty view s Irimself as building upon and bringing to maturation the 
liberal democratic hadition of wlrich he is a part. Of course, in this aspect, as in  
others w e have been discussing, Rorty seems to go w ell beyond either Locke's 
classical liberalism or Rawls' political liberalism.
If one is tempted to ask what justification Rorty has for continumg on in tire 
liberal ti'adition or what defence he offers for such liberal values as tire reduction of 
suffermg and cruelty, one w ill find no answer in Rorty beyond what was just 
mentioned, namely that Rorty finds himself in a culture based in the liberal tradition. 
For Rorty, that is enough. As Mulhall and Swift write, "for Rorty, liberalism is now  
simply a part of our cultural weather system .. .and w e should simply get on witir tire 
busiiress of developing emd refining the political vocabulary witir which w e find 
ourselves equipped, in accordance with the standards tirat are internal to tirat 
vocabulary and c u l t u r e .  "®6 We work towards justice because w e are tire heirs of the 
Enlightenment for whom  justice was a primary concern, w e aim for the reduction of 
suffering because liberalism has traditionally been concerned with such a reduction; 
because w e find ourselves in tiris culture, w e have no otirer option. Tlris is part of 
Rorty's understanding of the contiirgency of acculturation and tire inevitability of 
etirirocenti'ism. His denial of tiairscendent tiutlrs or reality, his 
antirepresentationalism, is concomitant witir tire recognition that what w e know and 
our options for how  w e live are utterly dependent upon tire culture in which we find 
ourselves. No 'skyhook' based in a greater reality, whetirer it be God or science, can 
rescue us from the cultural socialisation of wlrich w e are a part. The only hope for 
ti'anscendmg our acculturation lies in 'splits' or tensions tirat arise in one of two 
ways. Eitlrer tlrese tensions are already present in our culture or they result from an 
internal or external revolt tirat brings fortir new  initiatives and ideas to tiy  to 
overcome tire tensions tirat already exist. In short, standards, values, and options are
!44 Ibid., p. 84; pp. xiii-xv.
445 Ibid., p. 85.
146 MuUrall and Swift, Liberals and Connnunitarians, p. 245.
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based only in tlie ti'aditions smd consensus of particular conununities and cultiires; 
they, and consequently tliose who hold tihem, are inescapably etlinocentiic.i^^
This ethnocentricism does not have the last word, however. Liberals today 
are convinced that notiiing is worse tlian cruelty because that is where the processes 
of socialisation have led and "we have to start from where we are," but tiie progress 
and processes of liberal society embody anotlier idea that "takes tiie curse off tiris 
etimocenti'ism. "148 This is a dedication to "enlarging itself, to creating an even larger 
and more variegated ethnos-" tlie people who make up the 'we' are people "who have 
been brought up to distrust etlmocentiism. "i49 Part of tlie liberal project, tlien, is the 
expansion of w ho is included in that project, the move to include as many people in 
tliat 'we' as possible. Human solidarity is a legacy of the Enlightenment that is taken 
over but detadied from its larger metaphysical attaclmients. This solidarity comes 
not from an innate human dignity or rational power or basis in divine creation tliat 
serves to imite us, but ratiier fi'om a recognition that all haditional differences of 
religion, race, class, etc. are unimportant compared to tlie similarities w e have in 
terms of pain and humiliation (humiliation being of particular importcuice because it 
is a type of pain experienced only by humans).iso Furtiiermore, in this expemded 
solidarity lies our hope for overcoming oui' etliiioceiitrism and acculturation: "our 
best chance for tianscending our acculturation is to be brought up in a culture which  
prides itself on not being monolitliic—on its tolerance for a plurality of subcultur es 
and its willingness to listen to neighboring cultures."isi
We see here the emergence of a second reason for tlie importance of toleration 
witiiin Rorty's liberalism. The first reason is that tolerance is a legacy of liberalism 
and part of the liberal culture in wliich w e find ourselves; tlie second is that it is only 
as we encoimter difference and diversity and embrace it as part of our own culture 
that w e are able to ti'anscend our radical ethnocentrism. For this toleration to be 
realised, Rorty's project calls for an end to absolute ti'utli claims because, according to 
Rorty, they inevitably result in  exclusion, intolerance, and presumably pain and
‘47 Richard Rorty, introduction to Ohjectivit}/, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, vol. 1 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 13-15; "The Priority of Democracy to 
Philosophy," in Objectivity, Relativism, aiid Truth: Philosophical Papers, vol. 1 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 176-177.
‘48 Rorty, Contingency, p. 198; author's emphasis.
‘49 Ibid.
‘50 Ibid., pp. 192, 92.
‘5‘ Rorty, introduction to Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, p. 14.
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humiliation, tlie opposite of what our liberal culture should be seeking to attain. 
Rorty himself tiies to avoid appealing to absolute claims as he puts forward his 
political thought. He denies the claim tliat he is relying on a set of philosophical first 
principles by maintaining tliat his concern is ratlier to change the very questions tliat 
philosophy is asking, to get away from questions of metaphysics and epistemology 
because "tlie very idea of a 'fact of tiie matter' is one w e w ould be better off 
witliout."i52 Yet he does admit a moral purpose behind liis 'light-minded 
aestlieticism' towards traditional pliilosophical questions: "such philosophical 
superficiality and light-mindedness helps along tiie disenchantment of tlie world. It 
helps make the world's inhabitants more pragmatic, more tolerant, more liberal, 
more receptive to tlie appeal of insti'unieiital ratioiiality."‘53 For Rorty, the more 
disenchanted w e are, the more w e recognise tlie contingency of the world in whicli 
w e live, of the vocabularies that w e hold, and of the selves that we are, tlie more w e 
let go of questions pertaining to ti'utli and reality, in short, the more ironic w e are, tlie 
more useful we w ill be in helping to fulfil the liberal, tolerant purposes of society.
Rorty m ay w ell be right th a t p art of the liberal culture w e have inlierited is a 
desire to be ever m ore inclusive of those w ho are different. A t tlie least w e can say 
that Rorty's m ove tow ards tlie em brace of diversity is shared by a w ide range of 
contem porary political and  pliilosopliical thought that has come to be increasingly 
characterised by concern for difference. Rorty is likewise n o t alone in  attem pting to 
discern how  tliis espousal of difference interacts w ith  the public, political life of a 
society in  w liich confidence in  tlie unifying, im iversalistic notions of Reason, Truth, 
and God has been lost. If w e are indeed living "amid the debris of Reason," emd if it 
w as "on tlie tw in  pillars of 'Reason' and  'Revelation' tliat the unique balance betw een 
public and  private, universal and  particular interests tliat defined civil society was 
maintained," then it is no w onder tliat so m any today are seeking to understand, 
define, or re-im agine the p roper relationship betw een public and  private, betw een 
the universal and  tlie particular.is^ Rorty's redescription calls for leaving behind 
questions of tlie universal and  focusing on the particular w hile fostering a public 
realm  in  w hich suffering is decreased and  tolerance increased.
‘51 Rort}', "Priority of Democracy," p. 193.
153 Ibid.
154 Adam SeHgman, The Idea of Civil Society (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), 
pp. 1,11. Civil society is generally understood to be the realm between individuals and die 
state where citizens pursue social and individual ends.
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Yet to what does Üiis 'tolerance' amount? Rorty's use of tlie word is clearly 
different than that of Rawls, bordering on indifference towards competing 
subcultures, religions, and worldviews. According to Rorty, w e tolerate diversity in 
the sense that w e are not particularly bothered by the competing truth-claims or 
worldviews that are concomitant with diversity; this indifference is based on  
recognition of the contingency of all beliefs and cultures, the limitations of 
absolutism, and the need to include other cultures so tliat w e can som ehow move 
beyond our own ethnocentiism. None of this suggests tliat tlie particularity of the 
subcultures or individuals that come to be included in this ever-expanding 'we' is 
respected in its own right, nor does it leave open tlie possibility tJiat the ideals or 
values tliat tliey embody are of some enduring worth. If every tiling and everyone is 
a product of contingency and acculturation, how much respect can anytliing or 
anyone really be given? Furthermore, Rorty has no place for a toleration tliat 
involves botli diversity and disapproval. Surely if the implications of Rorty's 
recognition of contingency are anything, they are tliat no standard exists by which to 
judge others, no basis can be found by which to form disapproval, indeed no blame 
can really be placed upon those w ho hold the final vocabularies they do because 
such vocabularies are merely a result of time, chance, and acculturation.
Yet Rorty him self seems to express a disapproval of sorts, a disapproval that 
results not in  toleration for the object of wliich he disapproves but in calls for limits 
to tolerance and for dismissal. This dismissal applies to anyone who raises questions 
or issues that cannot be taken seriously by tliose who have been brought up in our 
particular historical situation, for our upbringing sets the limits of sanity and those 
who break these limits can be labelled 'crazy' and thereby dismissed. If w e recognise 
tliat human beings are centieless selves witli contingent vocabularies and histories, 
tlien w e will realise tliat no guai antee of common ground exists between tliose inside 
and tliose outside liberal society. So such mad fanatics as Nietzsche or Loyola, to use 
Rorty's examples, such "enemies of liberal democracy," may w ell be beyond tlie point 
of engagement w ith those living witliin a culture of liberal democracy and can 
tlierefore be dismissed from consideration and inclusion. Tliis has everything to do 
witli Rorty's understmiding of tlie contingency of tiutli, and, according to Rorty, "tliis 
short way of dealing witli Nietzsche and Loyola seems shockingly etluiocentric" only 
to tliose w ho are still relying on tiie idea that "anybody who is willing to listen to
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reason—to hear out all tlie arguments—can be brought around to the truthJ'i^s 
Instead of listening to the arguments or questions tliat someone like Nietzsche or 
Loyola might raise, w e need to recognise tliat
acconimodatioii and tolerance must stop short of a willingness to work within any 
vocabulary that one's interlocutor wishes to use, to take seriously any topic that he 
puts forward for discussion. To take this view is of a piece with dropping tlie idea 
that a single moral vocabulary and a single set of moral beliefs are appropriate for 
every human commmiity everywhere, and to grant that liistorical developments may 
lead us to simply drop questions and the vocabulary in which those questions are
posed.‘56
We see in Rorty's writing, as w e saw in that of Rawls, a willingness to exclude those 
witli whom  an 'overlapping consensus' cannot be reached. Indeed, these ideas of 
Rorty's emerge in an exposition of Rawls' work in which he attempts to identify 
Rawls as a fellow interpreter or 'redescriber' of liberalism after metaphysics (an 
identification tliat has not been convincing to all). The propensity for exclusion tliat 
Rorty shares witli Rawls results in tlie same problem w e identified in Rawls, namely 
tlie exclusion of many who are already a part of our liberal democratic culture. In 
Rawls' case this exclusion applies to tliose who adhere to comprehensive doctiines 
tliat are not reasonable by the standards he applies; in Rorty's case this exclusion 
seems to apply to any w ho hold comprehensive doctrines at all.
Among those excluded fi'om tlie conversation and community which Rorty 
depicts are, as Thomas Pangle identifies, such "sophisticated and intelligent 
nonliberals" as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Calvin, Thomas Aquinas, Rousseau, Aristotle, 
Marx, and Gandlii.is? Pangle notes tliat Rorty's response to such people, to tliose 
who would advocate the relevance of tlieir tiiought to the development of a richer 
public sphere, w ould be that they should privatise their ideas and rest content witli 
that. This returns us to the question of whetlier such discrete distinctions between 
our public and private lives are possible. This possibility is addressed by David 
Hollenbach, w ho argues to tlie contr ary that
there are no aii tight compartments in human consciousness, but rather a rich 
interweaving of its diverse elements. This implies that religious convictions can be 
transformed by social experience and the new emergence of new political ideas, just
‘55 Rorty, "Priority of Democracy," p. 188. 
‘56 Ibid., p. 190.
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as politics can be transformed by moral and religious belief. The interaction is 
reciprocal, a two-way street. The effort to isolate religion from politics is impossible 
given tliis view of human imderstanding.‘5s 
He goes on to suggest that the desire to restrict the interaction between religion and 
politics undermines the interplay and interconnections necessary for beliefs to be 
developed and changed, which in turn "risks precipitating the sort of 
fundamentalism, intolerance, and conflict that it seeks to prevent. "‘59 Furtiiermore, 
religion will be untrue to itself and tlieologically self-contradictory if it accepts such 
relegation to the private sphere. In Hollenbadi's estimation, Rorty recognises this 
and tlierefore ultimately pushes for secularism, or what can be called universal irony. 
The result, as O wen notes, is that despite the integral role tolerance plays in Rorty's 
project of redescription as one of the core values of liberalism, "tlie place of believers 
among Rorty's 'we' seems to be tenuous at best."‘5o
Rorty's liberalism does indeed move w ell beyond universalising notions of 
reason and trutli associated with tlie Enlightemnent, while he retains a commitment 
to certam liberal ideas whose heritage lies in the Enlightenment. Increased diversity 
and indusivity are chief among tlie liberal ideas that Rorty claims, making tolerance 
essential to Ills liberal society. Because of his miderstanding of contingency and the 
need to overcome ethnocentrism tluougli tiie embrace of difference, tolerance takes 
on even more importance in his tiiought than it does in otiier versions of liberalism. 
Yet this is tolerance understood as indifference, w h idi tiiereby encourages members 
of liberal society not to be bothered about the particulars of the differences they 
encounter. Wlien all persons, cultures, and beliefs are seen according to Rorty's view  
of contingency, without any enduring value, it is hard to find a basis for treating a 
particular person, culture, or belief as wortiiy of respect or engagement. The lack of 
common ground between people memis that no room exists for discussion between 
tliose w ho disagree because no hope exists tiiat such disagreements can be overcome. 
The lack of anytiiing universal connecting humanity means, rather ironically, that
‘57 Thomas L. Pangle, The Ennobling of Democracy: The Challenge of the Postmodern Age 
(Baltimore: Tlie Jolnis Hopkins University Press, 1992), p. 58.
‘58 David Hollenbach, "Religion and Political Life," Theological Studies 52, no. 1 (March 1991), 
p. 104.
‘59 Ibid.
‘ 60 Owen, Demise of Liberal Rationalism, p. 92. Owen's analysis of Rort}'^ 's liberalism addresses 
many details, connections, and contradictions that are beyond the scope of what could be 
covered here but were nevertheless of great benefit to this investigation. See especially pp. 
40-96.
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Rorty can offer no basis for tlie engagement of particularity. N ot only is interaction 
between differences severely resti'icted, but all those who do not readily fit into 
Rorty's liberal utopia are automatically excluded from membersliip. If this is tlie 
result of Rorty's attempts to redescribe liberalism for a post-Eiilighteranent and post­
metaphysical age, then w e may do w ell to wonder what otlier options exist, for his 
'indusivity' seems to have more do with exclusion wliile his 'tolerance' overlooks 
ratlier than recognises difference.
Such a call for recognition of difference has been clearly somided tlirough the 
multi-faceted movement known variously as tlie politics of difference, politics of 
recognition, identity politics, and/or multiculturalism. Though tliis movement 
consists of a number of disparate issues, the underlying concern is that the deep 
diversity and cultural pluralism of modern societies is ignored or stifled by most 
liberal thought.i^i Advocates of tliis politics believe that instead of abstracting from 
the particular identities of groups witliin contemporary society in the name of 
universal rights or liberal values, the identities and differences of each group should  
be recognised and accommodated. The fact that tliey seek tliis recognition in the 
public as well as tlie private sphere moves them well beyond the liberalisms of Rawls 
and Rorty.
Difference and  M ulticulturalism : A Brief Description  and  Critique
The politics of difference, or multiculturalism, represents another recent 
attempt to address tlie fact of pluralism and the breadth of diversity within  
contemporary Western society. It has not been witliout effect, nor has it escaped 
criticism. Though in some ways it moves beyond tlie minimal engagement with  
difference w e fomid in political liberalism, in other ways it continues to fail to engage 
with differences and identities in tiieir own right. Eor this reason, another group of 
thinkers operating in tiie name of difference cu'ticulates its own view  of what is 
needed for difference to be genuinely recognised and celebrated. These agonistic or 
post-Nietzschean political theorists are the next main character in the story of 
political tiieory and difference, but before turning to tiiem w e will look briefly at 
what has come to be known as the politics of difference. The critique of Stanley Fish
161 Kymllcka identifies some of these separate issues as; inuiiigration, minority nationalism, 
racism, indigenous peoples, religious groups, and gendei' equality. For a list of recent 
writings in each area, as well as recent attempts to develop a more general theory, see 
Kymllcka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, pp. 370-372.
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will provide a way into the difference between this politics of difference and 
agonistic political thought, while also raising questions about tlie viability of 
tolerance within a strongly multiculturalist political theory.
Charles Taylor offers one of the most oft-cited descriptions of the politics of 
difference, which he generally refers to as die politics of recognition in contr ast to a 
politics of universahsm,i62 From the viewpoint of a politics of universalism, it is 
essential that citizens only be recognised qua human and not by the differences tliat 
characterise them in order for their equal rights to be protected. When attention is 
paid to citizens on tlie basis of individual rather tlian miiversal identities, or to the 
different collective goals that various groups within society might have, the potential 
for bias and discrimination enters in. Rawls, with liis emphasis on political 
liberalism's concern for persons only as free and equal citizens, represents an 
example of tliis type of politics. Indeed, it is precisely conceptions of liberalism such 
as his tliat have brought fortli accusations of forced homogeneity and mhospitability 
to difference.‘53 Ri contrast to this, the politics of recognition asks tliat the unique 
identities of individuals and groups be recognised because, from this perspective, 
equal respect requires that particularity be acknowledged rather tlian 'homogenised' 
into a universal mould. Furtiiermore, proponents of the politics of difference accuse 
tlie politics of universalism of reflecting and imposing a hegemonic culture under the 
guise of neutr ality, tiiereby discriminating against other cultures in the name of equal 
dignity and universal rights.‘G4
With this latter point in mind it may become clear w hy the politics of 
difference often manifests itself in 'multiculturalism, ' or the desire to recognise, 
support, and foster interest in many cultures witliin political society rather than only 
one mainstream culture. Yet tliis move towards multiculturalism has not been 
witliout major critique. As Taylor notes, multiculturalism is often concomitant witii 
the demand that all cultures be accorded equal value, so tliat respect is given and 
value accorded to all cultures a priori, without genuine consideration of the specifics
‘62 Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in Multiculhiralism: Examining the Politics of 
Recognition, edited and introduced by Amy Gutmami (Princeton, N.J.; Princeton University 
Press, 1994), pp. 25-73.
163 Ibid., pp. 37-42,56-61.
‘64 Ibid., pp. 28-39,42-43. It may be worth noting that in Taylor's estimation, tiie politics of 
recognition has arisen because of an increased cultural emphasis on tiie importance of the 
development of personal and cultural identity. Indeed, tiie potential for identity formation 
seems to be, according to advocates of the politics of recognition, that which is universal.
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or the merits of tiie culture in question. In other words, positive judgements of 
worth are granted across the board without actual engagement w ith or recognition of 
the specificity of different group or cultural identities. Not only does tliis fail to give 
genuine respect to tiie particularity of cultures (here w e are reminded of our critique 
of Rorty's liberalism), but it also presupposes that tliose outside of the cultures and 
groups in question already have tiie necessary standards and norms for evaluating 
other cultures (that is to say, as Slavoj Zizek does, that multiculturalists seem to 
retain a privileged point of universality from which to appreciate otiier particular 
cultures properly‘6s). Stanley Fish, coming from a very different perspective, 
likewise finds this presupposition problematic. In his estimation, this reveals a 
problem witli both multiculturalism and toleration.
'Sti'ong multiculturalism,' as Fish calls it, is marked by mdiscriminatory 
respect for all cultures and valuation of difference in and of itself. This respect and 
valuation are connected w itli tolerance, which is, according to Fish, tiie first principle 
of multiculturalism. Yet tiie multicultural understanding of tolerance has to do with  
acceptance and embrace ratiier tiian eitiier disapproval or indifference, resulting in 
what Zizek calls a "multiculturalist universe of tolerance of difference, in  which  
nobody is excluded."‘66 This is inherently problematic, according to Fish, because at 
some point the culture of tiie values being tolerated will reveal itself to be intolerant, 
forcing strong multicultiualists to decide whetlier to extend tiieir toleration to 
include tiie intolerance witiiin tiie culture in question or to condemn that 
intolerance.‘67 if they decide for the former and allow intolerance to be present, 
tolerance w ill no longer be their guiding principle, but if they opt for the latter, then 
tliey deny tiie very distinctiveness of the culture tiiey were so keen to respect. Eitiier 
way, toleration is undermined.‘68
‘65 And, he continues, thereby assert their own superiority. See Slavoj Zizek, The Ticklish 
Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London: Verso, 1999), p. 216. Zizek's critique of 
multiculturalism is very different than that offered by Stanley Fish, which we go on to 
discuss, and would be interesting to addr ess m its own right, although space here does not 
permit it. For more see pp. 201-205, 215-221,
‘66 Zizek, Ticklish Subject, p. 201.
‘67 Stanley Fish, The Trouble loith Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999),
pp. 60-61.
168 Fish believes that most people opt for tire latter, or what he refers to as 'boutique 
multiculturalism,' which claims to respect and appreciate otiier cultures but does not extend 
such respect or appreciation when those cultures contradict its own values and assumptions 
(Fish, Trouble with Principle, p. 56). See also Zizek, Ticklish Subject, pp. 219-220 and Alain
73
According to Fish, the inability of multiculturalism to live up to its ideal of 
toleration is a reflection of the incoherence of tolerance itself. All proponents of 
toleration come to a point at which they must draw limits to its scope, begging the 
question of the justification behind tiiese limits. Fish believes that no justification 
exists "apart from the act of power performed by those who determine the 
boundaries, and that therefore any regime of tolerance will be founded on an 
intolerant gesture of exclusion."‘69 This critique is not offered because Fish himself 
values toleration and wants to fault liberalism for its intolerance, nor because he 
adheres to liberal ideals and views liberalism's failure as a matter that needs to be 
corrected. Instead he is criticising liberalism's claims because liberalism fails to 
recognise that conflict is our inevitable condition. Fish believes tirat democracy is 
meant to be an attempt to maintain difference in the face of inevitable conflict, not to 
force its citizens to release the particularity of tiieir truth-claims in tiie name of 
substantive notions of toleration or in the hope of harmonisation and co-operation.‘7o 
Fish calls for the recognition that politics goes "all the way down," that partisan 
agendas inform every political decision, and that the political process itself is 
inherently normative. We can then see that such liberal concepts as toleration and 
tiie division between the public and private spheres embody substantive views, and 
tliat the extent to which these views are accepted may be the extent to which those 
who hold them are in positions of power and authority.
If Fish is right, diversity and difference inevitably result in  conflict because, 
ontologically, conflict is what there is. Tliis represents a marked difference from the 
otiier theories w e have considered in this chapter. Rawls and Rorty respond to tiie 
fact of pluralism by articulating versions of political liberalism that, supposedly, 
allow particularity to flourish in the private sphere while restricting it in the public 
realm. As w e have seen, many comprehensive doctiines have to be altered, 
excluded, or dismissed for toleration to be attained witiiin tiieir different conceptions 
of liberalism, wliile neither version respects tiie integrity or particularity of religious 
or philosophical belief systems that camiot be neatly relegated to tiie private sphere. 
The politics of difference fares little better when it comes to recognising the actual 
particularity of individual and cultural identities; witii its unconditional acceptance
Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, trans. Peter Hallward (London: Verso, 
2001), p. 24.
‘69 Fish, Trouble zoith Principle, p. 167.
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of difference it leaves little room for cultures to be recognised in their own right or to 
be held up to standar ds of evaluation tliat lead to meaningful approval or tolerant 
disapproval. Given die inhactable difference upon wliich so much political theory is 
predicated, and the growing sense that such difference should be recognised in its 
particularity, what conceptions of political theory or tolerance are viable? Fish points 
tlie way towards a political theory that moves beyond tolerance in the name of 
difference while recognising tliat discussions of tolerance, difference, and political 
theory more generally are deeply impacted by tlie nature of conflict and power. It is 
to more fully developed articulations of this agonistic political Üieory tliat w e now  
turn.
7^0 Ibid., p . 301.
C h a pt e r  T hree 
Bey o n d  Liberal To ler a n c e
In tr o d u c tio n
Richard Rorty's political theory, as w e have seen, represents an attempt to 
move beyond die epistemological concerns and ambitions of die so-called 
Enlightenment project while retaining the legacy of certain liberal ideals and values 
that can form the basis of a 'postmodernist bourgeois liberalism.' Stanley Fish 
questions die very ideals that Rorty embraces, tiying to persuade his readers diat die 
recognition that politics goes all die way down precludes hope for a simple or lasting 
harmony in the midst of our diversity. Fish's emphasis on die pervasiveness of 
condict and its relation to democratic society opens a w indow into the role of 
ontology witiiin political dieory more generally. Wliile Rorty and Jolni Rawls want 
to avoid questions related to die nature of human being and 'what there is' more 
generally, William E. Connolly argues diat "every political interpretation invokes a 
set of fundamentals about necessity and possibilities of human being, about, for 
instance, the forms into wliich humans may be composed and die possible relations 
humans can establish witii n a t u r e . T h o u g h  die ontological dimension of political 
dieory is not often explicidy recognised by contemporary political tiieorists and their 
critics (as evidenced by Rawls' claim diat his political liberalism is 'political, not 
metaphysical,' witii metaphysics understood as 'what tiiere is'2) diere is, as Stephen 
K. White notes, "a curious commonality...emerging across a wide variety of 
conti'ibutions in contemporary political dieory. Increasingly tiiere is a turn to 
ontology. "3 This ontological turn is especially visible in a number of political
‘ William E. Connolly, The Ethos of Phirnlization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1995), p. 1.
2 Rawls' use of 'metaphysics' is similar to our use of 'ontology': he defines it as "at least a 
general account of what tiiere is" {Political Liberalism, paperback ed. [New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993], p. 379).
3 Stephen K. Wliite, Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory 
(Princeton. N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 3. White notes a shift in the use and 
meaning of ontology, from its traditional, restricted reference to the philosophical study of 
'being' to a general association witii die entities presupposed by scientific theories to a more 
specific reflection on the nature of human being that is part of a larger questioning of tiie 
entities tiiat have been taken for granted in the modern world. The ontological turn witli 
wliich he is concerned developed in light of a growing sense of living in 'late modernity' 
wliich concomitantly brought forth "deep reconceptualizations of human being in relation to
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Üieorists operating explicitly in the post-Nietzschean legacy, hi contrast to and in 
critique of contemporary political theorists who think their work avoids tlie reahn of 
ontology by remaining witli epistemological matters of legislative and juridical 
procedure, these theorists believe in tlie need to engage with ontological concerns as 
we attempt to create and refine political societies tliat acknowledge difference and 
particularity.
Difference is a concern common to tliese theorists, motivating their work in 
much tlie same way that the recognition of tlie fact of pluralism led Rawls to give 
tolerance such a primary place in his later theory. This concern for difference is to 
some degree simply a novel way of engaging with tiie diversity and plurality that the 
varieties of liberal tolerance whicli w e have considered tiius far are tiying to address. 
Yet the deeper ontological presuppositions held by these theorists motivate them to 
search for an engagement with difference tiiat moves beyond the tolerance foimd in 
most strands of current liberal tiieory.4 In following such thinkers as Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, these tiieorists, in varying degrees, 
stress that no political tiieory or society can fully include or incorporate all that there 
is to 'life' and 'identity,' that 'remainders' tiiat exceed our ability to capture tiiem will 
always exist, tiiat a certam amount of chaos and conflict is irreducible, and that 
power permeates every realm of political society and every articulation of political 
theory .5 This means tiiat at every point a particular configuration of identities or 
institutions within society based on contingent arrangements of power could be 
unnecessarily excluding mid doing violence to 'difference.'
In tiie name of difference, tlien, these tiieorists attempt to draw our attention 
to the ontological dimensions of all political theory, to be forthright about their own  
ontologies and the ways in which these ontologies affect their theories and tiieir
its world" (p. 5; see pp. 3-17 for a fuller account of his understanding of the ontological turn). 
Our use of the term includes its specific relation to tiie question of human being, but also 
involves questions of natme, law, design (i.e., 'what thei'e is'), which are, of course, 
inextiicably connected to tiie question of human being.
4 To give one example tiu ough which one begins to get a glimpse of tiiis, Bomiie Honig writes 
that "...the real challenge posed by tiie otiier is not whetlier or how to convert, tolerate, 
protect, or reject those who are not the same, but how to deal with difference, with those who 
resist categorization as same or other" (Bomiie Honig, Political Tlieoiy and the Displacement of 
Politics [Itiiaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press], p. 194).
3 The meaning and use of tiiese terms should become clear as we investigate post-Nietzschean 
tiieory in more detail. For an account of the development of 'agoiiism' within Foucault's 
tiiought, see Brent L. Pickett, "Foucault and the Politics of Resistance," Polity 28, no. 4 
(Summer 1996), pp. 445-466.
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concern for difference, to open our eyes to tlie role of pow er and tiie presence of 
conflict w ith in  all political and  social arrangem ents, and  to search for w ays to expand 
our pluralist im agination so that difference can be engaged w itii m ore honestiy and 
publicly. Such agonistic theory, w itii its belief in  the all-peivasive natu re  of conflict 
and its concern for diversity, is anxious about too m uch em phasis on 'harm ony' 
w ith in  political theory and  society. They follow Foucault and  Nietzsche w ho, in  
Connolly's w ords, "think tiiat tiie m ore compelling tiie drive to closure or unity  is in 
a state tiie m ore likely it is either to constitute a repressive regim e or to fom ent the 
very fragm entation it purports to fear the most. For the w orld  is n o t am enable to 
such unity ."6 h i conti'ast, tiien, to  liberal theorists, w ho are concerned to find w ays to 
fit difference into a unified political commmiity, these tiieorists prioritise diversity 
over unity. As w e tu rn  to look a t this theory in m ore detail, w e shall begin to 
understand  tiie reasons behind tliis prioritisation.
To w a rd s  t h e  Re c o g n it io n  o f  D ifferen ce ; A g o n istic  P o litica l  T h eory
Agonistic or post-N ietzschean political theorists are concerned w ith  the need 
to acknowledge the inevitability of conflict and  the all-pervasive natu re  of power. 
This involves expanding the concern for the 'big pow ers' of state, sovereignty, and 
law  th a t have historically an d  generally been the objects of consideration by liberal 
tiiinl<ers to include the m ore subtle pow er relations involved in  institutions, 
discipline, and  knowledge.^ These agonistic political tiieories are represented by 
such tiiinkers as Bonnie H onig, W illiam Corlett, S tephen K. W hite, C hantai Mouffe, 
and W illiam E. CoimoUy.s As W liite's discussion of the ontological tu rn  w ith in  some
6 Connolly, Ethos, p. 26.
2 For Foucault's contiibution to political philosophy in bringing such considerations of power 
to Hght, see Barry Allen, "Foucault and Modern Political Pliilosophy," in The Later Foucault: 
Politics and Philosophy, ed. Jeremy Moss (London; Sage, 1998), pp. 164-198. For a more typical 
liberal understanding of power as 'public power,' see Judith Shklar, "The Liberalism of Fear," 
in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), p. 29.
3 For a sampling of then drought, see Honig, Displacement of Politics; William Corlett, 
Community without Unity: A Politics ofDerridian Extravagance (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1989); Wlrite, Sustaining Affimiation; Chantai Mouffe, The Return of the Political (London: Verso, 
1993), The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000); William E. CoraroUy, Identity\Difference: 
Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), The 
Ethos ofPluralizntion, Why I am Not a Secularist (Minneapolis: University of Mhmesota Press, 
1999),
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of these political theorists concludes, a concern com m on to their tiiought seems to be 
tiie developm ent of an  etiiic or etiios tiiat is m ore sensitive and  attentive to others 
and otherness tlian tiie liberal values of tolerance and respect generally foster. This 
does no t entail wholesale rejection or d istrust of liberal dem ocracy and  its basic 
constitutional str uctures, b u t it does a t least involve re-tiiiiiking or re-im agining 
w ays of thinking about and  living out certain liberal principles and  ideals.^
To begin w ith  one exam ple of agonistic political tiieory, Bonnie H onig's 
Political Theory and the Displacement o f Politics attem pts, as tiie title suggests, to argue 
tiia t 'politics,' understood as conflict and  contestation betw een alternative 
perspectives, beliefs, and  form s of life, has been inappropriately and  indeed 
dangerously displaced from  contem porary political theory. Instead of recognising 
tiie inevitability of conflict, such  political tiieory presupposes tiiat its goal is tiie 
elim ination of conflict and dissonance. It conflates politics w itii adm inistration and 
pursues w ays to  build  consensus and  find stability through adm inistrative and 
juridical settlem ents. The underly ing assum ption of tiiese theories is th a t conflict, 
and  tlierefore ti’ue politics, can and should  be displaced, h i contrast to tiiese 'virtue 
tiieories,' as H onig calls them , stand  virtCi tiieories of politics. These tiieories 
recognise the perpetuity  of political conflict and  do no t believe that politics can be 
m aintained or overcome tlirough a particular arrangem ent of adm inistia tive and 
juridical institutions or regulations.^^
Virtue tiieorists (of w hom  Im m anuel Kant, John Rawls, and  Michael Sandel 
are her exem plary examples^i) fail to see that political tiieory cam iot involve 
overcom ing dissonances and  finding closure because subjectivity (i.e., the form ation 
of a self into a subject) an d  political system s always have rem ainders, excess, wliich 
cannot be contained w itiiin  one particular m oral or political order. D raw ing on 
Nietzsche and  H am iah A iendt, "with M achiavelli in  a m inor, supporting  role,"^^ 
H onig develops her understanding  of virtù  as the view  that institutions can never 
adequately accom m odate the identities of those w hom  they claim to represent 
because politics always has rem ainders. This recognition of rem ainders exposes the 
extent to w hich m oral and  political orders have to w ork to conceal or overcome 
resistance to their system. As w e saw  w ith  Rawls, to create his ordered political
5 Wliite, Sustaining Affirmation, p. 152.
40 Honig, Displacement of Politics, pp. 2.-3. 
44 Ibid., p. 2.
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society he has to exclude from participation all of those who disagree w ith its 
presuppositions. Based on his diagnosis of tiieir 'mireasonableness,' he feels justified 
in occluding their place in his system. In Honig's estimation, there will be people in 
every political system w ho do not fit (i.e., remainders). We need to recognise tliis as 
an indication of tlie perpetuity of political contest, instead of stifling it under the false 
pretence that all people can and w ill fit perfectly into a given system, if only that 
system can be more perfectly designed and articulated. It is tlie latter that leads to 
unrecognised and indeed unnecessary exclusion.
The recognition of remainders sei-ves another fimctioii, namely to create new  
spaces of possibility for our moral and political systems tliat more adequately allow  
for disagreement and difference. Tliis stems partly from tlie attitude of virtu  towards 
tiiese remainders, which is one of celebration because "there is vitality in a self that 
exceeds all o r d e r i n g s . T l i i s  excessive vitality exposes tlie extent to which existing 
arrangements are not natural, inevitable, or 'rational,' and opens the space for 
alternative ethical and political ideals. The virtù. perspective is related to, if not 
dependent upon, a vision of tlie self as multiple mid plural. Both Arendt mid 
Nietzsche believe that this multiplicity is the source of the self's power, energy, and 
action. The implication of tliis understanding of multiplicity as one of the conditions 
for action is for, Arendt, tliat the public realm depends upon inner multiplicity. 
Autonomy cannot, tlierefore, be accepted as a veilue or ideal because it would impose 
a false unity on a self tiiat is inevitability plural and erase the source of energy mid 
action necessary for the existence of tiie public realm.44 For the virtù  tiieorist, "tiie 
imier multiplicity of the self mid tiie plurality of tiie republic are conditions of action 
and politics. Both evidence space and belie, indeed resist, s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n . "is
Honig wonders if, by acknowledging the inevitability of remainders and 
dropping the demand that all subjects fit into one system, w e might decrease the 
propensity for self-loatiiing, vengemice, and violence that often result in mid towards 
tliose who do not fit into tiiat system. Similar concerns mark the work of William 
Corlett, w ho advocates "a supplementary approach" to politics tlirough recognition 
of "tiie remainder, the difference that camiot be reduced to o p p o s i t i o n ,  "is He thmks
12 Ibid., p. 3.
13 Ibid., p. 39.
14 Ibid., p. 83.
15 Ibid., p. 117.
15 Corlett, Community without Unity, pp. xvi, xvii.
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tlia t current political theory and  discourse, dom inated by tlie debate betw een 
political liberalism  and  com m unitarianism , are characterised by binary oppositions, 
such as black-white an d  m an-w om an, that fail to take into account bo th  pow er 
differentials and  the play or excess th a t cannot be fully captured in  sim ple polarities. 
Drawing from  the w ork of Foucault and  Derrida, he argues that bo th  sides of the 
com m unitarian-liberal debate fail to recognise tlie rem ainder th a t is n o t captured 
tiuough their tiieories and, therefore, do no t know  tlie cost of tlie exclusion of tliis 
excess. As he w rites, "the Foucauldian critique of ignoring w ha t is left ou t m  order to 
produce intelligible argum ents w ithin discourse has changed political theory,"i7 
Critics operating in Foucault's legacy "draw  attention to the scraps, the fringe, the 
recalcitr an t m aterial th a t resists tlie production of reasonable d i s c o u r s e ."is This leads 
to Corlett's proposal of com m unity w itliout unity: unity  is im possible if there is 
always excess, if difference is irreducible to binary opposition, if one recognises that 
underlying the diversity w e encounter in  everyday life are n o t order and  unity  bu t 
"forces of m adness, oblivion, delusion, accident, or chaos."i^
W e can begin to see certain com m on tliemes em erging, particularly  tlie desire 
to question the term s and  sufficiency of the current debate w ith in  political theory.
The recognition of chaos and  conflict a t die ontological level, am ong other tilings, 
seems to lead tiiese theorists to w onder w hether the theories subm itted  by political 
liberal or com m unitarian tiiinkers are inevitably closed to the possibility of real 
tolerance of or engagem ent w ith  difference. We can appreciate H onig 's desire to 
draw  attention to 'rem ainders' in  order to facilitate m ore honesty abou t how  w e deal 
w itii those w ho do no t fit into a given political theory or system. Instead of labelling 
such rem ainders 'unreasonable,' as Rawls is w ont to do, or 'crazy,' as Rorty does, 
tiiereby excluding m any people from  inclusion in  political society, even m any w ho 
are already p art of our liberal dem ocratic culture, H onig is seeking a w ay to 
recognise and  be m ore open to the excesses th a t will always exist w ith in  a given 
society. We can also appreciate her concern th a t ignoring tiie inevitably and 
perpetually  conflictual natu re of politics and  naïvely assum ing th a t the agonistic 
elem ent can be overcom e w itiiin  a political arrangem ent m ay resu lt in  dangerous, 
because unexpected, eruptions of the agon. Furtiierm ore, as N. J. Rengger points out.
17 Ib id ., p . 37 .
18 Ib id .
19 Ib id ., p . 71 .
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w hen politics is displaced an d  its conflictual nature obscured from  view  in  the 
m anner described by Honig, w e are prone to accept arrangem ents as tliey are; this 
puts us in danger of losing tlie ability to question or retliink the nature , convictions, 
identities, and  sym bols of our society and  its political and social institutions as tliey 
currently stand .20 Corlett's desire to m ove beyond the polarities th a t dom inate 
contem porary political tiieory an d  society offers one w ay of helping us rethink some 
of tliose sym bols and  ideas, and  of w orking tow ards m oving beyond the 
com m unitarian-liberal polarity th a t provides tlie accepted conceptual fram ew ork for 
m ost understandings of dem ocratic theory and  citizenship .21
A nd yet som e prelim inary questions raised by these approaches to political 
tiieory also emerge. Does Corlett, in  seeking to overcome certain polarities, no t 
sim ply replace them  w itli otiier polarities, assum ing, for example, tlia t unity  and 
diversity m ust always be held  in  polar opposition? Or is he right, and  perhaps more 
honest than  m ost, that if chaos and  conflict reign a t tlie ontological level then  any 
hope for unity  w itliin  a com m unity is lost? If w e take seriously tlie idea th a t the self 
and the republic exceed all attem pts a t ordering and  systém atisation, w h a t level of 
stability in a political society is really attainable? H onig assures us th a t points of 
stability are available and  tliat political order is still possible, b u t the m iexpected, 
unpredictable nature of the disruptions provided  by the rem ainders and  excess 
surely renders our attem pts to foster order and stability problematic. Further, does 
Honig 'ontologize' chaos and  contingency to such an  extent tliat those w ho  have 
different ontologies, w ho presuppose a level of order and  flexibility a t the ontological 
level and  concom itantly desire order and flexibility a t tlie political level, w ould  end 
up  being excluded rem ainders w ith in  her political s o c ie ty ? ^ 2
The issues raised in  these questions w ill be d raw n to our attention again, as 
will areas th a t w e can appreciate for tiieir help in  expanding our political and  
pluralist im agination, as w e look in  m ore detail a t tw o further agonistic political 
theorists. Chantai M ouffe and  W illiam Coimolly.
20 N.J. Rengger, Political Theory, Modernity and Postmodernity: Beyond Enlightenment and Critique 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 8.
2* For more on the problems raised by the miquahfied acceptance of the 'common conceptual 
binary' of liberalism: communitarianism, see Mary G. Dietz, "Merely Combating tlie Plu'ases 
of Tills World: Recent Democratic Theory," Political Theory 26, no. 1 (Feb 1998), pp. 112-139.
22 As Fish points out, Rawls would be one of these remainders. In Fish's opinion, "what 
[Honig] does not see is that opemiess to revision as a principle is itself a form of closure"
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C h a n t  AL M o u ffe 's Retu r n  o f  t h e  Po litic a l
Similar to  H onig's concern over tlie displacem ent of politics. C hantai Mouffe 
is interested in  tlie 'political,' understood as the irreducible antagonism  inherent in  
hum an  relations, and  the extent to w hich contem porary political theory fails to 
recognise it  and therefore unsuccessfully, and dangerously, seeks to elim inate it.23 In 
M ouffe's usage tlie political does no t concern only a certain sphere of society or 
particular institutions w itliin  that sphere, b u t refers m ore broadly to the dim ension 
of antagonism  "tliat is inheren t to every hum an  society and th a t determ ines our very 
ontological condition. "24 The illusion of m ost contem porary variants of liberalism  is 
tliat w itliin conditions of pluralism  a consensus can be attained w ithou t som e degree 
of exclusion and  antagonism  (Rawls' overlapping consensus being one obvious 
example). How ever, tlie very concept of a democracy im plies the existence of a 
people th a t belong to th a t demos (i.e., fiiends) as opposed to tliose w ho  are excluded 
from  it (i.e., enem ies ) .25 This understanding  of die political as connected to the 
creation of relations of friend and  enemy, the establislunent of an  'us' versus 'tliem,' is 
d raw n from  Carl Sclmiitt.26 According to Mouffe, he w as concerned, am ong other 
things, to correct the (over)em phasis of certain str ands of liberalism  on the struggle 
betw een individuals and  tlie pow er of the state by draw ing attention to  the 
im portance of the pow er a t w ork w itliin tlie form ation of collective identities. In 
constructing collective identities an  "us' has to be identified and  delim ited from  a 
'them.' Tills helps explain M ouffe's insistence on tlie irreducible antagonism
(Stanley Fish, The Trouble xoith Principle, [Cambridge, Mass.: Haivaid University Press, 1999], 
p. 235).
23 Mouffe uses the 'political' where Honig uses 'politics,' namely to refer to the dimension of 
conflict within relations. She uses 'politics' in reference to the "tlie ensemble of practices, 
discourses and institutions which seek to establish a certain order and organize human 
coexistence in conditions tliat ar e always potentially conflictual because they are affected by 
tlie dimension of ‘tlie political'" {Democratic Paradox, p. 101).
24 Mouffe, Return of the Political, p. 3.
25 With this understanding, Mouffe caimot but find recent attempts to articulate a 'global 
democracy’ problematic, a topic to which we will return below.
25 Mouffe engages wiüi Carl Sclunitt's work throughout her writings (and has edited The 
Challenge of Carl Schmitt [London: Verso, 1999]). She acknowledges his unfortunate political 
evolution (he joined tlie Nazi party in 1933) while maintaining tliat we can learn from his 
earlier insights. She, likewise, does not support all of the conclusions he draws, but instead
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involved in  politics. As she w rites, "when w e accept tliat every identity  is relational 
and  that the condition of existence of every identity  is the affirm ation of a difference, 
tlie determ ination of an  'other' th a t is going to play tlie role of a 'constitutive outside,' 
it is possible to understand  how  antagonism s arise."27 The very constitution of a 
given identity  happens as a pattern  of pow er relations establishes w h a t w ill be 
included and  w hat excluded in  tliat identity; tliis m eans that every identity  is 
constituted by both  the 'other' in  contrast to wliich its ow n identity  w as form ed and 
die acts of pow er w hich determ ined that relationsliip. This is w hy pow er has to be 
recognised in  its place a t d ie heart of our attem pts to create and  sustain a political 
order.28
W idi diis understand ing  of die constitutive nature of pow er, politics becomes 
the attem pt to create order and  find m iity w ith in  a context m arked by exclusion and  
conflict. The goal is to find w ays of organising pow er and relations of pow er tiiat are 
m ost com patible w itii dem ocratic values, especially die values of liberty and  
equality. It is die creation of an  agonistic pluralism , one tiiat has converted 
antagonism  to 'agonism ' by chaimelling passions in  w ays tiiat allow for collective 
expression and identification and  for "a vibran t clash of dem ocratic political 
positions" that m arks a w ell-functioning democracy.29 It likewise enables enemies to 
be converted to 'adversaries' w ho share die same symbolic space b u t disagree over 
how  tiiat space should  be organised. Mouffe identifies this understanding  of 
adversaries, as 'friendly enem ies' w itii w hom  w e disagree wliile acknow ledging tiieir 
righ t to p u t forw ard their ideas, w ith  "the real m eaning of liberal-dem ocratic 
tolerance, w hich does no t entail condoning ideas tiiat w e oppose or being indifferent 
to standpoints that w e disagree witii, b u t treating tliose w ho defend them  as 
legitimate opponents. M ouffe's intention in  her political tiieory is no t to leave 
beliind liberal ideals b u t to  create a 'radical and  plural democracy' th a t enables a 
fuller realisation of those ideals. Indeed, she believes tiiat dem ocracy itself is 
jeopardised w hen  tiie irreducibility of antagonism  goes unrecognised. She sees 
herself trying to rescue liberal dem ocracy from  tiie proponents of political liberalism.
states her objective as "to think witii Schmitt, against Schmitt, and to use Iris insights in order 
to str engthen liberal democracy against Iris critiques" (Return of the Political, p. 2).
27 Mouffe, Return of the Political, p. 2.
28 Mouffe, Democratic Paradox, pp. 21, 99.
29 Ibid., p. 104.
30 Ibid., p. 102.
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as well as advocates of identity  politics and unfettered pluralism , w hose inadequate 
assum ptions and  goals Üueaten to underm ine it^i
H ow  so? In p art the insufficiency of m ost contem porary political tliinking 
stems, according to Mouffe, from  its failure to recognise the paradoxical natu re of 
m odern  democracy. This paradox stem s from  tlie convergence of tw o distinct 
tr aditions, liberalism  an d  democracy, tliat each stand  for different ideas an d  id e a ls .3 2  
Though today w e m ight be tem pted to assum e that tlie tw o always go togetlier, 
Mouffe rem inds us tliat dem ocracy is a form  of rule that has existed an d  can be 
exercised w itliin  various symbolic fram ew orks (so, for example, A tiienian democracy 
existed w ell before the developm ent of liberalism). The symbolic fram ew ork in  
which it is exercised today is heavily influenced by the liberal discourse of hum an 
rights, ind ividual liberty, an d  the rule of law. The dem ocratic tradition , on  the other 
hand , stands for political equality an d  the sovereignty of tlie people. W here the 
form er could be said  to be concerned w ith  human rights, w ith  reference to people 
generally or universally, tlie latter is concerned w itli political rights, associated witli 
people w ith in  a given demos. The consensus th a t currently exists betw een these 
ti aditions w as no t attained w ithou t conflict and com prom ise, w hile even today the 
logic of each stands in  a constitutive tension w ith  the other th a t needs to  be 
constantly negotiated.
A brief look a t how  equality m ight be understood w ith in  liberalism  and  
democracy, respectively, m ay help to further illustrate how  Mouffe conceives of 
these traditions an d  w hat the tension betw een them  entails. A liberal invocation of 
equality usually involves an  understanding  tliat every person is equal to every otiier 
person and  th a t hum an  rights should be indiscrim inately and  universally accorded 
to all. Democracy's use of equality has m ore to do w itii tlie equal standing  of people 
w itiiin  a given political society, w h a t w e generally refer to as the sovereignty of the 
people. In short, Mouffe believes tiiat democracy, by definition, requires tiiat a 
distinction be m ade betw een those w ho belong to the demos and  tliose w ho  do  not.
Its concern w ith  tiie rule of the people necessarily involves a lim it to w ho is included 
in  'the people,' w hich is incom patible w ith  the universal rhetoric of liberalism . Ideas
32 See especially ibid., pp. 99-105; Return of the Political, pp. 7-8.
32 Tlu'oughout her discussion of this tension Mouffe is drawing heavily on the critique offered 
by Sclunitt. See Democratic Paradox, pp. 36-59. For a different perspective that also draws 
attention to tiie relationship between liberalism and democracy, see Benjamin R. Baiber,
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of a global democracy or a 'democracy of m ankind ' are unrealisable, according to 
Mouffe, because they d raw  on universal, abstract conceptions th a t lack tlie specificity 
needed to give tliem  m eaning ("equality can only exist through its specific m eaning 
in  specific spheres—as political equality, economic equality, and  so forth"^^). W hen it 
comes to equality w ith in  dem ocratic conceptions, tliose w ho do n o t belong to die 
demos in question are in  some significant sense no t equal to those w ho do belong to it 
because tliey do n o t receive the same political rights. Furtiierm ore, no  guarantee 
exists tliat die decisions m ade d irough democratic procedure will n o t com prom ise 
w ha t w e generally consider hum an  rights. Even though limits are set on tiie 
sovereignty of the people, usually in  tiie nam e of liberty and the protection of hum an 
rights, die m eaning of tiiese rights a t any given m om ent depends u p o n  how  tiie 
prevailing hegem ony defines t iie m .3 4  There is always, therefore, a tension betw een 
the ideals of liberalism  and  tliose of democracy.
Ratiier than  seeing this tension as tiie cause of tiie dem ise or inevitable failure 
of liberal dem ocracy, Mouffe views it as liberal democracy's constitutive element. It 
provides a very im portan t dynam ic th a t keeps the two had itions in  check, so tiiat 
neitiier tiie 'abstract universalism ' of liberalism  nor the exclusiveness of dem ocracy 
com pletely w ins tiie day.^s O n tiie flip side, failure to recognise this contradictory 
nature an d  the degree to w hich stabilisations found at any one tim e are only 
contingent, hegem onic resolutions of this conflict has negative, dangerous 
consequences. W ithout this recognition we assum e that the w ay pow er relations are 
currently configured is tiie w ay tliey m ust be configured according to natu re ('tiie 
w ay tilings are') and  we tiiereby lose the ability and resources to question that 
configuration. The acknow ledgem ent of conflict and  hegem ony enables us to re- 
envisage the status quo, the curren t ordering of tiie tension inherent in  liberal 
democracy, so that a fuller realisation of the ideals of each rem ains p o s s ib le .3 5
"Liberal Democracy and tiie Costs of Consent," in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy L. 
Rosenblum (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 54-68.
33 Mouffe, Democratic Paradox, p. 39.
34 Her use of hegemony draws upon her earlier work with Ernesto Laclau, Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London; Verso, 1985). Based on a 
questioning of tire objectivism and essentialism that mark much of democratic theory, and tire 
idea that "any social objectivity is constituted through acts of power" and is therefore political, 
she uses hegemony to refer to the point of confluence between objectivity and power 
(Democratic Paradox, p. 21).
35 Mouffe, Democratic Paradox, pp. 44-45.
35 Ibid., pp. 2-6,39-40,44-45.
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Mouffe, w liile recognising th a t a t one time such conflict and  tension w ere 
acknow ledged w ith in  political tiiought, is concerned about the degree to w hich 
contem porary 'neo-liberalism ' rests upon  assum ptions of the possibility of rational 
consensus and  social harm ony .37 She has in  m ind the paradigm  of dem ocracy that 
w as inaugurated  w itli Rawls' A  Tlteory o f Justice and w liich she finds represented by 
die two m ain  schools of Rawls and  Jürgen H aberm as .3» She finds such  tiieories 
united  around  die belief tiia t it  is possible and  necessary to reach a m oral consensus 
ill tiie public realm  th a t will reconcile the ideals of liberalism  and dem ocracy,39 But 
rational consensus in tiie public sphere cannot be attained because "every consensus 
exists as a tem porary result of a provisional hegem ony, as a stabilization of pow er, 
a n d .. .it always entails som e form  of exclusion."40 To forget this, to overlook the 
conflictual nature of tiie politicEil tiiat inhabits every consensus, is to open  tiie w ay to 
overlooking and  disguising tiie exclusions that necessarily exist u n d er any 
consensus, and  tlierefore to close the door to the m ultiplicity of voices th a t com prise 
contem porary pliualism .
One could w onder how  Mouffe levels this claim against Rawls considering 
tiie extent to w hich his later w ork is form ulated in  light of his recognition of 
inevitable disagreem ent, incom patible com prehensive doctiines, and  tiie fact of 
pluralism . Yet w hen  Rawls uses 'political' it is to differentiate liis version of 
liberalism from  a com prehensive doctrine n o t to recognise an  elem ent of conflict or 
antagonism  w itiiin  politics. H is 'political' has to do witii, as Mouffe puts it, "a m ode 
of reasoning wliich is specific to m oral discourse and  w hose effect w hen  applied  to 
tiie field of politics is to reduce it  to a ratioiiEil process of negotiation am ong private 
interests under the constraints of m orality. So conflicts, antagonism s, relations of 
pow er, form s of subordination and  repression sim ply disappear...."^r Likewise, 
tiiough he recognises the existence of inevitable disagreem ent betw een com peting 
com prehensive doctrines, he assum es that if tiiese doctrines are left o u t of the public 
realm  a substantive, m oral, stable overlapping consensus is attainable. Tlir ough tiie 
use of devices such as tiie original position and  tiie veil of ignorance an d  the
37 She writes of two different levels of 'neo-liberalism,' one of political theory, tiie other of 
political practice as seen in advocates of a 'tiiird way' such as Tony Blair and Bill Clinton. We 
are concerned here only witii the former.
38 Mouffe, Democratic Paradox, p. 81.
39 Ibid., p. 83
40 Ibid., p. 104.
42 Mouffe, Return of the Political, p. 49.
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articulation of suitable principles of justice, a sustainable consensus can be identified 
that will keep order a t the political realm  w hile allowing for disagreem ent in  private.
Furtherm ore, Rawls' theory does no t acknowledge the political elem ent 
involved in  establishing a definition of the 'reasonable.' In  the nam e of creating an  
inclusive, pluralist, to lerant society, Rawls' liberalism  does no t allow the 
participation of anyone w hose view s are considered um easonable. h i other w ords, 
"exclusions can be denied by declaring tliat tliey are the p roduct of the 'free exercise 
of practical reason' th a t establishes tlie limits of possible consensus. W hen a point of 
view is excluded it is because tliis is required  by tlie exercise of reason; tlierefore tlie 
frontiers betw een w hat is legitim ate and  w hat is no t legitim ate appear as 
independent of pow er relations. "42 histead of recognising tlia t the creation of a 
political society necessarily involves an  original exclusion, Rawls w rites as if a fully 
inclusive political society w as possible if only all people w ould  act reasonably and 
rationally. Likewise, instead of acknowledging tliat the criteria for inclusion in  his 
society are political, involving a t least a certain level and  kind of pow er in  being able 
to define tlie term s of inclusion (i.e., w h a t is 'reasonable'), instead of creating space 
for passions and  antagonism  to interact w ith in  established fram ew orks, he operates 
as if each of tiiese elem ents is w itliout relevance or influence w itliin a w ell-ordered 
society. M ouffe's concern is that "it is no t enough to elim inate the political in  its 
dim ension of antagonism  and  exclusion from  one's theory to m ake it  vanish  from  the 
real w orld. It does come back, and w itli a vengeance.. .far from  being conducive to a 
m ore reconciled society, tliis type of approach ends up  by jeopardizing dem ocracy."43
A m uch m ore adequate approach, according to Mouffe, is one tliat lets go of 
tlie goal of perfect social harm ony and realises the full extent and im plications of 
pluralism . O bviously som e level of consensus is necessary for any political society to 
function, and  M ouffe acknowledges this. A t the same time, she is asking that 
unachievable ideals of consensus and harm ony be abandoned. By asking us to 
abandon a picture of dem ocratic society as "a society that w ould  have realized tlie 
dream  of a perfect harm ony in  social relations," Mouffe believes she is opening the 
w ay for tlie realisation of radical and  p lural d e m o c r a c y .44 Pluralism , in M ouffe's 
estim ation, is tlie central question around  wliich m odern dem ocracy revolves. It is
42 Mouffe, Democratic Paradox, p. 31.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., p. 22.
w hat distinguishes dem ocracy today from  democracy in ancient times. By pluralism  
she does no t m ean  m erely the fact of pluralism  th a t w as so influential for Rawls' 
developm ent of political liberalism. Instead, she takes pluralism  as an  axiological 
principle tliat is constitutive of m odern  democracy and  should be celebrated and 
increased. In her definition, pluralism  is "the end of a substantive idea of tiie good 
life."45 It has everytiiing to do w itii "tiie dissolution of the m arkers of certainty," a 
quote from  C laude Lefort th a t appears frequently in  her writings .45 The effects of 
pluralism , of tiie recognition that values are p lural in  tiieir very nature , can be seen 
on tiie symbolic level, transform ing tiie ordering of our social relations. W hen it 
comes to democracy, pluralism  m eans th a t "we should acknow ledge and  valorize tiie 
diversity of w ays in  w liich the 'democratic game' can be played, instead of trying to 
reduce tiiis diversity to a uniform  m odel of citizensliip. This w ould  m ean  fostering a 
plurality  of forms of being a dem ocratic citizen and creating the institutions tiia t 
w ould m ake it possible to follow the dem ocratic rules in  a plurality  of w ays."47
Mouffe does n o t w an t to see pluralism  addressed m erely as an  em pirical fact 
that requires us to find procedures to deal w itii differences, w ith  tiie end  result being 
tiiat those differences in  tiieir particularity are deem ed irrelevant (as in  Rawls' 
tiieory). Nor, it is im portan t to point out, does she seek an  unfettered p luralism  that 
celebrates all differences w ithou t limits. The latter, in  her estim ation, too easily liides 
the w ay in  w hich certain differences are a result of subordination and  need to be 
challenged ratiier than  accepted by a radical democracy. The former, on  the otiier 
hand, fails to recognise tiiat the "homogeneity and unanim ity" it advocates 
necessarily involve exclusion and  furtherm ore does no t give difference any positive 
value .45 M ouffe's radical democracy, on tiie contiary, "dem ands th a t w e 
acknowledge difference—the particular, tiie m ultiple, tiie heterogeneous...," in short, 
she is w orking tow ards "a new  kind of articulation betw een the universal and  tiie 
particular."49 This articulation involves a rejection no t of m odernity  in  its entirety, 
bu t of certain assum ptions of m odernity  related to w h a t Mouffe calls "the 
Enlightem nent project of self-foundation. "5° It is no t necessary to seek to  find 
foundations for our dem ocratic project th rough reason and  rationality. O n the
45 Ibid., p. 18.
45 For example, see ibid.
47 Ibid., p. 73.
48 Ibid., pp. 19-20,134-135.
49 Mouffe, Return of the Political, p. 13.
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conü'ary, appeals to rationality erase diversity and  create false, dangerous dream s of 
die attainm ent of a fully inclusive consensual political society. Furtiierm ore, "when 
w e realize that, far from  being the necessary result of a m oral evolution of m ankind, 
liberal dem ocracy is an  ensemble of contingent practices, w e can understand  that it is 
a conquest tliat needs to be protected as well as d e e p e n e d .
Similarly, w e need to operate w ith  an  understanding  of citizensliip tliat 
recognises the contingency of identity. Rather than  operating w ith  tlie 
understanding  of the h um an  subject upon  w hich political liberalism  relies, nam ely a 
rational or utilitarian  right-bearing individual w ho stands independen t of the society 
of w hich he or she is a part, Mouffe calls us to understand  subjects as decentred, 
m ultiple, and  conti'adictory. O ur identity  is never fully established b u t alw ays open 
and am biguous, based on our participation in a plurality  of com m unities, social 
relations, and  discourses, A m odern  dem ocratic project is no t characterised by 
pluralism  only in  relation to a m ultiplicity of approaches to the good life, b u t also in 
relation to the m ultiplicity of each subject. As Mouffe w rites,
we are in fact always multiple and contr adictory subjects, inlrabitants of a diversity of 
communities (as many, really, as the social relations in wliich we participate and the 
subject positions they define), consti'ucted by a variety of discour ses, and 
precariously and temporarily sutured at tlie intersection of those subject positions. 
Hence the importance of the postmodern critique for developing a political 
pliilosophy aimed at making possible a new form of individuality tliat would be tr uly 
plural and deniocratic.52
W ith tills understand ing  of w ha t it m eans to be a subject, one needs to radically re- 
tiiink w h a t it m eans to be a dem ocratic citizen. Again, plurality is the key: "this 
w ould m ean fostering a plurality  of forms of being a dem ocratic citizen and  creating 
tiie institutions that w ould  m ake it possible to follow tiie dem ocratic rules in  a 
plurality  of w ay s ."ss in  Mouffe's use citizensliip becomes no t just a legal status or 
one identity  am ong m any b u t a form  of identification w ith  the res publica and  its 
etiiico-political values of liberty and  equality. It is a m eans for cultivating a conm ion 
political identity, while recognising tiiat those involved in  tiiis political society have 
different purposes and  various interpretations of the good. In  otiier w ords, the
50 Ibid., p. 12.
52 Ibid., p. 145.
52 Ibid., pp. 20-21; see also pp. 12,77; Démocratie Paradox, p. 95.
53 Mouffe, Democratic Paradox, p. 73.
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principles of liberty and  equality can provide a  'gi'ammar' of political conduct around 
which citizens are united  even as they disagree about how  tliose principles are to be
interpreted  54
The reader versed in post-structuralist, post-Nietzschean, or so called post­
m odern w ritings w ill have recognised m any familiar ideas in  M ouffe's political 
thought. M ouffe follows tlie political tlieorists w e investigated in  the last chapter in 
calling into question the larger epistemological presuppositions of tlie Enlightenm ent 
while seeking to  retain  w h a t she calls the m odern dem ocratic project. A t the same 
time, she seeks to radicalise dem ocracy as w e know  it, bringing recognition of the 
meradicable nature of conflict, tire constitutive role of power, and  tlie contingency of 
social relations and  identity  to  the fore for the sake of liberal dem ocracy itself. In her 
estim ation, no thing less is a t stake. One can see in  her anti-essentialism  the influence 
of Michel Foucault, Jacques D errida, and  Ludw ig W ittgenstein, though  only tlie 
latter tw o receive explicit engagem ent in  her work. W hen it comes to D errida, she 
uses liis idea of tlie 'constihitive outside' in her account of the form ation of collective 
political identities; every social objectivity is constituted in  relation to w h a t it is not, 
in  relation to an  otherness tliat is outside no t in m ere opposition to the inside b u t as 
die condition of die em ergence of die inside, diereby "showing die radical 
undecidability of the tension of its constitution."55 The constant presence of this 
undecidability leads to die conclusion d ia t "politicization never ceases.... Every 
consensus appears as a stabilization of som etiiing essentially unstable and  chaotic."56
W lien it  comes to W ittgenstein, Mouffe uses him  to explore a new  w ay of 
approaching political questions tiiat breaks w itii die "universalizing and 
hom ogenizing m ode that has inform ed m ost of liberal theory since H obbes."57 
Drawing upon W ittgensteinian insights, she is led to em phasise die contextual 
nature of liberal dem ocracy and  the w ay in  w liich liberal dem ocratic practices, 
institutions, and  values constitute one possible 'language game' or 'gram m ar' by 
w liich political life can be ordered. This is of crucial im portance to  M ouffe's attem pts 
to re-envisage dem ocracy because, in  her estim ation, it enables us to leave behind the 
pretence d ia t dem ocratic values can be stiengthened and  proliferated by offering 
liberal dem ocracy as d ie rational, universal, context-transcendent answ er to die
54 Mouffe, Return of the Political, pp. 65-73; Democratic Paradox, pp. 95-98.
55 Mouffe, Democratic Paradox, p. 12.
56 Ibid., p. 136. See pp. 12-13, 21-22,135-137.
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question of social coexistence. For dem ocratic values to ti'uly be instilled w e need to 
recognise th a t identification w itli dem ocratic values happens th rough  a complex 
process of practices, discourse, and  language-games.ss In applying tlie insights of 
W ittgenstein and  D errida, Mouffe hopes to find "a new  w ay of tiiinking about 
democracy that departs fundam entally  from  the dom inant-rationalist approach. A 
dem ocratic thinking th a t incorporates tlieir insights can be m ore receptive to the 
m ultiplicity of voices th a t a p luralist society encom passes and  to the need  to allow 
them  forms of expression instead of striving tow ards harm ony and  consensus. "59 
We see here, as w e saw  in  Corlett's w riting, firmly held  assum ptions about 
seemingly inevitable dichotomies. P lurality or harm ony. M uch depends upon  how  
each of tiiese term s is defined, a m atter to wliich w e will re tu rn  in our discussion of 
Connolly's work, b u t w e can nevertiieless raise questions as to w hy these are 
necessarily and  alw ays incom patible. We m ay recall tliat, in  M ouffe's estim ation, 
pluralism  is the defining and  disthiguishing characteristic of m odern  dem ocracy and 
once w e realise its full im plications we will relinquish false, dangerous dream s of 
harm ony and consensus. Yet some w ould  contend, as Nancy Rosenblum  does, that 
pluralism  is and historically has always been tlie heart of liberalism.^o A gain 
different definitions of tlie term s in  use m ust be addressed, bu t tlie least th a t can be 
said is tliat th roughout its history liberal thought has prim arily been concerned w ith  
finding a level of harm ony w ithin  conditions of pluralism ; for Mouffe to  operate as if 
tiiey are inevitably opposed is clearly a 'radical' shift in  political tiiinking tlia t m ay 
need m ore explanation. It also m ay need to be reckoned w itii m ore fully by Mouffe 
herself, as it is no t clear th a t she carries the im plication of this polarisation all tlie 
w ay tlirougli. If instability is so pervasive that every consensus is "a stabilisation of 
som etiiing essentially unstable and  cliaotic," if w e take seriously tlie sentim ent of one 
of her epigraphs, "Alas, poor race of m ortals, unhappy  ones, from  w h a t conflicts and 
w hat groans you w ere born," can w e then realistically hope to find or atta in  any level 
of stability or order w itiiin political society?6i W ith such ontological presuppositions 
can w e tliink we will find even tiie m inim al level of consensus necessary for liberal 
democracy to function? Clearly Mouffe tiiiiiks w e can, b u t it  m ay well be, as M ary G,
57 Ibid., p. 61.
58 Ibid., p. 70.
59 Ibid., p. 77.
69 Nancy L. Rosenblum, "Pluralism and Self-Defense," in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. 
Nancy L. Rosenblum (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 220.
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Dietz suggests, tliat Mouffe can only hold this hope because her desire for 
reconciliation dilutes and  ultim ately overcomes her ow n account of radical agonistic 
dem ocracy ,62 Fish concurs, w riting  tliat "taming politics is finally w hat Mouffe has in  
m ind, despite her pronouncem ents to the contrary. "63
Mouffe and  H onig, according to Fish, fall prey to tlie sam e lure, nam ely the 
lure of tiiinking tiiat becom ing aw are of an  inescapable condition enables one to 
escape, even in  some sm all m easure, th a t c o n d it io n .6 4  Mouffe is concerned to  bring 
to view  the forces of conflict an d  antagonism  at play in  our identities, institutions, 
and practices, b u t w e can w onder, along w itli Fish, if m ere recognition of these forces 
equips us to account for tliem  w ith in  our tiiinking and  practices, particularly if they 
are as unruly  as M ouffe suggests. Or could it  be tliat to Üiiiik th a t w e can recognise 
the political assum es that w e can distance ourselves from  our p resen t situation 
enough to see conflict for w h a t it is? A nd yet, if w e are as entangled in conflict and 
contingency as Mouffe claims, no such view  w ould  be p o s s ib le .6 3  The assum ption at 
w ork w ith in  M ouffe's w riting  tliat she herself occupies som e sort of neu tra l position 
from w hich she is able to recognise conflict and  develop a political tlieory to 
accoimiiodate it m ay actually serve to align her m ore closely w itli tlie positions of 
neutrality  she is r e fu t in g .6 6
This raises the question of how  m uch Mouffe actually 'radicalizes' political 
liberalism. Clearly qualitative differences exist betw een her assum ptions and  tliose 
of the theorists an d  political activiste to w hom  she is responding. Indeed, she raises 
very im portan t points tliat have been neglected w itliin recent political theory. Tlie 
subtle w ays in w hich pow er w orks w ith in  and  on our social relations, above and 
beyond the m ore obvious influences of, for example, the sovereign state, is surely 
som ething of w hich we need to be constantly aware. Recognising a level of 
contingency mid hegem ony w ith in  current configurations of institutions and  identity 
does enable us to question the status quo in  the hope of further realising the ideals to 
w hich w e adhere. W itliout this, w e m ay well be prone to let particular injustices and
61 Mouffe, Démocratie Paradox, p. 136; Return of the Political, p. viii.
62 Dietz, "Pluases of Tills World," pp. 112-133.
63 Fish, Trouhle with Principle, p. 236.
64 Ibid.
65 For a diagnosis of a similar tension in Foucault's work, see Slavoj Zizek, The Ticklish Subject: 
The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London; Verso, 1999), p. 174.
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exclusions unquestioningly stand. Mouffe's aw areness of the tension betw een 
liberalism  and  dem ocracy also serves as a welcome rem inder for those w ho assum e 
the tw o have alw ays gone together. A t the sam e time, despite her desire to 
em phasise dem ocracy, based in  the belief th a t w e have lost sight of the dem ocratic 
com ponent of liberal dem ocracy, her concerns do no t seem  far rem oved from  those 
generally attribu ted  to liberalism. Judith  Shldar w rites tiiat the one overrid ing aim  of 
liberalism is "to secure tlie political conditions tlia t are necessary for the exercise of 
personal freedom."67 She w rites further, in  her now  famous description of the 
'liberalism of fear,' th a t liberalism  w ants to prevent fear "which is created by 
arbitrary, unexpected, unnecessary, and  unlicensed acts of force and  by habitual and 
pervasive acts of cruelty and  torture perform ed by m ilitary, param ilitary, and  police 
agents in  any regim e."68 M ouffe's understanding  of antagonism  and  pow er m ay 
involve an  expanded in terpretation of w ha t limits personal freedom  and  w hat 
contributes to arbitrary acts of force, bu t at root the concerns th a t m otivate her to 
draw  attention to conflict are the same concerns here identified a t the heart of 
liberalism. For those w ho find som e of tlie presuppositions of liberalism  
problem atic, M ouffe's theory will no t provide m uch hope for furthering our 
engagem ent w ith  difference and  diversity. Francis Fukuyam a, for example, doubts 
that her solution "will do anything b u t prom ote liberalism 's inherent atom izing 
tendency."69 Charles T. M atliewes, w riting of agonistic tlieory m ore generally, 
likewise w onders "whetlier it really fulfills its claim to escape the logic of received 
liberal political theory; it seem s m erely to represent tlie recognition of intractable 
difficulties w itli the received liberalism...."7o
W illiam Connolly shares the concern that Mouffe m ay come too close to 
replicating the positions she is trying to counter, even as he recognises considerable 
overlap in  their attem pts to re-think our understanding of liberal dem ocracy and 
expand our p luralist imagination.7i H e w orries tliat her critique of 'essentialism ' is 
m ade w ithou t recognition of the faiüi and contestability involved in  her ow n
66 As Charles T. Matiiewes writes of agonistic theorists more generally, "like liberal theorists 
such as Rawls, they still want to be referees..." ("Faith, Hope, and Agony: Christian Political 
Participation Beyond Liberalism," Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics 21 [2001], p. 134).
67 Shklar, "Liberalism of Fear," p. 21.
68 Ibid., p. 29.
69 Francis Fukuyama, "The Return of the Political (book review)," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 5 
(Sept./Oct. 1994), p. 144.
70 Matliewes, "Faitli, Hope, and Agony," p. 133.
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position. He further w onders how  far Mouffe's tlieory takes us tow ard recognising 
tlie positive possibilities opened to us by tiie insights she pu ts  forward.72 Coraiolly's 
tlieory seeks to go further than  she does by pursu ing  a positive ethos tlia t builds 
upon  the recognition of antagonism , conflict, and  contingency a t w ork  w itiiin  our 
social and  political relations. It is to his tlieory that w e now  turn.
W illia m  C o n n o l l y  a n d  t h e  Ex pa n sio n  o f  o u r  P luralist Im a g in a t io n
Concern w ith  pluralism , contingency, identity and  difference, and  paradox 
m ark Comiolly's political theory, which, sim ilar to M ouffe's a ttem pt to radicalise 
liberal democracy, seeks to p u sh  'the sp irit of liberalism ' into realm s beyond those 
usually  considered by liberals.73 Like Mouffe, he is concerned about the lack of 
em phasis on  dem ocracy in  recent political theory, view ing it as a crucial practice tiiat 
needs to be recognised an d  cultivated alongside liberalism.^* In  h is earlier w ork  he 
articulates a vision of agonistic democracy in wliich relations of antagonism  w ould  
be converted into tiiose of agonistic respect in  tiie hope of cultivating a society 
m arked by 'critical pluralism.'^s In  his later tiiinking he seeks 'the pluralization of 
pluralism ,' in w hich w e are continuously seeking tiie expansion of tiie social 
pluralism  that has been achieved tiius far through tiie acceptance of new  identities 
em erging out of old conceptions of difference .76 Tliis involves the developm ent of 
'an ethos of critical responsiveness' and  a rew orking of the p luralist imagination.^^ 
Throughout his w ork  Connolly is concerned to develop an  etiiic adequate for the
71 Connolly, Ethos, p. 222.
72 Romand Coles raises a similar question in reference to the thought of Mouffe and Laclau. 
See Romand Coles, Rethinking Generosity: Critical Theory and the Politics of Caritas (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 190-196.
73 Comiolly, Ethos, p. 29.
74 Connolly, Ethos, p. 77; Identity\Difference, p. 211. Wliat Connolly refers to by 'democracy' 
will be addressed more explicitiy below.
75 William E. Connolly, The Augustinian Imperative: A Reflection on the Politics of Morality 
(Newbmy Park, Calif.: SAGE Publications, 1993),
76 Coraiolly's latest book continues this tiieme and other of his concerns through em 
exploration of recent insights from neuroscience and film. This work is not engaged at lengtii 
in tiiis study, though it is periodically referenced. See William E. CoraioUy, Neuropolitics: 
Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis; University of Minnesota Press, 2002).
77 Coimolly, Ethos, pp. xiv-xix.
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embrace of difference in  a p luralist culture, w ith  paradox playing a leading ro le/s 
He is likewise interested in  fostering m ore explicit engagem ent w itli the ontological, 
or 'ontopolitical,' fm idam ents involved in  political theory.
Beyond  Tolerance to  a n  Eth os  of Critical Responsiveness
Comiolly's lu iderstanding of the paradoxical relationship betw een identity 
and difference pervades his political tliought. In a nutshell, the problem  of 
'identityX difference relations' is tlia t "difference requires identity  and  identity  
requires difference."79 Identity  is crucial to hum an  beings, p roviding answ ers to tlie 
questions of w ho w e are and  how  w e are recognised, both  individually  and 
collectively, and  providing tlie basis from  wliich we act and interact w itli oüiers. 
Identity is always collective and  relational, and  each individual is com prised of a 
m ixture of identifications, often experienced as a tension betw een tliose intentionally 
sought and  those bestow ed th rough  different constituencies w ith  w hich  one 
interacts. Tliis discussion of identity, tlien, while often referring to 'self-identity,' 
views ind ividual and  collective identifications as inexhicably linked.^o As Comiolly 
writes, "to be wliite, female, hom osexual, Canadian, atheist, and a tcixpayer is to 
participate in  a diverse set of collective identifications and  to be situated  in  relation to 
a series of alter id e n t i f ic a t io n s .I n  addition to being form ed by a m ixture of 
identifications, identity is also form ed in  relation to and  conbast w ith  socially 
recognised differences. The existence of an  identity depends upon  th a t w hich  it is 
not, so that "tiiese differences are essential to its being."82
While difference is essential to the form ation of identity, it is all too easy for 
difference to be translated into otlierness or evil, while established identities come to 
seem  as if they reflect tlie im m utable, tiTie order of reality. Connolly believes tliat we 
have the tendency to 'normalize' identities, to see tliem  as reflections of an  intrinsic 
order based in  "tlie com m ands of a god or the dictates of nature or the requirem ents
78 It is worth noting tliat for Comiolly paradox is a characteristic that distinguishes 
'postmodern' tiiinkmg from 'modern' thinking; the latter assumes that coherence and 
integration are necessary for etliics and politics, wliile tlie former believes that "only 
attentiveness to ambiguity can loosen the hold monotonie standards of identity have over life 
in tiie late-modern age" (IdenUty\Difference, p. 60).
79 Connolly, Identity\Dijjêrence, p. ix.
89 Tliis means that Connolly's "discussion of identity is not simply about discrete individuals, 
but about collective identiticatioiis thiough which tiiey are mar ked" (ComioUy, Ethos, p. 200).
81 Connolly, Ethos, p. xvi.
82 Comiolly, Identity\Difference, p. 64.
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of reason or a free consensus;"83 this proclivity is fostered by the role established 
identities play in  m eeting tire desire for self-certainty and  m obilising collective 
action. To think, how ever, that one has a 'true identity ' is, in  Connolly 's estim ation, 
"to be false to difference."8* Instead of treating difference as a com plem entary or 
contending identity  w ith  w hich  one should  be engaged and to w hich one should  
give respect, belief in  the tr u th  of one's ow n identity leads one to  trea t difference as 
otherness. The latter results in  scapegoating and  oppression, while the form er 
recognises tlrat life, tlrough im possible w ithou t identity, exceeds capture by any 
single one.85 Comrolly uses the issue of gender to illustrate this point, draw ing 
atterrtion to tire w ays irr w hich belief tlrat a certEiirr dualistic urrderstandirrg of gerrder 
reflects a rratural or divine order produces a num ber of 'abnormalities.' These 
'abrrormalities' ("'homosexuals,' 'hernaphrodites', 'bisexuals,' 'the sexually irnpoterrt,' 
and  'perverts'") are labelled, m arginalised, institutionalized, or subject to  surgery or 
therapy because they are seen to be conbadictory to tire 'true' natm e of gender and 
s e x u a l i t y .86 Instead of 'norm alising' one conception of gender, I could recognise the 
degree to w hich m y conception of m yself as female aird w hat beitrg 'female' m eans 
has been received th rough  a particular configuration of id en tity \ difference relations, 
is actually constituted in  relation to, aird dependent upon, w ha t it is n o t (i.e., 
difference), and  therefore can be reconstituted in  different ways. This recognition 
w ould  m ake m e less likely to ostracise those w ho are different as others or 
abnormalities.
In  higW ighting tlie paradoxical nature of identity \d ifference, Connolly is 
trying to foster respect for difference by draw ing attention to the w ays in  w hich our 
identities are m ore contingent than  w e realise. He seeks to expose tlie degree of 
pow er and  politics involved in  identity  by rem inding us that identity, ra ther than  
being a reflection of th a t w liich is true or natural, is form ed in relation and  
opposition to difference. As he w rites, "if there is no natural or intrinsic identity, 
pow er is alw ays inscribed in  tlie relation an  exclusive identity bears to tlie differences
83 Ibid., p. 65.
84 Ibid., p. 67. When Connolly uses 'truth' in relation to identity, he is referring to tlie idea of 
living one's identity as if it represented an intrinsic truth which one knows to be true, as 
opposed to recognising the faith and/or contestability involved in the identity one holds.
The ideal, according to Connolly, would be to hold one's identity with tlie acknowledgement 
that "no identity is the true identity because every identity is particular, constructed, and 
relational" (ibid., p. 46).
85 Ibid., pp. 64-65.
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it constitutes. "87 Identity, Üien, alw ays involves a political negotiation betw een itself 
and difference; indeed, "politics, in  som e sense of th a t protean w ord , pervades social 
life. "88 Because of the relational and  collective nature of identity, tiie 
identityX difference relation necessarily involves social and  public form s Üu’ough 
w liich identity  is acquired a t the same time as some difference is excluded: "To 
establish an  identity  is to create social and  conceptual space for it to be in  ways tliat 
im pinge on the spaces available to otlier possibilities."89 Because tlie paradox of 
identityX difference cuts across all realm s, it is crucial to have a political theory that 
adequately recognises and engages w itli its am biguities, including provid ing  a 
means for public expression an d  questioning of current configurations of identity 
and difference. A cknow ledgem ent of this paradox is a t tlie heart of Connolly's 
rew orking of liberal and  dem ocratic theory.9o
Indeed, dem ocracy itself em bodies the political paradox of 
identityX difference, provid ing  a m eans by w hich difference can legitim ately become 
recognised identity  a t the sam e tim e as it can be a m edium  through w hich 
established identities become politically dogm atised. Comiolly's version of 
democracy d isrupts and  problem atises dogm atic identities, giving
a certain priority to life over identity, tieating identity not as tlie deepest trutli of tlie 
self or tlie coninimiit)'^, but as a specific formation drawn from energies of life 
(di/erence) never exhausted by any particular organization....Di/erence (pronounced 
difference) points to tlie noises, energies, and remainders that circulate thiough every 
cultural configuration and are not captuied by their self-identification.9:
The idea that die protean abundance of life exceeds capture in  a set of identities 
forms the basis for Comiolly's post-N ietzschean etliic, providing the m otivation 
behind and sustenance for an  ethos of agonistic respect and critical responsiveness. 
Agonistic respect applies to constituencies in a political society w ho are already 
established. These constituencies, instead of treating each other as differences to be 
oppressed, scapegoated, labelled, or denied, can come to respect each other, and  the 
excessive diversity of life, th rough  recognition of the interdependence involved in
86 Comiolly, Ethos, pp. 90-91.
87 Comiolly, ldentity\Difference, p. 66; autiior's emphasis.
88 Ibid., p. ix.
89 Ibid., p. 160.
99 Ibid., pp. X , 92-94.
9‘ Comiolly, Ethos, pp. 98-99.
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the establishm ent of their identities and  tire constitutive role of difference 92 Critical 
responsiveness pertains to the ethical attitude of an  entrenched constituency tow ards 
oppressed, undervalued , or unrecognised constituencies (i.e., constituencies 
currently u nder tlie tiueshold  of legitim ate recognition).93 A constituency operating 
w ith this etlios w ould  be open  to new  constituencies and  social m ovem ents and 
w ould  w ork  tow ards creating space for new  identities to em erge out of existing 
identityX difference relations. It w ould, furtlier, be w illing to renegotiate its ow n 
identity in light of the changes that occur as new  identities are constructed and 
recognised.94
Comiolly considers the ethos of critical responsiveness "tlie m ost fragile and 
indispensable elem ent in  a pluralizing dem ocracy,"95 If die goal of a dem ocracy in  a 
p luralist culture is tlie pluralisation of pluralism , w hereby new  identities are 
continually fashioned and  recognised o u t of tlie identities, and  difference, of w hich 
tlie curren t pluralism  is com prised, then critical responsiveness is the ethic tliat 
m akes such pluralisation possible. Comiolly identifies th iee crucial elem ents to this 
ethic, nam ely th a t it is anticipatory, critical, and  self-revisionary. By being open and 
responding to a constituency even before that constihiency has acquired its ow n 
identity (i.e., by recognising a new  constituency even before it  has reached the 
threshold of recognition and  helping it arrive at that threshold), it is anticipatory. This 
does not, how ever, require uncritical opemiess to any m ovem ent or constihiency tliat 
w ould arise. O n the conhary , it m ust be ctdtical tow ards any new  constihiency that 
w ould  m ake its identity  a universal requirem ent and  concomitantly seek to pm iish 
those w ho  deviate from  it. Finally, and "most crucially," it m ust be self-revisionary, 
recognising th a t curren t identities m ay need to be m odified to create space for and in 
light of the changes in identityX difference w rought by new  constituencies.96
It is tliis last characteristic tliat m ost distinguishes Comiolly's suggestion from 
liberal tolerance. "Tolerance," Comiolly writes, "is an  underdeveloped form  of 
critical responsiveness grounded in  m is r e c o g n it io n ." 9 7  It neitlier sufficiently
92 Connolly, Identity \Difference, pp. 166-167.
93 For Connolly's distinction between the ethos of agonistic respect and the ethos of critical 
responsiveness, see Ethos, pp. 234-235.
94 Connolly, Ethos, pp. 180-181.
95 Ibid., p. 180.
96 Ibid., p. 184.
97 Ibid., p. xvii. In relation to agonistic respect, he writes tiiat "tolerance and agonistic respect 
are kissing cousins, but tiiey are not equivalent" ("Confessing IdentityX Belonging to
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recognises the degree to w hich identity is constructed in relation to difference nor 
adequately acknowledges tlie politics involved in  the establishm ent of new  identities 
out of old differences. Tolerance does no t go far enough in questioning tlie 
hegem ony of a given identity, resting up o n  tlie assum ption tliat identity  is self- 
sufficient instead of recognising tlia t identity itself is constituted by and  needs to  be 
m odified in  light of the differences it encounters. Tolerance m ay acknow ledge 
difference, b u t a constihiency th a t tolerates anotlier constituency m erely allows it to 
exist, often as nothing b u t an  enclave w ith in  a culture in  w hich one p redom inant 
identity has hegem ony. The pluralising democracy th a t Connolly pictures w ould  be 
more like "a culture of selective collaboration and agonistic respect in relations betw een a 
variety of intersecting and interdependent constituencies, none of w liich sets the 
unquestioned m ahix  w itiiin  w hich the otiiers are p l a c e d . "98 Because of the 
in terdependent and  political nahire  of identity, tolerance as a "passive letting tlie 
other be" is in s u f f ic ie n t .9 9  Furtiierm ore, liberal tolerance does n o t generally engage 
w itii tile breadtii of diversity w ith  w hich Comiolly is concerned, nam ely 
"m ultidim ensional pluralism  tiiat covers m ultiple zones of diversity — in gender 
practice, sensual affiliation, conjugal form, etiuiic identification, source of m orality, 
language, and  re lig ious/m etaphysical orientation."48o Comiolly's p luralising 
democracy, then, m oves beyond tolerance to an  ethos of critical responsiveness.
The drive to p luralisation is n o t the only cliaracteristic of Connolly's version 
of democracy. Democratic culture thrives, in Comiolly's estim ation, w hen  the 
politics of pluralisation is in  constitutive tension w itii the politics pertain ing to tiie 
existing plurality. Likewise, "the perfection of dem ocratic politics" w ould  be visible 
in  a dem ocratic citizen w ho participated sim ultaneously in tiie representational 
politics of tlie state and  in social m ovem ents tiia t question the arrangem ents of the 
state and  other social institutions as they stand. In tliis understanding, dem ocracy is 
no t only a form  of rule and  governance pertaining to tlie existing order, w liich allows 
tiie existing order to become norm alised, b u t is also an  ethos, a social process, and  a 
distinctive culture m arked by the d isruption of established identities and  
conventions. T hrough an  ethos of critical responsiveness, existing configurations are
Difference," in Identity \Differe7tce: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, Expanded 
Edition [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991, 2002], p. xxvii).
98 Ibid., p. 92; autiior's emphasis.
99 Connolly, Augustinian Imperative, p. 156.
490 Connolly, Neuropolitics, pp. 2-3.
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continually questioned and pluralised, preventing tlie establishm ent of a sense of 
completeness and closure w ith in  political society that w ould do violence to 
difference. In  other w ords, w here this ethos is no t instilled, w here closure is sought, 
w here identities and  institutions rem ain  unquestioned, w here 'true identity ' and 
'harm onious com m unity' are postulated, difference is denied and  oppressed.^»!
Comiolly is setting a society inform ed by his democratic ethos in  contrast to 'a 
norm alizing society,' a society tliat "politicizes difference by converting it  into 
neediness or otlierness; it tlien dem oralizes and  depoliticizes those constituted as 
abnorm al and tiiose w ho w ould  call tiiis conversion process itself into q u e s t i o n .  "102 
The result, indeed the "consum mate irony" is that such a society "fosters the w orld  of 
antagonism , violence, and  fragm entation to wliich it purports to be tiie corrective, 
W ho exactly does Comiolly see as the opposition w itii w hom  he is contending for the 
sake of difference? Wliose tiieories, ideas, and presuppositions result in  norm alising 
societies of otherness and antagonism ? A t the broadest level, he seeks to 'disturb' 
any person, m ovem ent, or theory th a t strives for a unified nation, integrated 
com m unity, a n d /o r  norm al individual, tiiat believes m  'h  ue identity,' 'harm onious 
commmiity,' a n d /o r  state unity. This m eans th a t a t times Comiolly is concerned 
witii political tlieorists w ho proffer different view s w itiiin this overall m atrix, wliile 
a t otiier times he is addressing actual political constituencies w ho, in his estim ation, 
foster antagonism  rather tiian agonistic respect. W hile he addresses tiiese political 
theorists and  'fundam entalists' separately, as will w e shortly, he believes th a t tiiey 
are all characterised by 'arboreal pluralism ,' as opposed to the 'liiizom atic pluralism ' 
w hich he w ould  like to see in  place. For arboreal pluralists, diversity is understood  
as limbs b rand ling  ou t from a com m on tim ik. That tiTuik can be portiayed  variously 
as Christianity, K antian m orality, secular reason, or the liistory of a unified nation, 
b u t ill each case the tree h o rn  w liich diversity g low s is fed from  one ('exclusionary') 
taproot, h i contrast, Connolly w ould  hke to see a pluralism  m ore akin  to the 
rhizom e, a stem  th a t grows ju st under the ground consisting of m ultiple shoots and 
filaments ratiier than  one trunk  or root. He draw s tliis image from  Gilles Deleuze
Comiolly, Ethos, pp. 97-104,153. 
Ibid,, p. 91.492 .
493 Ibid., p. 90
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and Félix G uattari, and  he, like them , is "tired of tr e e s . His rhizom atic p lm  alism, 
depicted as "a variety of h um an  constituencies, each touched in w h a t it is by the 
dense, m ultifarious netw orks, hum an  and nonlium an, in  w hich it  participates," 
w ould  be m arked by mi eüios of generosity and  fo r b e a r a n c e .^ o s  The 
intercomiectedness of constituencies w ho understand  them selves rhlzom atically 
fosters a sense of tlie contingency and  interdependency of each identity , w liich 
should lead to agonistic respect and  critical responsiveness. It is w hen  some 
constituencies try  to become deep and  exclusionary roots, follow ing the arboreal 
m odel, that antagonism , social fragm entation, and tyranny e m e r g e .^ o e
This understand ing  is w ha t leads Comiolly to shetch  tlie definition of 
fundam entalism , from  w hat he identifies as its usual connotations of the assertion of 
one absolute g round of authority  upon w hich one's identity, allegiances, and  political 
stances are unquestionably based, "to include the refusal to acknow ledge tlie 
contestability of your ow n fm idam ents or to resist violences in  the exclusionary 
logics of identity  in  w hich you are im plicated."407 Comiolly recognises th a t every 
identity, theory, and  faith rests upon  some fm idaniental principles or beliefs, b u t he 
w ants to go further in  acknow ledging that strains of fundam entalism  exist in  each of 
us. Indeed, his concern is to show  that tliose w ho regularly apply the label of 
fundam entalism  only to 'the other' m ay them selves be prone to fm idam entalism , 
w hen it is understood as a set of political strategies th a t protects one's ow n 
fundam ents by labelling those w ho disagree w ith  or dishirb  one's fundam ents as 
enemies, deviants, im m oral, um iatural, or um easonable. H e w ants "liberals, 
secularists, m odernists, rationalists, scientists, [and] m oderates" to see the w ays in  
w liich they engage in  political practices of self-aggrandisem ent tlirough appeals to "a 
vocabulary of God, nature , reason, nation, or norm ality elevated above the 
possibility of critical reflection."498 In  tiiis sense liis w ork is addressed  as a corrective 
to those across the political spectrum  (his focus here is tiie U nited States) from  the 
Soutiiern Baptists w ho are h y in g  to coim teract w ha t tiiey see as tiie problem atic 
infilhation of m odernity  into Am erican culture and politics to the 'w hite m ales' and
494 Comiolly mentions tiiis parentiietically, after having cited it from Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari, A  Thousand Plateaus, tians. Brian Massumi (Minn.: University of Mimiesota Press, 
1987). See ibid., pp. 94,103.
495 Ibid., p. 94.
496 Ibid.
497 Ibid., p. xxviii.
498 Ibid., pp. 105,106.
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other consei’vatives trying to recover a unified, reinvigorated nation  in  tire face of 
relativism  and  m ulticulturalism  to liberals w ho argue for a secular state w hile failing 
to recognise the contestable fundam ents and  conceptions of tire good invoked in  tlie 
nam e of that supposedly  neutra l state.409 Indeed, tlie search for a w ay beyond these 
'conservative and  liberal fundam entalism s' m otivates Comiolly's W hy  I am N ot a 
SecMZfl7'/sf 410 Radier than  accepting secularism  and  C lnistianity as tlie only tw o ways 
to fram e our public life, he pu ts forw ard an  option tliat w ill help m ake democracy 
less "stingy, dogm atic, and  exclusionary" than  it  has been: "If th e  objective is to 
project your ow n perspective into tlie fray while also decentering tlie political 
im agination of the ensconced contestants so th a t each becomes an  honored  partipan t 
in  a pluralistic culture ratlier than  tlie authoritative em bodim ent of it, theti the 
positive possibilities expand. N ow  partisans of several types m ight negotiate a 
public etlios of engagem ent draw n from  several m oral so u r c e s ," 4 4 i
O n one level, tlien, Connolly's concern is for m ovem ents he sees on the public 
level that restiict and  vilify difference by seeking to elevate their ow n view  into the 
autlioritative ceiitie of a political democracy. H e w ants to m ove o u t of tlia t m ahix  
tlirough an  expansion of our p luralist im agination tliat w ould  enable constituencies 
to live together w ith  different beliefs w ithou t seeking to im pose tliose beliefs onto 
others or establish tiiem as the essential core of our political culhire. The resu lt 
w ould  be "a pluralism  in  w hich m ultiple possibilities of comiection open up across 
several lines of difference because m ore of tlie parties involved appreciate the 
profound contestability of the faitlis they honor the m ost, and a democracy in  w liich 
limits are set to the probable intensity of conflict betw een contending parties because 
m ore partisans acknow ledge their ow n am biguous im plication in  m any of the 
differences they en g ag e ."442 His suggestions for a pluralised dem ocracy are directed 
no t only to those involved in  public, political m ovem ents, b u t also to  political 
tlieorists w ho are tlieniselves trapped  in a m ahix  tlia t limits p luralisation and  
difference.
Comiolly sees m ost of political tlieory as operating w ith in  tlie sam e m ahix, 
w hat he calls "the ontopolitical m ah ix  of Anglo-American discourse in  the late-
409 For more on Connolly's discussion of fundamentalism, see ibid., pp. 105-133. 
440 See also Connolly, Neuropolitics, pp. 115,130.
444 ComioUy, Not a Seculnnst, pp. 158,6; autiior's emphasis.
442 Ibid., p. 155; author's emphasis.
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m odem  time."44s One axis of this m atrix consists, unsurprisingly in  light of the 
liberal-com m unitarian debate, of the individual and the collectivity, w ith  different 
theorists placing m ore em phasis on one or the other. The otlier axis includes tlie 
categories of m astery and  attunem ent. M astery refers to the belief tliat w e can 
m aster nature and  m ake tlie (indifferent) w orld  subject to hum an  control, wliile 
attunem ent involves the belief that the w orld  has a higher direction in  being to w hich 
a com m unity should  become athined. Different political theorists clearly occupy 
different positions w itiiin tliis m atrix, depending upon  tiieir views of w hether 
freedom  is attained m ore th rough m astering nature or finding harm ony w itli 
nature 's direction and  w hetlier this m astery or harm onisation is m ore of an 
individual or collective project. These differences form  the basis for m uch of tlie 
disagreem ent betw een theorists, som e of w hich we saw in the previous chapter. 
Connolly w ants to m ove outside of this m atrix altogetlier, by questioning the limits it 
establishes and  thereby conhibuthig  to tiie expansion of our political and  pluralist 
im agination. He view s all theorists w itiiin this m ahix  as sharing "a dem and to 
provide new  com pensations for the m odern  'loss' of expressiv ist/enchanted  
understandings of tiie w orld. M ost insist, therefore, tiiat tiie w orld  m u st be 
predisposed to us in  tiie last instance, either by containing a h igher direction w ith 
w hich w e can enter into closer com m union or by being a pliable m edium  ultim ately 
susceptible to hum an  m astery. Or b o t h . "444 In response to tiiis Comiolly asks "from 
w hence does one get tlie righ t to issue tiiese 'musts'? W ho or w h a t says tiie w orld 
owes us tills m uch, so th a t it m ust either be predisposed to the hum an  project of 
m astery or to hum an  athm em ent to its putative l i a r m o n i e s ? " 4 4 5
In Comiolly's estim ation the assum ptions behind these views need to  be 
"subjected to critical exploration from  a genealogical perspective. "446 Such a 
genealogical investigation w ould  reveal the extent to w hich m ost political theorists 
continue to  operate in  the legacy of A ugustine, carrying ou t in  different w ays the 
'A ugustinian Im perative' that insists upon  tiie existence of an  intrinsic m oral order 
tiiat can be authoritatively represented.447 W hetlier tiiis m orality is portrayed  as 
obedience to a tianscendental com m and, grounded, for example, in  a K antian
443 CormoUy, Ethos, p. 16.
444 Ibid., p. 19.
445 Ibid., p. 20.
446 Ibid., p. 21.
447 Connolly's Augustinian Imperative is dedicated to tiiis genealogical investigation.
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categorical im perative or a  Rawlsian veil of ignorance, or as attim em ent to tlie 
intrinsic design of the w orld, it rests upon problem atic assum ptions of inh insic 
m oral order. In  the form er use, 'order' is used as a  verb (to order) and  a com m and 
serves as the basis of m orality; in the latter, 'order' operates as a noun, referring to a 
harm onious design of being. Comiolly uses 'm orality' to refer to m oral orders tliat 
are based in  one or bo th  of these understandings, w hich he distinguishes from  an 
'ethic' as a conception tlia t "stiives to inform  hum an  conduct w ithou t draw ing on 
eitlier as so d e s c r i b e d . "us W hen disruptions to a m oral order appear, instead of 
being taken as signs tlia t life and  identity exceed ordering, they are labelled and  
m arginalised for their iim norality. A t root any theory that believes tlie w orld  is for 
us eitlier in  some teleological w ay or th iough  our ability to m aster it is, according to 
Comiolly, narcissistic, egoistic, an d  mietliical. It is narcissistic to think tlie w orld  was 
form ed for hum ans or th a t tlie w orld  is, need be, or can be subject to hum an  efforts 
to tam e it. It is egoistic to Üiink that one's ow n identity is tlie only source or shape of 
m oral life. It is, furtherm ore, unethical to allow a particular conception of morality, 
understood as a fixed code of autliority or justice, to be invoked as the basis of 
discipline and  discrim ination, as the m eans to traiiscendentalise one m oral identity 
over against differences tliat are tlien subject to violence and  oppression. The ethos 
of critical responsiveness tliat Comiolly pu ts  forw ard is very intentionally couched in 
ethical ratlier than  m oral language, m eaning that he w ants to provide a counterpoint 
to a m orality of com m and or contiact w itli an  ethic of cultivation. H e is challenging 
"the traditional, contending m oralities of com m and and com m m iion w itli a generous 
etliical sensibility grounded in  appreciation of tlie fugitive abundance of b e i n g . "4*9 
While he shares tliis concern for an  etliic of cultivation w ith  certain teleological views 
that em phasise v irtue over m orality, his etliic differs from  theirs in  seeking n o t 
com m on consensus or harm ony b u t the enliancem ent of om' sense of 
interdependence and  tlie enactm ent of a m ore generous pluralism  m arked by a 
p rotean care for d i f f e r e n c e  .420
One crucial distinction betw een Connolly and  the political theorists and 
activists w ho rem ain  w itiiin the m atrix he identifies is tlieir relationship to 
contingency. In  Comiolly's opinion, "there is a gravitational pu ll w itiiin  this m atrix
448 CoimoUy, Augustinian Imperative, p. 35.
449 Connolly, Ethos, p. xxiii.
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to domesticate tlie experience of contingency in life, either by treating contingency as 
a type of event susceptible to conti ol because it  is no t logically necessary or by 
tieating tlie contingent as an  unfortunate falling aw ay from  tlie intrinsic ideal. But 
die experience of contingency persistently exceeds such theorizations of it."i2i 
Connolly's N ietzschean sensibility of the abundance of life flowing th rough  and 
beyond our attem pts to  caphire it leads h im  to view  contingency as fundam ental 
rather than  accidental. U iose w ho in terpret their experiences of contingency as signs 
of fragm entation and  the loss of com m on identity end u p  looking for w ays to 
establish a m ore harm onious, collective unity; this ironically results in m ore 
fragm entation, as accepted ideals of identity  are furtlier entienched and  norm alised 
wliile all of those labelled as difference are subject to increasing osti'acisation. 
Connolly believes that increased acceptance of the inevitability of contingency w ould 
open ra ther tlian close the circle of accepted identities and  enable an  em brace of 
difference tliat m ore adequately expresses reverence for life. Tliis applies n o t only to 
the realm  of 'micropolitics,' in  w hich "by w orking patiently on specific contingencies 
in oneself, one m ay become m ore appreciative of the crucial role of contingency in 
identity  and  desire" and  thereby be open to "new possibilities of etliical 
responsiveness to difference," b u t also to the politics of the nation-state .122
D om inant nation-states have, according to Connolly, tried to m aster and 
dom esticate contingency in  their internal and external envirom nents, b u t their 
unsuccessful attem pts have resulted in  tlie em ergence of global problem s and  
possibilities, such as global w arm ing, economic interdependence, and  terrorism , tliat 
exceed tlie capacities of Euiy one state.423 N eeded now  are crossnational, nonstatist 
m ovem ents tliat question tlie identities and loyalties of states, p rom pting  tliem  to 
reconfigure tliemselves in the direction of ever-increasing pluralisation.424 After 
pointing ou t tiiat 'territory' derives etymologically from  'terrera,' m eaning to frighten, 
terrorize, and  exclude, Comiolly argues tiiat territorial states both  liberate and  
im prison. They liberate because they provide dem ocratic organisation and electoral
120 Ibid., pp. xviii, xxiii, 27-28,127; Augustinian Imperative, pp. 11-13,139-140;
Identity\Difference, p. 29-31.
421 Ibid., p. 22.
422 Ibid., p. 69; see also Identity \Difference, pp. 172-173. For more on micropolitics, see 
Coimolly, Neuropolitics, pp. 108-112.
423 Ibid., p. 22.
424 Cf. John Gray, who writes of the nation-state as "the great unexammed assumption of 
liberal thought" {Troo Faces of Liberalism [New York: The New Press, 2000], p. 123; pp. 122-132).
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accountability, but they imprison because they confine democratic energies tliat 
exceed the nation-state, and prioritise national identities and goals that are 
themselves contingent. The democratic etlios that Connolly seeks to foster embodies, 
as we saw above, much more Üiaii a form of rule or governance: "its role as a mode of 
governance is balanced and countered by its logic as a cultural medium of the 
periodic denaturalization of settled identities and conventions. "425 This 
denaturalisation applies to nation-states as much as any otlier identity. The 
pluralisation for which Connolly strives reaches far beyond more pluralism witiiin a 
given culture or nation; tlie democratic ethos he articulates is not confined to state 
walls. Territorial states will continue to exist, but their exclusive claims to loyalty, as 
well as tlieir identities and priorities, must be questioned in the face of global 
contingency and global issues.426 The distinctive time of late modernity, "marked by 
tlie globalization of markets, communications, monetary exchanges, transportation, 
disease tiansmission, strategic planning, acid rain, greenliouse effects, resource 
depletion, terrorist activity, drug trade, nuclear tlireats to civilization, and tourism ~  
just to list a familiar miscellany," must, in Comiolly's estimation, be matched by "the 
pluralization of democratic energies, alliances, and spaces of action tlirough and 
above the territorial democratic state."427
Connolly's though t is, as this discussion of contingency and  globalisation 
suggests, deeply inform ed by contem porary cultural conditions.428 H is desire to 
expand our p luralist im agination stem s from the conclusion tliat our curren t political 
im agination "remains too stingy, cram ped, and  defensive for tlie w orld  w e now  
inhabit. "429 H is concern to com bat fundam entalism s of all varieties stem s from  the 
belief that they arise in  response to the same cultural conditions th a t bring forw ard 
the possibility of increasing pluralisation. Fundam entaHsation and  ph u  alisation are 
two possible, contending responses to the acceleration of speed, com m unication, and 
interaction th a t m ark late m odern  life, to the increasing acknow ledgem ent of
425 ComioUy, Ethos, p. 155.
426 And so Comiolly prefers territorial politics or territorial state to 'nation-state,' believing 
that the drive for a highly centred nation is problematic, ending in repression or 
fragmentation. See William E. Connolly, "Cross-State Citizen Networks: A Response to 
Dallmayr," Millennium: Journal of Internatiojial Studies 30, no. 2 (2001), p. 350.
427 Connolly, Ethos, pp. 159,160; see also pp. xxu-xxiii, 21-23,135-161.
428 For an account of what Connolly considers to be the sahent features of contemporary life, 
seeIdentity\Difference, pp. 20-27.
429 ComioUy, Ethos, p. xii.
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contingency in  tlie face of the 'problem atisation of final m a r k e r s . Jn light of these 
shifts in  our cultural conditions, no "'return' to the politics of liberal neuti'ality, or the 
privatization of public conflicts, or a restiictive p luralism  rooted in  a sim ple 
consensus" is possible.^sr Comiolly suggests instead th a t "during a tim e w hen  
distance is com pressed by the acceleration of speed in  m any zones of life, tlie w ay to 
m ove is tow ard  a generous etlios of engagem ent betw een a p lurality  of faiths in 
private and  public life."432 According to Connolly, then, the options available to us in 
tlie face of difference are either a fundam entalist rage against difference in  the nam e 
of identity or an  etlios of critical responsiveness th a t continually redefines both  
identity and  difference and  engenders an increasingly generous pluralism .
Comiolly does recognise th a t some limits to the etlios of p luralisation m ust 
exist. N ot only do bom idaries exist, b u t they provide tlie conditions tliat m ake such 
an  etlios possible. Extreme economic inequality, for example, m ust be excluded. 
Fundam entalist constituencies need no t be excluded, bu t they are only to  be tolerated 
ratlier than  fully included in  tlie ethos of agonistic respect and critical responsiveness 
tliat Comiolly has proposed as the m ore fully developed and inform ed counterpart 
to tolerance. Though fundam entalist constituencies can be tolerated, they m ust be 
carefully watched: no  exclusionary push  to condem n difference tlirough tlie 
fundam entalisation of an  identity  can be allowed. Because established identities 
always have the tendency to naturalise and  fm idam entalise w ha t they are, this m ust 
be constantly guarded  against, lest cultural w ar displace critical responsiveness. This 
is a difficult task, how ever, because the response to fundam entalists m u st be done in 
a w ay tliat does n o t continue the process of fundam entalisation. As Comiolly writes: 
The issue can become a pai adox under unfavorable conditions: if you do not set 
limits to tlie culture of plmalization, pluralism itself might become undermined; but 
if you respond to its fervent opponents as Üiey would respond to you, plmalism 
might be defeated by the means tlirough which it is saved. This combination 
registers the fragility of p l u r a lL s m .4 3 3
130 THg is Comiolly's reworking of Lefort's 'dissolution of the markers of certainty,' a phrase 
also used by Mouffe, as we saw above. On why he prefers 'problematisation' to 'dissolution,' 
see ibid., p. 227, fn. 29.
131 Ibid., p. 100.
132 William E. Connolly, "Preface to the New Edition: The Plmalization of Religiosity," The 
Augttstinian Imperative (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), p. xx.
133 Connolly, Ethos, p. 235.
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The O ntological Turn
Connolly's recognition of fire fragility of p luralism  and  his desire to find a 
w ay to deepen tlie respect and  inclusivity of tlie pluralism  that has been achieved are 
w orthy of great respect. Unlike Rawls, for example, w ho attem pts to forge a tolerant, 
pluralist society by finding an  overlapping consensus upon  w hich  all constituencies 
can agree w ithou t acknow ledging the contestable presuppositions undery ling  his 
theory, Comiolly openly adm its tiiat his ideas m ay no t be acceptable to all. Indeed, 
he goes furtlier tlian that: "There is considerable irony and  foolishness in  a call to 
agonistic reciprocity, since it invites tlie fm idam entalist to incorporate an  elem ent w e 
endorse into its ow n identity. The invitation m ay be refused. ., .But the call is m ade 
in tlie context of acknow ledging tlie contestability of our fundam ents...."43* So w hat 
are tlie fundam ents th a t inform  Cormolly's political theory? A nd w hy  is it so 
im portant to him  to address them?
To begin w itli the latter question, Comiolly can be considered p a rt of tlie 
group of politicEil theorists identified earlier w ho tliink an  explicit tu rn  to ontology is 
in order w ith in  political theory. Comiolly liimself now  uses the term  ontopolitical, 
having used 'ontalogy' in  his earlier work; bo th  w ord choices represent an  attem pt to 
avoid tlie im plication of 'logos' th a t a fiuidam ental logic, principle, or design of being 
exists in  or underlies the w orld, h i contrast, tlien, to ontology, defined by Connolly 
as the study of the fundam ental logic of reality apart from  appearances, 'ontopolitical 
interpretation ' enables us to recognise tiia t every political in terpretation rests upon  a 
set of fundam ental beliefs about hum an  being and  the w orld even if those beliefs are 
no t concom itant w ith  assum ptions of a logic or design beliind tiie w orld. Comiolly is 
concerned w ith  the extent to w hich recent political theory has ignored its 
ontopolitical dim ensions, resting up o n  a presum ption of 'the prim acy of 
epistemology.' This em phasis on epistem ology usually involves one of tw o m istaken 
beliefs, either th a t one has access to criteria of know ledge w ithou t needing to invoke 
ontological beliefs or that one's epistem ology resolves ontological questions through 
its use of neutral procedures. In  tiieir concern w ith  the w ays in  w hich  know ledge is 
know n and  represented, such theories do no t explicitly engage w ith  ontological 
questions, b u t they are a t every m om ent resting unquestionably u p o n  a social 
ontology tiiat involves belief in  the hum an  being as a unified subject capable of
434 Connolly, Aiigustininn Imperative, p. 156.
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know ledge of objects tlia t are them selves subject to representation th rough  use of 
language as a m edium  of representation. These are som e of the very beliefs that 
Connolly w ants to call into question. More than  that, it is their micritical acceptance 
that contiibutes to the continuation of fm idam entalisation over pluralisation.
The 'antifoundationalist' and  'postm etaphysical' liberalisms presented by 
Rawls and  Rorty are exactly, though no t exclusively, w hat Comiolly has in m ind 
during his discussion of these matters. Rawls believes he can build  his theory upon 
an  overlapping consensus th a t already exists w itiiin  society w hile Rorty, similarly, 
develops liis thought on the basis of extant liberal values w ith in  our political culture, 
w ith  botli believing tliat they can do so w ithou t needing to defend, address, or 
question tlie fundam ental assum ptions upon  w hich liberal values or tlieir ow n 
tiieories rely. In Comiolly's estim ation, their assum ption tliat they can keep their 
ontopolitical interpretations from  being objects of critical investigation stem s from  a 
confidence tliat the m ost pressing conflicts and  problem s facing us today can be 
addressed w ithou t calling into question the presum ptions of m odernity  itself.435 But, 
Comiolly asks, w ha t if tlie m odern, liberal culture that Rawls and  Rorty accept in  
tlieir invocation of an  overlapping consensus or acceptance of liberal values also 
includes dangerous or exclusive elem ents tliat need to be questioned? "W hat.. .if the 
points of ontopolitical convergence in  late-m odern nation-states h im  o u t to be 
exactly the dom ain in  need of reassessm ent today?"436
Though the theories of Rawls and Rorty m ay seem 'ontologically m inim al' 
com pared to earlier C hristian or teleological traditions w ith  very explicit beliefs 
about lum ian being and  nature, tliey are, in  Comiolly's estim ation, carrying on tlie 
A ugustinian Im perative tlia t is a p a rt of tlie assum ptions and  conceptions inscribed 
in w estern culture. As w e saw  above, Comiolly believes that all theorists w ho can be 
located w itiiin the m ah ix  of attunem ent or m astery continue on in  this had ition . In 
die case of tlieorists of n eu h a l or pragm atic liberalism, they "shift faith from  God to 
the w orld, trusting that tlie w orld  is plastic enough to respond to tlie drive for 
m astery w itliout reacting back w ith  a vengeance born  from  its indifference to their
435 ComioUy, Ethos, pp. 3-4. This may seem a strange claim to make against Rorty, who has 
been so frequently labelled 'postmodern' and who so intentionally distances himself from 
certain aspects and presuppositions of 'modernity,' as we saw in the last chapter. Yet at tlie 
same time he is explicitly buUdmg his tlieory upon certain liberal values aheady in place in 
om culture, and to tlie extent that he miquestionably accepts tliose values he is vulnerable to 
ConnoUy's criticism.
436 Ibid., p. 4.
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ends and the diversity of forces and energies flowing through it, and then tlrey 
pretend that tlie withdrawal of faitli from God eliminates faith altogetlier. "437 This 
may seem more obvious when it comes to Rawls; as w e have already seen, his 
presuppositions regarding the individual, the veil of ignorance, reason, and tlie 
separation of public and private all embody contestable beliefs and result in tlie 
exclusion of many constituencies from his political society. While Rorty's embrace of 
contingency might lead one to assume tliat he and Comiolly would articulate similar 
visions of liberalism, Comiolly believes tliat Rorty's assumptions of tlie world's 
pliability keep him within tlie mastery perspective, while his support of irony in the 
private sphere without a concomitant recognition of its place in reconfiguring the 
public realm leaves him stiaddling rather than overcoming the individual- 
collectivity aspect of tlie matiix.438 In Comiolly's estimation, botli Rawls and Rorty 
need to recognise that issues related to contingency, identity, and tlie good camiot be 
relegated to tlie private sphere while supposedly neutral notions of justice and the 
right form a consensus in tlie public sphere. As w e have seen, identity has botli 
individual and collective manifestations, and the comiections between them "must be 
engaged overtly and politically if they are not to spawn a collective politics that 
unconsciously represses difference in tlie name of neutrality. "439 in  other words, 
"secular liberalism calls upon you to leave your fundamental religious/  existential 
faith in the private realm and then to confess faith in tlie sufficiency of reason, 
procedure, or deliberation m the public realm." In Comiolly’s version of pluralism, 
on the otlier hand, "you bring relevant chunks of your faitli into the public realm—as 
w e all do inevitably anyw ay—while carefully cultivating comparative modesty 
about it. "4*0
Coimolly sees himself operating in the company of a diverse group of 
thinkers, including, among others, Nietzsche, Arendt, Foucault, Taylor, Deleuze, and 
Derrida, who "suspect that self-denying ordinances vindicated in various ways by
437 Connolly, Identity \ Difference, p. 72; see pp. 71-73. Here Connolly uses the term 
'ontotlieology,' borrowed from Heidegger but given a different use, to refer to the western 
"tradition of tliought tliat demands or presupposes an ultimate answer to tlie question of 
being, an answer tliat includes an ethical principle humans are either coiimianded to follow 
or internally predisposed to recognize once distorting influences have been lifted from their 
souls" (p. 71). He acknowledges tliat it is an awkward term and does not use it in liis later 
works; I am assuming that I am following liis lead in replacing it with Augustinian 
Imperative.
438 Ibid., p. 227.
439 Ibid., p. 160.
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'nonfoundationalists' sucli as Rawls, Rorty, Habermas, Benbabib, Walzer, and 
Blumenberg express a refusal to engage questions most important to tlie late-modern 
time."444 In contiast to this 'nonfoundationalist' approach, the thinkers of the former 
group believe tliat every interpretation or theory rests upon fiuidamental 
presuppositions of being that should be acknowledged and critically engaged. 
Comiolly himself draws m ost explicitly on the thought of Nietzsche and Foucault to 
craft his (self-entitled) post-Nietzschean political theory. He recognises tliat both of 
these Blinkers are subject to a variety of interpretations, which prompts him to call 
his use of Nietzsche bny Nietzsche' in places and to suggest 'Fou-comioism' for his 
version of Foucault's tliought. He likewise points out the need to critically engage 
witli tlie work of both thinkers, using tliem to fill each otlier out, distancing himself 
from certain aspects of their thought, and pursuing various parts of their projects 
further until he arrives at a sustainable political tlieory that he is w illing to 
endorse.442 These are not the only two thinkers upon whom  he draws; w e have 
already seen his use of Deleuze's rhizome imagery to develop his rhizomatic 
pluralism, and liis idea of di/erence certainly draws upon the work of Derrida. The 
democratic ethos tliat Comiolly puts forward results, then, from reliance upon and 
expansion of tlie thoughts and strategies of a number of thinkers operating, to 
varying degrees, in tlie legacy of Nietzsche. From Foucault, for example, he draws 
the use of genealogy to expose how  current cultural notions of identity have been 
constructed and become naturalised, how our identities do not reflect some 
harmonious design or match an intiinsic moral order, and how w e can tlierefore hold  
our identities more contingently as w e become increasingly open to d i f f e r e n c e s . i * ^  
From Derrida he takes deconstruction as a way to show us tlie ambiguities involved  
in our miderstanding of rationality and decision-making in order to open us to
440 Connolly, "Preface to tlie New Edition," p. xxiii.
444 Connolly, Ethos, p. 4.
442 For some of his thoughts on these matters, see ibid., pp. 30,102-104, 208;
Identity\Difference, pp. 184-187; "Beyond Good and Evil; The Ethical Sensibility of Michel 
Foucault," in The Enter Foucault: Politics and Philosophy, ed. Jeremy Moss (London: Sage, 1998),
pp. 108-128.
443 For a more detailed exposition of Foucault's use of genealogy in relation to politics, see 
Wendy Brown, "Genealogical Politics," in The Later Foucault: Politics and Philosophy, ed. Jeremy 
Moss (London; Sage, 1998), pp. 33-49. In brief, she argues that Foucault deploys genealogy to 
displace other conventional approaches to scholarly engagement with political questions by 
posing a very different set of questions; On tlie one hand, what is the nature of our time, what 
is our political ontology? On the otlier, what are tlie logics of power that have produced this 
condition and within which we operate? (p. 34).
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aspects of difference th a t m ight currently exist outside prescribed notions of 
rationality and  identity. W hile he views these 'strategies of detaclunent' as 
indispensable to his political project, he does n o t tliink they enable us to go far 
enough tow ards tlie developm ent of a 'positive ontopolitical in terpretation,' so he 
add  to them  "a strategy of attaclunent tliat stands in  a precarious relation of 
im plication and  dissonance w ith  tliem."^** A crucial p art of tliis strategy is the 
explicit acknow ledgem ent of tlie ontopolitical dim ensions of our tlieory and  
interpretations. This involves n o t only recognising tlia t such dim ensions exist bu t 
also acknow ledging tlia t our im plicit projection of them  into our theory and  
interpretations exceeds our capacity to explicitly form ulate tliem, w hile w hatever 
explicit form ulations we do mcike exceed our ability to dem onstrate tlieir ti'utli.ws
Wliat, tlien, are the ontopolitical dimensions of Connolly's theory, as far as he 
is able to articulate them? Because Comiolly believes in being explicit about the 
presuppositions operating witiiin liis theory, w e have in essence been discussing 
them since the beginning of our investigation of his thought. Nevertheless, it is 
worthwliile drawing more definite attention to the main fundaments upon wliich his 
political theory rests. One of tiiese fmidaments is his belief in the abmidance and 
rich diversity of 'life,' with life understood as a 'protean set of energies' that exceeds 
every attempt to capture it witiiin a given identity or organise it within a particular 
political structure.4*6 This miderstanding of life, drawn from Nietzsche, serves as "an 
indispensable, non-fixable marker, challenging every attempt to treat a concept, 
settlement or principle as complete, without surplus or resistance."447 Life 
understood this w ay is concomitant with nontheistic gratitude for the abundance of 
being, which Comiolly refers to as his highest existential faitli and which serves as 
the source of his pluralising etliic.i*» Closely comiected to this ontopolitical 
assumption about life is the belief that 'notliing is fundamental' (tliis is drawn from 
Foucault), Tliis should be interpreted in two ways. The first reading emphasises tlie 
'fundamental' aspect: no fundamental law, purpose, contract, design, deity, moral 
order, or plasticity marks the world. The second focuses on the 'nothing' component, 
with notliingness miderstood as a fullness, as 'life,' as differences and protean
444 ComioUy, Ethos, p. 36.
445 Ibid.
446 Ibid., p. 28
447 ComioUy, "Beyond Good and Evil," p. 113.
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energies that circulate through and exceed tire 'perpetual gaps' in social consti'uctions 
of identity and institutions.^*^ 'Nothing is fundamental' is equivalent to 'di/erence is 
fundamental.' In either articulation, tlie implication he draws is tliat no identity is 
complete or uncontestable, and any attempt to establish an identity as such will 
result in muiecessary exclusion or violence to difference. He then acknowledges that 
tliis view  is an article of faith, profoundly contestable.
Even this acknowledgement of the contestability of his ontopolitical 
projections is supposed to further the goal of all constihiencies operating in light of 
the contingency of their identities and beliefs: tlie hope is that in revealing tlie 
contestability of his fundaments otliers will notice the contestability of their ow n  
fundaments and begin to see the violence involved in attempting to impose tliose 
fundaments upon everyone. He believes tliat incorporating "a deep plurality of 
religious/m etaphysical perspectives" into public discourse is a crucial component in 
tlie quest to develop a positive ethos of engagement out of tlie pluralism in  
contemporary life, but these perspectives need to recognise "the shakiness of the 
ground upon which tliey tliemselves stand" for such an etlios to emerge.4so In short, 
the consensus for which one can work witiiin a pluralising etlios is limited to 'an 
ironic consensus,' one "mobilized above all around reciprocal appreciation of the 
contestability of contending presumptions about the fiuidamental character of 
being. "451 Politics, in this understanding, is a way to engage tlie ambiguities 
concomitant witli tliis level of contestability and contingency, serving both to foster 
common purposes and to expose and disturb tlie 'musical harmonies' into which  
these common purposes tend to be transposed. Connolly says of this alternative 
liberalism tliat "it is not the best liberalism that can be dreamt, only tlie highest 
regulative ideal to pursue if w e are incomplete witliout social forms in a world not 
predesigned to mesh smoothly witli any particular formulation of social and 
collective identity. "452
It is clear from this last quote, as it has been tliroughout this discussion of 
Comiolly's tliought, that at every point his version of liberal democracy is affected by 
liis ontology. The honesty witli which he recognises that liis theory invokes "big
448 Coimolly, "Preface to the New Edition," p. xix; Ethos of Plumlization, p. 31; Neuropolitics, p. 
197.
4*9 Connolly, Ethos, p. 39; "Beyond Good and Evil," p. 119.
450 Connolly, Not a Secularist, p. 185, Ethos, p. 104.
454 CoimoUy, Ethos, p. 104.
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articles of faith" tliat are "about as big as tlie ones they contest" is a refreshing change 
from tliose w ho operate as if their variants of liberalism would be acceptable to any 
one who is reasonable, rational, or sane witliout acknowledging that controversial, 
potentially unacceptable presuppositions inform tlieir th in k in g .iss  It, indeed, opens 
the door to explicit engagement and conversation at the ontological level within  
political theory, which in some senses allows certain constituencies that are excluded 
from Hie liberal societies of Rawls and Rorty to be more fully a part of liis envisaged  
society. We camiot help but appreciate his concern for a society that is ever- 
increasing its acceptance of difference. This is clearly tlie motivation behind liis etlios 
of agonistic respect, by which he hopes tliat established constituencies can come to 
honour each other ratlier tliEui carrying on the cultural wars that currently mark 
political discourse and interaction. It is likewise beliind liis etlios of critical 
responsiveness, wliich would serve to enable currently um ecognised constituencies 
to reacli tlie thr eshold of recognition and respect. We only have to tliink of the ways 
in which slaves and w om en had to fight for this recognition, recognition that we now  
take for granted, to realise that it is important to be open to, and furtlier to help open 
the way to, those w ho may even now be unfairly oppressed and marginalised. We 
Cciii see this same motivation for an increased opemiess to difference operating in his 
desire to m ove beyond the liberal-comimmitariaii debate through a recognition that 
the relationship between and establishment of our individual and collective identities 
is much more nuanced tlian either side of the debate generally acknowledges. In 
addition to recognising that identity is more complex than current political theory 
acknowledges, Comiolly is also to be admired for attempting to account for tlie 
increased sense of contingency and globalisation that mark our current cultural 
milieu.454
Yet in every area where w e can respect the direction of Comiolly's thinking, 
w e can also raise significant questions as to how far his concern for difference is 
actually realised within the political tlieory he's presenting. We can furtlier wonder 
if the suggestions he raises, and tlie alternatives he rules out, represent tlie only way 
forward for those concerned to increase the respect for and acknowledgement of
452 CormoUy, Identity] Difference, p. 94.
453 CormoUy, Augustinian Imperative, p. 126.
454 Though Üie relationship between political pliilosophy and tlie actual world of political 
practice may be more nuanced than tliis sentence seems to indicate, as N. J. Rengger begins to
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difference. In other words, are his ontopolitical interpretations and his ethos of 
agonistic respect and critical responsiveness die only or the best ways to deal with an 
increasing sense of contingency and an elevated sensitivity towards difference? To 
take his understanding of contingency as an example, he writes that
by contrast to the necessary and universal, it means tliat which is changeable and 
par ticular; by contr-ast to the certain and constant, it means that which is uncertain 
and variable; by contr ast to tlie self-subsistent and causal, it means that which is 
dependent and effect; by contr ast to die expected and regular, it means that which is 
imexpected and ir regular; and by contr ast to the safe and reassuring, it means that 
wliich is dangerous, unruly, and obdurate in its d a n g e r . ^ ^ s  
On tiiis rendering, given die contrasts he presents, to try to come to terms w idi 
contingency means to accept die particular at die expense of die universal and to 
grant, seemingly unproblemadcally, that uncertain, unexpected, uiu'uly danger 
frames our experience of reality. But must die contrasts be set so strongly? We 
raised a similar question witii regard to die other agonistic political tiieorists w e have 
considered, pointing out die extent to which their diought depends upon  
assumptions of certain inevitable polarisations. Comiolly, too, seems to assume diat 
unity and difference, solidarity and diversity, and the universal and die particular 
must stand as irreconcilable opposites. Joseph M. Schwartz, after rioting diese 
dichotoniisatioris widiiri Connolly's writing, wonders if diey must be transcended 
politically for social justice to be a c h i e v e d . i s 6  Such transcendence is precisely what 
Connolly rules out, presenting his diought as if w e m ust choose eidier harmony or 
difference. In addition to questioning if this option is one w idi wliich w e must or 
should be willing to rest content, w e also need to question what Connolly 
understands by harmony.
Comiolly's liberalism leaves us w idiout hope for harmony or unity, without a 
pictirre of ariytiiing beyond the attairunerit of an ironic consensus. Such a consensus 
is 'ironic' because it is based in recognition of die contestability of die contending 
presumptions w e each bring w idi us. CormoUy's understanding of consensus is 
drawn from Foucault's oft-cited remark: "The fardiest 1 would go is to say diat 
perhaps one m ust not be for conseiisuality, but one must be against
discuss ill "The Boundaries of Conversation: A Response to Dallmayr," Millennhun: Jotirnnl of 
International Studies 30, no. 2 (2001), pp. 357-364.
Connolly, Identity\Dijference, p. 28.
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nonconsensuality.157" Comiolly is neivous about die damage diat can be caused and 
die difference diat can be oppressed when w e are overly concerned w idi seeking 
consensus, even wliile he recognises diat no political society cmi exist if 
'nonconsensuality' w ins the day. The ironic consensus or harmony he envisions 
would consist of an increased sense of interdependency between different 
constituencies and a more generous pluralism based in a protean care for difference. 
H ow different is diis from die visions of harmony and consensus he is trying to 
counter? Benjamin Barber speaks of the harmony sought by liberal democracy as a 
musical harmony, characterised by multiple, distinct voices coming together, 
"creating not the emiui of unison but a pleasing plurality."iss This is harmony used  
in its technical, musical sense in wliich a common voice emerges from a mixture of 
different voices rather tiiaii from an imposed unity or monism. Connolly, however, 
is not content w idi even diis description of harmony, drawing a picture of political 
society in which the recognition of ambiguity and contingency constandy disturbs 
the 'musical harmonies' into wliich common purposes tend to be transposed.i59
A t die sam e time, Comiolly liimself recognises d ia t die p u rsu it of harm ony 
has been a goal and  a need for centuries. The m edieval time period, according to the 
story Comiolly weaves, w as one in  w hich "signs of harm ony w ere everyw here iti the 
world." The increased tem po of life in  early m odernity, along w id i die greater sense 
of iiiteriority of die 'C hristian /K antian  self,' called these external signs of harm ony 
into question, causing a new  guarantor of harm ony to come fordi, nam ely 'com m on 
sense.' In  late m odernity, how ever, "everytiiing now  m oves faster and  tiiere is no t 
enough time to install die sam e com m on sense into everyone inhabiting die sam e 
space. N ow  contending drives to jundamentalize ^common sense' or to pluralize it 
escalate into a series of cultural wars."i6o The solution he proposes, in  light of die 
conditions of late m odernity  that, in his estim ation, m ake an appeal to anything 
universal problem atic, is to  relinquish harm ony in  favour of unhindered  
pluralisation and  particularity. G iven die im portance of harm ony w idiiii die story he 
tells, we m ust surely raise questions about die feasibility of such a solution. If
156 Joseph M. Schwai'tz, "Ethos ofPbirnlization (book review)," Journal of Politics 59, no. 2 (May 
1997), p. 618.
157 Michel Foucault, "Politics and Etiiics: An Interview," in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul 
Rabinow (New York: Pandieon, 1984), p. 379. Cited in Connolly, Ethos, p.l02,
158 Barber, "Liberal Democracy," p. 65.
159 Comiolly, Identity\Difference, p. 94.
160 ConnoUy, Not a Secularist, p. 174.
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harmony was a crucial aspect of medieval life and the importance of its preservation 
was precisely what called forth the Kantian common sense that has been sustaining 
us since early modernity, is it not naïve to tiiink that we can now  suddenly live 
without harmony? Rather than assuming tliat harmony necessarily involves 
'fundamentalization' in the name of the universal or that because w e are facing new  
experiences as part of our particular cultural moment w e must abandon an idea diat 
has been an integral part of political societies for centuries, might w e not use our 
political and pluralist imaginations to rediink the relationship between die universal 
and die particular in ways diat allow for harmony to be retained as a goal? In other 
words, does the need for harmony disappear just because its realisation seems more 
and more unattainable in light of certain cultural conditions and ontological 
presuppositions about die nature of antagonism and conflict? Or should w e perhaps 
be concerned to find more adequate and creative ways to diink about harmony in 
light of our heightened awareness of and concern for difference?
This is just one of the ways in which w e can wonder how  helpful Comiolly's 
agonistic political theory is in solving die problems raised by difference, problems 
likewise left unresolved by die versions of political liberalism we considered in die 
last chapter. In short, how far does Comiolly take us towards resolving certain 
problem areas w e noted in reference to political liberalism? Despite his attempts to 
move beyond liberalism of a Rawlsian variety, he may continue to operate in ils 
legacy and be plagued by its shortcomings. This seems to be the case w hen it comes 
to liberal individualism, which may be surprising given diat w e have already 
coimnended Comiolly for providmg a more nuanced pictme of identity diat seeks to 
move beyond die main terms of the liberal-communitarianism debate. While true, 
Comiolly also recognises that his political tiieory follows liberalism in terms of "its 
appreciation of die claims of i n d i v i d u a l i t y ,  He speaks of the need for a "political 
dieory of individuality" diat questions "state, corporate, and associational institutions 
of normalization" radier tiian assmning diat individuality can flourish w idim  die 
paradigms diat currently exist. Every established definition and potential site of 
normalisation needs to be questioned, in die public realm as w ell as diose realms 
usually associated w idi individuals, and attention needs to be given to relations of 
power and difference diat keep certain identities from being r e c o g n i s e d . i ^ z  Agcdn,
‘61 Connolly, ldentit\j\Difference, p. 94.
‘62 See ibid., pp. 73-94 for an elaboration of diese diemes.
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w e can appreciate liis concern to draw attention to these often uni'ecogrdsed 
influences upon our conceptions of identity, a concern which is clearly also 
undergirded by his belief that identity is collective as well as individual and that 
humans are incomplete without social form. Yet at root liis concern is motivated by 
a certain etlios of i n d i v i d u a l i t y por is not his motivation behind drawing attention 
to tlie elements of conflict, power, politics, and ambiguity in the establishment of 
identityX difference the desire to see every individual respected and recognised? Do 
we not need to hold our ow n beliefs and identities contingently precisely so Üiose 
beliefs and identities do not get in tlie way of any new  individuals crossing tlie 
tlireshold of recognition? And does this not mean that once again, despite 
Comiolly's attempts to create a more nuanced picture of tlie relationsliip between  
them, individual identity is prioritised over collective identity? Does he not assume 
that no collective identity can or should be so integral to a person's identity tiiat it 
camiot be held loosely and contingently? How much respect is actually accorded to 
a collective identity that is not allowed to be held with anything but a contingent 
sense, tliat is not understood to be constitutive of identity in and of itself but only in 
relation to difference? While he may not buy into the 'unencumbered se lf which  
political liberalism is accused of presupposing, he neverüieless seems to operate in 
the legacy of liberals who prioritise individual over collective goals. We may well be 
able to ti'ansfer to Comiolly Barry Allen's description of Foucault's tliought, namely 
that his work
is an effort to specify the most significant forces now aligned against tlie modern 
ethos of individuality, and to reaffirm, if in an unexpected way, the b aditional 
message of modern political individualism: tliat political government is properly 
subordinate to ethical ends, to the ethos of mdividuahty, to what makes individual life 
worüi living, ratlier than to collective ends imposed on individuals for whatever 
reason, in the name of whatever stirring ideal (social justice, democracy, progress, 
and so on) .‘64
Connolly, then, openly rejects tlie 'normal individual' upon which much 
contemporary liberal theory imquestioningly bases itself, but this rejection is 
ultimately for tlie sake of giving more respect and more recognition to a greater
‘631 draw tliis term from Allen, "Foucault and Modern Political Philosophy," pp. 164-198. 
‘64 Ibid., p. 190.
119
number of individuals, which seems like a mere continuation of liberalism's 
prioritisation of the i n d i v i d u a l . i ^ s
Comiolly's belief in tlie need to hold identities, including the various 
individual, collective, and relational components of which tiiey are comprised, witli a 
certain lightness reveals anotlier place in which his theory seems not all tliat different 
from a particular strategy of the liberalism he is trying to overcome. Can w e really 
hold our commitments and aims as loosely as Connolly and other agonistic tiieorists 
seem to think w e can or, as Matliewes suggests, is the 'lightness' that agonistic 
tiieorists commend predicated on a self-contiadictory and false human  
p s y c h o l o g y ?i66 Do not some commitments by their very nature and definition 
require a level of involvement tiiat is not so easily discarded? And is Comiolly, 
tiierefore, assuming that w e can and should change the nature of such commitments 
so that they become compatible witii his etiios? We saw in tiie previous chapter that 
Rawls, despite Ms concern for accommodating tiie inevitable pluralism of 
('reasonable') comprehensive doctrines, admits that comprehensive doctrines should 
be revised in order tiiat liberal principles of justice are prioritised. Coimolly, in the 
name of Ms etlios of critical responsiveness ratiier than liberal principles of justice, 
asks for considerable alterations to be made to the views of identity and morality of 
many constituencies witiiin our liberal democratic culture. Indeed, as w e discussed 
above, the third and most crucial aspect of Ms ethos is that of self-revision, meaning 
that current identities need to be ready to modify tiiemselves in light of new  
constituencies that arise and the changes they bring to identity\difference. To some 
degree openness and adaptability are necessary to any attempt to accommodate and 
welcome difference, but tiie extent of the adaptability is what is in question here.
The difference between Comiolly and Rawls on this point might be tiiat Connolly 
recognises tiiat tMs is controversial, and that asking identities to change in the way 
he suggests goes deeper tiian liberal tolerance. There will presumably be, however, a 
number of constituencies w ho would find tiiemselves unable to agree with or adapt 
to the chcuiges tiiat Comiolly commends, who would, indeed, be scarcely 
recognisable if tiiey did alter themselves in light of Comiolly's etiios.
■>65 Barry Harvey raises a similar criticism in "Why I am Not a Seculmist (book review)," Journal 
of Church and State 43 (Winter 2001), p. 141.
‘66 Matliewes, "Faitir, Hope, and Agony," pp. 134-135.
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That being said, we should recognise that the political society envisioned by 
Connolly is more inclusive than those described by Rawls and Rorty, for tliose who 
do not adopt the ethos he recommends and tliereby remain 'fundamentalists' are not 
excluded but rather tolerated. As w e discussed earlier, in Connolly's tiieory 
tolerance is one step short of the ethos of agonistic respect and critical 
responsiveness; it remains content with passively letting other identities remain as 
they are rather tiian questioning tiie identity\ difference relation involved in tiie 
establislmient of constituencies and allowing one's own identity to be shaped and 
changed in light of tiiat power relation. To treat certain fundamentalisms with  
tolerance allows Connolly to avoid excluding "moralities of god, home, and country;" 
such an exclusion would, as he acknowledges, "depluralize tiiis model of 
pluralism. "167 At tiie same time, it keeps liim from having to fully include, respect, 
and recognise certain problematic constituencies. Indeed, to limit his attitude 
towards such identities to one of tolerance ratiier tiian extending to them his etiios of 
critical responsiveness means tiiat tiie self-revisionary aspect of his etiios has its 
limits. He is clearly not open to learning from and adapting his ow n view s in light of 
any identity that has universal intent. For all liis emphasis on contingency, and his 
admission tiiat his ow n fundaments are highly contestable, articles of fEuth, tiiere are 
definite limits to what he w ill consider. Is he open, for example, to the possibility of 
moral order or harmonious design, or even to learning from constituencies w ho hold 
such beliefs, while not accepting their fundaments tout court? He writes that 
acknowledgement of "an ironic debt to tiie differences they contest" is a necessary 
step towards the development of agonistic respect.‘68 Does he seem to have such a 
debt to Clu'istian or Kantian formulations of political tiieory? Or is that why liis etiiic 
of respect falls short of including any sucli derivatives? At the end of tiie day even  
liis tolerance has its limits, not being extended to "identities that m ust define wliat 
deviates from them as intiiiisically evil (or one of its modern surrogates) in order to 
establish their own self-certainty" or those who "compel the universalization of what
they a r e . "169
Wliat criteria does Connolly use to establish the limits of his tolerance? His 
concern to stop fundamentaUsation and universalisation seems to stem from a deep
‘67 Connolly, Ethos, p. 202.
‘68 Comiolly, Augustininn hnpej'ntive, p. 159.
‘69 Comiolly, Identity\Difference, p. 15; Ethos, p. 203.
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belief that every person is worthy of respect, and that this respect should not be 
mitigated by certain constituencies who ostracise, label, or oppress those who are 
different from tiiemselves. We can see at the root of this agonistic democratic project 
a belief m tlie equal moral wortli of all persons. It does not seem so distant, tlieii, 
from the Kantian view  of respect towards every person, nor from tiie values of 
inherent human dignity and equality that are associated witii the Enlightenment 
more generally. Connolly is, at heart, motivated by a commitment to certain 
Enlightenment values, and tiie radical nature of his project consists not in inculcating 
new values but in attempting to find a different way to attain those values now that 
some parts of the so-called Enlightenment project appear u n te n a b le .^ ^ o  Perhaps 
Comiolly provides evidence to support Alasdair MacIntyre's claim tiiat "post- 
Enlightemnent relativism and perspectivism are...the negative counterpart of tiie 
Enlightemnent, its inverted mirror i m a g e .
Witii tiiis in mind, w e turn to the question of whether his vision provides 
enough to sustain our commitment to tiie values and etiios he endorses. We are not 
tiie first to raise tliis question. Even Stephen White, who is largely sympathetic to 
Comiolly's project, wonders if Comiolly's "central ontological figure of abundance, 
by itself, inadequately prefigures the ethical qualities ConnoUy assigns to critical 
r e s p o n s iv e n e s s .W h ite  questions whether Connolly's ontology is too 
underdetermined to provide tiie criteria by wliich w e can adjudicate between that 
which respecte and tiiat wliich harms human equality and dignity. Wliite concludes 
tiiat "Comiolly is taking us in a normative direction toward wliich liis ontology has 
not given enough orientation."‘73 Jolm R. Wallach similarly wonders if Comiolly has 
left us witii enough resources to combat tiie injustices to which he seeks to draw 
attention, notitig tiiat such resomres are drawn from tiie unities, constituencies.
‘70 At least two of ConnoUy's reviewers share tliis estimation. Diane Rubenstein thinks tiiat 
ConnoUy is still in tiuall to certain 'master sigiiifiers' rather tiian providing new 'master 
signifiers' of his own. See Diane Rubenstein, "The Four Discourses and the Four Volumes," 
Journal of Politics 56, no. 4 (Nov. 1996), p. 1130. Schwartz believes that CormoUy's defence of 
tiie equal moral worth of persons implicates him in a defence of the Enlightemnent values of 
equaUty and justice, which in turn prevents him from actuaUy engaging in a whole-hearted 
critique of Enlightenment rationaUty. He further accuses him of sneaking into his theory 
'quasi-Enlightemnent arguments' about human dignity and potential. See Schwartz, "Etiios of 
Pluralization (book review)," p. 618.
‘7‘ Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notie Dame: University of Notie 
Dame Press, 1988), p. 353.
‘72 Wliite, Sustaining Affirmation, p. 127.
‘73 Ibid., p. 128.
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ethics, and ideas that Connolly either drains of tlieir substantive content or regards 
as necessary but unwelcome in political life. He tliinks that, "at the very least, 
Connolly needs to explain furtlier tlie coherence of his own political program, which 
favors greater political and economic equality while welcoming all but the most 
extreme etliical v i e w s .  "‘ 74
When w e look more closely at Connolly's ethos, it is difficult to get a sense of 
the positive definition he gives to the term 'ethical.' He speaks of it as a 'sensibility,' 
and he asks "what makes such a sensibility e i / i z c f l / ? " ‘ 75 Wlien it comes to actually 
answering tliat question, however, he generally reverts to describing what it is not, 
so we know that it is not based in a moral order (used in either tlie verb or the noun  
sense) and it is not reducible to a moral code, hi one instance he goes on to describe 
his 'anti-teleological etliic' as one tliat cultivates "possibilities of being imperfectly 
installed in established institutional practices," drawhig its sustenance from "(a) a 
contingent identity affirming (b) tlie rich abundance of 'life' exceeding every 
particular organization of it. "‘76 Tliis somids like it has a positive component, but 
even here 'life' is described primarily m terms of its function hi challenging every 
alternative that tiles to bring closure. He writes tiiat "an ethical sensibihty is to be 
cultivated because tiiere is no compulsory basis for ethics," but is tiiat really an 
adequate m o t i v a t i o n ? ‘ 77 Even if w e would agree with Comiolly hi wanting to 
question the ethicahty or morality of those who base their etiiic or moral code solely 
in a moral command, even if w e would concur that w e hope for an etiiic that would  
hold even if no divine or moral command made it compulsory, w e are still left 
wondermg if nontheistic reverence for tiie "effervescent energies flowhig tiirough 
and over identity, tiie universal, and tiie real" is enough to be the source of 
Comiolly's e t h i c . ‘ 78 Can an ethic tiiat does not provide any substantive content to tiie 
distinctions between good and bad, or just and unjust, hold sway? H ow do w e 
actually move, as Slavoj Zizek asks, from an "'ontological' assertion of multitude to 
etiiics (of diversity, tolerance.. . ) ? " ‘ 79 Or is Connolly's ethos an example of tiie recent
‘74 John R. Wallach, "The Ethos of Phiralization (book review)," Political Theory 25, no. 6 (Dec 
1997), p. 891.
‘75 Connolly, Augiistinian Imperative, p. 140; author's emphasis.
‘76 Ibid., pp. 141,142.
‘77 ConnoUy, Ethos, p. 233; author's emphasis.
‘78 Ibid., p. 188. It is clear from this passage tiiat ConnoUy thinks it is enough; indeed he 
writes of it as an "mvaluable source of forbearance.. .and of critical responsiveness...." 
‘79Zizek, Ticklish Subject, p. 172.
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predominance of ethics in contemporary society identified by Alain Badiou, in wliich 
etiiics has come to designate an incapacity "to name and sti'ive for a Good," so tliat 
the reign of ethics "is one symptom of a universe ruled by a distinctive combination 
of resignation in the face of necessity together with a purely negative, if not 
destructive will?"‘s°
The Theological Turn
Badiou further maintains tliat "every effort to turn ethics into tlie principle of 
tliought and action is essentially religious, Connolly is clearly engaging witii 
many 'religious' themes throughout liis work: his language is imbued with  
tlieological terms, and his turn to ontology opens the door for his proposal to be 
viewed as a faith alongside other faiths. In his political society, w e w ould each place 
our projections, positions, and fundaments on the "ontological register, where 
alternatives contend witli each oilier while, hopefully, acknowledging tlie 
fundamental and reciprocal contestability of these contending articles of faitli."‘ 82 Yet 
more tlian just recognising his own fundaments as articles of faith, he engages very 
explicitly witli traditional religions, particularly Christianity, throughout liis work.
As Tracy B. Stiong points out, a major component of Connolly's project is the 
argument tiiat contemporary political theory camiot ignore Christianity.‘83 Wliile liis 
W hy I  am N ot a Secularist (whose title is an intentional play on Bertiand Russell's W hy  
I am N ot a Christian) opens with an autobiograpliical account of his experience of 
being a cliildhood atheist surroiuided by Southern Baptists, his earlier 
Identity \Difference begins with a discussion of the problem of evil. He identifies two 
problems of evil, the first referring to "human efforts to save tlie benevolence of an 
omnipotent god by exempting that god from responsibility for evil."‘84 This 
manifests itself on tlie political level as w e continue the task of protecting our own  
identities by labelling tliose who threaten that identity as evil. Tliis is, indeed, the 
second problem of evil, "the evil tliat flows from the attempt to establish security of 
identity for any individual or group by defining tlie oüier that exposes sore spots in
‘80 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, trans. Peter HaUward (London: 
Verso, 2001), p. 30. 
i8‘ Ibid., p. 23.
‘82 Connolly, Ethos, p. 188.
‘83 Tracy B. Stiong, "Identity\ Différence (book review)," Ethics 102, no. 4 (July 1992), p. 864.
‘84 Connolly, Identitxj\Difference, p. ix.
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one's identity as evil or i r r a t i o n a l . " ‘ 85 An exploration of whetiier it is possible to 
retain tiie functions served by identity witiiout perpetuating tiiis second problem of 
evil through dealing with difference as otiierness as evil is, as Rengger notes, "the 
defining question of the b o o k . " ‘ 86
Coimolly's main opponent in tiiis discussion is Augustine, who "tried to save 
his god from any trace of responsibility for evil while protecting tiiat god's 
omnipotence and its capacity to promise the possibility of eternal life."‘87 Indeed, one 
chapter oîldenÜ ty\D ifference  is "A Letter to Augustine," which serves, as Strong 
notes, as the emotional centre of the book.‘8s His next book is dedicated to an 
exploration of the Augustinian Imperative, which serves as tiie book's title. Wliile 
Connolly admits tiiat the book is not about Augustine as much as tiie imperative of 
wliich he was an exemplary articulator and with wliich much of contemporary 
political culture continues to operate, he explores Augustinian texts and ideas to find 
'Augustinian tactics of moralizatioii' that problematically pervade our tiiinking 
today. His goal is to "approach Augustine from a critical distance, from a (post-) 
Nietzschean perspective that seeks to reassess and modify effects of the Augustinian 
legacy on the present."‘89 As w e saw earlier, he tiaces two models of morality to 
Augustine, one which pictures morality as obedience to a transcendental command 
and one wliich thinks of morality as attunement to a harmonious design of being. 
Neither one, not even their secular variants and offspring ("secularism," Connolly 
tells us, "...constitutes tiie afterlife of Augustiiiiaiiism"‘9o), allows for the full 
appreciation and recognition of tiie abundance of being and diversity of life, wliich  
leads liim to counter morality witii liis etliical cultivation.
Comiolly does admit, hom  time to time, that Augustine shared a certain 
sense of the abmidance and mystery of life.‘9‘ He even admits that, "much more tiian 
most versions of secularism, Christianity honors a role for mystery, paradox, and 
existential struggle in life."‘9% Yet at the same time as he commends Augustine's
185 Ibid., p. 8.
‘86 N.J. Reiigger, " Identity \ Difference (book review)," Millennhim: Journal of International Studies 
20, no. 3 (Winter 1991), p. 532; see also Connolly, Identity\Difference, p. 8.
‘87 Connolly, Identity\Difference, p. 4,
‘88 Stiong, "Identity \ Difference (book review)," p. 864. See also Anne Norton,
" Identity \Difference (book review)," Journal of Politics 54, no. 3 (Aug. 1992), pp. 919-920.
‘89 Connolly, Augustinian Imperative, p. xviii.
‘90 Connolly, Identity \Difference, p. 145.
‘ 9‘ See, for example, ibid., p. 156.
‘92 Connolly, Augustinian Imperative, pp. 156-157.
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appreciation for mystery and plurality and tlie contribution Ms insights may have 
made towards future reflections on tiiese matters, he accuses Augustine of deploying 
mystery as a dogmatic instrument of power to protect Ms own doctrine, denounce 
competing doctiines, and draw stiingent lines around the diversity tiiat could be 
considered tolerable.‘93 Augustine has been one of the most influential figures in 
political theory, and perhaps in Western society more broadly, so it is in some senses 
not surprising that he would receive such explicit attention in Connolly's work. At 
the same time, w e may want to raise questions about the accuracy of Connolly's use 
and interpretation of Augustine. Rengger writes of Connolly's interpretation of 
Augustine as "a reading tiiat occasionally stimns my credulity."‘94 Stiong wonders if 
Augustine's tiiought, particularly on original sin, could not be interpreted in such a 
way that Ms critiques come very close to Connolly's own.‘95 If Augustine is indeed 
such a cential figure in the Mstory of political tiiought, if even Ms 'opponents' feel tiie 
need to engage him in conversation as they seek to develop a more adequate 
contemporary political tiieory in light of our sense of contingency and concern for 
difference, if he addresses issues of mystery and plurality tiiat continue to be of 
relevance, might it be worthwhile to look back to Augustine more dhectly, to see 
how his tiiought and Ms ontology might help us find more adequate ways to engage 
witii difference emd diversity?
Coimolly is certainly not alone in his attempts to draw Augustine into 
contemporary conversations about political society.‘96 JoMi Milbank, for example, 
has developed a 'postmodern critical Augustinianism'‘97 and cites Augustine as one 
interested in 'denaturalising' and 'deconstructing' the political order of M s day so 
tiiat he could show the dynamics and contingency involved in its construction.‘98 
Milbank's 'Augustinian' tiieology also leads him to question tiie 'secular' and to 
counter tiie predominance of morality based in law or command with an 'etiiic of
‘93 Ibid., pp. 112-113, 77.
‘94 Rengger, "Iclentit\j\Dijference (book review)," p. 534.
‘95Stiong, "Identity\Difference (book review)," p. 865.
‘96 The work of Romand Coles, in wliich he puts Augustine, Foucault, and Merleau-Ponty 
into conversation, is another example. See Romand Coles, SeXffPoxoer/Other: Political Theory 
and Diaological Ethics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992).
‘97 A label he uses for Ms own project in John Mübaiik, "Postmodern Critical Augustinianism: 
A Short Swnma in Forty-two Responses to Unasked Questions," in The Postmodern God, ed. 
Graham Ward (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1997), pp. 265-278.
‘98 Jolin Milbank, "Against Secular Order," Joitrnal of Religions Ethics 15 (Fall 1987), pp. 208-210. 
See also Jolm Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1990), pp. 380-438.
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gift.'199 Though tlaese concerns are sim ilar to tliose of Connolly, M ilbank believes tiiat 
a tenable ethic needs to be grounded in  an  abundance and  p lenitude th a t go m uch 
deeper than that w hich can be d raw n from  Nietzsche. A t the ontological level, he 
sees in A ugustine tlie prioritisation of peace over conflict, so tliat the tr agic, 
conflictual condition in  w liich w e live is a contingent result of tlie fall mid peace 
rather tlian conflict is our ontological reality .200 For tlie agonistic recognition of 
conflict is not, according to Jean Betlike Elshtain, shocking new s to fliose w ho study 
history and have an  aw areness of hum an sin and  evil. It is "a w akeup call only for 
those w ho w ere first lulled to sleep by consensus theory or some such."2oi The 
difference betw een agonistic and  C hristian thinkers is not, as Elshtain notes, 
recognition of conflict, b u t tlie assertion th a t tliis conflict and  violence com prise our 
ontological reality, for "Hobbes and  Jesus of N azareth  camiot botli be righ t . "202
It m ay w ell be, then, th a t the ontology of A ugustine offers us a w ay to m ove 
beyond tiie seemingly hopeless and  one-sided ontology of violence p u t forw ard by 
Comiolly and  tlie otlier agonistic tiieorists w e have considered. By so iJioroughly 
ontologising and  naturalising conflict, agonistic theorists m ay be guilty of tlie charge 
levelled against them  by M athew es, nam ely th a t of "refusing all im aginative 
possibilities for some sort of ideal absolute harmony." Such a refusal "stands in 
m anifest tension w ith  tiie agonists' ow n insistence that patterns of h tm iaii interaction 
are radically contingent, alw ays open to contestation mid re-imagination. "203 For, as 
M ilbank w onders "how does one establish, w ithout a  renew ed form  of 
foundationalism , that the agon is inescapable, or th a t epistemological m icertainty is 
endless conflict ratiier tlian the tensional bu t 'peaceful' participation of tiie finite in
tiie infiiiite?"204
O ur agonistic political tiieorists believe that harm ony in  tiie m idst of our 
p lurality  is no longer a plausible ideal because of the conflict mid chaos th a t m ark
‘99 On the secular, see Milbank, "Against Secular Order," pp. 199-224; Theology and Social 
Theojy, "Problematizing the Secular: The Post-postmodern Agenda," in Shadow of Spirit, ed. 
Philippa Beiiy and Andrew Wernick (London: Routiedge, 1992), pp. 30-44. On why 
'morality' is not equivalent to Christianity and camiot be Cluistian, see John Milbank, The 
Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Ctdture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 219-232.
200 Jolm Milbank, "The Midwinter Sacrifice: A Sequel to 'Can Morality be Christian?"' Sttidies 
in Christian Ethics 10, no. 2 (1997); Theology and Social Theory, p. 390.
201 Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Response to Panel Papers," Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics 21 
(2001), p. 154.
292 Elshtain, "Response," p. 154.
203 Mathewes, "Faitli, Hope, and Agony," p. 137.
204 Milbank, "Against Secular Order," p. 212.
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our ontological reality. In tlieir thinking a m ove beyond liberal tolerance in  the nam e 
of difference is concom itant w ith  the relinquislunent of hope of unity  am idst 
diversity. This post-Nietzscheem political thought attem pts to overcom e certain 
binary oppositions w hich tliey find in  m odern tiieory, m oving beyond strict 
delineations betw een Self and  Otlier, identity and  difference, inside and  outside, in 
the nam e of and  for the sake of pluraliiy and  multiplicity .205 Yet in  the place of these 
'm odern' binaries they establish tlieir ow n oppositions, unnecessarily establisliing 
strict dichotom ies betw een harm ony and  difference, un ity  and  diversity, the 
universal and  tlie particular. Furtherm ore, some of the very chmiges and  m ovem ents 
that tliey app laud  and encourage, such as the m ultiplicity of identity  and  tlie 
increased sense of contingency experienced under conditions of pluralism , do no t 
seem liberating to significant parts of the w orld 's population. As Zizek and  Michael 
H ard t and  A ntonio N egri note, outside of elite intellectual circles, increased 
hybridity, mobility, and  contingency are often experienced traum atically and 
associated w itli increased sufferiiig .206
W liat hope, then, do w e have, in  tliis w orld  of difference an d  plurality  in 
wliich w e find ourselves today? Does agonistic political tiiought, despite its 
insufficiencies, represent the best prospect for engaging w ith  diversity? O r is it 
possible th a t an  alternative ontology could provide us w ith  different pictures of w hat 
is possible w hen  it comes to questions of difference? Could it  be tiiat a non-violent 
ontology w ould  enable us to im agine and  w ork tow ards com m unities of harm ony 
that respect the universal and tiie particular? We w ould  do w ell to  w alk  tiuough  tiie 
ontological door opened by agonistic political tiieorists and w alk tow ards 
Christianity 's ontology of peace as a possible w ay to expand o m  political and 
pluralist imagination.
205 For a discussion of tiiis move witiiin postmodern tiiought more generally, see Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 
139-143.
206 Zizek, Ticklish Subject, pp. 220-221; Hardt and Negri, Empire, pp. 154-155.
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C h a pter  Four  
A u g u stin e  a n d  th e  T h eo lo g ic a l  T u r n
In t r o d u c t io n
The w ritings, letters, and  serm ons of A ugustine reveal a p icture of tlie natm e 
of reality and  hum an  being tliat is vastly different from  tlie pictures th a t em erge out 
of political liberalism  or post-N ietzschean political tliought. W hereas tlie post- 
Nietzschecms see chaos and  conflict predom inating, A ugustine believes peace and 
harm ony to be tlie m ost fundam ental realities. W hereas political liberals seek a 
political realm  in  w hich conflict is overcome th rough consensus, A ugustine is aw are 
of the ineradicable presence of lust for dom ination and pow er in  our eartlily polis. 
Indeed, A ugustine w as neitlier naïve about tlie pervasiveness of pow er gam es w ithin 
society nor unaw are of tlie complexities concomitEuit w itli situations of plurality  and 
diversity. A nd yet liis tlieological tiiinking about hum anity, com m m iity, and  
political life reveals ideas and  pictures that have long been absent from  m ainstream  
political theory. T hat being said, w e are no t tiie first, as we saw  in  the last chapter, to 
tu rn  to this w riter, thinker, and  bishop from  tiie fourth century in  an  effort to address 
tiie question of difference as it  faces us in tiie tw enty-first century.
A tu rn  to A ugustine w itiiin certain pockets of political theory, philosophy, 
and theology m ay perhaps best be m iderstood as a response to tiie deep questioning 
of m odernity, and  m any of its presuppositions and institutions, tiiat m arks our 
contem porary milieu. This questioning has w rought changes in  political theory, as 
we have seen, and  seems to have opened tiie door for considerations of new  and 
different resources tiiat m ight help our political im agination in  tlie face of pluralism . 
Agonistic political tiiought is one such resource, wliile A ugustine, as a political 
tiim ker w ho predates m odernity, is another. As Joshua M itdiell rem arks, in  an 
attem pt to explain w hy changing circumstances have enabled recent political 
tiiought to reconsider tiie w ork of A ugustine, "under such circum stances as tiiese, 
Augustine ceases to be a figure w ho quietly adm inisters the sedative of faith to tiie 
W estern w orld  — the effects of w hich take a m illenium  to w ear off. A nother 
possibility emerges."‘ Peter Brown likewise believes tliat because "tiie w hole
' Joshua Mitchell, "The Uses of Augustine, After 1989," Political Theory 27, no. 5 (October 
1999), p. 696. Mitchell's article helpfully summarises some recent attempts to draw on
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em phasis on  w ha t is fruitful in  political theory has shifted," A ugustine now  seems 
like a tliinker w ho stands very close to the preoccupations of our age.2 A t tlie same 
time, certain changes in  our intellectual climate have revealed tlie degree to w hich 
the concerns of political philosophy are integrally related to ontological beliefs about 
the nature of reality and  hum an  being, so that, as Charles M athew es writes, "what 
initially seems a contingent political question is revealed to be a deep and  
inescapable m etaphysical i s s u e . T h i s  m eans tliat questions related to  pluralism  and 
difference need to  be addressed, as M atliewes points out, no t only because they m ark 
our curren t socio-political reality b u t for properly theological reasons. To look a t the 
question of pluralism  in  tlieological terms, w e m ay need to look beyond and  behind 
m odern tiieology to recover earlier sources, of w liich tlie A ugustinian tradition  
stands as a ricli and  fruitful spring.^
A lthough A ugustine's situation w as significantly different from  ours today, 
so th a t it is im portan t to ti eat liis w ork in  light of his historical circum stances ratiier 
tlian m erely appropriating  it for our purposes, w e need n o t assm ne th a t he lived in a 
time of sim plicity and  likem itidediiess while w e are the first to face com plexity and 
plurality. As Charles Norris C ochiane w rites, "Augustine w as born  in to  a w orld  the 
perplexities of w liich have probably never been exceeded by any period, before or 
since, in hum an history.''^ N or need w e assum e that agonistic theorists operating in 
Nietzsche's legacy are tlie first to expose the underlying pow er games a t play in 
society and  politics. A ugustine believes that the libido dominandi is a t the very heart 
of tlie city of this w orld, "a city wliich aims at dominion, wliich holds nations in
Augustine to address political questions. See pp. 694-705. See also "Bibliography," in 
Augustine: Political Writings, ed. E.M. Atkins and R.J. Dodaro (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), p. 1.
2 P. R. L. Brown, "Political Society," m  Augustine: A  Collection of Critical Essays, ed. R.A.
Markus (New York; Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1972), p. 312. Reinhold Niebuhr counsels 
us to look to Augustine because of the breakdown of community in contemporary society, 
while Eugene TeSelle calls for such a turn in light of the threats to theological edifices built 
from tiie Middle Ages onwards. See Reinhold Niebuhr, "Augustine's Political Realism," in 
The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr: Selected Essays and Addresses, ed. Robert McAfee Brown (New 
Haven: Yale Universit}^ Press, 1986), pp. 133-134 and Eugene TeSelle, Augustine the Theologian 
(London: Burns & Oates, 1970), p. 119.
3 Charles T. Mathewes, "Pluralism, Otherness, and tlie Augustinian Tradition," Modern 
Theology 14, no. 1 (Januaiy 1998), p. 86.
4 Matliewes, "Pluralism," p. 84.
3 Charles Norris Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Cidture:A Study of Thought and Action from 
Augustus to Augustine (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), p. 380.
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enslavem ent, bu t is itself dom inated by that very lust of dom ination."6 A ugustine 
furüierm ore recognises tliat a certain degree of contingency m arks the w orld  as w e 
know it, particularly  w hen  it comes to such forms of security as pow er. For 
A ugustine the lu st for dom ination and  the contingency of w orldly  pow er provide all 
die m ore reason to acknow ledge the insufficiency of the 'earthly city,' the city and 
political society of tliis saeculum / in  contrast to tlie H eavenly City, the City of God, 
tlie city that is on pilgrim age in  tliis age and therefore co-exists w ith  tlie earthly city, 
while having a fundam entally  distinct origin, basis, love, and  telos.
Peace, everlasting and perfect, is the Suprem e Good of tlie City of God, w hich 
its citizens look forw ard to on  tlie basis of faiüi and hope. Love for God ra ther tlian 
lust for dom ination defines tliis city. Its citizens come from  all nations and  speak all 
languages, adorn ing  different dress and  adhering to different m am iers of life, 
um estrained  by conform ity of customs, laws, and institutions, free to have "tlieir 
innum erable variety of desires and  thoughts and everything else w hich  m akes 
hum an beings different from  one anotlier. "s Its peace is vastly different from  that of 
tlie eartlily city, so different that Augustine believes it is the only peace w orthy  of the 
nam e .9 It is a peace th a t is inextricably connected to harm ony, "for tliis peace is the 
perfectly ordered and  com pletely harm onious fellowsliip m  the enjoym ent of God, 
and of each other in  God."‘o Unlike the post-N ietzschean political theorists of the last 
chapter, tlien, w ho, in  the nam e of difference and in recognition of the prevalence of 
conflict and  pow er, give up  all hope for harm ony, A ugustine speaks of a w orld  that 
has harm ony am idst diversity a t its very centie. It is th rough a close look a t tlie 
writings of A ugustine that tlie distinctness of the ontology w ith  w hich he operates 
becomes visible, in  stark  contrast to tliat offered either by political liberalism  or 
agonistic political thought. Once his ontology is before us, w e can tlien tu rn  to see 
how  it m ight benefit and  expand our current political imagination.
6 Concerning the City o f God Against the Pagans I, preface, trans. Henry Bettenson 
(Hai'mondswortli, England: Penguin Books, 1972).
7 The saecnlnm is defined by Peter Brown as "the sum total of human existence as we 
experience it in the present, as we know it has been since the fall of Adam, and as we know it 
will continue until the Last Judgement" and by R. A. Markus as "the whole stretch of time in 
which the two 'cities' are 'inextricably intertwined'" (Brown, "Political Society," p. 321; R.A. 
Markus, Saeculnm: History and Society in the Theology of St Augustine [London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970J, p. 133).
8 Augustine, The Augustine Catechism: The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love XXVII, 103, 
bans. Bruce Harbert, ed. Jolm E. Rotelle, O.S.A. (Hyde Paik, N.Y.: New City Press, 1999).
 ^City of God XIX, 17.
-^0 City of God XIX, 17.
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Before w e begin this task, it m ay be helpful to clarify w h a t the am bitions of 
tlris chapter are, and  w ha t they are not. The overarching goal is an  im m ersion into 
tlie ontology tliat underlies A ugustine's thought, as it can be d raw n o u t from  an 
investigation of a distinct num ber of his w orks.“  This will obviously involve a 
certain am ount of selectivity, both  in  the w orks that are considered and  in  the parts 
of tliose w orks th a t are directly addressed. The aim, however, is to step back from  
isolated w orks so tliat a picture emerges of die ontology that m idergirds his thought, 
inform ing it both im plicitly and  explicitly. This is not, tlien, an  investigation focused 
on articulating the relationship betw een die tw o cities, as m any w orks of 
A ugustinian political tiieory are, nor is it  an  attem pt to come to term s w ith  his 
understanding  of the self, as is m uch m odern interaction w itii A ugustine. Though 
discussions of tiiese im portan t realm s of A ugustine's thought w ill certainly be a part 
of our endeavour, they are only th a t—one p art of A ugustine's larger ontology. As 
we step into that ontology, the hope is that some new  possibilities w ill begin to 
em erge for helping us p icture life together. W e are n o t trying to transfer A ugustine 
wholesale into our political m om ent, b u t w e are trying to see wliich parts of his 
ontology m ight augm ent our curren t political and theological im agination.
We begin this chapter w itii a broad articulation of tiie fram ew ork w hich 
A ugustine assm nes and  develops as tlie nature of tiie w orld and  hum an  being in 
certain of his w ritings, and  tlien move into a m ore detailed discussion of tiie specific 
com ponents of w hich his ontology is comprised. W ithin tiie broader p icture of order 
and harm ony tiiat he paints, w e w ill need to deal closely w ith  his understand ing  of 
God's creation of nature, hum anity, and  order; the d isorder and  disharm ony tliat 
result from  sin; the role of Jesus Christ and the Trinity m ore generally in  creating and 
redeem ing the w orld, m aking possible and  providing eschatological hope for
“  Because of tiie magnitude of Augustine's corpus (117 books, according to Brown,who cites 
tiiis number after noting Isidore of Seville's alleged comment that if anyone says he has read 
all tiie works of Augustine he is a liar ["Political Society," p. 311]), for tiie purposes of this 
investigation it was necessary to choose to work witii a handful of Augustine's works that 
seemed most relevant to tiie discussion at hand. These include On Music, trans. Robert 
Catesby Taliaferro, in The Fathers of the Church, vol. 4 (New York: The Fatiiers of the 
Church, Inc., 1947); On Christian Doctrine, bans. D.W. Robertson, Jr. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs- 
Merrill Company, Inc., 1958); Confessions, bans. Hemy Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991); The Trinity, bans. Edmund Hill, O.P., ed. John E. Rotelle, O.S.A. (Brooklyn, New 
York: New City Press, 1991); The Augustine Catechism: The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love 
(hereafter' Enchiridion); and Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans (hereafter City of God). 
For relevant letters and sermons I have relied upon Augustine: Political Writings, ed. Atkins
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renewed peace and unity amidst diversity; and how  God's redemption plays out in 
terms of the Heavenly City and tlie Church. With these in mind, w e w ill then be able 
to turn to how  Augustine conceives of the relationship between the Heavenly City 
and the eartlily city, and what hopes citizens of the Heavenly City can have for the 
earthly city while tliey are on pilgrimage in its midst.
H a rm o n y  a n d  D iversity 
An  Overview
Peace, harmony, and order are fundamental to Augustine's picture of the 
world, implicitly underlying his tliought if not explicitly articulated in a given piece 
or text. They are at the heart of his understanding of the creation of nature and 
humanity, tlie fall and the manifestation of sin in the world, the redemption of 
creation that conies through Jesus Christ, and tiie eschatological hope that marks tiie 
Heavenly City. One of Augustine's eaiiiest works is, in fact, entitled De ordine (On 
Order) a n d  his belief in the underlying order of God's created world continues 
throughout liis lifetime, certain changes in liis tiiinking on the matter 
notwitlistanding.‘3
In liis earliest works, tliis belief in God-created order is articulated in terms of 
music and number, which, according to Augustine, reveal tiie beauty and unity of 
God's w orld .‘4 For number begins from tiie unity of one and has beauty in its
and Dodaro. Otlier texts and letters will be cited m the course of our discussion, but the 
aforementioned serve as my main sources.
‘2 De ordine in Contra academicos. De heata vita. De ordine, edited by William M. Green and 
Klaus D. Daur (Turnliolti: Typographi Brepols, 1970).
‘3 He, for example, changed his view of how one arrives at knowledge of this divine order. 
His earlier works, including De ordine, are concerned witii the role of the liberal arts as 
preparation for understanding this order, while he later comes to question the efficacy of the 
liberal arts in light of the extent of humanity's sinfulness. (For background on De ordine, see 
TeSelle, Augustine the Theologian, pp. 77-82. For Augustine's distancing of himself from his 
earlier views on the importance of the hbeial arts, see Hemy Chadwick, Augustine (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 33. He also based some of his earlier tiiinking on order on 
a mistranslation of Rom 13:2, so that at one time he believed it to be "AH order is of Cod," 
while in his Retmctions he admits tiiat it is better ti anslated "the things that are are ordained 
of God." See O f True Religion xli, 76 and Retractions I, xiii, 8, in Augustine: Earlier Writings, 
translated by John H.S. Burleigh (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1953).
‘4 See esp. On Music VI. This work reveals Augustine's belief in a mathematical order of the 
universe tiiat can be disclosed tluough music, for he believes that underlying creation is the 
harmony of number. This idea, as Hans Urs Von Balthasar notes, was drawn from 
Pytiiagoras by Plato and then incorporated by Plotinus, whose tiiought presumably served as
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equality and  likeness, just as nature, Üiough com prised of a variety of different forms 
and  sizes, comes from  one beginning and has beauty in  its equality and  sim ilitude. 
The diversity of nature stem s from  tlie riches of God's goodness and  is "joined 
togetiier in  charity as one and  one gift from  o n e ." ‘ 5 Tliroughout his w orks,
Augustine m aintains tliat creation has one begimiing, nam ely the fullness of God's 
goodness, o u t of w hich G od created, giving form  and  particularity to th a t w hich w as 
formless, endow ing tlie vast diversity of creation w ith  m easure, form, an d  order, 
giving each p art of creation its place w ith in  God's o r d e r .‘ 6 Creation, then, is 
m anifold and inter-com iected w itiiin a divine order. H um anity, too, is p a r t of this 
picture of diversity and  harm ony, for, according to A ugustine, God chose to begin all 
hum anity  from  one single individual so that the hum an  race w ould  "be bound  
togetiier by a kind of tie of kinship to form  a harm onious miity, linked togetiier by 
the 'bond of p e a c e ' ."‘ 7
The divine order tiiat A ugustine identifies w ith  God's creation is 
fundam entally relational, involving a harm ony of relation betw een an d  w itiiin  God, 
angels, hum anity, animals, and  n a t u r e . ‘ 8 This harm ony is rooted in  A ugustine's 
belief tiiat God's order involves a hierarchy of goods in w hich each good has its 
p roper p l a c e . ‘ 9 The highest goods in  this liierarchy are im m ortal goods related to 
eternal peace and  tiie everlasting enjoym ent of God and others in  God. W lien tilings 
are properly ordered, hum ans delight in  and refer all else to these im m ortal goods, 
"where tiie highest unchangeable undisturbed  and eternal equality resides," so that 
"terresti'ial subjects are subject to  celestial, and tlieir time circuits join together in
Augustine's soui’ce for tiie idea. In The Nature of the Good, tiiis discussion seems to take place 
m terms of 'measure, form, and order,' while engagement witii particular numbers can be 
seen in The Trinity IV, 7 and City of God XI, 30. See The Nature of the Good, in Augustine: Earlier 
Writings, tr anslated by John H.S. Burleigh (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1953), esp. iii-xxxviii.
Von Balthasar notes tliat Augustine's "metaphysic of numbers recedes into tlie backgromid" 
over tiie course of liis writing, although, as he points out, its presence is still visible in the 
later work of City of God. See Hans Urs Von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A  Theological 
Aesthetics, vol. 2, Studies in Theological Style: Clerical Styles, trans. Andrew Louth, Francis 
McDonagh, and Brian McNeil, C.R.V., ed. John Riches (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998), p. 
119; pp. 116-123.
‘5 On Music VI, 56. See also W.F. Jackson Knight, St. Augustine's De Musica: A  Synopsis 
(London: The Orthological histitute, 1949), pp. 122-125.
‘6 Confessions XII, iii (3), Xlll, ii (2); Enchiridion III, 9; The Nature of the Good iii.
7^ City of God XIV, 1.
‘8 N.B. This is in contr ast to William Connolly's interpretation of Augustine's order as 
fmidamentally moral. Hie relational nature of tire divine order, as Augustine describes it, 
certainly has an accompanying etlrics, but at heart it is concerned primarily witir relationality 
ratlrer tiran moralrt)\
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harm onious succession for a poem  of the universe . "20 This reveals another sense in 
wliich the divine order is relational: w ith in  God's divine order all things w ere created 
to be related and  referred to God. As Brown w rites, "the w ord  referre, 'to refer', or 
'relate', is central to  A ugustine's discussion of hum an  activity; an d  for A ugustine, of 
course, this hm nan  activity of w hatever kind, can only reach fulfillm ent w hen  it can 
take its place in  a harm onious w hole, w here everything is in relation to God."2i All 
goods, then, are to be referred to tlie greater, m ichanging good of God. Even love of 
self and  love of neighbour are ultim ately undertalcen for tlie sake of God; a  person, in  
"loving his neighbour as h im self.. .refers the love of both to th a t love of G od wliich 
suffers no stream  to be led aw ay from  it by wliich it m ight be dim inished. "22 
A nd yet hum anity  tu rned  aw ay from  the greatest goods to low er ones, 
choosing self-love over love of God, and tliereby d isrupting  the harm onious unity  of 
creation and allow ing 'd isordered chaos' and tlie prevalence of disunity over unity  to 
ho ld  sw ay in  tliis w o rld .23 As Augustine w rites in  The T nnih j, "by w ickedness and 
ungodliness w ith  a crasliing discord w e had  bounced away, and  flow ed and  faded 
aw ay from  tlie one suprem e true God into the m any, divided by the m any, clinging 
to die many. "24 From  die initial act of creation came die m any from  die One, united 
in  order and harm ony, b u t from  the fall of hum anity  came die d isruption  of order 
and  the division of the m any into ever-increasing disharm ony, into the m any
‘9 See Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture, pp. 486-487.
20 On Music VI, 29. Note liis use of 'delight': delight is important because it is a weight in the 
soul that order s the soul.
21 Brown, "Political Society," p. 318.
22 On Christian Doctrine 1,21. This is why Augustine writes, in 1,20 of On Christian Doctiine, 
that only God can be 'enjoyed' wliile one's neighbours are to be 'used,' for by 'use' Augustine 
means to love something for the sake of God rather Üiaii for its own sake. It is not that the 
thing 'used' is not loved, but only that the love offered to it is related or referred to God, 
tiiereby preventing it from being looked to in ways that exceed its capacities. For an 
introduction of diis conceptualisation and die reasons it has come under recent critique, see 
Carol Harrison, Augustine; Christian Truth and Fractured Huntanity (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), pp. 98-100, For what is considered die classic critique of Augustine's distinction, 
see Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953). For an account 
of different strategies employed in recent scholarsliip to help Augustine out of this critique, 
culminating in a defence of Augustine's distinction, see Eric Sean Gregory, "Love and 
Citizenship: Augustine and the Etiiics of Liberalism" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 2002), pp. 
223-247. For a different defence based in a re-reading of The Trinity, see Mathewes, 
"Plm'aUsm," pp. 95-100.
23 Confessions XIII, xxxiv (49).
24 The Trinity TV, 11. N.B. The endnote following this quote discusses die neoplatonic 
background of tiiis language.
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witiiout tlie miity of tlie One. Whence the need for the redemption and 
reconciliation that came through Jesus Christ, tlie 'one' of the following passage:
And so it was fitting that at the beck and bidding of a compassionate God the many 
should themselves acclaim together the one who was to come, and that acclaimed by 
the many togetiier die one should come, and that die many should testify together 
that die one had come, and that we being disburdened of the many should come to 
die one; and that being dead in soul through many sins and destined to die in die 
flesh because of sin, we should love tiie one who died in the flesh for us without sin, 
and tiiat believing in him raised from the dead, and rising omselves witii hmi in 
spirit through faith, we should be made one in the one just one; and that we should 
not despak of ourselves rising in tiie flesh when we observed tiiat we tlie many 
members had been preceded by the one head, in whom we have been purified by 
faitli and will then be made completely whole by sight, and that thus fully reconciled 
to God by liim the mediator, we may be able to cling to tiie one, enjoy the one, and 
remain for ever one.^s
This passage resonates w ith the neoplatonic language of tiie one and the many of 
Plotinus to make tiie point tiiat tiirough tiie one Jesus Christ, tiie one w ho as God and 
man was able to be tiie mediator between God and humanity, tliose w ho are many 
can again become one.26 Tliis unity is not merely one of nature or kinship, but one of 
charity: tliose who are one in Christ are bound in tiie fellowship of love.27 Tliis love
25 The Trinity IV, 11.
26 The degr ee to which Augustine is influenced by Platonic and Neoplatonic drought is a 
matter of no small discussion and debate. Augustine believes that books by the 'Platonists' 
Plotinus and Porphyry played a prominent role in his conversion to Cluistianity, and yet he 
also recognises tirat Jesus Christ, as the Word made flesh and one who was bodily resmrected 
is incompatible with Platonic thought. For Iris thoughts on Platonists, both how they 
influenced him and how they fall short, see Confessions Vll, ix (13), x (16), xx (26), xxi (27); City 
of God VIII, 4-22; X; XXII, 25-29; O f True Religion i, 1-vi, 11. For a helpful review of differing 
evaluations of Augustine's relatioirslrip with Platonism, see Robert Crouse, "Paticis Mutatis 
Verhis: St. Augustine's Platoirism," in Augustine and His Critics, ed. Robert Dodaro and George 
Lawless (Loirdorr: Routiedge, 2000), pp. 37-50; for background oir tire debate surrounding 
how influenced Augustine was by Plotinus and what works Augustine might have read, see 
TeSelle, Augustine the Theologian, pp. 49-54; oir how Augustine's belief in Cluist as mediator 
forces Iris decisive break witir Platonism, see Harrison, Augustine, pp. 30-37; on Augustine's 
use and subsequent rejection of tire Platonic idea of 'the ascent of the soul,' see Martha 
Nussbaum, "Augustine and Dante on the Ascent of Love," in The Augustinian Tradition, ed. 
Garetir Mathews (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 63-74; on the influence of 
Neoplatonism on Augustine in City of God, see Robert Russell, O.S.A., "The Role of 
Neoplatonism in St. Augustine's De Civitate Dei," in The City of God: A  Collection of Critical 
Essays, ed. Dorotiry F. Doimelly (New York: Peter Lang, 1995), pp. 403-413.
27 The Trinity IV, 12.
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is love of God and  neighbour, and  a soul tliat "loves H im  above itself, tliat is, God 
and fellow souls as itself," is a soul tliat is in  o r d e r . 2 8
This love is what binds tlie Heavenly City together: "the children of grace, the 
citizens of tlie free city, the sharers in eternal peace, who form a community where 
tiiere is no love of a will tliat is personal and, as we may say, private, but a love that 
rejoices in a good tliat is at once shared by all and unchanging—a love that makes 
'one heart' out of many, a love that is the whole-hearted and harmonious obedience 
of mutual a f f e c t i o n . " 2 9  Furtliermore, once tlie Heavenly City reaches its fulfilment in 
'eternal bliss,' an even deeper state of harmony w ill be reached. Harmonies of tlie 
body that were heretofore hidden w ill be revealed and harmonies of archangels, 
angels, and humans that in this age exceed tlie powers of our imagination and 
description will be made known.^o No lust for domination will be evident between  
humans in this divine order, nor will humans have dominion over each otlier. Such 
tilings arise only w hen human sin replaces genuine dutiful concern and compassion 
witli the pride tliat "hates a fellowship of equality under God, and seeks to impose its 
own dominion on fellow men, in place of God's rule."5i Indeed, just such a 
disruption of tlie divine order, caused by a "perverted imitation of God," resulted in  
tlie need for government tliat involves power, compulsion, and c o e r c i o n . 8 2  This 
govermnent is a providential provision that can help towards the attainment of 
limited peace between people in tlie earthly city, but because of humanity's 
disruption of tlie divine order tluough its preference for the lower goods of power 
and self-love, the only true hope for equality and harmony lies in tlie City whose 
fotmder is Jesus Cluist.53
It is w hen  hum ans tu rn  from  tlie liighest, unchangeable goods and  prioritise 
low er goods tliat tlie harm ony God in tended for tlie w orld  is disrupted. The
28 On Music VI, 46.
City of God XV, 3.
City of God XXll, 30.
31 City of God XIX, 12; XIX, 14.
32 Tills view clearly goes with interpretations of Augustine in which politics is seen as a God- 
ordained result of die fall but not God's original intention for creation. For an account of 
recent scholarship covering the range of possible positions on tliis issue (i.e., that Augustine 
views politics as natural, as 'bad,' or as somewhere in between), see Peter J. Burnell, "The 
Status of Politics in St. Augustine's City of God," History of Political Thought 13, no. 1 (Spring 
1992), pp. 13-29.
33 Elaine Scarry athibutes to Augustine the belief that equality is "the thing of all things to be 
aspired to.. .[and] the morally liighest and best feature of tlie world" {On Beauty and Being Just 
[Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999], p. 98).
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harm ony of tlie universe is, according to A ugustine, inextricably connected to 
harm ony w ithin  hum ans, for w hen  hum ans choose to prioritise low er goods over 
liigher ones, tliey d isru p t God's in tended order for their internal and  their external 
lives, m eaning the harm ony w itiiin  them selves and the harm ony betw een them selves 
and the rest of God's creation. As R ow an Williams notes, "the pax of the individual 
soul and  the pax of the universe are parts of a single continuum , so tliat attem pts at 
peace on the low er levels w ithou t regard  to the higher are doom ed to disaster. "34 We 
see this in tlie following passage, in  w hich A ugustine m oves from  the peace of die 
body to tlie peace of d ie soul, to the peace of m an and  God to peace betw een men, 
and  ultim ately to the peace of die Heavenly City in  w hich the w hole universe resides 
in perfectly harm onious fellowsliip in  the enjoym ent of God and  m utual fellowship 
in  God, in the tranquillity of order:
The peace of die body, we conclude, is a tempering of the component parts in duly 
ordered proportion; the peace of die iirational soul is a duly ordered repose of die 
appetites; the peace of the rational soul is tiie duly ordered agreement of cognition 
and action. The peace of body and soul is tiie duly ordered life and health of a Hviiig 
creature; peace between mortal man and God is an ordered obedience, in faith, in 
subjection to an everlasting law; peace between men is an ordered agreement of mind 
with mind; the peace of a home is the ordered agreement among tliose who live 
together about giving and obeying orders; tiie peace of the Heavenly City is a 
perfectly ordered and perfectly harmonious fellowship in the enjoyment of God, and 
a mutual fellowship in God; the peace of the whole miiverse is the tranquillity of 
order — and order is the arrangement of things equal and unequal in a pattern which 
assigns to each its proper position.^s
The Details: Loves, P eace, H ope, a nd  Ends
This broad fram ew ork of harm ony and order has given us a glim pse of m any 
of the key ideas and  concepts to wliich w e now  tu rn  in  m ore detail as w e seek to 
enter m ore fully into A ugustine's ontology. This is a vast endeavour, an d  w e do no t 
presum e to be able to place all of his m any ideas and concerns into one overarching 
schema even as w e hope to address some of tiie m ost im portan t and  relevant aspects
34 Rowan Williams, "Politics and the Soul: A Reading of the City of God," Milltozun Studies no. 
19/20 (1987), p. 63.
35Q'fi/o/GoziXIX,13.
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of his thought.36 We m ust also bear in mind that altliough Augustine is invoked time 
and again witiiin tlie world of political tliought, not a single one of liis books, as Peter 
Brown points out, is devoted to political theory as such.37 At times, then, our 
discussion may seem  to be drawing us far away from the question of how  to engage 
witli difference and diversity within political society tliat dominates the previous 
chapters of this project, but the comiections should become increasingly evident as 
tlie discussion progresses.
Let us return to tlie beginning, namely Augustine's understanding of 
creation. Creation comes from die fullness of God's being and goodness, so tliat God 
is tlie source of all existence and being is a gift from God flowing from the abundance 
of God's own b e i n g . ^ s  At the heart of Augustine's picture of creation is God as 
'Almighty Artist,' a "wonderful and indescribable craftsman" w ho fashioned and 
made all created things out of God's own g o o d n e s s . 3 9  This is God miderstood as tlie 
Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and the creation fashioned by this Triune God 
is full of wonder and beauty:
For a Cluistian it is enough to believe that tlie cause of created tilings, whether in 
heaven or on eartii, visible or invisible, is nothing other than the goodness of tiie 
creator who is tiie one true God, and that there is nothing that is not either liimself or 
from him, and tiiat he is Trinity, tiiat is. Father, the Son begotten from tiie Father and 
the Holy Spirit who proceeds from tiie same Father, and is one and tiie same Spirit of 
Father and Son. By tiiis Trinity, supremely, equally, and unchangeably good, all 
tilings have been created...and at the same time all tilings are very good, since in aU 
tiiese things consists the wonderful beauty of the u n iv e r s e .4 0  
Indeed, A ugustine has seem ingly endless appreciation for tiie w onders of creation, 
from  hum ans w ho could m ove their ears and  produce som ids from  tlieir beh ind  a t
36 Indeed, the breadth of Augustine's writings precludes such a schema, for, as Herbert Deane 
and Oliver O'Donovan point out, one camiot expect absolute consistency from a thinker 
whose writings cover such a broad range of topics and were developed over many decades. 
See Herbert A. Deane, "Augustine and tiie State: The Return of Order Upon Disorder," in The 
City of God: A  Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Dorothy F. Domielly (New York: Peter Lang,
1995), p. 62; Oliver O'Donovan, "Augustine's City of God XIX and Western Political Thought," 
in The City of God: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Dorothy F. Domielly (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1995), p. 142.
37 Brown, "Political Society," p. 311.
38 Confessions XIII, i (I)-iv (5); City of God V, 11.
39 City of God XXII, 11; Enchiridion XXIII, 89. Note that Augustine is careful to emphasise tiiat 
"God did not create under stress of any compulsion, or because he lacked sonietiiing for his 
own needs; his only motive was goodness; he created because his creation was good" {City of 
God XI, 24).
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will '"without any stink" to the ability of peacocks to resist putrefaction, from wood  
tliat floats instead of sinks to mountains that belcli out fire.^i His sense of wonder 
and appreciation for the diversity of creation is especially evident in the following 
passage:
How could any description do justice to all these blessings? The manifold diversity 
of beauty in sky and eartli and sea; the abundance of light, and its miraculous 
loveliness, in sun and moon and stars; the dark shades of woods, tlie colour and 
h  agiance of flowers; the multitudinous varieties of birds, with tlieir songs and thek 
bright plumage; the countless different species of living creatures of all shapes and 
sizes, among whom it is the smallest in bulk that moves our gieatest wonder—for we 
are more astonished at the activities of the tiny ants and bees than at the immense 
bulk of whales. Then there is the mighty spectacle of the sea itself, putting on its 
changmg colours like different garments, now green, witli all the many varied 
shades, now purple, now blue.. .Think, too, of aU Üie resources for tlie preservation of 
healtli, or for its restoration, the welcome alternation of day and night, the soothkig 
coohiess of the breezes, all the material for clotlimg provided by plants and animals. 
Who could give a complete list of all these natui-al b l e s s i n g s ? ^ ^
Yet in God's original design for creation some of tiiese blessings would have been 
less necessary than others, for man would have enjoyed perfect health in body and 
complete tranquillity in soul as long as "he lived in the enjoyment of God, and 
derived his ow n goodness from God's goodness."43 Neitlier desire nor fear, neitlier 
scarcity nor sadness, neitlier disease nor fatigue was present in the paradise tliat was 
marked instead by ease and plenty, by joy flowing h om God to liumans and a "blaze 
of love" gokig from humans towards God, by mutual respect and love between man 
and woman, and by "a harmony and a liveliness of mind and body."44
And so tlie world would have remained, full of goodness and harmony, had 
no one skuied. Indeed, tlien tlie distinction between tlie eartlily city and the 
Heavenly City w ould never have arisen, for the only city would have been "the vast 
and all-embracing republic of the whole creation" governed by God its creator and 
Jesus Christ its king.45 Augustine is, in some ways, most well known for his 
conception of 'original sin,' namely the belief that sin came into the world tiirough
40 Enchiridion III, 9,10.
41 See Citij of God XIV, 24; XXI, 4; XXI, 5; XXII, 11; XXII, 24.
42 Ckyo/Gorf XXII, 24.
43 City o/Gorf XIV, 26.
44 City o/Gorf XIV, 26.
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the one m an A dam  an d  w as thereby passed to all hum anity  so th a t even infants are 
sinful and  stand  in need of baptism  and r e b i r t l i Tliis sin violated tlie harm ony and 
hierarchy that w ere p a rt of God's order for the universe. As such, sin  can be 
understood as a d isruption  of tlie relational harm ony that God in tended  for God's 
creation, betw een G od and  hum anity, betw een and  w itliin hum ans them selves, and 
betw een hum anity  and  creation. H ow  does A ugustine describe sin? "W hat happens 
is tliat the soul, loving its ow n pow er, slides aw ay from the w hole w liich is com m on 
to all into tlie p art w liich is its ow n private property. By following G od's directions 
and  being perfectly governed by his laws it could enjoy the w hole universe of 
creation; b u t by the apostasy of pride w hich is called the begim iing of sin  it strives to 
grab som etliing m ore th an  the w hole an d  to govern it by its ow n laws; and  because 
tliere is nothing m ore tlian d ie w hole it is thr u st back into anxiety over a part, and so 
by being greedy for m ore it gets less."^^ sin , then, is tu rn ing  aw ay from  God and the 
com m on good tow ards oneself and  one's private concerns and  property. It is 
neglecting the w ay God created the w orld  and  the greater w hole and  harm ony of tlie 
universe. It is, m  short, falsehood. "Every sin is a falsehood," A ugustine w rites, and 
"falsehood consists in  no t living in  the w ay for w hich he w as created." Indeed, m an 
"forsakes God by shining, and  he sm s by living by his ow n s tan d a rd ,
-IS The Trinity III, 9.
For the first occurrence of 'original sin' wMrin his writing, see Confessions V, ix (16). See also 
Confessions I, vii (11); Enchiridion XIII, 45,46; City of God 1,9.
The Trinity XII, 14. In The Literal Meaning of Genesis, Augustine notes tliat calling property 
'private' is indeed a very shrewd name, for 'private' is "a word clearly suggesting loss rather 
tlian gain in value; every privation, after all, spells diminution. And so the very means by 
which pride aims at pre-eminence serve to tiuust it down into sore str aits and want, when its 
ruinous self-love removes it from what is common to what is its own property" {The Literal 
Meaning of Genesis XI, 19, in On Genesis, fcrans. Ednumd Hill, O.P., ed. John E. Rotelle, O.S.A. 
[Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 2002]). See also On Music VI, 53. N.B. Edmund Hill's 
endnote on tlie passage from The Tiinity: "Augustine's view of die fall and sin is thorouglily 
socialist or even communist in its orientation. Any notion of the sacred rights of property 
would have been abhorrent to him. The desire for private possession is a kind of mark of 
Cain, the stigma of man alienated from God" (endnote 42; p. 340).
City of God XIV, 4. This understanding of sin is clearly linked to Augustine's view of evil as 
tlie privation of good. Augustine's rejection of Manichaean dualism, in which evil and good 
were considered two separate principles, in favour of tlie view that "evil has no existence 
except as a privation of good" was based on the belief tliat evil is the decrease of good in a 
creature and is thereby dependent on the existence of tlie good {Confessions III, vii [12]; see 
also VII, xiii [19] and The Nature of the Good iv). And this leads Augustine to a 'surprising 
conclusion,' namely that every being is good, so calling sometliing evil means only that it is a 
contaminated good, not evil in and of itself {Enchiridion IV, 13). Augustine is willing to leave 
some questions unanswered when it comes to evil and its origin, but he is not willing to 
compromise tlie belief that all that is created by God is good. We should note that his 
concern, contra William Comiohy, does not seem to be primarily to develop an account of evil
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This, in fact, is the defining m ark of Üie difference betw een the city of m an 
and  die City of God, and  th a t to w liich the cities owe their existence: the form er lives 
by tlie standard  of hum anity , or the standard  of the flesh, wliile the latter lives by 
God's standard , or the standard  of the Spirit.^^ This is prim arily a m atter of love for, 
as Augustine writes, "tlie tw o cities w ere created by tw o kinds of love: the earüily 
city w as created by self-love reaching tlie point of contem pt for God, die H eavenly 
City by die love of God carried as far as contem pt of self. ...In  the former, die lust for 
dom ination lords it over its princes as over the nations it subjugates; in die odier bodi 
tiiose p u t in audiority  and  diose subject to diem  serve one another in love, d ie rulers 
by dieir counsel, die subjects by obedience. The one city loves its ow n strength  
show n in its pow erful leaders; die odier says to its God, 'I w ill love you, m y Lord, m y 
strengdi.'"so So die eardily city is m arked by love for itself, and  its citizens likewise 
are concerned prim arily  w id i love for tiiemselves, w hereas die H eavenly City and  its 
citizens live for die good of God, odiers, and  creation m ore generally.
For A ugustine, the question of love is integrally comiected to the question of 
order, for w hen  hum ans live by God's standard  and  love God accordingly tiien diey 
will be living in harm ony w ith  God's order and  design for die universe. As he says 
in  one serm on, "I sim ply w an t your loves to be properly ordered. P u t heavenly 
things before earthly, im m ortal things before m ortal, everlasting tilings before 
transitory ones. A nd p u t d ie Lord before everydiing, and n o t just by praising liim, 
b u t also by loving him."5i It is w orth  noting that for A ugustine love of God, 
neighbour, and  self are all inextricably comiected, so d ia t w hen  God enjoins God's 
people to love God and  neighbour, God is also enjoining diem  to love th e m s e lv e s .sz
in which God has no responsibility; if that were his driving concern, die Manichaean notion 
of a separate force of evil would surely have seemed more compelling. He seems rather more 
concerned widi showing diat all beings and aU goodness depend for tiieir existence on God, 
die Supreme Being and Good, and diat no corruption of order and harmony would exist if all 
beings continued to look to God as tiieh Supreme Good.
« C % o /G o rfX IV ,4 .
50 City of God XIV, 28. For an account of politics as a struggle over people's disordered loves 
that is rooted in Augustine's tiiought, see Charles T. Matiiewes, "Faith, Hope, and Agony; 
Christian Political Participation Beyond Liberalism," Annual of the Society o f Christian Ethics 21 
(2001), p p .  125-150.
51 Sermon 335c, 13, in Augustine: Political Writings (p. 59).
52 Hamiah Arendt focuses her critique of Augustine here, on Augustine's conception of love 
and its relation to God, neighbour, and self (Hannah Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine, ed. 
Joamia Veccliiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1996]). Aldiough we caiuiot respond to her critique witiim this work, responses can be made. 
See, for example, Mitchell, "The Use of Augustine," pp. 699-703 and, for a more developed 
response, Gregory, "Love and Citizenship," pp. 124-247.
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For to truly love tiiemselves, hum ans m ust also love God, and  thi'ough this love of 
God tliey will be them selves renew ed and  enabled to love others: " ...w hen  tlie m ind 
loves God, and  consequently as has been said rem em bers and understands him , it 
can rightly be com m anded to love its neighbor as itself. For now  it loves itself w ith a 
straight, no t a tw isted love, now  tliat it loves God; for sharing in  h im  resulfs no t 
m erely in  its being that im age, b u t in its being m ade new  and  fresh and  happy after 
being old and  w orn  and  m ise r a b le . "53 Furtlierm ore, if all people w ere to  follow tliese 
tw o precepts of loving G od and  loving neighbour the result w ould  be peaceful 
ordered harm ony:
Now God, our master, teaches two chief precepts, love of God and love of neighbour; 
and in them finds three objects for his love: God, liimself, and his neighbom-; and a 
man who loves God is not wr ong in loving himself. It follows, therefore, tliat he will 
be concerned also tliat his neighbour should love God, since he is told to love his 
neighbour as himself; and the same is tr ue of his concern for liis wife, his children, for 
the members of Ms household, and for all odier men, so far as is possible. And, for 
the same end, he will wish his neighbour to be concerned for Mm, if he happens to 
need that concern. For diis reason he will be at peace, as far as lies in him, widi all 
men, in diat peace among men, diat ordered harmony .54 
Such harm ony, die k ind d ia t "makes 'one heart' ou t of many," is possible only w hen a 
com m unity is based on  an  unchanging good d iat all can share, radier tiian  on a love 
w hich is private and dependen t on the changing nature of hum an  wills.ss For in 
A ugustine's diinking, as John Burnaby notes, "the Sum m um  Bonum  is by its very 
nature the bonum commune, a good w hich can be possessed only by being sh ared ,..."56 
It is because of the shared nature of the highest good, com bined w ith  the social 
nature of hum anity, that calls to love God, odiers, and  oneself are n o t in  opposition 
to each odier.
That A ugustine believes th a t hum ans are iiiherendy social shou ld  come as no 
surprise, in  light of die discussion dius far. In diis, Augustine sees him self in 
agreem ent w id i die ancient pliilosophers w ho "hold die view  d ia t die life of the wise 
m an should be social; and  in  diis w e support diem  m uch m ore h e a r t i l y . "57 A ugustine
53 T/ieTnmfy XIV, 18.
54 Q-fyo/Gofi XIX, 14.
City of God XV, 3.
56 JoMi Burnaby, Amor Dei: A  Study of the Religmi of S t  Augustine (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1938), p. 127.
City of God XIX, 5.
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acknowledges th a t "God created m an  as one individual," and  yet, he continues, "tliat 
did no t m ean tliat he w as to rem ain alone, bereft of hum an  society. "58 Indeed, God 
began witli die creation of one individual and  had  the rest of h iunank ind  come from 
d ia t one individual so that all of hum anity  w ould  be kn it togedier by a sense of 
kinship and  bound togedier in  die m idst of tiieir differences: "God started  the hum an 
race from  one m an  to  show  to m ankind how  pleasing to liim  is unity  in  plurality. "59 
A nd yet this liumEui race, as w e now  see it, is "at once social by natu re  and  
quarrelsom e by perversion. "6° In die face of die disharm ony d ia t results ft om fallen 
hum an nature, A ugustine turns again to die fact that God began die h u m an  race 
h'om one m an, coim seling his readers to rem em ber th a t diey come from  one parent, 
"who w as created by God as one individual w id i diis intention; d ia t from  d iat one 
individual a m ultitude m ight be propagated, and d ia t this fact should  teach m ankind 
to preserve a harm onious unity  in  plurality."6i
The difficulty, of course, w idi preserving this harm onious un ity  in p lurality  is 
d ia t hum ans are now  m arked by sin, understood, as w e saw above, as tu rn ing  aw ay 
from  God and  die com m on good tow ards oneself and one's private concerns and 
property. The result is d isorder and  disharm ony both  betw een and  w id iin  
individuals, for the fall d id  no t only involve a tu rn  aw ay from  the com m on good, bu t 
it also in terrup ted  die order and harm ony found w idiin  persons. To offer a complete 
account of A ugustine's m iderstanding of die hum an  self is a task d ia t lies beyond the 
param eters of diis project, an d  yet it is im portant to identify certain key aspects of his 
understanding  of the person and  die im pact of sin on die self. Eacli person, 
according to A ugustine, is com prised of "body and  soul together," w ith  the body 
being that w liich God m ade ou t of d u st and  die soul being that w hich  w as im planted 
in die body by die breath  of God.62 Body and soul can also be d iough t of as the 'outer 
m an' and  die 'timer m an,' term s d ia t Augustine draw s ft'oni 2 Corinthians 4:16.63 
A ugustine uses tliis term inology in  The Trinity  to  offer a complex h u m an  psychology 
in  w hich bodi the tim er and outer m an  are further delineated in  term s of dieir
58 City of God, XII, 22.
59 City of God XII, 23.
60 City of God XII, 28. See also XIX, 5.
61 City o/Gorf XII, 28.
62 City o/Gorf XIII, 24.
63 City of God XIII, 24. See also The Trinity XII, 12; City of God XXII, 24. A contemporary 
rendition of 2 Cor. 4:16, NRSV: "So we do not lose heart. Even though our outer nature is 
wasting away, our timer nature is being renewed day by day."
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various functions and  aspects, all of w hich have been disordered by sin. For, in 
A ugustine's view, before the fall, and  again in  the City of God, tire body w ould  have 
been properly ordered in  subjection to the m ind and  soul. Yet w ith  the first sin  of 
A dam  "the soul, in  fact, rejoiced in  ite ow n freedom  to act perversely and  disdained 
to be God's servant; and  so it w as deprived of the obedient service wlrich its body 
had a t first r e n d e r e d . "64 In  o ther w ords, for Augustine, as w e saw  above, the peace of 
the individual is dependen t upon  tire proper ordering of its various com ponents; sin 
d isrupts this peace by d isrupting  tiris ordering, so tirat tire m dividual's imrer 
com ponents, desires, and  loves are disordered just as Ms or her relationsM ps witir 
God, others, and  creation are d i s r u p t e d . 6 s
Because of this disruption, then, hum anity  and  its loves an d  desires are in 
need of re-ordering. This is precisely w hat, according to M athew es, "tire w hole of De 
trinitate is m eant to teach": its goal is "to educate the agent's desires tow ards right 
love of God, and  to teach the agent that their desires, how ever crooked, have always 
already had  God as their final end  all a l o n g ." 6 6  A nd this reveals tirat wlrich 
undergirds all of Augustine's anthropological m usings, or w hat M athew es calls "tire 
ultim ate theological pom t of Augustine's analysis of selfhood," nam ely "that tire self 
finds itself, in  fact it is a self, only insofar as it is engaged by an otirer, a divine 
o t h e r ." 6 7  Rowan W illiams reaches sim ilar conclusions in  relation to tire search for 
seltirood and  The Trinity, arguing tirat A ugustine's probings into self-knowledge 
reveal that "self-knowledge is precisely tire know ledge of tire self as incom plete, as 
seeking."68 This is because "we are no t able to know  or love ourselves 'accurately' 
unless we know  aird love ourselves as knowir and  loved by God."^^ A ugustine's 
understairding of tire self does not, according to Williams and Matirewes, resu lt in  
tire establisM neirt of tire solitary hum an ego or 'Cartesian solipsism,' as it is often 
a c c u s e d ; 7 o  instead, it  establishes the self firm ly in relation to God and  in  need of the
64afyo/GorfXIII,13.
65 C%o/Gorf XIX, 13.
66 Mathewes, "Pluralism," p. 99.
67 Ibid.
68 Rowan Williams, "'Know Thyself: What Kind of an Injunction?" in Philosophy, Religion and 
the Spiritual Life, ed. Michael McGhee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 
221- 222.
69 Rowan Williams, "Sapienta and the Trinity; Reflections on the De trinitate," in Collectanea 
Augustiniana: Mélanges T. /. Van Bavel, vol. 1, ed. B. Brmring, M. Lamberigts, and J. Van 
Houtem (Leuven; Augustinian Historical Institute, 1990), pp. 319-320.
70 In "Sapienta and tire Trinity," Williams is explicitly tiymg to comrter the accusations often 
levelled against Augustine of being responsible for the development of the modern self and
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otherness of God for its ow n self-knowledge and  self-love. Further, the self cannot 
be know n "w ithout a grasp of the inseparability of its good h o rn  tlie good of all."?! 
Thus, according to  M athewes, "on A ugustine's picture, othernesss no  longer appears 
as necessarily heteronom ous." Instead, "Augustine offers a picture of selfhood 
inextricably intertw ined w ith  otherness and  community," for "otherness and  selfhood 
interm ingle a t every level of tlie self's reality."??
Of course. The Trinity  is n o t only about the self's quest for self-knowledge but 
also about the Trinity, w ithou t w hich there w ould  be no self for w hich  to search, nor 
any hope for tlie re-educating of tliat fallen self's desires. For it is only th rough the 
grace and  aid of the Triune G od tliat an  individual can come to recognise the 
'otlierness' tliat is a t its core and  the com m unal, social nature of its existence. In tliis 
sense, w hat is needed  is no t m erely re-education b u t renewal, reform ation, and, 
indeed, reconciliation, aU of w hich are given by the gift and w ork of God.?^ Even 
love for God is a gift from  God, a gift m ade possible only th rough  the Holy Spirit. 
A ugustine's frequently offers 'tlie Gift of God' as tlie nam e for tlie H oly Spirit, for the 
Holy Spirit is given to hum anity  to pour ou t the love of God, to m ake know n  the 
charity of God tlie Fatlier and  God the Son.74 It is God's gift of the Spirit th a t "makes 
us abide in  G od and  liim  in  us," that "fhes m an  to  the love of G od and  neighbour 
w hen  he has been given to hini."?5 The Father, tiie Son, and  the Spirit can all be 
called charity and together com prise one charity, an d  yet A ugustine identifies the
for the focus within Western theology on the unity rather than the triunity of God. See also 
John Milbank, "Sacred Triads: Augustiiie and tlie Indo-European Soul," Modern Theology 13, 
no. 4 (1997), pp. 462-468; Michael Hanby, "Desire: Augustiiie Beyond Western Subjectivity," in 
Radical Orthodoxy: A  Neiu Theology, ed. Jolm Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graliam Ward 
(London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 109-126 and Augustine and Modernity (London: Routledge, 
2003); Lewis Ayres, "The Fundamental Grammar of Augustine's Trinitarian Theology," in 
Augustine and His Critics, ed. Robert Dodaro and George Lawless (London: Routledge, 2000), 
pp. 51-76. For an example of the arguments to which they are responding, see Colin Gunton, 
"Augustine, tlie Trinity and the Theological Crisis of tiie West," Scottish Journal o f Theology 43 
(1990), pp. 33-58 and The One, the Three, and the Many: God, Creation and the Culture of 
Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Jolm Zizioulas, Being as 
Communion: Studies and Personhood in the Church (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimh's Seminary 
Press, 1985); Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), esp. pp. 127-142.
?i Williams, "'Know Thyself,"' p. 222.
?2 Matiiewes, "Pluralism," pp. 99-100; Williams, "Sapienta and tlie Trinity," p. 331. Witiiin The 
Trinity, see esp. XIV, 15-26.
?3 The Trinity XIV, 22-24.
?4 The Tiinity XV, 32. For examples of Augustine calling tlie Spirit 'the Gift of God,' see 
Enchiridion XII, 40 and The Trinity V, XV.
?5. The Trinity XV, 31.
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sp irit closely w ith  love because of tlie distinctive w ork of the Spirit in  actualising the 
salvific love of C hrist in the life of those called to be part of God's family ?6 The 
m ediating life and  w ork of Jesus C hrist lie a t the heart of the love th a t tlie Spirit 
pours into hum anity, because w ithout C hrist no  renew al of hum anity  and  no 
reconciliation betw een hum anity  and  God are possible.
According to A ugustine, Jesus C hrist is the m eans by w hich the lost harm ony 
of God's created w orld  is restored. Through his life, m inistry, death, and  
resuirection, he took tliat w hich w as disordered in  hum anity  and  ordered  it  back to 
God, thereby opening the w ay for hum anity  and  the rest of creation to be re-ordered 
and restored to its original, created harm ony. Jesus C hrist w as able to do this 
because he w as botli God and  h u m an  and  could thereby act as a m ediator. Tliis idea 
of Jesus C hrist as m ediator betw een God and  hum anity, draw n from  1 Tim othy 2:5, 
is cenhal to Augustine's christology.7? Because sin  had  separated  tlie hum an  race 
from  God, a m ediator w as needed  to reconcile hum ans to God; to fulfil the role such 
a m ediator needed to have som etliing in com m on w ith  both  God an d  hum anity. 
Jesus Christ, as bo th  W ord of God and  Son of M an, became "the m ediator w ho alone 
was born, lived and  w as killed w itliout sin, that hum an pride m ight be rebuked and 
healed by tlie hum ility  of God and  tlia t m an m ight be show n how  far he had  
w andered from  G od w hen  he w as called back by God incarnate...."?8 The m ediating 
w ork of C hrist enables a restoration of that w hich w as in tended for hum anity  in 
creation, nam ely participation in  the Triune God.79 As A ugustine w rites, ".. .we were 
absolutely incapable of such participation and quite unfit for it, so unclean w ere w e 
thi'ough sin, so w e had  to be cleansed. Furtlierm ore, tlie only thing to cleanse tlie 
w icked and the p roud  is the blood of the just m an  and  the hum ility  of G o d .... So 
God became a just lucui to intercede w ith  God for sinful man. The sinner d id  not 
m atch die just, b u t m an d id  m atch man. So he applied to us the sim ilarity of his 
hum anity  to take aw ay the dissim ilm ity of our iniquity, and  becom ing a partaker of 
our m ortality he m ade us partakers of his divinity, "so
76 The Trinity XV, 28-31.
771 Tim. 2:5, NRSV: "For tliere is one God; Üiere is also one mediator between God and 
humankind, Christ Jesus, himself human." Augustine generally quotes a shorter portion of 
tlie verse, translated "the one mediator between God and men, the man Jesus Christ" (see City 
of God XVIII, 47 for one example).
78 Enchiridion XXVIII, 108; see also Confessions X, xlii (67).
City of God IX, 15.
80 The Trinity IV, 4.
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The key to A ugustine's conception of the Incarnation is, as G erald Bonner 
puts it, "tlie W ord of God descending to m an, so th a t m an m ight in  tu rn  ascend to 
God."8! This understanding  of the w ork of C hrist as M ediator involves n o t only the 
rem ission of sins b u t also the fulfihnent of hum anity 's created destiny, w ha t 
Augustine refers to as participation or deification.^? H e draw s this concept from  
Platonic though t w hile 'radically Christianising' it, as did the Greek Fatliers, so tliat it 
comes to m ean no t just th a t hum anity  exists by participating in  God b u t th a t such 
participation is only possible because of tlie Incarnation and m ediation of Jesus 
C hrist as the God-man.83 To p u t it differently, tlie salvation of hum anity  by Christ 
enables hum ans to partake of the divine life th rough Christ, because the hum anity  of 
Christ serves as the veliicle th rough w hich sinful hum anity  is re-united w ith  and  re­
ordered to tlie divine. T lirough this participation in  God, b rought about by tlie 
indwelling of the Holy Spirit, hum ans become transform ed into children  of God, 
adopted as sons, p a rt of the family of tiieir Triune God.^4 Or, to use different 
language, they become citizens of the H eavenly City, living as pilgrim s in  their 
earüily cities w hile their lives and  loves are ordered around God as tiieir sum m um  
bonum, their unchanging and  com m unal Good.
These citizens of tlie Heavenly City are no longer m erely individuals, turned 
in on them selves and  their lower, private goods, b u t are together un ited  around the 
com m on good of God in  tlie Body of Christ, the C hurch of Christ, by tlie H oly Spirit. 
But this does no t m ean that a re tu rn  to harm ony and  order is always ev ident in  the 
institutional C hurch as it exists in  tlie here and now , for tlie City of God is n o t 
equivalent to the C hurch in  the saeculum. A lthough in places A ugustine w rites of the
8! Gerald Bonner, "Cluist, God and Man in tlie Thought of St. Augustine," Angelicum 61 
(1984), p. 280. Cf. City of God XXI, 15: "For just as we have descended to this evil state through 
one man who sinned, so through one man (who is also God) who justifies us we shall ascend 
to tliat height of goodness."
8? Bonner notes that Augustine uses the term ’deification' sparingly, but deification 
nevertiieless has a strong conceptual presence in his thought. See Gerald Bonner, 
"Augustine's Concept of Deification," Journal of Theological Studies 37 (1986), p. 369.
S3 See Bomier, "Deification," pp. 369-386 for Augustine's use of deification and participation, 
and tlie relationship of liis use to that of Platonic and Neoplatonic thinkers. See Patr icia 
Wilson-Kastner, "Grace as Participation in die Divine Life in tlie Hieology of Augustine of 
Hippo," Augustinian Studies 7 (1976), pp. 135-152 for a comparison between the use of 
participation by Augustine and the Greek Fathers.
84 Augustine uses boüi 'participation' and 'adoption' to speak of the spiritual bii'th that 
enables humans to become cliildren of God inliis letter to Macedonius. See Augustine, Letter 
153,13, in Augustine: Political Writijigs (p. 78). Bonner notes tliat deification is, for Augustine 
as for die Greek Fathers, die equivalent to die New Testament doctiine of sonship by 
adoption du’ough die Incarnation (Bomier, "Deification," p. 378).
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City of God as the Churches his writings, particularly those against the Donatists, 
leave no doubt that he harboured no illusions about the perfectability of the C hurch 
or tliose w ho attend  C hurch on eartli. H e differentiates between the C hurch as it 
exists now, in  wliich bo th  tlie faithful and  the unfaithful, tlie redeem ed and  the 
unredeem ed, are its m em bers, an d  the C hurch 'as it w ill be,' w hen  it w ill consist only 
of citizens of tlie H eavenly City.s^ A ugustine's vision of the C hurch and the 
H eavenly City is ultim ately eschatological, as he anticipates tlie day w hen  the 
citizens of tlie H eavenly City w ho are now  pilgrim s on eartli are joined togedier w ith  
die Euigels w ho have alw ays rem ained w id i God in heaven; they "will togedier form 
one com pany in  eternity, wliich is one already by die bond of charity, established to 
w orship die one God."8? A nd yet tliis does n o t dim inish the im portance of the visible 
Church, for die Heavenly City is already present w idiin  die Church; as Nicholas 
Healy w rites, "Augustine clearly affirms die ontological relation betw een die City of 
God and  die c h u r c h . I n  A ugustine's view, Christ is inseparable from  His body, 
w liich is die Church.®^ This is w hy, as Patr icia W ilson-Kastner notes, "For Augustine 
the C hurch is die extension of the Christ in  space and  time. H e is die head  and  we 
are liis m em bers, and  d irough  being joined in  com m union w ith  h im  w e are adm itted 
to com m union w ith  God."9o Further, one m ust share in  die sacram ental life of die 
Church, for die Holy Spirit and  Christ, the great h igh  priest, w ork  th rough  the
85 See, for example. City of God VIII, 24; XIII, 16; XX, 11.9
86 City of God XX, 9. See also Harrison, Augustine, p. 220; Deane, "Augustine and the State," p. 
58. To the description of the Church including tlie " Üie faithful and the imfaitiiful, die 
redeemed and tlie unredeemed," one could also add, per Augustine, "tlie elect and tlie 
condemned." Because most of Augustine's thoughts on predestination are developed in Iiis 
later writings, largely witliin die context of debates witii die Pelagians, they did not figme 
largely in die works used for this project. While James Wetzel may well be right that diis 
doctiine "is not easily excised from Augustine's thought," because it did not seem essential to 
die works under review, and because most of die essential aspects of his ontology can stand 
widiout it (a point for which I caiuiot here develop the case), we have left diis aspect of liis 
thinking out of our discussion (James Wetzel, "Snares of Trutii: Augustine on Free Will and 
Predestination," in Augustine and His Critics, ed. Robert Dodaro and George Lawless [London: 
Routledge, 2000], p. 125). For more on die context surrounding Augustine's later thinking on 
predestination, see Brown, Augustine of Hippo, pp. 340-377 and 383-410. For a helpful 
discussion of the development of Augustine's thoughts in tiiis area, see TeSelle, Augustine the 
Theologinn, pp. 313-338, and for die connection between predestination and his understanding 
of grace and human will, see Burnaby, Ajnor Dei, pp. 228-230.
87 Enchiridion XV, 56; City of God X, 7.
88 Nicliolas M. Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life: Practical-Prophetic Ecclesiology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 55.
89 Enchiridion XV, 56; XVII, 65. See also Bomier, "Christ, God, and Man," p. 288; Bomier, 
"Deification," pp. 375,383; Wilson-Kastner, "Grace as Participation," pp. 147-148,151.
90 Wilson-Kastner, "Grace as Pai'ticipation," p. 148
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sacraments.9i For these reasons, n o t to m ention tlie com m im al natu re of botli 
hum anity and  its sum m um  bonum, A ugustine can conceive of no 'individual' life of 
faitli, separated from  tlie C hurch and  its sacraments. As Bomier writes, "for 
Augustine deification is an  ecclesial process, in  tlia t it takes place w itliin  tlie 
com m union of the Church, to w liich the Christian is adm itted  by baptism . For this 
reason, it can be called a sacram ental process, in  tlia t tlie C hristian grows in  grace by 
being nourished by the eucharist, w hich he receives as p art of tlie w orship  of the 
Cliurch."92
The Church, tlien, despite its recognisable imperfections, is tlie place in which 
hum ans, th rough  participation in  God by the gift of tlie Holy Spirit, are reconciled to 
God and each oüier. Through this participation they begin to have tiieir loves and 
desires re-ordered so tliat they can again partake of and  contribute to the harm onious 
unity  tliat God in tended  for God's creation. This radical re-ordering of relationships 
and loves takes them  ou t of the earthly city and  into the City of God, in  the sense tliat 
tiieir prim ary identity  is now  given by their participation in God and  God's 
Kingdom. Once tliey receive die saving love of Christ tiu’ough die Spirit and  become 
partakers of die divine life, diey are citizens of die H oly City of God, abiding as 
pilgrim s in  this present life as tiiey seek to live by die love, virtues, and  standards of 
die City w hich has dieir prim ary a l l e g i a n c e . 9 3  W idi diis change in  allegiance, dieir 
perception of the earthly city is radically altered. As tiiey go th rough  die present age 
on pilgrimage, they do n o t cling to it or its blessings as do those w ho only know  
citizenship in  die eardily city.94 Instead, tiiey recognise diat a certain degree of 
contingency m arks die goods and  custom s of die tem poral life, including som e of die 
goods d ia t seem m ost i m p o r t a n t . 9 5  They are given a  new  lens tiu o u g h  w hich to view 
the disorder, disunity, and  lust for pow er d ia t m ark die eardily city, a t  die sam e time 
as they begin to see the differences betw een die aims and  ends of the tw o cities m ore 
distinctly. H ow  does being a citizen of die H eavenly City im pact one's view  of the 
earthly city, according to A ugustine? H ow  does it affect one's efforts to  love, serve, 
and live in  die earthly city? It is to tiiese questions d ia t w e now  turn.
91 On die latter, see City of God X, 20.
92 Bonner, "Deification," p. 383.
93 Qhyo/Gorf XIV, 9.
City of God 1,29.
93 See City of God XIX, 17; On Chiistian Doctrine III, 19-22.
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T h e  Tw o  C ities: D ifferen t  En d s , D ifferent  G o o d s
The tw o cities, as w e saw  above, w ere created by tw o kinds of love, so tliat 
tlie H eavenly City is m arked by love of God and tlie earthly city by love of self. This 
distinction betw een tw o loves goes back to A ugustine's earliest articulation of tlie 
tw o cities in  TIte Literal M eaning o f Genesis. This distinction carries w itli it  a host of 
other differences, as tlie following passage m akes clear:
These two loves—of which one is holy, tlie otlier miclean, one social. Hie other 
private, one taking thought for the common good because of the companionship in 
the upper regions, die odier putting even what is common at its own personal 
disposal because of its lordly arrogance; one of them God's subject, die otiier his rival, 
one of them cahii, the otiier turbulent, one peaceable, die otiier rebellious; one of 
tiiem setting more store by the tiutii than by the praises of tiiose who stray from it, 
the otiier greedy for praise by whatever means, one friendly, the otiier jealous, one of 
tiiem wanting for its neighbor what it wants for itself, the other wanting to subject its 
neighbor to itself; one of them exercising authority over its neighbor for its neighbor's 
good, tiie otiier for its own—these two loves were first manifested in the angels, one 
ill the good, tiie otiier m the bad, and then distinguished the two cities, one of the 
just, tiie otiier of tiie wicked, founded m tlie human race under tiie wonderful and 
inexpressible providence of God as he admhiisters and directs everytiimg he has 
created. These two cities are mixed up together in the world while time runs it 
course, until they are sorted out by the last judgment... .96 
W hat is it d ia t causes such differences betw een the two cities, d ia t directs tiieir loves 
to such different ends? Perhaps it can best be view ed dirough die lens of hum ility, 
for according to A ugustine hum ility  leads to dependence on God w hile hum ility 's 
opposite, exaltation, leads to dommation.9? As Brown w rites, A ugustine 
characterises "the m ost basic relationship in die divine order as one of dependence, 
and  so die m ost basic sym ptom  of die dislocation of this order, as one of 
dom ination—of die need to secure die dependence of odiers."98 This dom m ation, 
this libido dominandi, m arks die eardily city. Indeed, A ugustine is so concerned about 
die predom inance of diis lu st for dom ination diat, as he confesses a t die beginning of 
City o f God, he "cannot refrain from  speaking about the city of diis w orld , a city w hich
96 The Literal Meaning of Genesis XI, 20. Augustine ends tiie passage with a hopeful 
anticipation of what became City of God: "About tiiese two cities we shall perhaps have more 
to say, ranging more widely over tiie subject, if tiie Lord so wishes, in another place." 
97Cifyo/GofiXIV,13.
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aims a t dom inion, w hich holds nations in  enslavem ent, b u t is itself dom inated by 
that very lust of domination."99
The H eavenly City is n o t unaw are of or unconcerned w id i pow er, b u t it fails 
to give pow er die pre-em inence it receives in  die earthly city and it (ideally, of 
course) refuses to  use the m eans of dom ination to achieve pow er w ith in  diis w orld. 
The City of God gives prom inence to justice over pow er, and  to hum ility  over pride, 
for pow er is only bad  w hen  it becomes an  end in  itself radier diaii being referred to 
the greater good of justice .100 The challenge is convincing die p ro u d  d ia t hum ility  is 
die w ay to ti'ue pow er, m eaning pow er that is subsum ed under the greater good of 
justice radier than  pu rsued  for its ow n sake. The m istake of die devil, according to 
Augustine, w as precisely die desire to play die pow er game radier diaii die justice 
game, while die m eans to overcom e his audiority  conies d irough and  in im itation of 
Jesus C lu ist w ho prioritised justice over power:
The essential flaw of the devil's perversion made him a lover of power and a deserter 
and assailant of justice, whidi means that men imitate liim all die more tiiorouglily 
die more they neglect or even detest justice and studiously devote tiiemselves to 
power, rejoicing at die possession of it or inflamed with tiie desire for it. So it pleased 
God to deliver man from the devil's audiority by beating liim at tiie justice game, not 
the power game, so that men too might imitate Cluist by seeking to beat tiie devil at 
the justice game, not tiie power geuiie. Not that power is to be slimmed as sometiimg 
bad, but tliat the right order might be preserved which puts justice first.^o!
W liat happens w hen  pow er is placed over justice? The fall of Rome, for one 
tiling, for die lust for pow er found in the Rom an people "first established its victory 
in  a few pow erful individuals, and  dieii crushed the rest of an  exhausted countiy  
beneadi die yoke of slavery . "102 The love of dom ination, w hich A ugustine describes 
as the greed for praise and  glory, becam e die p rhnary  concern of die Rom ans, w hen 
it was love of justice d ia t w ould  have served diem  better.!03 A ugustine counsels 
people no t to pursue lives of honour or pow er, nor to pursue h igh  position, unless it 
is done under the com pulsion of love or for the sake of prom oting die well-being of
98 Brown, "Political Society," p. 320.
99 City of God I, Preface.
So Augustine can write of tiie 'power of limnility' in City of God 1, Preface. 
The Trinity Xm, 17.
City of God 1,30.
City of God Y, 13 ,14.
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the p e o p l e  !0 4  Por the ü'uÜi is that all pow er belongs to God ("what, after all, could be 
m ore pow erful tlian the all-powerful, or w hat creature's pow er could be com pared 
w ith  the creator's?"!05)^ b u t in  God a radical inversion of tlie hum an  understanding  of 
pow er takes place. Jesus C hrist incarnate, instead of dem onstrating the pow er of 
dom inion th a t comes from  pride, exhibits die pow er of charity th a t results from  
hum ility. This is ev ident in  die 'm arvellous gentleness' of Jesus as he interacts w idi 
die w om an caught in  adultery (this passage from  John, it is w ord i noting, is one 
A ugustine often uses to examine die nature of judicial audiority): "He b rought die 
ti'udi, then, as a teacher, gentleness as a liberator, justice as a judge. That's w hy  the 
prophet foretold d ia t he w ould  reign in the Holy Spirit. W hen he spoke, his tru th  
w on recognition; w hen  he w asn 't roused against his enemies, his gentleness w on  
praise. His enemies, dieii, w ere torm ented by spite and  hatred  because of these two, 
his ti'udi and  his gentleness, and  tiiey p u t a stum bling-block in  the p a th  of the third, 
his j u s t i c e . "106 For A ugustine, ti’udi, gentieness, and  justice belong togedier, as they 
are em bodied togedier in  Jesus Christ, and  they take priority over and  transform  
com m on understandings of power.lo?
io4Q'iyo/GorfXlX,19.
The Trinity X m , 17.
106 Commentary on the gospel of John, 33 419/421,4, in Augustine: Political Writings (p. 103).
107 This may be die best place to address how, in light of this emphasis in liis diought,
Augustine later came to endorse die use of coercion to bring Donatists back into the Catiiolic j
Church. We must first remember, as Peter Brown helpfully reminds us, that Augustine lived
ill an age of intolerance, in wliich "religious intolerance was part and parcel of the peculiar I
nature of the exercise of power in late antiquity" ("The Limits of Intolerance," in Authojity and ;
the Sacred: Aspects of the Christianisation of the Roman World [Cambridge: Cambridge University I
Press, 1995], p. 53; pp. 27-54). To endorse coercion at all, however, represents a significant 
shift in Augustine's thinking; his earlier writings are concerned not with forced conversion
but widi persuasion (see, for example. O f True Religion xvi, 31 and On Clmstian Doctrine, esp. ‘
IV). Augustine himself writes that his "opinion originally was that no one should be forced to =
the unity of Christ, but that we should act with words, fight with aiguments, and conquer by ■
reason," and yet his diinking was changed by tiie examples of Donatists who seemed to be
thankful to have been coercively returned to tiie Catholic church ("they give thanks that tliey
have been reformed and freed from this disastrous madness. Those who used to hate now
love...."). See Letter 93, in Letters 1-99, trans. Roland Teske, S.J., ed. Jolm E. Rotelle, O.S.A.
(Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 2001) (p. 387) and Letter 185, in Augustine: Political Writings 
(p. 176). It may help, too, to remember that Augustine's views on coercion developed in 
response to particular situations rather than taking shape as a fixed tiieory, and tliat he would 
never have anticipated tiie degree to which his wiitings would be appealed to to justify 
religious persecution in later times (see intioduction to Augustine: Political Writings, p. xxiii).
For these reasons, Eric Gregory's assessment that religious coercion is not a conceptual 
requirement of Augustine's political thought seems a valid one ("Augustine and Citizenship," 
p. 9).
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This is all p a r t of A ugustine's understanding of order, in  w hich higher goods 
are to be preferred to low er goods an d  all tilings enjoyed for tlie sake of God. The 
original divine order w as one of perfect justice; w hen  goods are used  for the w rong 
ends or prioritised incorrectly (e.g., if pow er is placed over justice), then  no t only is 
tlie divine order d isrup ted  bu t justice is no t tipheld.ios Por tliis reason, it is only in 
relation to God that ti'ue justice can be realised, for only tlirough Jesus C hrist can a 
people's d isordered loves and  priorities be re-ordered, can pow er and  dom ination be 
subsum ed m ider justice and  love. The only association, tlierefore, in w hich justice 
will be found is one in  w hich people are united  in  love for God mid love for 
neighbour:
It follows that justice is found where God, the one supreme God, rules an obedient 
City according to His grace, forbidding sacrifice to any being save himself alone; and 
where in consequence the soul rules the body in all men who belong to this City and 
obey God, and die reason faithfully rules die vices in a lawful system of 
subordination; so diat just as tiie individual righteous man lives on tiie basis of faith 
which is active in love, so the association, or people, of righteous men lives on tiie 
same basis of faitii, active in love, the love with which a man loves God as God ought 
to be loved, and loves his neighbour as liimself.!®^
In short, the only city that is capable of ti'ue justice is tliat w hich has Jesus C hrist as 
its founder mid ruler, nam ely the City of God.™
This understm iding of justice leads A ugustine to deny th a t the Rommi 
com m onwealtii of w hich Cicero w rote actually existed, according to Cicero's 
definition of a com m onwealtii as "the w eal of tiie people" in  w hich the people are an 
"association of m en united  by a com m on sense of right." For w itliou t tru e  justice 
tliere can be no time right, no com m on sense of righ t around wliich people cmi unite. 
"The irresistible conclusion" A ugustine reaches is tliat "where tliere is no  justice tliere 
is no commonwealth."!!! W hile Cicero w ould agree th a t a society requires justice, 
Augustine finds his conception of justice w anting, asking "what kind of justice is it 
tliat takes a m an  aw ay from  the true G o d ..,?"!!? For, as w e have just seen, a m an's 
loves need to be re-ordered in  relation to God for justice to be realised. If tiie justice 
of a people depends upon  the justice of the individuals w ho com prise th a t people,
!08Qhyo/God XIX, 13.
109 City o/God XIX, 23.
City of God I I 21.
Ill City of GodXLX, 21. 
ii2Qfyo/GodXIX,21.
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and if individuals cannot be just unless tliey participate in  God, how  can a society 
tliat turns people aw ay from  God ever be truly just? The upshot for A ugustine is 
that "if a soul does n o t serve God it cannot w itli any kind of justice com m and tlie 
body, nor can a m an 's reason contr ol the vicious elem ents in the soul. A nd if there is 
no justice in  such a m an, there can be no  sort of doubt th a t there is no  justice in  a 
gatlierm g wM ch consists of such men,"ii3
Based on tliis view  of justice, it is of no surprise that A ugustine does no t 
restrict his critique of a lack of justice to  Rome, b u t expands it to include Athens, 
Babylon, and  any city tliat does no t have God as its ru ler and  the com m on basis of its 
faitli and love, m eaning any city that is no t the City of God, A ugustine does provide 
an  alternative definition of a people, one tliat depends no t on a com m on w eal or 
sense of right bu t on "a com m on agreem ent about the objects of its love."ü4 Ri this 
way a people can be a people even if it  is devoid of justice, identified by exam ining 
tlie objects of its loves. One love th a t is sure to be found w ith in  every city is a love of 
peace, for desire for peace is a p a rt of hum an nature, and even in  w ar peace and 
victory are tlie ultim ate g o a l s . Indeed, A ugustine believes that "peace is so great a 
good that even in relation to tlie affairs of earüi and of our m ortal state no w ord  ever 
falls m ore giatefully up o n  tlie ear, nothing is desired w ith  greater longing, in  fact, 
nothing better can be fo u n d ."ü 6 Eartlily cities seek peace, and  even attain  it a t times, 
and such peace is to be enjoyed as a good and  as a gift from God.™  Earthly peace 
can indeed be considered the single aim  of the m any diverse custom s, law s, and  
institutions of various nations. A nd yet if tliis peace is sought after for its ow n sake 
or for die sake of low er ratlier than  higher goods, "if tlie liigher goods are neglected, 
wliich belong to the City on  high, w here victory will be serene in  the enjoym ent of 
eternal and  perfect peace..., the inevitable consequence is fresh m isery...."™
The problem s tliat arise in  the pu rsu it of peace come w hen people prefer a 
prideful peace of injustice to tlie just peace of God. U nder tlie just peace of God all 
w ould  have equality under G od's rule, b u t u nder the un just peace of pride som e 
hum ans seek to im pose their w ill and  dom inion on otliers.^^ Ri ligh t of these
™Qh/o/GorfXIX,21.
” 4 Q-fy 0/ God XIX, 24.
City of God XIX, n .
!i6Qti/o/GodXIV, 11.
™C%o/GodXV,4.
"»C%fyq/GodXV,4.
™ City of GodXlX, 12.
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conditions, tiie earthly city can only aim  a t an  eartlily peace; the harm ony to wliich it 
is lim ited is that of a com prom ise betw een hum an  wills about tilings pertaining to 
tiie m ortal life. The peace of the Heavenly City, by contrast, "is the perfectly ordered 
and harm onious fellowship in  tiie enjoym ent of God, and of each other in  God."™ It 
is a peace of im m ortality, given once hiunans arrive a t that state w here life no  longer 
ends in deatii bu t lasts for the eternal enjoym ent of God and one's neighbour in 
God.!?! Augustine believes tliat "tiie Suprem e Good of tiie City of G od is everlasting 
and perfect peace," w riting  "we could say of peace, as we have said of eternal life, 
that it is the final fulfilm ent of all our goods."™ All of this leads A ugustine to 
conclude th a t the peace of the earthly city does n o t com pare to the peace of the 
Heavenly City, "which is so tru ly  peaceful th a t it should be regarded as the only 
peace deserving tiie name."™
This peace of the H eavenly City, despite its eschatological nature , is relevant 
for pilgrim s in  tiie eartlily city. A t tiie least, tiiis is because A ugustine believes peace 
to be a necessary prerequisite for the creation of hum ans, w ho "could have no 
existence w ithou t some kind  of peace as the condition of tiieir b e i n g ." ! ? ^  
Furtherm ore, citizens of the H eavenly City look forw ard in  hope to tiieir prom ised 
peace, even as they enjoy an d  use tiie peace of tiie eartlily city w hile tiiey are on 
pilgrim age in  this w orld. H ope for the fulfilm ent of the heavenly peace provides 
sti ength  to pilgrim s in  the face of tiie lack of peace found in tiie tem poral world; 
w itliout hope of the realisation of a greater good in tlie age to come present reality 
turns into m isery and  d e s p a i r . ™  As Augustine writes.
We see, then, that the Supreme Good of the City of God is everlasting and perfect 
peace, which is not the peace tlirough which men pass in tiieir mortality, in their 
journey from birth to death, but that peace in which tiiey remain in their immortal 
state, experiencing no adversitj^ at all. In view of this, can anyone deny tliat this is 
tlie supremely blessed life, or that the present life on earth, however full it may be of 
tlie greatest possible blessings of soul and body and of external circumstances, is, in 
comparison, most miserable? For all that, if anyone accepts the present life in such a 
spirit tliat he uses it with the end in view of tliat other life on which he has set his
120 City 0/ God XIX, 17.
121 City o/God XIX, 17,13.
122 City o/God XIX, 20,11.
City of God XIX, 17.
City of God XIX, 13.
125 City of God XV, 18,21; Letter 155, in Augustine: Political Writings (p. 92).
156
heart with all his ardour and for which he hopes with all his confidence, such a man 
may without absurdity be called happy even now, though ratlier by future hope than 
in present reality. Present reality witliout that hope is, to be sure, a false happiness, 
in fact, an utter misery,
According to one scholar, A ugustine's em phasis on living in  hope is a 
'profound change' that m ay in  fact signal the end  of classical tiiought, in  w liich tlie 
em phasis w as instead on w h a t people could do and achieve.!?? It is true that 
A ugustine's understand ing  of hope and  the eschatological realisation of peace give 
him  reason to be cautious about w hat can be achieved w ith in  the eartlily city. For 
tliis eschatological em phasis w ith in  A ugustine does not, as Eugene TeSelle points 
out, m ean th a t the H eavenly City needs to be constructed on tliis eartli, no r tliat tlie 
eartlily city is to be transform ed into tlie Heavenly City.!?^ Q uite the opposite, for the 
realisation of the H eavenly City belongs to the age to come ratlier th an  to this age. 
Citizens of tlie Heavenly City, w hile here on eartli in  tiie saeculum, instead of trying 
to force the eschatological peace of the Heavenly City, can and should  enjoy the 
eartlily peace of the earthly city as a good from  God, as a good suitable to the 
tem poral life and one they seek to foster, even as they recognise th a t it is n o t tiie 
highest good for w liich they hope. The conclusion to w hich all of tliis points is tliat, 
for A ugustine, the eartlily city is neitiier tiie ultim ate com m unity nor the prim ary 
fram e of reference, and  it should  n o t be looked to for the realisation of the goals of 
peace, justice, and  love that can only be realised in  tiie Heavenly City, This is not to 
deny tliat tiie earthly city has its necessary place and  role, b u t rather to keep from  
placing false hopes in w ha t can be accom plished in  the saeculum. A nd this is no 
small thing, as Cochrane notes, because while no t destroying tiie str uctures of the 
earthly city, it enables tliem  to be view ed in a new  light, in wliich the 'state' is seen 
"no longer as the ultim ate form  of com m unity, b u t m erely as an  in sh u m en t for 
regulating the relations of w ha t Augustine calls tiie 'exterior' m an...."™
The answ er to w h a t all of tliis m eans for tlie relationsliip of citizens of the 
Heavenly City to tiie eartlily city lies som ewhere in betw een tiie tw o extrem es of 
com pletely abandoning tiie earthly city and  looking to tiie earthly city to achieve 
utopian-like harm ony and  peace. A ugustine is clear that citizens of tiie H eavenly
!26C%o/GorfXIX,20.
!27 Brown, "Political Society," p. 323.
!28 Eugene TeSelle, "Towards an Augustinian Politics," The Journal of Religious Ethics 16 (1988),
p. 102.
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City share in  the goods of the earthly city, m aking use of its eartlily peace and 
helping to defend an d  sustain  tlie lim ited harm ony th a t is possible in tlie earthly city, 
"a k ind of com prom ise betw een hum an wills about things relevant to m ortal life."™ 
The harm ony and  order tlia t can be achieved in the eartlily city, tliough tliey m ay be 
peiwersions of God's original intentions for creation, are still p art of God's order for 
tlie fallen w orld. For "even w h a t is perverted m ust of necessity be in, or derived 
from, or associated w ith .. .som e p art of tiie order of tilings am ong w hich it has its 
being or of w hich  it consists. O therw ise it w ould  no t exist a t all."™ So every 
disorder is predicated  on a prior order, and  even tlie m ost disordered persons and 
institutions do no t fall outside of tlie providence of God.is? The earthly city can, then, 
achieve lim ited goods, even if no t the greatest goods for w hich hum ankind  w as 
created. A nd citizens of tlie H eavenly City can help foster tiiose goods in  tlie m any 
different earthly cities in  w liich tliey find themselves.
As these citizens contribute to tlie goods of tiieir eartlily cities, they need no t 
tiy  to force their different earthly cities into one supposedly G od-prescribed political 
arrangem ent. For w hen  A ugustine offered a definition of a 'people' based on its 
com m on loves ra ther tlian the realisation of true justice, he opened a w ay for a 
variety of political institutions and  societies w ith  different concerns and  ends to be 
considered a 'people' or a res publica, even if tliey cam iot attain  the true justice for 
w liich hum ankind  w as created. That is to say, no one political arrangem ent or order 
is prescribed by the Christim i faitli, or, as Williams puts it, "no particular ordo is 
identical w ith  the order of God's city, and  so no state can rightly be defended as an 
absolute 'value' in  itself."™ A variety of political arrangem ents can produce earthly 
peace and  justice, lim ited as those ends are, so citizens of the H eavenly City are not 
to seek a u topian  political arrangem ent for this age. O n the contrary, the H eavenly 
City tianscends earthly political arrangem ents, even as she shares tliem:
Wliile tliis Heavenly City, tlierefore, is on pilgrimage in this world, she calls out 
citizens from all nations and so collects a society of aliens, speaking all languages.
She takes no account of any difference in customs, laws, and institutions, by which 
eartlily peace is acliieved and preserved — not that she amiuls or abolishes any of 
those, rather, she maintains tiiem and follows them (for whatever divergences there
129 Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Cidture, p. 509.
130 Cifyo/God XIX, 17.
131 City of God XIX, 12. See also O'Donovan, "Western Political Tiiought," p. 143.
132 See City of God IV, 35; V, 1. See also Deane, "Augustine and the State," p. 67.
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are among the diverse nations, those institutions have one single aim — earthly 
peace), provided that no hindrance is presented thereby to the religion which teaches 
that the one supreme and true God is to be w o r s h i p p e d - i 3 4  
Citizens of tlie H eavenly City Ccui and should follow tlie laws and institutions of their 
eartlily cities for the sake of earthly peace, so long as tliey do n o t h inder the w orship 
of the God w ho provides their true sum m um  honum.
Does A ugustine really call tiiese citizens to be involved in  tlie eartlily city 
given liis understanding  of the disordered pow er and  dom ination tlia t m ark  and 
define it? A ugustine recognises tlie degree to w hich injustice an d  the libido dominandi 
are inevitably p a rt of political and  civil life, he lam ents it, particularly w hen  it comes 
to tlie need for judges mid judgm ents against fellow hum ans, an d  yet he still 
m aintains th a t some are called to be involved in  the political and  judicial life of the 
earthly city.^ss Indeed, they are called to be involved as Christians, bringing their 
faitli and tiieir perspective to bear on  theii- positions. Tliis becomes particularly  clear 
in  his correspondence, as he writes to C hristian judges and  proconsuls to be as gentle 
and hum ble as possible, to soften their judgm ents as m uch as they can w ithou t 
prom oting injustice, to observe the h im ianity  of those w ho are being judged, and to 
set an  exam ple of C hristian faith and  gentleness .436 Wlien, to use W illiam s’ language, 
a m em ber of tlie City of G od is called to be in a position of pow er in  tlie earthly city, 
A ugustine believes tlia t he or she "continues in a practice of nu rtu rin g  souls already 
learned in  m ore lim ited settings."43? A ugustine goes even further tlian tliis, believing 
tliat Christians bring unique and  beneficial contiibutions to tlie eartlily city because 
of their hum ility, their m ercy, tiieir desire to place justice above pow er and  to love 
the Heavenly City m ore th an  the earthly city .438 As W illiams argues, for A ugustine it 
is only a Christian ruler w ho can tr uly safeguard political values because only such a
133 Williams, "Politics and the Soul," p. 66. See also Deane, "Augustine and the State," p. 55.
434 City of God XIX, 17.
435 See City of God XIX 5,6 for the ambiguities of the earthly city and Augustine's lament of the 
consequences of injustice and ignorance on the innocent. For more on why Augustine tiiinks 
Cluistians are called to service in the 'mijust' earthly city, see Peter J. Burnell, "The Problem of 
Service to Unjust Regimes in Augustine's City of God," in The City of God: A  Collection of Critical 
Essays, ed. Dorotiiy F. Domrelly (New York: Peter Lang, 1995), pp. 37-49.
436 See, for example, his letters to Marcellinus (133 and 139), Aprmgius (135), and Macedonius 
(152-155), in Augustine: Political Writings (pp. 61-99).
437 Williams, "Politics and tire Soul," p. 68.
438 See City of God V, 24. Cf. Peter Brown's comment that Augustine's picture of tire Christian 
ruler would be unconvincing to air historian. As he writes, "Augustine's summary of tire 
virtues of a Christian prince.. .are, in themselves, some of tire most shoddy passages of tire 
City of God" ("Political Society," p. 319).
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ru ler can resist the tem ptations of the libido dominandi in  light of tlie recognition that 
political values and  all else are ultim ately safeguarded by God in  God's 
providence.439 But a C lu istian  ru ler is n o t called to m ake tlie political realm  itself 
Christian. Indeed, such a task w ould be impossible exactly because of the injustice 
and libido dominandi tliat alw ays m ark the earthly city and  the individuals of w hich it 
is comprised. As Deane w rites, no m atter how  pious or well-intentioned a ru ler 
m ight be, "tlie state itself—Hie political o rd e r—can never be ti'uly just."44o
To draw  tlûs discussion togetlier, let us sum m arise w hat w e have concluded 
tlius far. Because of tlie fallen nature of the w orld  and  tlie eschatological nature of 
tlie H eavenly City, citizens of tlie H eavenly City, wliile they are on pilgrim age here 
on eartli, do n o t look to tlie eartlily city for the realisation of true justice, peace, order, 
or harm ony. Instead, they experience the firstfruits of the re-ordering of their loves 
and relationships tlirough participation in  God tiuough  Jesus C hrist and  Christ's 
Body, tlie Church. O n tiieir pilgrim age they are p art of the earthly city and  share 
some of its earthly goods, they accept calls to positions w itiiin the earth ly  city, and 
yet they do n o t view  the eartlily city as their prim ary com m m iity, no r do they view  
its arrangem ents as u ltim ate or final. Indeed, an  aw areness of the passing, 
contingent natu re of the tem poral w orld  provides a  basis for no t h ea tin g  its 
contingent arrangem ents as natu ra l or inevitable, thereby providing a basis from  
wliich tiiey can question the status The recognition tiiat eartlily peace and  the
139 Williams, "Politics and the Soul," p. 67.
440 Deane, "Augustine and the State," p. 63; see also pp. 56-58, 62-66. N.B. Tliis does not mean, 
however, that tiie political order is neutral, nor that Augustine is a foreruimer of liberalism in 
which the spheres of 'climch' and 'state' ar e kept entir ely separate, contra tiie interpretation of 
R. A. Markus (see, for example, Saecidum, pp. 69-70,173). Ratlier than being neutr al, as we 
have seen and as Oliver O'Donovan points out, tiie earthly city is marked by love of self and 
tiie libido dominandi (See O'Donovan, "Western Political Thought," p. 141). Further, as 
Williams suggests, Augustine's purpose is not to argue that the Fleavenly City is 'private' and 
non-political while the earthly city is 'public' and political. Ratlier, he hopes to demonstrate 
that "tiie spiritual is the authentically political" and to redefine the public itself, "to show tliat it 
is life outside the Christian commmiity wliich fails to be truly public, authentically political" 
("Politics and tiie Soul," p. 58; see also p. 67). We will retmn to tiiis point in the following 
chapter.
441 For more on how Augustine's eschatological perspective makes his political perspective 
'radical' and critical, see Markus, Saeculum, pp. 168-170. Of course, not all agree on this point, 
noting tiiat Augustine's scepticism towards the possibility of any significant change in tiie 
human situation and his lack of an accomit of an ideal earthly city may have prevented liim 
from imagining, for example, the possibility of a world without slavery. See TeSelle, 
"Towards an Augustinian Politics," pp. 92-93; Williams, "Politics and the Soul," pp. 63, 67. See 
also Augustine, City of God XIX, 15, on how slavery is a result of and pmiishment for sin, and
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institutions and  law s tliat contribute to tliat peace are a good desired by heavenly 
citizens supplies sufficient m otivation for the pilgrim s of the H eavenly City to 
support and  engage the tem poral w orld. A t tlie sam e time, their involvem ent w itli 
the eartlily city is tem pered by tiieir citizenship in  the City of God, for tliey refer 
lower tem poral goods to  the greater goods of their eternal God. As A ugustine 
writes:
...it is clear tliat when we live according to God oui' mind should be intent on his 
invisible things and thus progressively be formed from his eternity, truth and charity, 
and yet tliat some of om' rational attention, that is to say some of tlie same mind, has 
to be directed to the utilization of changeable and bodily tilings witliout wliich tiiis 
life cannot be lived; this however not in order to be conformed to this xvorld (Rom 12:2) 
by setting up such goods as the final goal and twisting om* appetite for happiness 
onto tiiem, but in order to do whatever we do do in the reasonable use of temporal 
things with an eye to the acquisition of eternal things, passing by the former on tlie 
way, setting om- hearts on the latter to tiie end.™
Citizens of tlie H eavenly City are never to forget tliat to seek the goods of tlie eartlily 
city for tiieir ow n sake is to seek disorder, bu t to  pursue the goods of the Heavenly 
City tiuough  participation in  God is to  pm 'sue that w liich enables God's diverse 
creation to come togetlier in unity, harm ony, justice, equality, and  love, the firstfruits 
of w hich can be tasted even now.
This im m ersion into the ontology tliat underlies A ugustine's though t reveals 
a rem arkably different picture of tlie nature of reality and  hum an  being than  those 
tiiat inform  contem porary political theory. Tliis different ontology leads to a distinct 
understanding  of the political realm  and  w hat can and  cam iot be accom plished 
tiuough  it. It, likewise, leads to different pictures of how  tiie diversity of creation can 
be re-harm onised and  re-united. H ow  m ight tiiese pictures help  us as w e 
contem plate how  to engage w itli difference w itiiin contem porary society? W hat 
m ight A ugustine's ontology have to offer to om* curren t political im agination? The 
following chapter attem pts to answ er tiiese questions by putting  A ugustine's tiiought 
into conversation w ith  tiie political theorists of our previous chapters and  w ith  
contem porary theologians w ho are concerned w itli sim ilar m atters.
Letter 10, in Augustine: Politicnl Writings (pp. 43-47) as an example of Augustine's concern 
over unjust practices of slavery and his efforts to intervene on behalf of slaves.
442 Augustine, The Trinity XII, 21.
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C h a pt e r  Five 
T o w a rd s  a  Th eo lo g y  o f  th e  P o litica l
In t r o d u c t io n
We w ere left w ith  a quandary  a t tlie end of our tliird  chapter. We agreed 
witli the agonists that tlie theory of political liberalism entails quite a bit more, 
ontologically speaking, than  political liberals w an t to adm it, and results in  a theory 
that is neitiier as to lerant nor as inclusive as tiiey them selves desire it to  be. Like the 
post-Nietzscheans, w e desire a  w ay to m ove forw ard th a t m ore honestly  and  fully 
recognises and  respects difference in  all of its particularity, b u t unlike the post- 
N ietzchean tiieorists w hom  we engaged, we were unconvinced tiia t ontologies 
deeply rooted in  conflict and  pow er can sustain the etiios they com m end. W e raised 
serious questions about the necessary dicliotom isation such tiieorists posit betw een 
unity  and  diversity, harm ony and particularity. W e w ondered w h a t w ould  happen  
if we looked a t an  ontology that is distinctly Christian, rooted in  a Trinitarian 
understanding  of God as the source and  redeem er of reality, creation, and  hum an  
being. Towards tiiis end, in  an  effort to supplem ent tiie ontological tu rn  begun by 
post-N ietzschean political theorists w ith  a theological turn , w e im m ersed ourselves 
in  the ontology of A ugustine of H ippo, well-know n to be one of the m ost influential 
political and  social theorists in W estern liistory.
In this chapter w e will d raw  the different strands of our investigation 
together, pu tting  a tiieological ontology into conversation w itii the ontologies of 
political liberals and  post-N ietzscheans by discerning if a w ay exists to m ove beyond 
tolerance to a fuller em brace of difference. For Augustine, diversity and  unity  can 
only truly come together in  the H eavenly City, so th a t tire first p a r t of an  answ er to 
tire question of how  to m ove beyond tolerance lies in  tire need to look to tire 
Heavenly rather tlrair the earthly city as the place in  wlrich difference can be 
recogirised, respected, and  em braced; tiris is tire subject of the first p a rt of tiris 
chapter. From tirere w e m ove iirto a conversation witir anotirer tireologian w ho has 
also attem pted to posit a unique relationship between C hristianity an d  difference, 
nam ely Jolrir Milbairk. M ilbank draw s heavily upon  A ugustine, b u t his re- 
appropriation of A ugustine's tirought looks ra ther different tirair ours, in  w ays that 
m ight be illum inating for tire present discussion. After a brief excursus into his
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tirought, w e tu rn  to look a t the relationsliip betw een the H eavenly City as it exists 
here on  earth  in  the institutional C hurch and  the eartlrly city, w ith  specific reference 
to its political realm. W e begin by discussing the relationship betw een tire C hurch 
and the political m ore generally, by putting  Augustine into conversation w ith  
M ilbank and  Karl Bartlr, and  then  tu rn  to look m ore specifically a t contem porary 
W estern political society, for if critics are righ t that today's liberalism  does n o t allow 
for tire particularity of its constituents to be recognised, tiris has surely im pacted 
Christianity as well. Part of this discussion will take place by trying to  articulate 
w hat sort of relationship betw een C hiistianity and  the political realm  w ould  allow 
Christianity to be h u e  to its particularity  as a public, social, em bodied reality. Tiris is 
undertaken  both for tire sake of tire Churclr as it h ies to m ake sense of its calling and 
place witlrin a pluralist, liberal, 'tolerant' society and  for the sake of otirer 
com ponents witlrin this society w ho are h y ing  to bring their particularity  to bear in 
its public life. The final section w ill offer a picture of how  these different 
particularities m igh t come togetlrer in  rich conversation. This will no t be an  attem pt 
to attain tire celebration and  embrace of diversity tirat is only possible in  the 
Heavenly City, bu t it w ill be hopeful of deep conversation of w ord  and  practice 
rooted in  the particular identities of differences w ho reside alongside each other in  
contem porary life. Such conversation both  acknowledges particularity  and  enables 
com ponents to genuinely learn  fiom  each other, in  w ays that allow for the possibility 
of persuasion, change, and  even conversion.!
1 For tire purposes of tiris discussion we are not engaging witir tire 'political theology' tirat 
arose in tire 1960s and is associated with such tireologiairs as Jürgen Moltmaiur and Johann 
Baptist Metz. This is partially because I follow Oliver O'Donovan in tire belief that political 
theology "has many centuries behind it" (The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of 
Politicnl Theology [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], p. 4) and partially because 
of concerns over the tireological and methodological approaches associated with tiris self­
entitled school of political theology. Some of these concerns, particularly in relation to 
Moltmaim, have been thorouglrly aird helpfully ar ticulated by Arne Rasmusson in The Church 
as Polis; From Political Theology to Theological Politics as Exemplified hy Jürgen Moltmann and 
Stanley Hauenvns (Notre Daiire: Uiriversity of Noti'e Dairre Press, 1995). For an account by 
Moltirrarar of the rise of political theology, see Jürgeir Moltnraim, God for a Secular Society: The 
Public Relevance of Theology (Mimreapolis: Forti'ess Press, 1999), pp. 42-45,46-70.
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A u g u stin e 's O n t o l o g y : Bey o n d  T o lera n ce
W hat we discovered in  our tu rn  to A ugustine w as a vastly different picture of 
the nature of reality and  h um an  being tiran that uncovered in tire ontologies of 
political liberals and  post-Nietzscheans. If w e have been on a quest to find a  w ay to 
create and  sustaiir a society th a t is m arked by m ore than  m ere tolerance, in w hich 
h u e  particularity  comes together in  com m unity while still being retained, respected, 
and even encouraged, then the tireological ontology found iir A ugustine offers a way 
tow ards tire fulfilm ent of our quest, hr air A ugustinian view, such dream s are 
realisable, bu t only in  the society know n as the Heavenly City, understood botlr 
ecclesiastically and  eschatologically.? W hile tire K ingdom  of God has been 
inaugurated  and  m em bers of the C hurch already participate in  and  w itness to  its 
firsth'uits, the full realisation of tire City m arked by love, embrace, aird a peaceful 
com ing together of difference will no t occur in  this saeadum. If w e look for Ürese 
goals to be fulfilled in  the here and  now , in  tire eartlrly city or the nation-state or tire 
global w orld, w e will be sorely disappom ted. We m ay even be dangerously 
m otivated to seek som etliing th a t is beyond the reach of fallen h um an  nature. A t the 
least w e will rem ain  in  tire place in  w hich w e find ourselves now , after tw o hundred  
or so years of the liberal dem ocratic experim ent, w ondering, along w ith  Charles 
Taylor, w ha t sources can underlie and  sustain  our far-reaclring com m ihnents to 
benevolence, justice, tolerance, and, now , difference.^ In short, political society 
cannot be tire site of tire fulfilm ent of utopian  dream s of harm ony in  the m idst of 
diversity. This side of tire fall, even w ith  tire far-reaching consequences of the cross 
and  the ever-im portant role of hope in  sustaining tire society know n as tire Churclr, 
w e dare no t look for too m uch in  tire eartirly city.
It is no t difficult to see just how  different tire picture of tire w orld  presented 
by A ugustine is from  the pictures considered in  earlier chapters. H arm ony, order, 
peace, kinslrip, and  love are a t tire heart of God's design for tire created, and  
redeem ed, w orld. U nderlying all the conflict, struggles for pow er, eind disunity 
evident in  tiris w orld  a deeper harm ony remains, a harm ony visible in  tire Trinity, 
and offered to hum ans th rough participation in  the Trinity. Life as it should  be
2 We will return to fire relationship between the Heavenly City's eschatological and 
ecclesiastical dimensions below.
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consists of neitlrer prim ordial conflict, as for tire post-Nietzscheans, nor individuals 
in  a state of scarcity, as for political liberals. These are contingent results of the fall of 
hum anity bu t they do no t have to com prise hum anity 's prim ary reality. Indeed tire 
situation is quite the conhary , for tire Clri'istian believer.
For Augustine, creation is m arked by a diversity of people (from the One 
came the m any), a  diversity th a t results from  tire fulhress and  abundance of God's 
ow n being and  is un ited  as one in  love for God aird each otirer. All beiirg is gift, 
flowing from  God's goodness; hum airity w as m eant to forever live in  tire enjoym ent 
of God's goodness, in  conditions m arked by ease and  plenty, abundance and  joy, and 
love and  harm ony betw een God and hum anity  and  betw een all creatures. In 
A ugustine's view, G od purposefully  had  the creation of hum airkind begin w ith  just 
one person so tirat all people w ould  "be bound together by a kind of tie of kinship to 
form  a harm onious uirity"^ and  "to show  to m ankind how  pleasing to Irim is unity  in 
plurality."^ We fail to see this kinslrip aird this unity  in  plurality w hen  w e have 
ceased to live in  tire harm ony for wlrich w e w ere created, w hen w e have tu rned  
aw ay from  God and  each other to  ourselves, w hen, in  short, w e see ourselves 
fundam entally as iirdividuals.
This is clearly a different picture of hum anity from tirat w ith  wlrich John 
Rawls, Richard Rorty, C hantai Mouffe, and  W illiam Coimolly are operating. For 
Rawls and  Rorty, tire ind ividual rightly and  unapologetically forms the basis of tlreir 
political tlreory and  ontology. For Mouffe and  Coimolly, though they a ttem pt to 
eschew an em phasis on the individual that comes a t the expense of com m unal 
identities, tlrey canirot escape tire h u tlr that their fundam ental concern is for respect 
of tire individual. The very language of the individual, standhrg alone, conceivable 
apart from  social existence and a com m on sum m um  bonum, is foreign to Augusthre's 
understanding  of the w ay hum anity  ought to be. Indeed, God's creative purpose 
was to have a united, harm onious people; tiuough  the grace offered by and  through 
Jesus Christ, hum ans can be restored to a right relationship w ith  bo th  God and  tire 
family tirat God begair in  creation, becoming God's children by the Holy Spirit.
3 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), p. 515.
4 Augustine, Concerning the City o f God Against the Pagans XIV, 1, b ans. Hemy Bettenson 
(Harinondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1972).
 ^City of God XU, 23.
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For those w ho accept the free gift of grace offered by Jesus C hrist through the 
Holy Spirit, tlieir identity  becomes rooted in  being a  p art of G od's fam ily and  
com m unity. They are first and  forem ost children of God, citizens of die H eavenly 
City, abiding as pilgrim s in  this p resent life. To use the Pauline language of 
Scripture, tliey have been rescued and  hansferred  into die k ingdom  of die beloved 
Son; diey are citizens w ith  the saints and  m em bers of the household of God; their 
citizenship is now  in  heaven.^ They still live in  die eardily city, b u t diey no  longer 
view diem selves prim arily as individual citizens of political society. They w ill not 
have the sam e hopes for w ha t can be accom plished in  die eardily city, d ia t is to say 
in political society, d ia t citizens of the earthly city m ight have. The political society 
or nation-state in w hich diey happen  to find diem selves will n o t be v iew ed as 
ultim ate, nor w ill it provide dieir telos, their hope, or their com m on good. A t the 
sam e time, diey will no t have die sam e hopelessness as die post-N ietzscheans, for 
they believe th a t the grace of God is present in  die eardily city even as they w ait in  
faith and  hope for die eschatological peacefulness of the City of God.
Citizens of die Heavenly City can and  should contribute to  the earthly city 
and its goods of peace and  justice, recognising d iat such goods are w ordiy  of pursu it 
wliile a t die sam e tim e acknow ledging their limits. The justice and  peace of the 
eardily city are no t die sam e as die justice and peace d ia t are theirs in  p art and  will 
one day be dieirs in  full th rough  participation in  the Triune God. As w e saw  in  the 
last chapter, for A ugustine h u e  justice and true peace, h u e  equality and  h u e  
harm ony, can only be realised in  relation to God. The harm ony, equality, peace, and 
justice for w hich w e w ork in  this age are hardly, if even, shadow s of d ia t w hich can 
be found th rough  Jesus C hrist in  die Heavenly City, partially visible in  die C hurch 
now, reacliing true fulfilm ent in  die age to come. All of these ideas are linked and 
inseparable for Augustine; the just peace of die Heavenly City "is d ie  perfectly 
ordered and  harm onious fellowsliip in  the enjoym ent of God, and  of each other in  
God,"^ in  w hich all people are equal. In  diis understanding, and therefore for citizens 
of the H eavenly City, neidier justice nor peace, neidier harm ony nor equality, can be 
attEiined outside of a righ t relationship w ith  God d ia t restores the d isorder d ia t m arks 
die fallen w orld and  eardily city and  re-orders die disordered loves and  goods of
6 Col. 1:13-14; Eph. 2:19-20; Phil. 3:20, NRSV. 
‘^ C it\jofGodXlX,17.
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fallen hum anity. This m eans th a t any attem pt to, for example, achieve harm ony in  
the m idst of diversity outside of the context of the Trinity is doom ed to failure.
The question of diversity and  harm ony has been a t the heart of this study: 
how  are we, in  a political society m arked by pluralism , going to  find w ays to either 
tolerate each other or m ove beyond tolerance to a deep respect of the particularity  of 
tlie difference w e encounter? We have seen and  questioned how  political liberalism 
answ ers Üiis question, and  w e have likewise seen and questioned the response of 
agonistic political theorists, h ideed, a t die end of our d iird  chapter w e w ere left still 
looking for answers, for diere seems to be no w ay to acliieve w ha t d ie post- 
Nietzscheans hope for on die basis of die ontology and  edios diey provide. This is 
w hat prom pted  our tu rn  to A ugustine, to see if the ontology d ia t underg irds his 
drought m ight provide us w id i som e answers, w id i w ays to expand ou r p luralist 
political im agination that m ove us beyond die strict dichotom ies of un ity  and  
diversity, harm ony and  plurality. In w h a t sense and  to w ha t degree can w e respect 
difference and be a unified political entity? We can start to miswer this question by 
noting d ia t w e need no t assum e, as the post-Nietzscheans do, d ia t un ity  is equivalent 
to hom ogeneity or uniform ity, nor d ia t unity and  diversity are a t odds w ith  one 
anodier. As Oliver O ’D onovan helpfully w rites, "We should never allow  ourselves to 
speak of a 'contrast' or 'tension' betw een unity  and  diversity. Diversity is the 
historical content of unity, die m aterial in  w liich die unity  becomes c o n c r e t e . T h e  
w orld in its complexity, O 'D onovan goes on to say, reflects die creator's unity. A nd 
die church, in  its diversity, is miified in  die w ord  of God d ia t acknow ledges Jesus as 
his Son. A C hristian ontology, rooted in  die Triune God w ho bodi creates and 
redeem s die m anifold diversity of diis earth, provides a w ay for un ity  and diversity 
to be reconciled w id iou t eidier one being lost. As Robert Jenson notes, "Hum anity's 
End is a perfecdy m utual com m m iity betw een differentiated persons, foundationally 
enacted by die Spirit as die love of die Fadier and die incarnate Son.. .We w ill be as 
different from  one anodier as die Fadier is different from  die Son; ju st as such w e will 
be perfecdy united  to  one anodier by the Spirit."^
8 O'Donovan, Desire of the Nations, p. 177. Cf. David S. Cumiingham, These Three are One: The 
Practice of Trinitarian Theology (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1998). Cunningham 
explores die ways in which Trinitarian dieology helps us rethink the categories of oneness 
and difference. See esp. pp. 270-303, in wWch he distinguishes between a trinitarian practice 
of 'pltiralizing’ and die contemporary enthusiasm for 'pluralism.'
5 Robert W. Jenson, Systematic Theology, vol. 2, The Works of God (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p. 319.
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W here does this reconciliation betw een unity  and  diversity take place? O n an 
A ugustinian view, the H eavenly City is tlie only place w here unity  an d  diversity can 
h'uly co-incide. Jean Betlike Elshtain is right to acknowledge th a t "to celebrate unity 
w ithin the diversity of sentient hum anity, and diversity w ith in  the unity , is a cenhal 
feature of A ugustine's w o r k , " i o  yet she is n o t careful in  articulating tliat, for 
A ugustine, such a celebration is only possible through participation in  die Christ 
w ho reconciles die One and  die many. T hrough C hrist w e rediscover die kinship 
that exists betw een all of hum anity, w e become p art of God's family, w e m ove aw ay 
from  our private self-absorption to concern for the odier and  the com m on good. 
Reconciliation to God th rough  C hrist and  the Holy Spirit provides die only w ay for 
hum ans to m ove beyond toleration of difference to love for each odier in  die m idst of 
difference. The m ore far-reaching goals desired by die post-N ietzscheans can, 
ironically, only be realised th rough  Chr ist. W idiout belief d ia t the diversity of 
creation is God-given, created by God d u o u g h  Christ, w e have nothing to sustain  die 
belief that diversity is a good to be cherished and  embraced. W idiout die 
redem ption of creation by God th rough Christ, we have no ability to see d ia t die 
diversity of creation is a t  the sam e time a beautifully, inter-connected harm ony. 
W ithout die prom ise of C luist's retirrn, we have no  hope d iat die H eavenly City will 
one day come dow n from  heaven to earth, uniting great m ultitudes from  all nations, 
tribes, peoples, an d  languages before C hrist dieir King.^i
This p icture of diversity unified around com m on purpose and  w orship  does 
not, contrary to popu lar belief, require hom ogeneity. A nother look a t A ugustine's 
picture of die H eavenly City should  am ply reveal diis:
while.. .on pilgriiiiage in tills world, she calls out citizens from all nations and so 
collects a society of aliens, speaking all languages. She takes no account of any 
difference in customs, laws, and hisdtutions, by which earthly peace is achieved and 
preserved — not that she annuls or abolishes any of those, rather, she maintains them 
and follows them (for whatever divergences tiiere are among the diverse nations, 
tiiose institutions have one single aim — eartiily peace), provided tliat no liindrance 
is presented thereby to the religion wliich teaches tliat tlie one supreme and true God 
is to be worshipped-^2
Jean Bethke Elshtain, Augustine mid the Limits of Politics (Notie Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1995), pp. 43-44.
11 See Rev. 7:9; 21:1-4, NRSV. 
i2afyo/GodXIX,17.
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U nited in  Christ, differences of nationcdity and culture cease to be divisive w itliout 
diereby ceasing to exist. In otirer w ords, such differences are taken seriously in their 
particularity  w hile sim ultaneously being recognised as contingent ra ther than  
ultimate. Furtherm ore, no  national identity is seen as absolute, and  no  political 
system  as beyond questioning. Such identities and system s can alw ays be queried 
and critiqued in  term s of how  well they are upholding the ideals w hich they are 
in tended to uphold , w hether that be peace, justice, or respect for difference. An 
A ugustinian perspective on  the earthly city can provide just the so rt of questioning 
of the status quo that is of such im portance to our post-Nietzscheans, as w ell as 
provide deep reasons to lim it tire role of nation-states in defining identities and 
subsum ing local cultures. Robert Dodaro identifies just this sort of legacy in 
Augustine, "one capable of offering at least a partial antidote to the ideological pull 
of statehood, race, philosophy and  religion, class and  national s e c u r i t y .  Dodaro 
locates this 'antidote' in A ugustine's view  of tire ongoing confessional natu re of 
hum anity: because w e are sinful, w e m ust accept responsibility for conhibuting  to 
the breakdow n of harm ony in  society, we m ust look to see the reflections of our 
images in  the im ages of our enemies, and w e m ust try  to be reconciled w ith  Ürose 
images. To p u t it differently, there are comrections betw een hum anity, in  its 
createdness, sinfulness, and  redem ption, tliat far surpass the comrections that arise 
from  a com m on nation-state or class identity. A nd yet tire deeper kinship th a t comes 
fr om  God and  tlrrough participation in  God does no t erase local custom s and  
national identities w hich are in som e sense constitutive of persons and  practices.
Stepping back for a m om ent, w e have w ell seen by now  tlrat how  one 
understands and  view s difference is related to one's deepest beliefs abou t the nature 
of reality and  hum an  being. This project discloses som e very different approaches to 
difference, w hich in  tu rn  yield very different political suggestions. As R ow an 
W illiams w rites, "The question of how  w e are to consfr ue difference is in  tire long run  
a m etaphysical one; th a t is, it is n o t a question tlrat can be settled by appeal to a 
tangible state of affairs or set of facts, yet a t the sam e time no t a question that can be 
relegated to a m atter of taste or private judgem ent, since the m atter is one
n  Robert Dodaro, "Augustine's Secular" City," in Augustine and His Critics, ed. Robert Dodaro 
and George Lawless (London: RouÜedge, 2000), p. 251. Note that he brings this up in tire 
context of Connolly's critique of Augustine.
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th a t.. .shapes decisively the w ay in w hich political options are understood."i4 In 
political liberalism, for example, the fact of p lm alism  is precisely that, a fact, to be 
acknowledged and  accoim nodated, w hereas in  post-N ietzschean political theory, 
pluralism  is a condition to be celebrated and  cultivated in tire nam e of ever- 
increasiirg respect for difference. W hen it comes to Chr istianity, it is a commoirplace 
that Christianity is opposed to differeirce, m asm uch as it purports to offer tire oire 
w ay to universal tru th  to w hich all people m ust adhere in order to find salvatioir.
We, how ever, have tried to show  that Christianity and  difference do no t inherently 
coirflict witlr oire airother. As O'Doirovair rem arks, "it is irot a Christiair or a Jewish 
view tlrat siir is difference.. .Plural self-consciousiress is no t itself the fall."is
A t tire sam e time, Christiarrity does irot offer air unequivocal endorsem ent of 
all kinds of difference. As w e think of A ugustine's ontology, it m ay be helpful to 
identify tw o view s of differeirce, one 'positive' and one 'negative.' Some differences 
are p art of God's very purposes for creation, p art of God's overflowiirg abundance 
and generosity, to be celebrated and  recognised both now  and  everm ore (i.e., 
positive difference). O ther levels and  kinds of difference are understood  to be a 
result of the fall of hmnmrity, to be divisive aird conhary  to God's created purposes 
for hum anity. Such differences will rem ain w ith  us hr tire earthly city, no t as a cause 
for celebration bu t as a fact of this fallen w orld  (i.e., negative difference). U ris is 
w hat m akes tire post-N ietzscheans nervous, for drey view  any attem pt to curtail 
difference as a sign of a m isuse of pow er in  the nam e of self-protection and  self­
aggrandisem ent. Yet w e m u st all surely recognise that unlim ited difference is 
neitlrer plausible no r desirable. Speakhrg of drives for 'inclusion' tlrat are reticent to 
acknowledge tire need for som e boundaries, M iroslav Volf notes that "w ithout 
boundaries we will be able to know  only w hat w e are fighting against b u t no t w hat 
we are fighting for. hrtelligent struggle against exclusion dem ands categories and 
norm ative criteria th a t enable us to distinguish betw een repressive identities and  
practices tlrat should  be subverted and  nonrepressive ones that should  be 
a f f i r m e d . A s  Elshtam  astutely observes, "for the time behrg w e seem to have lost 
the via media betw een denying differences or absolutizing them  definitively; betw een
14 Rowan D Williams, "Between Politics and Metaphysics; Reflections iir tire Wake of Gillian 
Rose," Modern Theology 11, no. 1 (January 1995), p. 5.
16 Oliver O'Donovan, Common Objects of Love: Moral Reflection and the Shaping of Community 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Fublislring Company, 2002), p. 40.
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presum ing a too tlioroughgoing unanim ity and negating the possibility of any 
c o m m o n a l i t y . " i 7  A lthough the efforts of tlie post-Nietzscheans are undertaken  in the 
nam e of an  ever-expanding em brace of difference, they clearly, as w e saw , operate 
w ith  criteria for evaluating difference and  deciding w hich differences are to be 
em braced, w hich tolerated, and  w hich excluded. Perhaps the uniqueness of a 
Christian ontology lies in  tlie fact tliat tlie prim ary political society w itli w hich  it is 
concerned is tlie H eavenly City, so tliat its exclusivity need n o t determ ine w ho can be 
involved in tlie earthly city.
T hat is to  say, the claims of this section that participation in  the H eavenly 
City offers the only w ay for sinful differences to be reconciled and  G od-given 
differences to be celebrated, th a t participation in  God provides die only m eans by 
w hich unity  and  diversity can be b rough t togetiier in  harm ony, do no t lead on to a 
political pichire in w hich die ontology of C luistianity takes over the political realm. 
Christianity does uniquely offer resolution to the problem s d ia t plague our political 
societies, problem s d ia t have led us to tiy  to address die dilem m as left u iuesolved by 
both  m odern  an d  post-N ietzschean attem pts to create pluralist societies m arked  by 
tolerance a n d /  or deep em brace of difference. But this resolution will no t be fully 
visible diis side of die eschaton, nor, w id i its understanding of sin and  die libido 
dominandi, does it expect d ia t any eardily city could reflect die realities of the 
H eavenly City.^s It hopes, of course, d iat citizens of the eardily city will become 
citizens of die H eavenly City, finding th iough  participation in die T riune G od die 
com m unity, the peace, the justice, and  die love that m any had  hoped  to  find in  the 
eardily city. It cares for die eardily city and  its mem bers, offering, a t least ideally, 
service d ia t is no t m arred by lu st for glory and pow er, in joint pu rsu it of d ie goods 
wliich die H eavenly City shares w idi die eardily city w hile it is on  its pilgrimage. 
A nd it influences how  its citizens view  and  contribute to eardily justice and peace
16 Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A  Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and 
Reconciliation (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), p. 63.
17 She continues, "This is but one of die many reasons we, as a society, are in trouble."
Elshtain, Limits of Politics, pp. 104-105.
IS Augustine did not think die Heavenly City could be realised in die saeculum both because 
of his belief in die category of die reprobate who exist alongside the elect in diis age and 
because of die "darkness that attends the life of human society" this side of die eschaton {City 
of God XIX, 6). We follow Augustine in die latter but not die former, believing diat aU are 
given die opportunity to participate in God through the salvific work of Jesus Christ dirough 
die Holy Spii'it. Neverdieless, we maintain that even if all did respond to God's grace in diis 
age, die realities of sin and die libido dominandi are so stiong that die realisation of die 
Heavenly City on eai di must wait for God's eschatological activity.
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tlirough its understanding  of heavenly justice and  peace. But, for reasons tiiat w ill be 
entered into m ore fully below, it does no t seek tlie realisation of its p icture of 
reconciliation in the earthly city.
Before turn ing  to explore tills m ore fully, w e shall pause briefly to engage 
w ith tlie w ork of John M ilbank. We are not the first to h y  to engage in  a theological 
account of difference that seeks to show, conha liberals and post-N ietzscheans, tliat 
Christianity offers the site for the h u e  embrace of harm ony and  difference. Drawing 
on A ugustine and  w riting  of Christianity ontologically, M ilbank has given 
considerable attention to questions of theology and  difference. H is w ork  represents 
an  attem pt to take certain insights of post-N ietzscheans (e.g., concern for difference 
and the linguistic an d  contingent iiahire of reality), dem onshate th a t such insights 
w ere latent w ith in  Christianity, and  tliereby offer a theological account th a t is botli 
'radical' and  orthodox. Because of our overlapping concerns, and  the m anifold 
attention his w ork has received, it is w orthw liile for us to spend som e time engaging 
w ith  his tliought. Thr ough such an  engagem ent, im portan t issues tliat ar e of direct 
relevance to our discussion w ill be raised.
T h eolo g y  a n d  D ifference  A c c o r d in g  to  M ilb a n k : A  Brief Excursus
W e have seen how  the ontological picture offered by post-N ietzschean 
theorists shapes their em brace of difference. We have also questioned w hether such 
ontologies can sustain  tlie positive ethos tow ards diversity that they com m end, given 
their despairing roots and the all-pervasive realities of conflict and pow er tliey 
perceive. John M ilbank has raised sim ilar questions, w hile further claim ing tliat 
ratlier tlian breaking w ith  liberalism  and  the Enlightem nent, post-N ietzschean 
tliought, or w ha t he term s 'poshnodem  nihilism ,' rem ains in  continuity w ith  it.i^ He 
presents Christianity as tlie only persuasive alternative to eitlier liberal or 
poshnodem  tliought, for in  his estim ation Christianity is unique in  positing a 
universality tlia t does no t come at the expense of difference and in  offering a  w ay to 
m ove beyond tolerance and inevitable resignation to conflict. W e quote h im  a t some 
lenghi:
49 Jolm Milbank, "Postmodern Critical Augustiiiianism: A Short Smimia in Forty Two 
Responses to Unasked Questions," in The Postmodern God: A  Theological Reader, ed. Graham 
Ward (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), p. 267.
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Clu'istianity.. many other discornses, pursued from tlie outset a universaHsm
which tried to subsume rather than merely abolish difference: Cliristians could 
remain in their many different cities, languages, and cultures, yet still belong to one 
eternal city ruled by Cluist, in whom all "humanity" was fulfilled. In this way it 
appears as a "precursor" of enlightenment, and any claim of outright Christian 
opposition to enlightenment is bound to be an oversimplification. But the liberty, 
equality, and fraternity latent as values in Christianity do not imply mere mutual 
tolerance, far less any resignation to a regulated conflict. On die contrary, 
Cluistianity is peculiar, because wliile it is open to difference—to a series of infinitely 
new additions, insights, progressions toward God, it also strives to make of all of 
diese differential additions a harmony, "in die body of Christ," and claims that if the 
reality of God is properly attended to, there can be such a harmony. ...Chiisdanity, 
therefore, is not just in die same position as all odier discourses vis-à-vis 
postmodernity; it can, I want to claim, diink difference, yet it perhaps uniquely tries 
to deny that diis necessarily (radier diaii contmgendy, in a fallen world) entails 
conflict. 20
H ere some of the m ajor tliemes of M ilbaiik's drought emerge. H e is concerned to 
persuade his readers th a t die picture described by post-N ietzscheans in  w hich 
conflict and  violence appear as prim ary and  inescapable is no t the only ontological 
possibility; indeed, Christianity offers a 'counter-ontology' in w liich peace has 
priority over conflict, for conflict is a contingent resu lt of die fall radier diaii a 
description of die inevitable natu re of (created) reality, and  only w id i such an 
ontology can difference be tru ly  acknow ledged and  respected .21 The description pu t 
forw ard by post-N ietzscheans is b u t one mythos, while the description proffered by 
Christians is anodier; M ilbank's rendering of diis description draw s heavily on his 
interpretation of Augustine. The overlap betw een M ilbank's project and  our ow n 
should be obvious by now , in  d iat bodi are concerned w id i presenting Christianity 
ontologically, draw ing u p o n  Augustine and  paying attention to die question of how
20 Ibid., pp. 267-268. Cf. a later writing: "The miiversality of die Church transcends the 
universality of enlightenment in so far as it is not content widi mere mutual toleration and 
non-interference widi the liberties of odier s. It seeks in addition a work of freedom which is 
none odier than perfect social harmony, a perfect consensus in which every natural and 
cultural difference finds its agieed place widiin die successions of space and time" (John 
Milbank, "The Name of Jesus," chap. 6 in The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Cidture 
[Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997], p. 154).
21 For an account of the extent to which die Christian mytii is opposed to die 'Babylonian 
myth' of redemptive violence whose legacy continues today, particulai'ly in the prioritisation 
of peace and order over evil and violence, see Walter Wink, Engaging the Pozvers: Discernment 
and Resistance in a World of Domination (Mimieapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), esp. pp. 13-14,30.
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difference is to be understood w idiin  liis ontological picture. These attem pts have 
yielded some sim ilarities as well £is m any differences, even wliile diis project has, 
adm ittedly, been gready influenced by M ilbank's dieological approach.
W lien M ilbank discusses post-Nietzschean, or w ha t he m ore often refers to as 
poshnodem  or niliilist, thought, he is referring to die w ork of Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Deleuze, Lyotard, Foucalt, and  D errida .22 W hile he is not, dien, explicitly engaging 
w ith  die post-NietzschecUis w id i w hich our investigation has been concerned, he is 
focusing on m any of die diinkers w ho have gready influenced their diought. He is 
particularly concerned w id i the sufficiency of their accounts of difference. H e sees in  
such thinkers die desire to articulate a positive view  of w ill-to-pow er in  w liich pure 
difference is affirm ed and nothing is negated. Yet, given their understand ing  of die 
prim acy of conflict and  com petition for pow er, he w onders how  difference can enter 
com m on cultural space w id iou t com peting, displacing, or expelling odiers or odier 
differences, w idiout, in  other w ords, negating some type of difference. O n tiieir 
account, difference cam iot escape being 'oppositional difference,' for "diere is a 
ti'anscendental assum ption of a negative relation persisting betw een all 
differences."23 H ow  m ight one get to a positive view of difference, in w hich  the 
affirm ation of difference is no t concom itant w id i assum ptions of conflict and 
competition? Only, for M ilbank, d irough a recovery of a scliolastic or Thomistic 
understanding  of analogy.
M ilbank draw s upon  analogy as a w ay to diink about created reality d iat 
does n o t rely on die rigid classification system s based in  genera and  species that 
em erged in m odernity. W hereas die latter try to determ ine w hat is held  in common, 
w ha t com m onalities of essence can tie objects togetiier, analogy links different objects 
by noting both  w ha t objects have in  com m on and  w here diey are different. Again, 
w hereas die latter, in  an  effort to group tilings togetiier by com m on classification, 
require abstiaction from  the particularities of the objects a t hand  and  rely upon  the 
assum ption d ia t each object has an  univocal m eaning, analogy depends upon  
identifying both die similarities an d  die differences in  objects being com pared so d iat
22 Jolui Milbank, Theology and Social Theoiy: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1990), p. 278. Note diat he intentionally treats dieii' writings as "elaborations of a single 
ndiilistic pliilosophy, paying relatively less attention to died divergences of opinion" (ibid).
23 Ibid., p. 289.
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tliey are never abstracted or given one single absolute m eaning .24 T hat is to say, as 
M ilbank pu ts it, analogy refers to "a 'comm on m easure' betw een differences w hich 
does n o t reduce differences to m ere instances of a com m on essence or genus. In 
other w ords a likeness that only m aintains itself through the differences, and  no t 
despite or in addition  to theni."25 M ilbank w ould  like to see "aU unities, relations and 
disjunctures" understood  analogically because he believes it w ould  enable likenesses 
betw een entities to be discovered and re-discovered along the w ay while 
sim ultaneously allowing for recognition of die actual content and  difference of each 
entity .26 Because of analogy's ability to recognise die differences and  particularity  of 
each entity, M ilbank believes that analogy provides die w ay for difference to be 
positively radier than  negatively related.
M ilbank's su p p o rt for analogy is concom itant w id i a  concern for die dangers 
of univocity, or the belief d ia t "diiiigs 'are' in  die sam e way," d iat Being is die sam e in 
every instance .22 M ilbank blam es Duns Scotus for the first articulation of such 
univocity, for by conceiving of Being as miivocal, by positing that bodi finite and 
infinite (m an and  God) 'are' in die sam e way, Dmis Scotus invented the separation 
betw een ontology and  dieology and  subverted die scholastic understand ing  of being 
as analogical. As Michael H ard t and  Antonio N egri tell die story. Duns Scotus' belief 
d ia t "every entity has a  single essence" essentially "subverts die m edieval conception 
of being as an  object of analogical, and  dius dualistic pred ication—a being w id i one 
foot in this w orld  and  one in  a transcendent realm," and  diereby conh ibu ted  to w hat 
diey identify as die prim ary  event of m odernity, nam ely "die affirm ation of die 
pow ers of this w orld , the discovery of the plane of immanence. "2s This is precisely 
where M ilbank identifies die problem  of m odernity, and  it is w hat he continues to 
identify in  die d iough t of so-called postm odern diinkers. For according to Milbank, 
the ontologies of Heidegger, D errida and Deleuze all rely upon  Scotus' 
transcendental, content-less univocity, even w hile diey add  "a niliilist tw ist by 
denying die hierarchy of genera, species and individuated res. There aie  no stable
24 For helpful background on analogy, its development within scholastic diought, and how it 
functions as an alternative between univocation and equivocation, see New Catholic 
Encyclopedia, vol. 1 (New York: McGraw-Hül Book Company, 1967), pp. 461-465.
25 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 289.
26 Ibid., pp. 304-306.
27 Ibid., p. 303.
25 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2000), p. 71; see also pp. 70-82.
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genera, b u t only complex m ixtures, overlappings and transform ation" (we're 
rem inded here of Connolly's preference for the liiizom e over the tree, w hich he takes 
from  Deleuze) .29 Tlois results, in  one sense, in an  absolute diversity of genera, but, in 
another sense, "tlie reverse side of tliis diversity rem ains the univocity of being: only 
Being, declares D errida, has a literal and  no t a m etaphorical sense. Likewise, for 
Deleuze, every differential happening is also the eternal re turn  of die sam e, die 
eternal repetition of a self-identical e x is te n c e .M ilb a n k  questions die assum ption 
of diese dieorists d ia t dieir phÜosophy of univocity is any m ore 'fundam ental' dian a 
Cadiolic lu iderstanding of analogical difference, and he m aintains d ia t an  analogical 
approach is equally viable.
Yet M ilbank distances him self from  die traditional presentation  of analogy, 
for he w ants to argue th a t analogy is no t necessarÜy concom itant w id i identity, 
presence, and substance. H ere he agrees w id i m uch postm odern pliilosophy d iat 
these categories have become problematic. Indeed, Iiis larger dieological project is 
one in  w hich notions d ia t have traditionally been associated w id i Chr istianity, and 
w hich have recently been discredited by postm odern philosophers, such as presence, 
substance, and  die rational essence of subjects, are no longer seen as necessary to 
dieology, wliile odier notions th a t have been the subject of posh n o d em  critique are 
retained as essential to a Christian ontology. These latter notions include 
"h anscenderice, participation, analogy, liierarchy, teleology (diese last tw o in  
m odified forms) and  die absolute reality of 'the Cood' in  rouglily die Platonic 
sense."34 It is w orth  noting tiiat, on  M ilbank's account, die subject of die postm odern 
critique has often been form s of Platonism  and metaphysics d ia t postm odern  
diinkers conflate w id i Christianity w id iou t recognising die degree to w hich ideas 
originally garnered fr om Platonic and  m etaphysical sources are often radically 
altered by die C hurch Fadiers; in  diis sense, M ilbank, in  jettisoning ideas d ia t have 
seem ed to be integral to Chr istian diought, does n o t see liimself doing som ediing 
radically different, b u t m erely carrying on in  die tr adition of certain earlier Christicui 
thinkers w ho m odified or abandoned diese n o t i o r i s . 3 2  In short, M ilbank is able to
29 Milbank, Theology mid Social Theory, p. 303.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., p. 296.
32 See ibid., pp. 295-296. The drinkers he has in mind are, as he lists diem, Augustine, 
Eriugena, Gilbert Porreta, Thomas Aquinas, Nicholas of Cusa, Leibniz, Berkeley, Vico, 
Hamami, Kierkegaard and Blondel. For an example of how Milbank applies this approach to 
Cluistology, see "The Name of Jesus," pp. 145-168. He is very explicitly attempting both to
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combine his understanding  of analogy w ith  a Deleuzian conviction of the need to 
recognise the overlapping natu re and  m ixtures of life: "analogy does n o t im ply 
'identity', b u t identity  and difference at once, and tiiis radical sense can be liberated if 
one jettisons tlie genera/spec ies/ind iv iduals  hierarchy and  recognises, zuith the 
nihilists, only m ixtures, continua, overlaps emd disjunctions, all subject in  principle to 
limitless transform ation. If the Aristotelian categories are abandoned, tiien the w ay 
is open to seeing analogy as all-pervasive, as governing every unity  an d  diversity of 
tlie organized world."33
Milbcuik is asking for no thing short of a radical re-working of how  we 
approach the w orld, one tlia t opts for a dynam ic 'analogizing process' th a t discovers 
likenesses betw een entities by paying attention to their actual content, w itliout 
relying on pre-established categories or a univocal process that ignores particular 
d i f f e r e n c e s . 3 4  This analogizing process is p art of participation in divine Being, and 
the divine Being to  w hom  M ilbank refers, tlie God of Christianity, bo th  is and  creates 
difference. In  M ilbank's estim ation, difference lies so close to the heart of 
C luistianity that one can offer a re-description of God, creation, and  charity using the 
language of difference. So M ilbank w rites tliat God is difference, as such including 
and encom passing every difference, w hile also being tiie One w ho differentiates. 
Creation is understood, tiierefore, as God's grahiitous giving of existence and  
thereby of difference. Tliis is w hy  M ilbank links charity so closely w itli difference, 
because creation, as God's original charitable act, is "tlie gratuitous, creative positing 
of difference, and  the offering to  others of a space of freedom , w hich is e x i s t e n c e .  "35 
This creative charitable act does no t set dow n a fixed hierarchy b u t is better 
understood as a serial em anation from  God, in  w hich each individual has its ow n 
unique place in  tlie series; this, M ilbank writes, "makes difference ontologically 
ultim ate and  w orthy  of tlie highest v a l u a t i o n . "36 God is, furtherm ore, continually 
creating, continually differentiating, so that creation is n o t a finished p roduct in 
space b u t continues ex nihilo in  time. This understanding of God is reliant on
rehieve and to 'perfect' tlie Chalcedonian position by abandoning the idea of 'substance': "...I 
do not wish to disguise the fact that I am transposing Chalcedonian ortliodoxy into a new 
idiom which only perfects it by dissolving 'substantial' notions of subjectivity which it did not 
always fully overcome" (p. 157). See also Jolm Milbank, Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon 
(London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 136-137.
33 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 304.
34 Ibid., p. 305.
35 Ibid., p. 416.
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M ilbank's invocation of the view  of D ionysius the Areopagite, w ho sees G od as an  
internally creative power. God is, mysteriously, both  "infinite realized act and  
infinite unrealized power"; this 'power-act' plays ou t tluough  tlie Trinity in  a 
m ovem ent from  tm ity to difference.37
M ilbank goes on to offer a description of the Trinity in  term s of difference. 
The relation betw een Fatlier and  Son can be seen as the 'first difference,' a m ove from  
unity  to difference "m w hich unity  is th rough its pow er of generating difference, and 
difference is th iough  its com prehension by unity. "35 The 'second difference,' 
referring to the H oly Spirit, is w ha t allows tlie Trinity to be a "'musical' harm ony of 
infinity," revealing God's "radically 'external' relationality."39 T h iough  tlie Spirit the 
relation becomes m ore than  just one that is locked betw een tlie tw o poles of Fatlier- 
Son in  a w ay that m ight seem  to deny difference, bu t instead enables a m ovem ent of 
difference beyond the Father-Son relation. Difference in  the first instance 
(speculatively speaking) constitutes unity  betw een tlie Father and  the Son and  in  tlie 
second instance (speculatively speaking), in  the Spirit, it is a response to unity  that is 
actually m ore than  unity. Or, as M ilbank w rites elsewhere, tlie first difference (i.e., 
tlie relation betw een tlie Fattier and  tlie Son) is tlie articulation of the content of God, 
tliough tliat content is inseparable from  Godself, and  the second difference (i.e., the 
Holy Spirit) is tlie in terpretation of that articulation. W ith the second difference 
comes a m om ent of response to the expression of God as found in  the fu s t difference, 
and tliis response "is 'excessive' in relation to the expression."40 Thus tlie love 
betw een the Fatlier and  tlie Son is com m unicated tlirough the Spirit "as a furtlier 
difference tliat always escapes;"^: this escape is w ha t involves and  enables hum an 
participation in  tlie Trinity. The Trinity consists in  this interplay betw een Father, 
Son, and  Spirit, ra ther than  in  a  finished or static totality, w hich is w ha t leads 
M ilbank to w rite of tlie Trinity both  as community^z and  as a "'musical' harm ony of
infinity. "43
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., p. 423.
38 Ibid., pp. 423-424.
39 Ibid., p. 424. For a more detailed account of Milbank's understanding of tlie Holy Spirit, see 
Milbank, "The Second Difference," chap. 7 in The Word Made Strange, pp. 171-193.
40 Milbank, "Postmodern Critical Augustiiiianism," p. 274.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 424.
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This God w ho is difference and  w ho, in  continuously creating, is 
continuously differentiating, is the God in w hom  the created w orld  of tim e 
participates. In this participation, hum ans are lliemselves "radically creative and 
differentiating. "44 Indeed, in  M ilbank's understanding of participation, "it is vital to 
realize tliat contingent 'm aking' should naturally be conceived by Christianity as tlie 
site of our participation in  divine understanding. "4s Participation is a t tlie heart of 
M ilbank's theological picture, b u t it is participation tliat goes further than  m ost 
tlieological renditions, w hich focus on shared being and know ledge in  tlie Divine, for 
it takes into account issues related to tlie m aking and  creating of culhire, language, 
time, and  liistoricity th a t are often, according to M ilbank, dow nplayed by those 
espousing tlie had itio iial notion of participation.46 In other w ords, posh n o d em  
philosophy has m icovered w ays in  wliich language and  culture, for exam ple, are 
subject to cliEuige and  contingency, dependent on  different pow er shuggles and 
attem pts to posit 'hu tli.' M ilbank has tried to respond to this, theologically, w itli liis 
accounts of participation and  analogy. H is analogical approach is dependen t upon 
participation in  divine creativity, or differentiation ("the analogizing capacity itself is 
'like God'"47). His em phasis on tlie dynam ic nature of analogy results from  his belief 
tliat the likenesses discovered through analogy are constructed, either by natural or 
cultural processes, and  are open to refashioning and reshaping .48 O n this account, 
language and  concepts are flexible and  schematic, being based on analogies tliat 
result from  a constant exchange of predicates rather than  being fixed in  definite 
categories or classifications. W lien hum ans undertake tlie analogical process, w hen 
they engage in 'm aking,' they are participating in  tlie divine.49 A n excerpt from  
M ilbank m ay further elucidate this point:
...I have always tiled to suggest that paihcipation can be extended also to language, 
liistory and culture: the whole realm of human making. Not only do being and 
knowledge pai'ticipate in a God who is and who comprehends; also human making
44 Ibid., p. 425.
45 Ibid. Milbank elsewhere discusses similar ideas using Üie language of poesis, working with 
an understanding of humanity as fmidamentally poetic being and of revelation as the 
intersection of divine and human creations. See Milbank, "A Chiistological Poetics," chap. 5 
in The Word Made Strange, pp. 123-144.
46 Jolm Milbank, Being Reconciled, p. ix
47 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 305.
48 This is linked to die idea presented in The Word Made Strange tliat language, rather than 
representing ideas, constitutes ideas (p. 29).
49 See Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, pp. 304-306.
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participates in a God who is infinite poetic utterance: the second person of the 
Trinity. Thus when we contingently but autiientically make things and reshape 
ourselves thiough time, we aie not estianged from the eternal, but enter further into 
its recesses by what for us is the only possible route.5°
The details, nuances, and im plications o f Milbank's thought in  these areas are 
neither possible to explore w itliin  the confines of this work nor fully articulated by 
Milbank. H e continues m any of tlie them es inhoduced  in Theology an d  Social Theory  
in  later w ritings, particularly in  m any of the essays included in  The W o rd  M ade  
Strange. In tliese, the extent to w liich  Milbank believes tliat language should  be one 
of the central concerns o f theological inquiry, and indeed  tiiat reality and existence 
are fundam entally linguistic, becom es clear. Frederick Bauerscluiiidt's sum m ary of 
tliis book's argum ent brings tiiis to light: "That argument, briefly put, is that 
postm odernism  is correct in  seeing reality as fundam entally linguistic, but tiiat tiiis is 
som ething tliat had already been realized, at least iiicipientiy, in the Christian  
dochine of tiie Triunity o f God and the equiprim ordiality of W ord and Spirit w ith  
the Fatlier. Therefore, the task for theology at the end of m odernity is to rethink itself 
in  light o f tiiis, its ow n  m ost basic insight, "si In som e w ays, then, M ilbank is h y in g  to 
take into accom it som e of the very sam e insights that our post-N ietzschean political 
tiieorists are, and to em erge w ith  a theology tiiat can respond to tiie concerns over 
difference tiiat certain so-called postm odern tliinkers have raised. Indeed, the level 
of engagem ent by M ilbank over these issues far exceeds that of m ost other 
theologians, but it m ay be debatable w hetiier tiiat is to Milbank's credit. Indeed, w e  
m ust w onder w hether he has so  im bued the philosophy and language of these  
thinkers that he lets them  position  liis thinking, even  as he decries theology for 
letting itself be positioned by m o d e r n i t y .52
50 Milbank, Being Reconciled, p. ix. This book is an attempt to fm-ther Milbank's earlier work 
on participation in terms of poeisis to include an understanding of participation in terms of 
donum, or gift.
54 Frederick Cluistian Bauerschmidt, "The Word Made Speculative? John Milbank's 
Christological Poetics,". Modern Theology 15, no. 4 (October 1999), p. 418.
52 As Wayne Hankey notes, "the position of postmodern Christian tiieology vis-à-vis 
philosophy is strikingly ironic. The totality with which it asserts its right and need to proceed 
independently of philosophy is, in fact, philosophically situated and determined" (Wayne J. 
Hankey, "Theoria versus Poesis: Neoplatonism and Trinitarian Difference in Aquinas, Jolm 
Milbaiik, Jean-Luc Marion, and John Zizioulas," Modern Theology 15, no. 4 [October 1999], p. 
387). For reviews that raise a similar point, along with other criticisms, see Douglas Hedley, 
"Radical Orthodoxy. A  New Theology," Journal of Theological Studies 51, no. 1 (2000), pp. 405-408; 
Reinhard Hütter, "The Church's Peace Beyond tiie 'Secular': A Postmodern Angustinian's 
Deconstruction of Secular Modernity and Postmodernity," Pro Ecclesia 2 (Winter 1993), pp.
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M ilbank helpfully dem onshates tliat theology is no t necessarily incom patible 
w ith  concern for difference. M ore than  that, he show s that the post-Nietzscheans' 
approach to difference has some inlierent problem s, for difference m ust always be 
negatively related w ith in  an  ontology in w hich conflict and  pow er define the very 
param eters of reality and  therefore of interaction betw een differences w ith in  that 
reality .53 W e are again led to the conclusion tliat a positive em brace of difference is 
no t possible w itliin such a negative ontology. We m ust look elsew here for 
sustenance for tlie sh  ong ethos tow ards difference tliat the post-N ietzscheans desire. 
In tliis, M ilbank is right, euid his presentation of a picture of C hristianity in  w hich 
difference can be seen as p art of God's creative purposes provides a w ay to root 
difference positively. A nd yet theologians m ust be w ary of being so im bued by the 
spirit of the age that they let the concerns of tliat age set the term s of tlieir tlieological 
conversation. Efforts to redescribe tlieological dochines that have been handed  
dow n tlu'ough the ages using language tliat derives from  recent scholarship and 
contem porary concerns need, if undertaken  a t all, to be done w ith  considerable 
caution and  hum ility .54 M ilbank's shongly  presented redescriptions of haditioiial 
concepts, in  w liich he ascribes 'difference' to the very heart of the C hristian dochine 
of creation, indeed to the very heart of God's Trinitarian self, in  w hich he alters and 
expands the notion of participation that dates back to the early C hurch  Fathers, seem, 
perhaps, m ore presum phious tlian humble.
M ilbank w ould  presum ably disagree, because he view s his w ork  of 
m odification or description as, as w e've seen, tlie continuation of a h ad itio n  already 
begun by certain great tlieological thinkers. Furtlierm ore, he believes th a t this is the 
only hope for Üieology's survival ("tlie only chance lies in  the com posing of a new  
theoretical music. Hence m y endeavour to m ake the C luistian logos sound again 
afresh, even in  its dying fa ll.. ."55). The post-N ietzsdieans m ight agree w itli this 
claim, presenting, as they think, persuasive reasons w hy haditioiial C luistianity is no
106-116; Peter J. Leithart, "Can Radicals Be Ortliodox?" The Weekly Standard, 15 November, 
1999, pp. 36-39.
53 So, describing tliose who hold visions of 'ontological agonism,' he writes, "...where every 
assertion is arbitrary, where every insinuation of stable presence can only succeed by 
suppressing the flux which subtends it, then violence can never be overcome..." (Jolm 
Milbank, "The End of Enlightenment: Post-modern or Post-secular?" in The Debate on 
Modernity, ed. Claude Geffré and Jean Pierre Jossua [London: SCM Press Ltd., 1992J, p. 46.
54 Kathiyn Tamier's efforts to talk about difference in trinitarian terms may be an example of 
tliis type of theological humility. See Katluyn Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity: A  Brief 
Systematic Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), pp. 13-14.
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longer plausible, and, furtlier, is dangerous, in  a cultural m ilieu  concerned w itii 
difference. Yet w e are tem pted to agree w ith  Reinhard H ütter that M ilbank's 
"enemy, postm odern  nihilism , dictates the logic of argum entative victory even in the 
occurrence of its ow n defeat, and  m oves like the Trojan horse as C hristian  m yth os  into 
the very citadel of M ilbank's theology!"56 We agree further witlr H ü tter tlrat in  Üris 
regard M ilbank is no t A ugustin ian  enough.57 Indeed, the 'radical' tu rn  that M ilbank 
takes in  understanding  our contingent hum an  creativity as the essence of our 
participation in the divine obscures w h a t A ugustine believed to be tire heart of 
participation, nam ely reconciled relatioirship witlr God the Fatlrer th rough  the Son 
and tire Holy Spirit. Tlris is tire participation that, according to Augustine, enables 
hum ans to be reconciled to God and each otirer, to have their loves re-ordered and 
re-harm onised so that they can be m rited across their differences in  tire unchairging 
Good of the Triune God. This picture of participation, in  w hich all of hum anity  is 
harm onised into a family, united in  their differences by God's love and  redem ption, 
m ust remedir at the centre of our theological understanding, even a t the cenh e of our 
tlreological discussioirs of difference. I f  w e re-define our tlreology too m uch m  terms 
of difference, if w e abandon tlreological concepts tlrat have long underg irded  
orthodox theology, if our reconceptions and  'radicalisation' of C hristian ideas are 
driven m ore by abstract m etaphysics and  sem antics than  Scriptural engagem ent, 
tlreir w e risk losiirg sight of tire very m eans w hereby harm ony in  tire m idst of 
difference becomes possible, nam ely participation in  God tlrrough the person of Jesus 
C hrist and  tire Holy Spirit.58
Indeed, M ilbank's theological approach involves a decreased focus on Jesus 
and an iircreased em phasis on the Kingdom  of God, for "the nam e 'Jesus' does not 
indicate an  identifiable 'character*, b u t is ratlrer the obscure and  m ysterious hinge 
w hich perm its shifts from  one k ind of discourse to a iro th er ." 5 9  In his reading.
55 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, p. 1,
56 Hütter, "The Church's Peace Beyond the 'Secular'," p. 116.
57 Ibid.
58 Tlris is certainly not the first time such a dairger has been identified. For more detailed 
rendermgs of the potential for Milbairk's work to lose sight of the concrete contents of 
Cluistianity and particularly the person of Christ, see R. R. Reno, "The Radical Orthodoxy 
Project," First Things no. 100 (February 2000), pp. 37-44 and Bauerschmidt, "The Word Made 
Speculative?" pp. 417-432.
59 "Name of Jesus," p. 149. His overall claim is that if we try to approach the gospels as the 
story of Jesus, we will quickly discover tlrat 'Jesus' has no real content, but if we read tire 
gospel stories as tire foundation of a new city and commmrity, then 'Jesus' has content as the
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"christological and atonem ent dochines a re .. .tlieoretically secondary to definitions of 
the character of the new  universal com m unity or C h u r c h .  Further, M ilbank 
hanslates Jesus' life, his deatii on the cross, and his atonem ent into tire language of 
signs and m etaphor, so that they are no t to be understood realistically bu t 
m etaphorically, so that Jesus on the cross is substituted for us because "he becomes 
totally a sign, here he is hansform ed into a perfect m etaphor of forgiveness," and 
m etaphors of atonem ent "are not to be taken realistically, as approxim ations to an 
'atonem ent in itself, an  invisible eternal hansaction  betw een God and  hum anity. 
Instead, tlrese m etaphors represent tlie actual happening of atonem ent as a m eaning in 
language."61 By such a re-hanslation of Christology and  atonem ent Milbanlc believes 
tliat he is providing tlie w ay forw ard for the Church; by such a re-interpretation we 
believe that he is m issing tlie Incarnation of Christ w itliout w hich no  reconciliation 
between God and  hum ankind, Euid therefore no reconciled com m m iity, is possible. 
W ithout the real presence of Jesus Christ on this eartli as divine and hum an, as the 
m ediator betw een God and  fallen hum anity, as tiie Reconciler and  Saviour of God's 
people, Jesus could no t be tlie founder of a new  city, the Heavenly City, presen t in 
part on this eartli as the Church. M ilbank's sem antic reappraisal of Jesus w ould  have 
been mitliiiikable to A ugustine, w hose Cluistology is dependent up o n  Jesus C luist as 
mediator. In fact, M ilbank's efforts to re-think theology in  order to distance it from 
m odern tliought seem to have pushed  him  to em brace a 'poshnodem ' tu rn  to 
semantics, though such a  tu rn  is no t the only option available to contem porary 
tliinkers and  theologians. As A lasdair M achityre writes, "Some recent philosophers 
have supposed  tliat sem antics is first philosophy, having displaced epistem ology 
from tiiat fundam ental position, and  have w ritten  as if it is a t tlie level of semantic 
enquiry that philosopliical disagreem ents have to be resolved first, tlie answ er to 
epistemological, m etaphysical, and  ethical questions then being derived, a t least in 
part, from tlie findings of semanticists." But, he continues, "there is no  particular 
reason to believe t h i s . "62 W e have no t believed tliis, as should be obvious by tliis 
po int in tlie project, and  have tiierefore chosen not to follow the sem antic h a il blazed
founder of this new city (see p. 150). Tliis seems to be a continuation of a theme that he began 
in Theology mid Social Theory, p. 387.
60 Ibid., p. 148.
61 Ibid., pp. 160,161; autlior's emphasis.
62 Alasdaii- MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 371.
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by certain 'postmodern' thinkers, even  as w e've tiied  to m ove beyond certain 
problematic assum ptions of modernity.
To Milbank, the option w e  offer w ill not be enough. H e w ill say both drat the 
ontology w e've presented, rooted as w e  think it is in A ugustine, does not adequately  
shed die more problematic aspects of Christian dieology tiiat postm odern  
philosophy has so decisively rendered suspect and tiiat it leaves in  place a space for 
die secular. This latter concern provides a helpful w ay  for us to m ove this discussion  
from the H eavenly City to the earthly city, as it were. On one level, at least, w e  agree 
w id i Milbsmk and A ugustine tiiat tiie only place w here difference can be united in a 
harm ony that continues to respect difference is in  the H eavenly City. But w hat  
happens in tiie eartiily city, in  tiie here and now , in a society in  w liich  tiie majority of 
people neidier claim  nor desire citizenship in the H eavenly City? W hat hope do w e  
have for social and political theories and structures attempting to create and sustain  
societies in  w hich difference is recognised and respected? On the one hand, very  
little, if w e hope for too m uch and look to ontologies w ith  expectations and desires 
tliat far outw eigh their ability to realise them. On tlie other hand, w ith  our 
expectations in  check and a theological understanding tiiat Christ is Lord of all, w e  
can hope for a society in  w hich  genuine conversation is possible, in  w hich  each party 
of w hich tiiat society consists can interact w ith  others in  the particularity o f its 
identity, practices, and beliefs. To tliis matter w e  w ill return more directly at the end  
of die chapter. We can only arrive tiiere tiieologically if w e  take a dieological road 
through the relationship betw een tiie H eavenly and earthly cities in  the here and  
now , m eaning die church and the political realm as tliey exist in the saectiliun. This 
road m ust also take us th iou gh  the w ays tiiat Christianity needs to understand itself 
and to be m iderstood w ithin  die earthly city so that its 'difference' and particularity 
are respected. That is to say, w e need to see w hat it looks like for the Church to be 
faitiiful to tlie fullness of its identity w itliin  contemporary society, and this, 
concom itantly and seem ingly ironically, should  open w ays for otiier com ponents of 
society to picture how  they can be true to the fullness of tiieir identities. But first w e
turn to die relationship betw een Christianity and the political.
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Th e  C h u r c h  a n d  t h e  P o l it ic a l : C h rist  is Lord
Any theological discussion attem pting to address issues related to political 
society and  political tlieory m ust consider tlie relationship betw een the C hurch and 
tlie political. By die political, w e m ean the realm  of die eartiily city tiiat is prim arily 
responsible for dealing w ith  the structure or affairs of governm ent of tiie earthly 
city .^ 3 By die C hurch, w e m ean that p art of the eschatological H eavenly City, or the 
Kingdom  of God, tiiat has ils instantiation here on earth. As w e saw  in  the previous 
chapter, Augustine does no t conflate the H eavenly City and the Church, believing 
tiiat the Church contains tiiose w ho are faitiiful and  tiiose w ho are unfaitiiful, or 
tiiose w ho are citizens of the H eavenly City and  those w ho, though p a rt of the 
Church, continue to be citizens of tiie eartiily city. A ugustine neverdieless affirms, as 
Nicholas Healy puts it, an "ontological relation betw een tiie City of God and  the 
c h u r c h . I n  o ther w ords, the H eavenly City is connected to the C hurch an d  present 
w ithin it, even as tiie Church, as a m ixed body in  a fallen era, will never attain  tiie 
perfection of tiie City of God in  this age. The full revelation and  realisation of the 
Heavenly City will no t occur mitil the eschaton, so here and now  we can and  should 
expect trouble and  conflict w ith in  the church. Yet w e should also expect to see, 
experience, and delight in  die first fruits of tlie Heavenly City in  the C hurch in  tliis 
saeculum, for ChristicUis aheady  participate in God through Jesus C hrist and  tlie Holy 
Spirit. As M iroslav Volf w rites, ".. .participation in tiie com m union of the tiiuiie 
God. ..is n o t only an  object of hope for tiie church, bu t also its present experience," 
and, furtlier, "Cluist prom ised to be present in  it th rough his Spirit as the first fruits 
of die gathering of tiie w hole people of God in the eschatological reign of God."^s
Any attem pt to conceptualise the H eavenly City and  the C hurch  will 
encounter tensions and  obstacles, for the H eavenly City is already present and 
visible, though n o t yet nearly  all that it w ill be in  the age to come, while die Church 
lives in tiie p resent in  a state of eschatological anticipation tiiat involves the
We use the terms 'the political' and the 'political realm' to avoid tiie use of tiie 'state,' 
believing that the rise of a conception of the 'state' over against the 'chmch' is a relatively 
recent phenomenon that occurs witli the rise of liberalism (more on this below). Tliis use of 
tiie 'political' is not meant to deny tliat tiie Heavenly Cit)'^  is also political, in the sense of being 
its own polis in contiast to that of tiie eartiily city.
^  Nicholas M. Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life: Practical-Prophetic Ecclesiology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 55.
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beginnings of participation in  tire realities of tire H eavenly City, wlrile still being  
marked by the realities of sin, evil, and conflict. We need to hold  tightly to this 
tension, as unclear as it m ay be to us in this age w hen  w e continue to see as thi ough  
a glass, dim ly, expecting neither too m uch nor too little from the Church and  
Christianity in tlris age. For as eschatological as tire Church's hopes are, its 
experience of the Kiirgdom of God and eternal life in  tire here aird n ow  camrot be 
underestim ated. A s Katirryn Tanner w rites, "At the m ost fmrdamental level, eternal 
life is ours n ow  in  union witlr Christ, as in tire future.. .This realm of eternal life is not 
other-worldly, either in  tire sense of becom ing a reality only after our deaths or in tire 
sense of a spiritualized, m erely personal attitude to events of this w orld. Instead, 
eternal life exists n ow  in  com petition witlr another potentially all-embracing 
sti'ucture or pattern of existence marked by futility and h op elessn ess.... Eternal life 
iirfiltiates, tiren, tire present w orld of suffering and oppression, to bring life, 
understood as a n ew  pattern or structure of relationslrips marked by life-giving  
vitality and renew ed p u r p o s e . T l r i s  is w hy Clriistians and churches m ust take 
seriously their responsibility in  fostering the unified and diverse commuirities of love  
tlrat are only even  a possibility because of their participation iir God's eternal life. It 
is also w h y  they m ust think tiu ough w hat tire relationship is betw een their ow n  polis, 
tire Church as it exists in  the earthly city, and the political realm of tlrat sam e eartirly 
city.
Should the political and the Church be understood as tw o  separate, unrelated  
spheres, w ith  independent purposes, concerns, aird purviews? Or do tirey have  
overlapping areas of interest, so tlrat each can and should influence the other, even  as 
tirey remain distinct? Is a strict distinction betw een them  problematic because tire 
political requires tlreological grounding for its very sustenance? Or, going further, 
does tire political act in opposition  to the Church w hen  tire tw o are separated, so tlrat 
the ontology witlr w hich tire political operates is n ot only incom patible witlr but 
actually hostile to the ontology of Christiairity? On tire latter v iew , tire relationship  
betw een tire tw o is nothing short of com petitive and antagonistic, wlrile otirer v iew s  
leave open the possibility of a com plem entary relationship. This reference to 
'possibility' draws our attention to a com plicatm g factor in this discussion, nam ely
Mii’oslav Volf, After our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity (Grand Rapids, Mich. 
William B. EerdniEms Publishing Company, 1998), pp. 129,158.
Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, pp. I l l ,  112.
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tire need to differentiate betw een possibility and actuality, betw een w hat has the 
potential to be tire case and w hat actually is the case at different tim es and in  
different places w h en  it com es to the relationship betw een the Church and tire 
political. Such a distinction m akes it possible for more than one of the v iew s w e  
cursorily presented to be correct, or at least to be on to som ething im portant and  
wortlrwhile, at tire sam e time. This m ay becom e clearer if  w e  look more closely at 
som e of tire nuances and distiirctions found in  the thought of different theologians as 
they discuss the realms of the Church and tire political.
We'll begin by again looking to John Milbank, w hose concerns hr tlris area 
continue to overlap witir ours. In Milbairk's estim ation, to believe that the political 
realm exists as a necessary and independent sphere is to allow  for an area of life in  
w hich Christianity aird tire C hm ch are seen as extraneous. As he w rites, "Once tire 
political is seen as a perm anent natural sphere, pursuing positive finite ends, then, 
inevitably, firm lines of d ivision  arise betw een w hat is 'secular' and w hat is 'spiritual'. 
Tending gardens, buildm g bridges, sow ing crops, caring for clrildren, camrot be seen  
as 'ecclesial' activities, precisely because these activities are n ow  enclosed w ithin  a 
sphere dubbed ' p o l i t i c a l ' . F o r  A ugustine, Milbairk notes, and here our 
interpretation agrees witir Iris, 'church' and 'state' w ere not understood as separate, 
natural spheres w ith  different concerns and purview s resulting from God's order of 
creation. One could say, how ever, that (coercive) political rule is 'natural' after tire 
fall in  the sense that it is part o f God's rem edy for maintahring order in  the face of 
hum an sinfulness. This is precisely w here Milbmrk fm ds deep problem s m  
Augustine's thought, because, according to Milbank, this v iew  allow s "a curbing of 
sin by sin, aird, in a w ay , by more serious sin, because more self-deluded in  its pride 
and claims to s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . otirer w ords, tire earthly city is marked, according 
to Augustiire, by tire libido dom inandi, by lust for glory and pow er, by coirflict and a 
lack of ti'ue virtue, yet out of tlris city arises, supposedly, tire memrs for curbing tlrese 
v e iy  appetites and tlris very sinfulness. H ow  cair this be?
For Milbank, resignation to the idea of the necessity of a political realm, even  
if  it is understood as non-natural (in tire sense of part of tire rem edy of the fall rather 
tiran part of God's origiiral creative intentions), inevitably involves certain problems. 
This m ay be w hy, at times, he seem s to read back into Augustine's w ritings the idea
Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, pp. 407-408. 
68 Ibid., p. 406.
187
that tire political realm  should, ideally, be ever-receding into tire C hurch ("Augustine 
him self im plies that the Christian em peror will m ake tire em pire recede into the 
C hurch ,.. ."69; "...it is abundantly  clear from  the writings of Ambrose, A ugustine and 
others, that the gradual conversion of Ronrair citizeirs aird of Romair rulers was 
expected to have im plications for tire character of political governance, and  indeed 
(in a mairirer tirey fomrd inlrerently problem atic to define) to bring tlris rule also 
w itlrin the scope of the ecclesial rule"70). Yet he also recognises tlrat, according to 
Augustine, sin  will exist in  tlris w orld  as long as Ürere is time, thereby necessitating 
tire existence of w orldly political rule to mitigate tire effects of sm.^i hr keeping w ith 
the early Church, Augustine view ed tire use of coercion as that w hich m arked the 
political from  tire ecclesial. It is here, in tire details of Augustiire's understandiirg  of 
the role of coercion aird punishm ent, tlrat Milbairk locates "Augustine's real mistake," 
nam ely an  inconsistency whiclr allows som e positive role for punishm ent in 
accordance w ith  divine wiU.72 The details of M ilbank's account of this are no t as 
relevant to our discussion here as his conclusion; th a t A ugustine's account of the 
inevitable contiirued existence of the political in  the fallen w orld and  his 
com m endation of the use of coercion and puirislunent in tire political reahn  risk 
losing sight of the tiagic nature of botir politics and coercion.73 In otirer w ords, the 
separation of the imperium  from  the ecclesia, of tire 'state' from  tire Church, is a 
ti agedy, and its tragic reality should never be lost from  sight. The up sh o t of tlris 
view, for Milbank, is that "one needs to add  to Augustine tlrat all punishm ent, like 
the political itself, is a tiagic risk, aird tlrat C luistianity should seek to reduce tire 
sphere of its operation. "7^  O n tlris reading, the ideal scenario is one in w hich tire 
scope of the C hurch is ever-increasing so that tire ti agic political realm  can have less 
and less of a presence in  tlris w orld. M ilbank is right in  one sense w hen  he notes tlrat 
"Augustine certainly understairds tlrat salvation means tire recession of dominium  (of
69 Ibid., p. 419.
70 Ibid., p. 400.
71 Ibid., pp. 401-402.
72 Ibid., pp. 417-422; see especially pp. 419-420 on tlris point.
73 Note that Milbank makes this poiirt even as he admits tlrat he agrees witir Augustine that 
coercion is sometimes necessaiy because tire danger of permanent self-damage outweighs the 
good of freedom of the will. This viewpoiirt does not seem to fully reconciled with his later 
articulation of the idea tirat every pmrishment denies a person's freedom and sphitual 
equality, and that the only non-sinful punishment is tire self-pmrishment inherent in sin. See 
ibid., p. 421.
7-1 Ibid., p. 421.
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the political, of 'secular order'),"^^ b u t for Augustine such a recession w ould  only be 
realised in  tire eschaton. Milbank, too, believes tlrat the counter-polity of tire Church 
can no t be seen as perfect w ith in  this age; though it is perfect in  heaven, now  w e can 
only "glimpse dim ly its perfection witlrin a process of reconciliation th a t is bu t 
fragnrentarily realized."76 A nd yet M ilbank's honesty about tire failures of the 
Church reveals his belief tlrat the Church could have 'succeeded,' that the m iddle 
ages, w hich he calls "tire Christian 'interruption' of history," could have enabled and 
sustained a w ay of ruling tlrat did n o t involve a form al m echanism  of law  or politics. 
But "tire C hurch d id  no t succeed in  displacing politics, and as a result, politics 
returned." In  other w ords, the possibility of tire C hurch's success in  realising an  
alternative civitas in  tlris age w as no t ruled ou t a priori bu t could have been realised, 
had tlrmgs gone differently. A certain tension seems to exist in  his writing, between 
recognising tlrat iir tire saeculum w e have to be resigned to a level of dominium  and 
believing tlrat "the Christian counter-ethics ends and subsum es all politics."77 
H ow ever m uch M ilbank's beliefs are tem pered by an  eschatological vision, he is 
unable to rem ain resigned to the existence of the political, as his continuing efforts 
towards C hristian socialism attest.^s
M uch of tire m otivation for Milbairk's shong  view point on tlris m atter seems 
to lie in his concern tlrat a belief tlrat tire realm  of the political can and  should  be 
separate from  tire realm  of tire Church renders the political a 'secular' sphere, thereby 
preventing m any aspects of life from  being seen as concerns of tire Church, for 
Church is reduced to 'care for tire souls.' D isquiet over tire existence of tire 'secular' 
runs th roughout M ilbank's w ork, for Milbairk believes that tlreology has acquiesced 
to problem atic aspects of moderirity, including certaiir unquestioned assum ptions 
related to tire existence of supposedly neu h a l secular realm s fi'onr wlriclr tlreology is 
excluded. ("Once, tlrere w as no 'seculcu','" begins M ilbank's first chapter of TJteology
75 Milbairk, Theology and Social Theory, p. 421.
76 Milbairk, Being Reconciled, p. 105; see also pp. 42,133 for glimpses of the eschatological 
tension.
77 The former becomes especially clear in a section entitled "Christianity and Coercion," 
Theology and Social Theory, pp. 417-422; for tire latter, see ibid., p. 430.
78 Much of Iris earliest work was dedicated to Clrristiair socialism (see footnote 82), aird it 
remains a presence in Iris later works. In his latest book, for example, he writes, ".. .in times of 
diminution, our task is not only to recover the pre-1300 vision, but also to acknowledge 
human consensus, co-operation and varied free poetic power in a way this vision did not 
fully envisage. High medievalism needs to be supplemeirted by a Christian socialism, 
conceived in tire widest sense" (Milbank, Being Reconciled, p. 136). See also John Milbank,
"The Politics of Time: Community, Gift and Liturgy," Telos no. 113 (1998), pp. 41-69.
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and Social Theory. "And the secular w as no t latent, w aiting to fill m ore space w ith  the 
steam  of the 'purely hum an ', w hen  the pressure of the sacred w as relaxed. Instead 
there w as tire single com m unity of Christendom , witlr its dual aspects of sacerdotiiim 
and regnum .. .The secular as a domaiir had  to be instituted or imagined, both in theory 
and in practice."79) A desire to m ove beyond the acceptance of tlris problem atic 
aspect of m oderirity in  wlriclr tlreology becomes 'positioned' by otirer disciplines and 
discourses is w hat, in  M ilbank's estim ation, separates Iris tlreology from  th a t of other 
tlreologies, such as neo-orthodoxy, that m ark tire contem porary tlreological w orld.
As he w rites, "'post-m odern theology', in  m y usage, goes furtlrer than 'neo­
orthodoxy', because it does not, like the latter, tend to leave m rquestioired the 
'godless' and  autonom ous self-enclosure of m odernity .... "so
Yet w e have been as concerned as M ilbank to discern a w ay iir w hich  to 
question botlr m odernity  and  the autonom y and  supposed neutrality  of tire secular, 
and to insist that Christiairity is not m eant to be com partm entalised or positioned by 
other discourses. We have rooted tlris m  A ugustine, bu t iir m any w ays om' reading 
of Augustine seems vastly different than  Milbank's, which m ay be contributing to 
our differmg solutions. This is no t to say that areas of agreem ent w ith  Milbcurk over 
interpretations of Augustine do n o t exist. We agree, for example, tlrat Augustine is 
not tire forerum rer of liberalism, and  tlrat Augustine does n o t provide theological or 
pragm atic reasons for tire delineation of a separate sphere called the secular. But 
questions m ust be raised about Milbairk's proposed solution to the 'secular* problem.' 
Is his view tire only w ay to overcome a problem atic separation of C hurch and  'state' 
tlrat results in  tire 'privatization' of Christianity? Do w e need to su p p o rt the ever- 
dimhrislring role of the political in  order for C luistianity to be true to iiself? Do we 
need, a t the least, to support a form  of 'complex space' that coirsists of sm all local 
groups, overlapping boim daries, and  plural m em bership in  m ultiple interm ediate 
associations that lim it the totalising nature of a sovereign state, as M ilbank does?si
79 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 9.
80 Milbank, The Word Made Stjwtge, p. 35. Similarly, in the introduction to Radical Orthodoxy 
Bartlr and Bar Brian neo-orthodoxy are critiqued for so insisting upon the autonomy of 
tlreology and refusing tire mediation of knowledge from other realms tlrat they, in the end, 
remained conrplicitous witir the modern duality of reason and revelation and, tlrereby, left 
space for spheres that were outside of the pmview of tlreology (John Milbank, Catherine 
Pickstock aird Graham Ward, eds.. Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology [London: Routledge, 
1999], p. 2).
81 See Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, pp. 407-408 and "On Complex Space," chap. 12 iir 
The Word Made Strange, pp. 268-292.
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M uch of Milbaiik's earlier w ork attem pts to articulate a Clu'istian socialism, 
prom pted, it seems, by his questioning of w hether certain aspects of secular pow er 
and knowledge, including absolute state sovereignty, are compatible w ith  
Christianity and Ms refusal to be resigned to sinful structures, whetlrer they be 
political or e c o n o m i c But is such a socialism possible before the eschaton, given 
the realities of tire eartlrly city on a tlreological perspective? M ilbank seems m uch 
m ore optimistic here than  A ugustine, m uch m ore open to tire idea that tire C hurch 
does no t need to be 'resigired' to tire perm anent existence of tw o cities during  tire 
saeculum. A ugustine, how ever, does no t just have m ore space for a political realm  
(which, w e should note, is neither entirely separate from  the C hurch nor 'natural') 
because he is resigned to hum anity 's sinfulness in this age, b u t because of his sttong, 
biblically rooted belief tlrat CM ist is Lord of all.
"Witlrout tire slightest doubt," Augustine writes, "tire kingdom s of m en are 
established by divine providence"; . .itr his conttol are all tire kingdom s of tire 
eartir."83 God granted dom inion to tire Romans, to the Assyriairs and  the Persians, 
and to tire Israelites, He gave pow er to Caesar and A ugustus an d  Nero, to tire m ost 
atttactive and to the m ost rutlrless of leaders. In  A ugustine's view , "we m ust ascribe 
to the true God alone tire pow er to grant kingdom s and  empires. He it is w ho gives 
happiness m  tire kingdom  of heaven only to tire good, bu t grants eartlrly kingdom s 
both to the good and  to tire evil, in  accordance witir Iris pleasure, wlriclr can never be 
unjust. "84 In tiris sense A ugustine is in keeping witir tire spirit of Paul, for w hom  
C hrist is above all rule, autirority, and pow er, under w hose feet all things have been 
placed, and in  w hom  "all tirhrgs in heaven and  on earth  were created, tMirgs visible 
and mvisible, w hether tM'ones or dominioirs or rulers or pow ers...."85 Witir tiris in 
m ind, even tire earthly city and  tire pow ers that reign and conflict in  tire ear thly city 
are soirrehow to be coirsidered as placed uirder tire victory aird rule of Jesus Christ 
and, iirdeed, as p art of tire creatioir through CMist. hr A ugustine's view, in  wlriclr tire 
mechanisms of tire eartlrly city are part of God's m eans for m inim ising disorder after 
the disruptioir of tire fall, tire political reahn cair clearly be seeir uirder tire purview  of
82 See Milbank, "Letters to tire Editor: A Socialist Economic Order," Theology 91 (September 
1988), pp. 412-415; "The Body By Love Possessed: CMistianity and Late Capitalism in Britain," 
Modern Theology 3 (October 1986), pp. 35-65; "An Essay Agaitrst Secular Order," Journal of 
Religious Ethics 15 (Fall 1987), pp. 199-224.
83 City o/GoriV,l;V, 12.
84 atyo/GorfV, 21.
85 Eph. 1:20-23; Col. 1:16.
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God's providence w itliout being understood as part of God's original design  for 
creation. That is to say, politics per se, as a realm separate from the Church and oüier 
spheres of life, is not part o f an order of creation w hich tends towards, as Milbank 
pointed out, tire establishm ent of 'secular' areas to wlriclr Christianity is deem ed  
irrelevant. Yet politics does fall under God's providence aird Christ's authority, 
given its provision to deal w ith  the realities o f our not yet fully redeem ed world.
If tire ideal goal is the contiirual m inim ilisation of tire political m  tire face of 
tire ecclesial, as it is for Milbank, one w onders to w hat degr ee tire political carr be 
seen as under God's providerrce and authority. Wheirce tire irrlrererrt suspiciorr 
towards tire city of tiris world? It m ust arise, at som e deep level, from arr inability to 
recogrrise the Lordship of Christ over all of created reality. Arrd yet w e  have seerr the 
degree to wlriclr the libido dom inandi, lust for pow er and greed, and corrflict arrd 
corrtingerrcy dom inate the politics of the eartlrly city. We have seerr the degree to 
wlriclr contemporary political theories seekirrg to shape political life em body  
orrtologies that are mimical to Cluistiarrity, rrot aUowitrg Christianity or the Church 
to be true to its rrature as a social, eirrbodied public reality. A ugustine saw  that the 
differerrce betweerr the H eavenly City and tire eartlrly city, m  terms of tire Heaverrly 
City knowirrg orrly God as its object of worship, w ou ld  preverrt tlrem fronr sharirrg 
corrunorr law s of religiorr, arrd indeed w ould  result at tim es iir disserrsiorr by the 
Heaverrly City arrd persecutiorr at the harrds of tire eartlrly city. Arrd yet irr gerreral 
tire H eavenly City "here orr eartlr rrrakes use of the eartlrly peace arrd deferrds arrd 
seeks the com prom ise betw een humarr w ills irr respect of tire provisiorrs relevairt to 
the mortal rrature of man, so  far as m ay be pernritted witlrout detrim ent to true 
religiorr arrd piety."^^ hr short, Augustirre exhibits a trust in  the rnecharrisms o f the 
eartlrly city as tlrey relate to the thirrgs of this world, everr as he recognises that at 
tim es citizerrs of tire Heaverrly City w ill be faced witir thirrgs m  the eartlrly city tlrat 
preverrt the w orship of Üreir God. H e sees tlrose tirrres as periodic, occasioiral, ratirer 
tlrarr as eirdemic to tire rrature of tire political realm, ratirer tharr as a reasorr to be 
seekirrg to exparrd tire 'political' purview  of the Church. Arrd he holds this v iew  everr 
w ith Iris tlrorouglrly realistic picture of the fallerr rrature of the world. Wlrerrce arises 
his h'ust? H is belief iir God's providerrce arrd order, his understarrdirrg that God has 
established nreans to rnirrinrise the disorder of the fallerr w orld, and that tire political
C ity of God XIX, 17.
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realm  is one of tlrose means, ratirer tlrair separate from  or opposed to God's workiirgs 
in tiris w orld.
On tiris view , tire political and  tire ecclesial both fall under tire Lordship of 
Christ and  are part of God's rem edy for the fallen w orld, w itlrout necessarily being 
entirely separate, independent realms. O n the contrary, as we have seen in Scripture 
and in  A ugustine, both  the H eavenly City in  its pilgrim age on eartlr and  the eartlrly 
city w hile it continues to exist in  tire saeculum are upheld  by God. Rom ans 13 
contains tire m ost com m only, and  conhoversially, referenced passage on the 
question of tire relation betw een tire C hurch and political authority: "Let every 
person be subject to the governing authorities; for there is no autirority except from 
God, and  tlrose authorities that exist have been instituted by God. Therefore 
whoever resists autirority resists w hat God has appointed, and those w ho resist will 
incur judgm ent. For rulers are no t a terror to good conduct, b u t to bad. Do you w ish 
to have no fear of tire authority? Then do w ha t is good, and you will receive its 
approval; for it is God's servant for your good. But if you do w ha t is w rong, you 
should be cifraid, for the autirority does not bear the sw ord in  vaiir! It is the servant 
of God to execute w ratlr on the w rongdoer."8? The im plication of Paul's w riting here 
seems to be tlrat God has appointed political autirority to address certain m atters of 
conduct and  to  be the bearers of force and  punishm ent, w orking tow ards some good 
outside of tire sum m um  bonum  of the H eavenly City, th a t is to say w orship  of God 
tlrrough C hrist and the Spirit. The political realm  will no t be m arked by the gieatest 
good of the worslrip of CMist, nor even by a tMck com m on good (for such a common 
good is only to be found  in  CMist),^^ bu t that does n o t leave it w itlrout Christ. If 
M ilbank is righ t that to have a place for a political realm  is to have a realm  separate 
from CM ist and  tire C hurch and, iir that sense, to be secular, then w e w ould  have to 
join him  in  hopiirg to see the end of tire existence of such a realm. But M ilbank is not 
right, though he m ay well be picking up  on an  area of theology wlriclr has been
87 Rom. 13:1-4, NRSV.
88 Here we agree witir Ashley Woodiwiss who, writing of what Christians can expect and 
work towards witiiin the current political milieu, notes tlrat "there is no common good per se 
(how can there be in the contemporary context of difference?), but only contingent localized 
and time-bounded common goods for the here-and-now..." ("Deliberation or Agony? Toward 
a Postliberal Clrristian Democratic Theory," in The Re-Enchantment of Political Science: Christian 
Scholars Engage Their Discipline, ed. Thomas W. Heilke and Ashley Woodiwiss [Lanham, Md.: 
Lexington Books, 2001], p. 162).
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underdeveloped, nam ely the Chiistological comiection betw een the earthly city and 
tire H eavenly City.
Karl Bartlr raises just this point in  an  essay probm g tire comrection betw een 
the justification available to sùrful hum ans through Jesus Christ and  the justice of 
hum air society and  law , or tire relationship betw een divine justification and  hum an 
j u s t i c e . 8 9  He notes that the existence of tirese two realities w as affirm ed clearly and 
pow erfully by Reform ation writers, b u t tlreir em phasis tended to be prim arily  on tire 
idea that the tw o are no t in  conflict ratirer tlran on w hat constitutes tlreir comrection. 
Bartlr identifies a strange gap betw een w hat usually and  for the m ost p a rt forms the 
cenhe of the Reformers' C hristian message, nam ely tire gospel of Jesus CM ist, and 
tlreir discussion of the existence of political authority, speaking of this gap as "tire 
lack of a gospel foundation, tlrat is to say, in tire strictest seirse, of a Chiistological 
fouirdatioir, for tMs p art of tlreir c r e e d . " 9 0  It is rrot oirly no t eirough, accordiirg to 
Bartlr, to posit tire existeirce of tlrese two spheres w ithout articulating arrd 
urrderstarrdirrg the vital comrectiorr betw een tlrem, it is also darrgerous, resulting irr 
either the abairdom nent of corrcerrr for hum air justice by the C hurch (because it is so 
corrcerrred w ith  a 'purified' divirre justificatiorr) or the creatiorr of a system  of 'secular' 
hum an justice that irrvokes 'God' bu t has no real comrection to tire justification that 
comes from  tire Fatlrer tM ough the Son arrd the Spirit (Barth lirrks tire form er to 
'Pietistic sterility' and  tire latter to the sterility of tire Eirlighteirmerrt). H ow  to avoid 
these dcurgers? Recogrrise tire Chiistological corurectiorr betweerr all of creation tlrat 
fornrs the 'irrward arrd vital comrectiorr' betweerr tire tw o realm s of C hurch arrd state. 
Barth calls us to look agairr a t Romarrs 13, for such a passage reveals that the God 
w ho has irrstituted arrd ordained political authority  "carrrrot be urrderstood apart 
from  tire Person arrd the W ork of Christ; He camrot be understood irr a gerreral w ay
89 Tills discussion of Karl Barth wiU highlight some of Iris Üiinkiiig on the relationsliip 
between the church and the political without presenting an exhaustive accouirt of his thought 
in this area. Neither will it address the internal difficulties and inconsistencies tlrat can be 
found within this tlrought. For more oir both, see Will Herberg, "The Social Philosophy of 
Karl Barth," irr Community, State, and Church: Three Essays (Gloucestor, Mass.: Peter Smith, 
1968), pp. 11-67. For more on Iris political tlrought, see William Werpehowski, "Karl Bartlr and 
Politics," hr The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. Jolm Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), pp. 228-242. For some criticisms of Bartlr's tlrinkhrg hr tiris matter, see 
O'Donovan, Desire of the Nations, pp. 213-214,227, 285-286 (and for a response to these 
criticisms, see Stanley Hauerwas, Wilderness Wanderings: Probing Twentieth-Century Theology 
and Philosophy [Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1997], pp. 215-216).
98 Karl Bartlr, "Church and State," hr Community, State, and Church: Three Essays (Gloucestor, 
Mass.: Peter Snrith, 1968), p. 104.
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as Creator and Ruler, as w as done in the exposition of tire R eform ers.... W hen the 
N ew  Testam ent speaks of the State, w e are, fundam entally, in  tire Christological 
sphere; we are on a low er level than w hen it speaks of the Church, yet, in  true 
accordance w ith  its statem ents on tire Church, w e are in  the sam e unique 
Christological s p h e r e . " ^ !  Barth presents a picture of the Church as a circle iirside the 
circle of tire political, w ith  both circles having Jesus Christ as their centr e. Christians 
are part of botlr circles, living in  the inner circle of tire Church as w ell as tire outer 
circle of tire state, wlrile C hrist is seerr as tire source arrd fourrdatiorr of b o t l r . 9 2  The 
state is a rem edy for sirr rather tharr arr order of creation as such, b u t th a t does rrot 
mearr that the state is no t a p art of a divirre ordirrarrce, £ur instrum errt of grace to 
mirrirnise tire chaos tlrat w ould  otlrerwise have resulted from the fall, ra ther tlrarr a 
p roduct of sin. 93 As such, "it shares botlr a corrrrnon origiir arrd a corrrmorr cerrhe 
witir the C hristian cornmurrity.. .It serves to protect marr from  the irrvasiorr of chaos 
and therefore to give Irirn time: time for the preachirrg of the gospel; time for 
reperrtarrce; time for faith....Its existerrce is not separate from the Kirrgdorn of Jesus 
Christ; its foiurdatiorrs and its influerrce are no t autorrornous. It is outside tire Church 
bu t not outside the range of Christ's domirriorr—it is arr exporrerrt of H is K m g d o m . " 9 4  
hrdeed, if orre derries that the state is operating accordirrg to a berrevolerrt 
arrarrgemerrt of God wherr it carries ou t its resporrsibilities, whetlrer or rrot tire state 
krrows it, tirerr, accordirrg to Eberhard Jiirrgel, one "disperrses those ruling and  those 
ruled of tlreir resporrsibility before God...Like every religious deificatiorr, every 
demonisatiorr of tire state is also a tlrorouglrly urrchristiarr u r r d e r t a k i r r g . " 9 5
Irr short, tire political realm  camrot be seerr as arr area that is discomrected 
from Jesus Christ. As Scriptrrre tells us, Jesus C hrist sustains all tlrirrgs by His 
pow erful w ord; this m ust include, for the Christian, tire political, everr as tire
9r Bartlr, "Church and State," p. 120.
92 See Bartlr, "Christiarr Coirrirrmrity arrd Civil Community," in Community, State, and Church: 
Three Essays (Gloucestor, Mass.: Peter Snrith, 1968), pp. 158-159.
93 The followmg quote from Eberhard Jüngel may help clarify the distinctiorr I have m rrrirrd 
betweerr the state as part of divme providerrce arrd the state as grounded irr arr order of 
creation: "In the irot-yet-redeenred-worid tire state exists because it has a worldly
'task.. .according to divirre appoirrtrrrerrt'. That the state directs us back to a divine 
appomtmerrt (ordinatio) -  tire expression is takerr from Ronr 13:2 -  but is rrot designated as arr 
order (ordo) of creation, sigrrifies a poirrted disassociatiorr fronr arry gromrding of a 
metaphysic of the state eitlrer hr tlreology or rratural rights. The state's existerrce is not arr end 
hr itself" (Eberhard Jürrgel, Christ, Justice and Peace: Toioard a Theology of the State, trarrs. D. 
Bruce HamiU arrd Alan J. Torrance [Edinbm'gh: T&T Clark, 1992], p. 46).
94 Bartlr, "Christian Corrrnrmrity arrd Civil Corrrnrmrity," p. 156.
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C hristian recognises that the state can easily and often does stand in  opposition to its 
Lord.96 Nevertheless, tire political rem ains under tire Lordship of Christ, comrected 
to bu t a separate entity from  tire C hurch until the time of Christ's re turn , w hen tire 
Kingdom  of God will be fully realised and  supersede both the C hurch and  tire 
political. The tasks of tire C hurch aird the state are different, so th a t tire Church, 
while it is itself political,^^ best serves the State by being tire Church, by, in other 
w ords, preaching, teachiirg, and adm inistering tire sacram ents to proclaim  the 
Kingdom of Chiist.^s The state, on tire other hand, is concerned w ith  (fallen) 
hum airity's need for "an external, relative, and  provisional order of law , defended by 
superior autirority and force," wlriclr tlrose in tire C hurch need as m uch as those 
outside of tire Church.99 Perhaps the im portance tirat Barth places in  the separation 
between tire tw o is best articulated in  tire Barmen Declaration, w hich Bartlr drafted 
on behalf of tire G erm an Confessional Churches in tire early 1930s, The fiftir tiresis of 
tire final version includes tire following:
We reject the false docti'ine that beyond its special conmrission tire State should and 
could become the sole mrd total order of human life and so fulfil tire vocation of tire 
Church as well.
We reject the false doctrine that beyond its special commission the Cluu’ch should 
and could take on tire nature, tasks and dignity which belong to the State and tirus 
become itself an organ of tire State.^oo 
Bartlr is concerned about the dangers on botlr sides, of the state taking on the role of 
tire C hurch as that w hich orders aird provides m eaning to life and of the C hurch 
unwisely taking on tire task of the state. C ontem porary tireologians such as Stairley 
H auerw as and  Oliver O 'D onovan share these concerns. For H auerw as, w hen tire 
C hurch becomes too concerned witir the political realm, forgetting tirat it is itself its 
ow n proper polis and  th a t tire realm  of goverirment is also under the Lordship of 
Christ, the w ay is paved "for w ha t w e Cluistiairs m ust regard as a h u ly  frighteiring 
national agenda: dom esticathrg religious passion, subm erging people's energy in the
95 Jüngel, Christ, Justice mid Peace, p. 64.
95 See Heb. 1:3, NRSV. Bartlr is very clear that tire state may beconre demonic. See "Cluistian 
Comnrmrity and Civil Commmrity," p. 138.
97 See Bartlr, "Cluistian Commmrity and Civil Conununity," pp. 153-154,184-185.
98 Ibid., p. 146; see also pp. 131,154,157-158,166.
99 Ibid., p. 154.
100 "pBe Barmen Theological Declaration: A New Translation" by Douglas S. Bax, in Eberhmd 
Jmrgel, Christ, Justice and Peace: Toward a Theology of the State, trans. D. Bruce Hamill and Alan 
J. Torrance (Edinbmgh: T&T Clark, 1992), p. xxviii.
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self-interested pursuit o f material comfort, constiucting an arrangement in w hich  
religion is subordinated to the political order."loi Tiris concern is sim ilar to tlrat 
expressed by O'Donovan, w h o  notes that "of tire tw o perils identified by the fifth 
chapter of the Barmen Declaration, perhaps tire church falls ratirer less mto the 
tem ptation o f assum ing tire state's authority, ratirer more m to that o f acquiescing  
w ith  tire state's assum ption of its ow n ."482 The Church m ust guard against the 
tem ptation to allow  the articulation and dem ands of the Gospel to be sw ayed  by tire 
expectations of society .483
The conclusion tirat can be tentatively reached from this d iscussion of 
Milbairk and Barth is tirat a w ay  exists for the Church and the political to be seen as 
separate realms, both im der tire Lordship of Christ, witlrout maintaiiring tirat tire 
Church or Christianity is irrelevant to w hat happens iir the political or any other 
realm of society. The 'secular' does not have to be granted a priori status even  as w e  
recognise, witir A ugustine, tirat significant and irreconcilable differences exist 
betw een tire H eavenly City and tire eartlrly city. Another w ay to approach tiris m ight 
be to determ ine w hether one v iew s the difference betw een tire H eavenly and the 
earthly cities positively or negatively. Bartlr represents tire former, in  that he 
recognises tlrat Christians have their citizenship iir tire H eavenly City, w h ich  m akes 
tlrem pilgrim s of the earthly city, but, as he writes, "if they are 'strangers and  
pilgrims' here it is because this city constitutes below  tlreir faitlr and tlreir h o p e—and 
not because they see tire im perfections or even the peiversions of tire states o f tiris 
age and tiris work! It is not resentment, but a positive sentim ent, tlrrough w hich, m  
conti adistinction to non-Christians, it com es about, that they have no 'continuing  
city' h ere ...,"404 Milbank could represent tire latter, the 'negative' v iew , for his 
discussion of tire need for the Church to be ever-increasiirg in the face of the political 
seem s to be alm ost entirely framed in  terms of the perversions of the earthly city, and 
its concom itant philosophies aird ontologies. Yet M ilbank is aware of certain
484 Stanley Hauerwas, In Good Company; The Church as Polis (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1995), p. 214.
482 O'Donovan, Desire of the Nations, p. 224. This is not mtended to obscure the considerable 
differences between Hauerwas and O'Donovan. William Cavanaugh helpfully and briefly 
articulates these differences, while still liiglrlighting the common concerns that unite their 
tlrought, hr William T. Cavanaugh, "Chui'ch," hr The Blnchoell Companion to Political Theology, 
edited by Peter Scott aird William T. Cavanaugh (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp.
403-405. I
483 Interesthrgly, O'Donovan's discussion of this temptation hrcludes tire contemporary j
concern for pluralism. See ibid., p. 226. j
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dynam ics operative w ith in  m odern political liberalism 's characterisation of 'church 
and state' that m ake him  w ary, dynam ics tlrat seem  to have escaped the notice of 
Bartlr.
Bartlr denies tlrat the state has any right to m ake an  inw ard claim  upon  its 
subjects and  citizens or to im pose upon them  a particular philosophy of life.ios He 
claims tlrat tire civil commuirity, as opposed to the church com m unity, has no 
message of its ow n to deliver, no creed or gospel to proclaim. "As m em bers of the 
civil commuirity they cair oirly ask, as Pilate asked: W hat is hutlr? smce every airswer 
to tire question abolishes tire presuppositions of tire very existence of tire civil 
com m unity."405 Political liberalism w ould  agree witir this, claiming tlrat it can be, to 
use Rawls' lairguage, political w ithou t bem g metaphysical. Tiris is tire very claim 
tlrat our second chapter called into question, for we noted that a t every level tire 
political tlreories of Rawls aird Rorty invoke deep presuppositions about the nature 
of h  utlr, reality, aird hu m an  being despite their claims to the conhary. A nd, as we 
discussed hr our th ird  chapter, the taken-for-granted im derstandhrgs of hutlr, reality, 
and hum an  being in a given society are shaped by those w ith  tire pow er and  ability 
to defhre tlrose understandings; according to the post-Nietzscheans, tiris pow er and 
ability have for too long been claimed by the all-too-exclusive political liberals, 
despite tire fact that their efforts have been h idden  and veiled un d er a rhetoric of 
neutrality. Bartlr seems to believe that tire state could exist neuhally , wlriclr is why 
he feels free to use the term  'state,' w hereas Milbairk views tire adoption  of such a 
term  as too complicitous w ith  theologies and  coimter-ontologies tlrat articulate and 
m aintam  a strict separation betw een church and state.407 (Here w e side w ith  
Milbank, w ho seems m ore aw are tiran Bartlr that such term inology m ay be 
problem atic in tire assum ptions and  presum ptions it briirgs along witir it.)
484 Bartlr, "Church aird State," p. 123.
485 Ibid., p .  143.
485 Barth, "Christian Community and Civil Community," p. 151; see also p. 158.
487 See Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, pp. 406-408. We should note that the English title 
of "Church and State" given to one of Barth's key essays on these issues is not a dhect 
tianslation of the German title, which is "Justification and Justice." No editorial explanation is 
offered for tliis change of title. Further, Barth writes in another essay tlrat he prefers tire terms 
'Christian community' and 'civil commmrity' over 'Church' and 'State,' for the former draw 
attention to the positive connection between them and help highlight that Barth is less 
concerned with tire institutions than the human beings that comprise the two conuirmrities 
(Bai'tlr, "The Cluistiair Commmrity and the Civil Commmrity," p. 149). Nevertheless, Barth 
does not raise questions about tire deeper presuppositions he may be adopting when he uses 
these terms as they have been defined by oürer sources.
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In draw ing tlrese thoughts together, perhaps w e can say that ideally the 
political realm  w ould  offer no com peting account of hutlr, no  antagoiristic gospel to 
proclaim, b u t that in reality such an accom plishm ent is impossible. If this is tire w ay 
to fram e tire m atter, then  M ilbank has been helpful in  openm g our eyes to the irahire 
of tire ontologies undergirding tire political realm  and their potential to usurp  and 
dim inish the purview  of Christianity. A nd Barth has, despite a certain na'ivete,408 
provided a helpful corrective, rem inding us of the Christological comrection between 
tire political and  the ecclesial tlrat enables us to, like A ugustine, be w ary of the 
political in  its inability to share a common object of w orship witir tire C hurch while 
still allowiirg tire political to exist as part of God's design to miirimise disorder, as 
p art of that w hich has been placed under C luist's feet aird continues to be upheld  by 
the w ord  of Christ, aird as th a t which can be abided by tire C hurch despite their 
different ends. The goods of tire Heavenly City and tire eartlrly city, of tire differing 
ontologies that guide tlrem, can a t times overlap. Even w hen they do not, the earthly 
city, despite its fallen irahire, can thr ough God's providence be used to provide order 
and overlap betw een hum ans and instihitions tlrat w ould  otheiw ise be helplessly 
overrun by the libido dominandi.
A t tire sam e time, rem inders that tire earthly city is neither n eu h a l nor 
indifferent tow ards questions of tire good and  the h u e  camrot be heard  often enough. 
As Augustine show s us, tlrere are limits to w hat citizens of the H eavenly City can 
abide in the earthly city, for at times the laws of religion of tire eartlrly city will be in 
conflict witir tlrose of tire H eavenly City. Citizens of the H eavenly City are free to 
follow tire customs, laws, and  mstitutioirs of tire earthly city up  to tire poiirt tlrat they 
hinder their w orship  of God.^o^ To apply this line of tlrinking to our contem porary 
situation, w ha t is it about political liberalism tlrat m ight be Irindering tire w orship of 
tire Triune God of Chiistiairity? Wlrat is it th a t has Milbairk so conviirced tirat tire 
political is opposed to the ecclesial under m odern  liberal thought? W hat is it about 
today's liberalism tirat m ost hinders tire ability of tire Church to be respected in its
4881 am waiy of accusing Barth of being naïve, for in his post-Nazi Germany context he must 
have been more aware tiran most of the dangers associated with tire political realm. Yet he 
does seem to believe that it's possible for tire political realm to be entirely neutral on matters 
of ti'uth, which, to tire credit of post-Nietzschean plrilosophy, is difficult to believe today. At 
tire least we need to follow Augustine in recognising that the earthly city is always marked by 
tire libido dominmidi and can therefore never be free from conflict over power and glory, even 
as it falls mrder God's providence.
489 City of God, XIX, 17.
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particularity just as so m any other particularities fail to receive public 
aclaiowledgem ent? The heart of the m atter involves the distinction betw een public 
and private that is p art of tire essence of liberalism. From  a tlreological perspective, 
reason exists to be w ary no t only of the term s 'church' aird 'state' b u t also of 'public' 
and 'private' as tlrey are defined by m odern political liberalism aird grafted m to tire 
Church's self-understanding. It m ay be tlrat tire Church has been too w illing to 
redefine itself using tire language of liberalism, curd tirat tlrat redefinition has come at 
tire cost of the C hurch's ability to be true to the particularity of its social and 
com m unal identity.
C h ristia nity : P ublic  o r  P rivate?
The contem porary configuration of tire church-state relationslrip has m uch to 
do witir the story of tire rise of liberalism: in  tire haditional story, Christiairity had  to 
become private and  learn to tolerate differiirg m terpretations of its key doctiines to 
avoid the bloodshed and  conflict that inevitably arise w hen Christianity, or one 
shaird  of it, attem pts to lay claim to being public. In our initial discussion of 
liberalism w e w ere inhoduced  to the idea that liberalism em erged ou t of tire 
religious diversity of post-Reform ation Europe and  tire religious w ars of the 
sixteenth and  seventeenth century, w hich raised tire question of how  tire relationslrip 
between groups w ith  different m terpretations of Clnistiairity should  be configured 
and negotiated. Toleration w as offered as tire answer, understood as the best w ay to 
move beyond tire antagonism  and bloodshed that w ere afflicting tire differing 
sh an d s of Cluistiairity. Jolm Rawls, as w e learned, affirms this view, w riting  tlrat 
"the historical origm  of political liberalism (and of liberalism m ore generally) is the 
Reformation and  its aftermatlr, witir tire long controversies over religious toleration 
in  tire sixteenth aird seventeentlr centuries."44o hrdeed, Rawls views his ow n project 
as tire continuation of tiris liberalism; in  his estimation, if his particular coirfiguration 
of tire answ er w ere to be successfully accepted, "it w ould  complete and  extend tire 
m ovem ent of thought tlrat began three centuries ago witir tire g radual acceptance of
448 Jolm Rawls, Political Liberalism, paperback ed. (New York; Colmirbia University Press, 
1993), p. xxvi.
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the principle of toleration and  led  to  the nonconfessional state and  equal liberty of
conscience."!!!
Recently, how ever, some scholarship has em erged to challenge the story tlrat 
presents tire rise of liberalism as tire solution to religious coirflict. Pierre M anent, 
w riting w hat he term s air intellectual history of liberalism, argues tirat liberalism  was 
m otivated m ore by a desire to escape from  the institution of tire C hurch tlrair by tire 
attem pt to provide a w ay out of religious coirflict. hr this view, m odern  liberal 
tiriirkers w ere essentially h y ing  to escape the political pow er of revealed religion and 
tire institutionalised Churclr, and looked to tire theory of those w hom  w e now  see as 
tire founders of liberalism  for the intellectual resources to m ake tiris move.ü^ M anent 
argues tirat a concom itant p a r t of tiris escape w as tire effort to m ove political 
questions aw ay from  conceptions of tire good, because questions of the good clearly 
and easily fell m rder tire purview  of tire Church; as M anent writes, "in order to 
escape decisively from tire pow er of tire singular religious instihitions of the Church, 
one had to renounce tiriirking about hum an life in  term s of its good or end, wlriclr 
w ould always be vulnerable to tire Church's 'h'ump.'"ü3 hr short, p art of tire reason 
for tire liberal m ove to prioritise tire right over tire good lies in  the desire to move 
political questions outside of tire sphere of tire Church, hr other w ords, liberalism 
arose less because of the need for a solution to religious conflict and  m ore because of 
its ow n ideological com nritm ents tirat w ere hr conflict witir revealed and 
institutionalised religion.
Mairent's larger argum ent is echoed and extended by tire m ore recent 
scholarslrip of W illiam Cavairaugh, w hose overaichhrg concern is how  Christiairity 
came to be translated from  a public, em bodied social institution into a set of private 
beliefs and values. In  C avanaugh's estim ation, tire so-called W ars of Religion did not 
necessitate tire b irth  of tire m odern  State as a w ay out of insurm ountable religious 
disagreement; on the contrary, tirese w ars "were in  fact tiremselves tire birthpangs of 
tire S tate.. .fought largely for tire aggrandizem ent of tire em erging State over the 
decaying rem nants of the m edieval ecclesial order."™ To reinforce his argum ent he
14! Ibid., p. 154.
!!2 Pierre Marrent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, trans. Rebecca Balmski (Frmceton. N.J.: 
Princetoir University Press, 1994), esp. pp. viii, xvii, 114,116. N.B. This book was origmally 
published as Histoire Intellectuelle du Libéralisme: Dix Leçons (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1987).
443 Ibid., p. 114.
414 William T. Cavairaugh, "'A Pire Strong Enough to Consume tire House:' The Wars of 
Religion and the Rise of tire State," Modern Theology 11, no. 4 (October 1995), p. 398.
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goes back to the history of tire tim e period in question, noting th a t it is m uch more 
complex aird nuanced tlran is norm ally perceived to be tire case; tire idea tlrat civil 
autirority could outw eigh tire C hurch predates the 'Wars of Religion,' for example, 
while those m volved in  instigating and  sustaining the w ars w ere often m otivated 
m ore by tire desire for pow er as it related to tire emergence or defeat of a centralized 
State tlran they w ere by tlreological or ecclesiological conviction.üs Yet for 
C avanaugh the issue goes deeper tiran the personal religious m otivations of tire 
major players of the time. H e w ants to question tire very creation of tire category of 
'religion,' understood as a set of beliefs related to personal conviction ratirer tiran 
public loyalty to tire State and  em bodied ecclesial practice. For witir this 
understanding of 'religion,' Chiistiairity comes to be seen as a set of beliefs th a t can 
be separated from  tlreir particular em bodim ent in  tire social space of tire C hurch and 
as bu t one m airifestation of a universal religious im pulse. In  C avanaugh's reading of 
tire situation, tire creation of 'religion' as a universal category separated  from  its 
particular m stantiations and  com m unal em bodim ents leads to religions being treated 
as "domesticated belief system s w hich are, insofar as it is possible, to be m anipulated  
by the sovereign for tire benefit of tire State. Religion is no longer a m atter of certain 
bodily practices w ith in  tire Body of Christ, b u t is lim ited to tire reahn of the 'soul,' 
and the body is handed  over to tire State.
W lrat is problem atic about tiris? Liberalism presents us witir a p icture in  
wlriclr tire neutra l liberal state steps in  to end tire bloodshed and  w ars that are 
conconritant witir tire competitive aird irreconcilable nature of absolute religious 
ti'utlr claims, yet tire nineteenth  and  tw entieth centuries saw eur mcrease ratirer tiran a 
decrease in  the am ount of bloodshed and w arfare in the w orld. The state w as 
supposed to be tire peacem aker, enablhrg us to overcome violence com m itted hr tire 
nam e of religion. In tire W estern w orld w e m ay no longer see violence undertaken 
on behalf of religion, b u t violence itself has no t come to an  end. Bloodshed, now  
conunitted by the state in  the nam e of democracy and  freedom, is as com m on today 
as it has been throughout tire centuries. The call of liberalism, accordm g to 
Cavanaugh, w as m erely a call to tiansfer loyalties from  the C hurch to tire State, 
wlrich em bodies a particular set of goods aird a soteriology that are a t odds w ith 
tlrose of tire Church, and  wlrich, furtherm ore, has failed to deliver on its prom ises of
415 Ibid., pp. 398-403. 
445 Ibid., p. 405.
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peace and  harm ony. Tolerance, in this reading, w as no t the solution to conflict and 
bloodshed b u t w as, and  rem ains, the tool through w hich tire State divided and  
conquered tire Church, w hile the State continues to be involved in  violence and
warfare.!!7
Cavanaugh is clearly akin to Milbairk in his assessm ent of Are antagonistic 
relatioirship betw een tire C hurch and  tire State, at least tire m odern  state. Though 
Christians m ay no t fully agree w ith  tiris assessment, it w ould be wise for tlrem to 
learn from  Cavanaugh to  take m ore heed tlran they often have of the complexity 
surrounding tire rise of tire m odern  political liberal state .us This is no t to deny tlrat 
such drinkers as Jean Jacques Rousseau and Jolm Locke genuinely thought that a 
new  w ay forw ard was needed to overcome the conflicts tlrey saw  arising from  
Christianity and post-Reform ation religious differences, bu t it  is to say that the 
solutions they proffered w ere driven by tlreir ow n beliefs and ideologies aird had 
sigirificant tlreological and  ecclesiastical consequences. For botlr Rousseau and 
Locke, the danger of Cluistiairity w as precisely its potential to divide allegiances, to 
limit citizens' loyalty to the political system  in which tlrey lived in  favour of loyalty 
to an  ecclesiastical system. This is w hy tolerance can be extended only to those who 
are willing to lim it their Christianity to beliefs that do no t interfere w ith  tlreir 
prim ary allegiance to tire state; this, in  short, is w hy Rom an Catholics, w ho retained a 
m ore explicit understanding  of tire uiriversal nature of the C hurch and  their 
allegiance to tire papacy, w ere no t to be tolerated. Indeed, according to Michael 
Walzer, the reason that toleration w orks in couirtiies like the U nited States is that 
"the expandm g toleration regim e tended to protestantize tire groups th a t it included. 
Americair Catlrolics and Jews gradually came to look less and less like Catholics aird
447 Ibid., esp. pp. 399,408-409,407. For more on the differing soteriologies of the state aird the 
Church, see William T. Cavanaugh, '"The City: Beyond Secular Parodies," in Radical 
Orthodoxy, ed. John Milbank, Catirerine Pickstock and Graham Ward (London: Routledge, 
1999), pp. 182-200; for his droughts on tolerance, see p. 190, on violence, see p. 194. N.B. This 
essay has been reprinted along with two otirers in William T. Cavanaugh, Theopolitical 
Imagination: Discovering the Liturgy as a Political Act in an Age of Consumerism (London: T& T  
Clark, 2002).
448 It is important to note that even those who don't go as far as Cavanaugh in re-interpretmg 
history nevertheless see some of the same implications for the Chmch to wlriclr Cavairaugh 
draws our attention. Elshtam, for example, in an account of the rise of sovereignty notes tirat 
"witir tire coming of sovereigir prerogatives, all intermediate bodies and their corporate 
privileges came under pressme to succumb or to conform—whether cities, guilds, feudal 
prmcipalities, or tire Church itself" (Jean Betirke Elshtam, New Wine and Old Bottles: 
International Politics and Ethical Discourse [Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1998], p. 15).
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Jews in  other coiinhies: com m unal controls weakened; clerics spoke w ith  less 
autirority; individuals asserted their religious independence, drifted aw ay from  the 
com m unity, and in term arried ... In  short, com m unities of faith tirat formerly 
w ould  have been unable to im agine tiremselves as individualised, privatised belief 
systems became just tirat.
One can hard ly  fail to see tire differences tirat em erge betw een Christianity 
understood as a m atter of private belief, subject prim arily to tire realm  of individual 
choice and  conscience, and  Augustine's pichire of Christianity as belief tirat is 
necessarily concom itant witir a different identity, loyalty, allegiance, and  practice.
For Augustine, as w e have well seen by now, a Christiair is prim arily a citizen of the 
Heaverrly City, and  only secondarily a pilgrim  m  the political society in  w hich she or 
he happens to live. It w ould  have been inconceivable for Augustirre to divorce 
Christiairity from  the life of tire C hurch or to view  it  as anything b u t a public, social 
etiric. Indeed, tire very categories of public and  private tirat go han d  in  hand  witir 
liberalism are foreign to Augustine. As Elshtain notes, Augustine does n o t bifurcate 
"tire eartlrly sphere into rigidly dem arcated public and  private realms";!^8 instead, as 
w e saw  iir tire previous chapter, Augustine sees a contiiruum  in  w hich tire peace of a 
person, of the household, eurd of the city are all connected. In contrast to Aristotelian 
thought, in w hich tire city and tire household, or tire poUs aird tire oikos, are m arkedly 
opposed, witir tire latter being sigirificantly devalued in com parison to tire former, in 
Augustine's tlrought, as Elshtain writes, "the household and  city, public aird pfivate, 
do no t diverge as types or 'in kind'; ratirer, aspects of tire w hole are bo rn  into tire 
parts, and tire integrity and  m eaning of the p art carries forw ard to become an  integral 
part of the whole."™ Elshtain uses Augustine's tlrought as air example of tire m oral 
revolution inaugurated  by C hristianity iir which prevailing im ages of public and 
private w ere dramatically ti-ansformed .122 C avanaugh and  H iitter reach sim ilar 
conclusions in tlreir respective discussions of Ephesians 2:19, in  w hich Paul w rites to 
tire Ephesians as "fellow citizens witir God's people and m em bers of God's 
household," tirereby transcending tire usual distinction betw een tire polis aird tire
449 Michael Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1997), p. 67.
420 Jean Betirke Elshtam, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought 
(Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981), p. 70.
424 Ibid.
422 Ibid., p. 56. Also transformed, according to Elshtain, were the prevailing images of male 
and female. The connection between conceptions of male, female, public, and private is the 
driving concern of Elshtain's project.
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oz7cos.!23 This issue of 'public/ as it is conceived and  pichired differently by the 
C hurch and tlie contem porary liberal state, m ay take us to the heart of the m atters 
w e have been discussing throughout this work.
By definition, 'public' need no t refer only to a nation or a state, or to the 
explicitly political realm  of nations and states. It can also refer to a com m unity or a 
group of people united  by a com m on interest or good, say, for example, w orship of 
God, the highest and m ost unchanging good. A people united togetlier thr ough 
w orship of God can be considered a public just as m uch as a people un ited  together 
tlrrough a com m on national allegiance. To reh irn  to Ephesians 2:19, to be a Christian 
is to be a citizen of the K ingdom  of God and a m em ber of God's family. This identity 
is a m atter of tr u th  and  belief, b u t this tru th  and  belief call forth a response and  an 
ethic that are visible and  tangible, em bodied in the collective life an d  practices of the 
Church. Christianity is at heart a com m unal and public enterprise: the C hurch is 
com prised of a group of people sharing the com m on interest of w orship  of God and 
love of neighbour. Liturgy itself is, by definition, public; m ore precisely it is tire 
public w orship of God th a t belongs to the people. As such, as C avanaugh writes,
"tire liturgy does m ore than  generate interior m otivations to be better citizens. The 
liturgy generates a body, the Body of C M ist—tire Eucharist m akes tire drurclr, m 
H enri de Lubac's w o rd s—w hich is itself a sui generis social body, a public presence 
irreducible to a voluntary  association of civil society."™ Augustine similarly 
remiirds us tlrat th rough participation in  tire C hurch and its sacram ents, citizens of 
the Heaveirly City are united  around tire coiiununal and  m rchanging good of God, 
their collective sum m um  bonum. As Robert Jenson notes, "what m ust always be iir our 
vision w hen tlrinking of A ugustm e's City of God is the Eucharist, a public space
423 As Reiiihard Hütter writes, "Taking the radical nature of this sentence seriously prompts |
the conclusion tlrat by attempting to formulate its own self-mrderstanding in the Hellenistic I
political terminology accessible to it, tire ecclesia at least implicitly and quite early
transcended the framework of the political order of antiquity, since the latter was based not 
least on the strict dichotomy between polis and oikos" {Suffering Divine Things: Theology as 
Church Practice, tians. Doug Stott [Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2000], pp. 163-164). See also William T. Cavanaugh, "Is Public Theology Really 
PubUc?" Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics 21 (2001), pp. 116-117 (also included in an
edited version as "The MyÜr of the Civil Society as Free Space," in Cavanaugh, Theopolitical '■
Imagination, pp. 53-95). Note tlrat in this section he also provides an interesting and relevant 
discussion of the origin and use of tire term ekklesia.
424 Cavanaugh, "Public Theology," p. 116. Catherine Pickstock develops liturgy in directions 
that go far beyond what we have here suggested, ultimately arguing that Catholic liturgy is 
uniquely free of exclusions and offers a way for the universal and the particular to be brought
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where tire one God gives him self to his com m unity, and w here in  consequence all 
sorts and  conditions of hum airity drink from  one cup and  eat of one loaf...."™
This em phasis on tire public nature of tire C hurch is different from  tirat witir 
which m ost proponents of 'public theology' operate, for our concern is less to provide 
legitimacy for tlreological and  ecclesiastical contributions to tire public square and 
m ore to re-think tire very coirceptions of public arrd private tirat have come to be 
taken-for-grairted witiriir contem porary liberal society .126 As C avairaugh notes in  his 
discussioir of recent Catirolic attem pts to articulate a 'public tlreology,' such 
approaches accept the irotioir of public as defined by tire liberal natiorr-state aird tiren 
h  y to present Christiairity as a set of values or a type of voluntary association tirat, 
because it has a contribution to make to civil society a n d /o r  political citizenship, 
should be allowed in  tire public square,™  M issing from  their discussion is any of the 
A ugustinian notion tirat m em bership in tire Heavenly City m ight have priority over 
m em bership in civil aird political society, iirdeed tirat tire Church is its ow n res 
puhlicaP-^ This is integral to Augustine's picture of tire Heavenly City, as w e have 
well seen by irow.!^^
Indeed, W illiams argues tirat Augustm e's m ain purpose in  Citxj o f God, and 
particularly m  book XIX, is no t only to show  that the Church is its ow n public b u t to 
redefine the very im derstanding of w hat is ti uly public and political: "he is engaged 
in a redefinition of tire public itself, designed to show  that it is life outside tire 
Christian com m unity w hich fails to be truly public, autirentically political."!3° On
togetlier that enables more tlian liberal tolerance. See Catiierine Pickstock, "Liturgy and 
Modernity," Teles 30, no. 113 (fall 1998), pp. 19-40.
425 Robert W. Jenson, "Eschatology," in The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology, edited by 
Peter Scott and William T. Cavanaugh (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p. 413.
426 For examples of the former type of public theology, see Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked 
Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. 
Co., 1984) and Ronald F. Thiemamr, Constructing a Public Theology: The Church in a Pluralistic 
Culture (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/Jolm Knox Press, 1991).
427 He has in mind Jolm Courtney Murray, Richard John Neuhaus, Michael and Kenneth 
Himes, and otlrer work based in John Boyte's thoughts on civil societ)'.
428 Cavanaugh, "Public Theology," p. 116.
429 Cf. Jolm Gray, who writes tirat Rawls "is mistaken in supposing that, in late modern 
conditions, peace can be pursued by relegating worldviews, conceptioirs of tire good, and 
cultural identities to the sphere of voluirtary association. Liberal institutions in which 
divisive commitments are privatized are successful as devices for promoting peace only when 
the backgromrd culture is already individualist. Where it is not—as in most of the world— 
the search for terms of peace leads not to liberal civil society, but to various kinds of pluralist 
iirstitutiorrs" ("Two Liberalisms of Fear ," The Hedgehog Review 2, no. 1 [Spring 2000], p. 17).
430 Rowan Williams, "Politics aird the Soul: A Reading of tire City of God," Milltozon Studies no. 
19/20 (1987), p. 58.
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this reading, for som ething to be truly public it m ust provide com m on ends around 
wlrich people can be united, com m on purposes around w hich shared life can take 
shape, a com m on good that is unchanging; such ends and purposes, such a com m on 
good camrot be found outside of Jesus Christ and His Body, the Church. It m ust, 
furtlrermore, address tire truest hum an  needs, wlrich accordmg to A ugustine aie, of 
course, related to God. H um an  beings, w ho were created for com m m rion witir and 
enjoym ent of God, camrot have tlreir deepest needs addressed outside of a restored 
relationslrip w ith  God or the com m unity of tlrose w ho have been sim ilarly restored. 
While a social or political un it united around certain aims that do no t include 
enjoym ent of God "may be em pirically an  intelligibly unified body, it is constantly 
underm ining its ow n com m unal character, since its com m on goals are no t and 
camrot be tlrose abiding values w hich answer to the ti'uest hum an  needs."™  Such 
societies camrot, ultim ately, cohere, because tlrey fail to be united around  the only 
h u e  source of coherence; "tlreir character and shuctu re are inimical to the very 
nature of an  ordered unity  in  plurality, a genuine res puhlicn"'^^'^
A ugustine's belief that a t the heart of sm  lies a tu rn  aw ay from  tire coim non 
good to the self, from  that wlrich is public and  shar ed to tlrat w hich is private, is 
integrally related to tiris discussioir. Oir this view, a commoirwealtlr, a society tlrat is 
truly concerned w ith  the com m on good, is irot possible outside of redem ptioir and 
restoratioir, for hum airs ireed som e w ay to be transform ed so tlrat they cair m ove out 
of tlreir preoccupation w ith  them selves and into their greatest good, nam ely the 
enjoym ent of God and love for others w hich constitute tlreir p roper end. To be 
concerned prim arily witir w hat is private and personal is, in fact, a loss for hum anity, 
for, as Augusthre notes, 'private' is "a w ord  clearly suggesting loss ratirer tlran gain m  
value; every privation, after all, spells diminution. Tiris is w hy, for Augustine, the 
Heavenly City is tlrat wlrich is ti'uly public aird political; it restores the p roper end to 
hum anity and provides the place in w hich com m on goals and goods serve to unify 
its people. If, in otlrer w ords, a polis is understood as Alasdair M achrtyre defines it, 
"as the form of social order w hose shared m ode of life already expresses tire 
collective answer or answ ers of its citizens to the question 'W hat is the best m ode of 
life for hum an bemgs?"', and if concom itant witir tlrat answ er are certain goods and
131 Ibid., p . 60.
132 Ibid.
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systematic forms of activity related to those goods, tlien Christianity is as m uch a 
polis as the polis of liberal democratic society.™
This discussion is no t m eant to deny a place or a role for the political realm, 
bu t it is supposed to raise questions about how  we rm derstand w hat is m eant by 
'public' and  w hat is allow ed to be public and enter tire so-called public square in 
contem porary liberalism. We are not disputing the claim ably represented by 
Elshtain that some distinction betw een public and private is necessary for politics to 
exist, nor are we disagreeing w ith  tire idea that im portairt aird sigirificant areas of life 
cair best flourish w hen left outside of the direct purview  of an  all-embracing public 
(as in  political) im perative .i35 W e are, however, like Elshtain, w ondering how  
different conceptions of public and  private and, here differently than  Elshtain, an  
expairded space for overlapping 'publics,' m ight help expand our curren t political 
and theological im agination. From a tlreological perspective, w e m ust be w ary of 
accepting definitions that im derm ine the essence of CM istianity as an  em bodied, 
social public, un ited  around the com m on interest of love of God. We m ust be careful 
to prevent the C hurch from  grafting into its self-understanding w ays of tlrinking that 
do no t allow it to be seen as the site of the true com m on good around wlrich people 
can be mrited in  shared purpose, as tire commoirwealtlr in  wlriclr justice aird peace 
are actual possibilities, tM ough the m ediating and  redeem ing w ork of Jesus Christ.
If w e understand  politics as a hum air m ode of association, Christiairity and 
liberalism (and post-N ietzschean political tlreory for that m atter) p resen t vastly 
different picMres of the hum ans in  tlrat association and  of the association itself. Tiris 
is just as we w ould expect, given the differences in  the ontologies tlrat im derlie tlreir 
respective political and  social tlrought, b u t tlrese differences have often been 
occluded as CM istianity has accepted reigning paradigm s of thought in  order to be 
included in the curren t conversation. Such inclusion should no t need to come a t tire 
expense of Christianity 's identity as commmral and public; it should no t need to 
require Christiairity to com prom ise its m tegrity by distancing itself from  its social, 
public, and institutionalised hom e so that it becomes a privatised system  of beliefs 
w ith relevance only for tire 'life of tire soul.' hr short, a w ay should exist for
'33 The Literal Meaning of Genesis XI, 19, iir On Genesis, trans. Edmund Hill, O.P., ed. Jolm E. 
Rotelle, O.S.A. (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New Cit}^  Press, 2002).
134 MacIntyre, iMiose Justice? Which Rationality? p. 133.
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Christianity to be public w ithou t taking over w hat w e com m only m iderstand as tire 
public square. All of tiris is to say that Christianity, in  air Augusidiriair vein, cannot 
rem ain content witir tire w ay it has let itself be positioned by contem porary political
liberalism.!35
The discussion w e have been having up  to this po in t leaves us witir 
conclusions th a t are no t far afield, in  some respects, from those of Stanley 
H a u e r w a s . ! 5 7  For H auerw as, Christiair beliefs camrot be divorced from  the k ind of 
com m unity the church is and should be. C luistian discipleship botlr creates and  is a 
polity: to be a C hristian is to be in  a com m unity form ed around tire obedience of 
Jesus Christ to tire c r o s s . ™  Theology caiurot be conceived as m erely a set of ideas or 
interior beliefs. It m ust be rooted in  practices and  disciplines that constitute the 
Church tlu'ouglr time; in  other w ords, Christianity is e c c l e s i o l o g y . ' s ^  Yet Christianity, 
in  H auerw as' opinion, has let itself become privatised, allowing democracy to 
become prim ary wlrile it has become subordinate to democratic political 
arrairgements.!48 W hen Cluistiairity is separated from  its em bodied social form, 
w hen  it comes to be seen first and  forem ost as a set of private beliefs or values, it not 
only ceases to be understood as public, it also allows for the emergence of a 'public' 
space m  w hich a vague national or civil 'religion' comes to be seen and  em braced as 
that wlrich is com m on to all citizens. Such a national 'religion' is, how ever, deeply at 
odds w ith  a Christianity that is understood as, a t heart, public and w ith  a church tlrat 
is seen as, fundam entally, its ow n poZis.™ Furtirerm ore Christianity is deeply a t odds 
witir liberalism, as evident in  every tiring from  tlreir differing understandings of the 
'individual' to their conceptions of freedom, justice, and  trutlr. For H auerw as,
135 See Elshtam, Publie Man, Private Woman, pp. 201,351. On the importance of the private 
sphere, see also Duncan B. Forrester, Beliefs, Values and Policies: Conviction Politics in a Secular 
Age (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 7-8.
136 This is in contrast to those who have offered and continue to proffer versions of 
Augustinian liberalism. See, for example, Paul Weithman, "Toward an Augustinian 
Liberalism," in The Augustinian Tradition, ed. Garetlr Matthews (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1999), pp. 304-322 and Eric Sean Gregory, "Love and Citizenship: Augustine 
and the Ethics of Liberalism," (Ph.D. dis s., Yale University, 2002). Gregory provides a helpful 
categorisation and discussion of different versions of Augustinian liberalism, see pp. 87-123.
137 A full ai'ticulation of Hauerwas' thought is well beyond the purview of tliis work. For an 
impressively tliorough and articulate accomrt of much of Hauerwas' thinking, see 
Rasmusson, The Church as Polis, esp., in terms of our interests, pp. 174-230 and 248-302.
138 Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character: Toioard a Constmctive Christian Social Ethic 
(Notie Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 1,49.
139 Hauerwas, In Good Company, p. 58.
140 Ibid., p. 201
141 Ibid., p. 210.
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Chl'istians have failed to see the profound differences betw een the politics of liberal 
democracy and  the politics of tire Church, and have tirereby assum ed th a t by serving 
the secular polity they have been advancm g the Gospel. Christians, for example, 
believe tlrat they should  be engaged in  politics to help secure a m ore nearly just 
society, while failing to see tlrat tire justice of CM istianity is profoundly different 
from that of political society. Wlrereas liberal political societies have focused on the 
just d istiibution of desires and  goods, the church's political task is tire developm ent 
of virtuous people, form ed in  a society built on ti'ust ratirer than fear, w ho are 
equipped witir skills of discrim ination that enable its m em bers to perceive and  
in terpret the larger society (and its limitations) in wlrich they find tiremselves. This 
happens only as Christians are uiriirvolved in  the politics of tlrat larger society emd 
involved in the polity tlrat is tire church.i^z
The latter condition is not one prom ulgated by Augustine, w ho believes tlrat 
Christians can and should  accept involvem ent iir the political reahn. We will re turn  
to this m atter below. For now  let us notice tire considerable agreem ent betw een 
H auerw as and  A ugustine on tire importmrce of recogirising that one's prim ary 
identity is as a citizen in the K ingdom  of God, wlrich is itself a polity witir its ow n 
distinct ends and  means. H auerw as is right to rem hrd CM istians that the language 
and presuppositions of liberalism  are often at odds w ith  those of Christianity, and 
that Christians need to acquire skills of discernm ent and tire virtues and  practices 
tlrat enable tlrem to distinguish between, for example, tire justice of liberalism  and 
tire justice of Christ, hr otlrer w ords, the W ord of God in  CM ist needs to defhre the 
w ords and practices of tire Chm ch; the w ords by wMch Christians live and in wlrich 
Christians believe m ust have tlreir source in  tire W ord m ade flesh. As A lan Torrance 
asks, "How far does tire specific and  concrete W ord of God to hum ankind  hr CM ist 
require a revision of our intuitive hrterpretations of tire natm e and  fmrction of tire 
state and of its obhgatioirs aird responsibilities for justice, peace and freedom ? H ow 
far does tire W ord, as the im petus and  w arran t for God-talk w ith in  tire political 
domahr, involve a sem antic reconstruction of tlrese term s reorienting tlreir meanhrg 
ratirer than sim ply endorsing tlreir everyday l a n g u a g e ? " 4 4 3  His answer: "...to the 
extent tlrat C hrist is tire Logos of God he stands as the Counter-logos to our
'42 Hauerwas, Community of Character, pp. 73-74.
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preconceived social, cultural, political, and  religious conceptualities. As such he 
radically revises and  re-orders the prior blueprints w ith  wlrich w e intuitively desire 
to shape our w orld  and  in terpret our e x p e r i e n c e . " i 4 4
All of tiris is to say, tire language used and tire definitions given to its term s 
are of profom rd im portance to the discussion of issues related to the C hurch and the 
political (as our post-N ietzscheans helped us to see in  chapter Ürree). Iirdeed, one of 
tire m ost fundam ental tasks for the Church to consider is w ho defines its language: 
w hat understandings are invoked in  descriptions of the Church's ends or tire tasks 
m rdertaken by CM istians? H ow  far does tire C hurch w airt to go, for example, in  
explaining w ha t CM istians are doing w hen  tlrey love tireir neighbour as 'helping 
civil society' ratirer than as being faitirful to the CM istian calling? H ow  m uch do 
Cluistiairs w ant to enable them selves to be part of liberal political society by 
accepting that tireir CM istianity is a m atter merely of private belief, w hen  th a t goes 
against the grain of the Iristory and  tradition of the C hurch and  tire w ritings of tire 
earliest Church fatirers and Holy Scripture? H ow  far does tire C hurch go in  choosmg 
to view  itself as one of a num ber of 'voluntary associations,' thereby enabling itself to 
be part of the 'public realm ,' w hen tlrat comes a t tire cost of an  understanding  of 
Christianity as tlrat wlrich is authentically public, providing the only real source of 
commonality, goodness, peace, justice, and right? Or are CM istians williirg to view 
tiremselves as m em bers of a polis that takes prim acy over the political societies of 
wlriclr tlrey happen  to be a part, aird to have tireir involvem ent in  th a t polis serve, to 
some degree, as a rem inder tirat certain goals will never be attained in tire earthly 
city?
At tire sam e time, despite tire critical distance tiris reading fosters iir 
Christians tow ards tire eartlrly city, tlrey m ay also need to be w illing to participate in  
it, even in its curren t liberal configuration, briirging to it  criticisms, challenges, and 
contributions that can help fur tirer its goods and goals. For, as Robert Song writes, 
"liberal society as m uch as any other social order m ay be sacralized, and  stands in  as 
great a need of challengiirg aird, if necessary at times, c h a n g i n g ,  And, as he 
contiirues, "the institutional form  of tiris standing refusal is tire Church." We
'43 Alan J. Torrance, "Introductory Essay," iir Eberhaid Jüngel, Christ, Justice and Peace: Toward 
a Theology of the State, trans. D. Bruce Hamill and Alan J. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1992), p .  X.
'44 Torrance, "Introductory Essay," p. xiii.
'45 Robert Song, Christianity and Liberal Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 229.
211
rem em ber from  tire last chapter A ugustine's conviction tlrat no t only should 
Christians be m volved in the earthly political society bu t that they should  be 
involved as Christians. In  his writings on the role of Christians m  different aspects of 
tire earthly city's legal and  political structures, Augustine always places tire Christian 
identity of those w hom  he is addressing or discussing at the forefront. A pilgrim , for 
example, w ho is called to be a judge is to approach being a judge as, ratirer than 
separate from  his identity as, a C luistian. Such a Christian judge is called to 
rem em ber Iris ow n guilt and  his need of God's generous grace, so that he judges iir 
mercy and love w ith, as D odaro puts it, "the love born  m  tire interior recogirition of a 
m oral sym m etry betw een Irimself and tire o t h e r ." ' 4 6  hr tire case of Clrristian rulers, 
A ugustine w rites tirat "tlrere is no happier situation for mairkind than  tirat they, by 
God's mercy, should  w ield p o w e r ; " ™  he says this not because he tirmks Christian 
rulers can aird should  m ake Christiair em pires or nations, for he is far too realistic 
about the libido dominandi of tire earthly city aird its citizens to tirink tirat tire political 
realm  could itself em body the justice and peace of Christ. H e says tiris because in  his 
view only a C luistian  ru ler can escape the lust for pow er and self-glorification tirat 
generally m ark the earthly city. Such rulers rule w ith  justice ratirer tiran pride, they 
subm it their pow er to God ratirer tiran to tireir ow n desires for aggrairdisem ent 
(remember that for Augustine pow er is rightly subsum ed under justice), they are 
slow to punish  and  eager to pardon, tlrey restm in their self-indulgent appetites, aird 
tlrey are m otivated by love of God rather tlran tire desire for em pty g l o r y They 
remember, in  short, tirat even "tire loftiest sum m it of p o w er.. .is notiring b u t a passing
mist."™
For Augustirre, in  sum m ary, the Christian brings to political involvem ent a 
right understandm g of the provisionality and contiirgency of contem porary 
arrangem ents, a proper source for hum ility, tire grace to counter the lust for pow er 
that dom inates the eartlrly city, and  a knowledge of tire G od-intended order of tire 
universe tirat provides a po in t of critique and challenge. A nd yet even as Christians
'46 Robert Dodaro, "Loose Canons: Augustine and Derrida on Then Selves," in God, the Gift, 
and Postmodernism, ed John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana 
University Press, 1999), p. 95. See also pp. 91-93 and 99. Remember, as we mentioned in the 
last chapter and as Dodaro also discusses, Augustine's propensity to use the story of Jesus 
and tire adulteress when pondering judgment and the role of judges.
WQhyo/GorfV, 19.
™Qfyo/GoiZV,24.
'49 City of God V, 26 (drawing on James 4:14).
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share in  tire life and  peace of the earthly city, even as they are open to participation in 
its political sti’uctures, they rem em ber w ith  each step that tlrey are first and  forem ost 
citizens of the Heavenly City. The prim ary task of C lnistians is to be citizens of the 
Heavenly City, defining them selves and tlreir actions in  light of tire C hristian 
narrative, and  only secondarily is tlreir task to be p art of the earthly city, h r light of 
tiris claim, w ha t can they expect of tire earthly city? Perhaps to no t dem and so m uch 
of its m em bers tlrat the particularity of w ha t they view  as their prim ary identity  is 
not underm ined. Perhaps even to give space for its m em bers to practice their 
identities and their faitlrs publicly and  as publics, so tlrat tlrey m ight be 'publicly' 
respected and  even m utually  appreciated.
This returns us agam  to tire question of w hat a political arrangem ent that 
allows the public recognition of particularity m ight look like. Benjamin Gregg has 
recently articulated a position that looks m ore prom ising than  other ones w e have 
considered tlrus far. He is in  search of a w ay to have a political realm  m arked not by 
'norm ative coirsensus' bu t by tire m ore realistic goal of 'accommodation.' Instead of 
presupposing or searchiirg for 'fmrdamentally shared principles,' he offers space for a 
variety of 'tlrick' m oralities as em bodied in  different political, social, aird cultural 
groups and  individuals. His proposal of 'tlrick moralities, th in  politics' allows for the 
presence of different, co-existhrg moralities, so long as tlrose groups agree to w ork 
wiüriir the bounds of law. In  otlrer w ords, "no one of tlrese groups has tire right to 
im pose its position on anotlrer, unless those positions 'win' in  term s of legislation or 
judicial interprétation."'so A nd if tlrey don 't w in? They "retaiir tire righ t to maiirtain 
their contrarian view points and  to continue to advocate them."'S' In  short, "tire 
politics of thick norm s m ust expect coirstairt disagreem ent a t tire m oral level, bu t it 
seeks political cooperation in  the face of enduring disagreement."'S2
This seems to be a very prom ising w ay forw ard, bu t Gregg also grafts some 
problem atic assum ptions into Iris thhrkmg. Wlrile claiming tlrat his proposal "does 
not elide differences am ong norm atively thick groups or standpoints" he continues to 
insist tlrat as citizens in  debate tlrey be required to share tlreir view points aird 
a ttem pt to persuade the other side using only 'tlriir terms,' m eanhrg term s w hich are
150 Benjaiirin Gregg, Thick Moralities, Thin Politics: Social Integration Across Communities of Belief 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), p. 5.
15' Ibid.
'52 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
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potentially acceptable to th a t other s i d e . ™  hr other w ords, "one m ust be prepared to 
place (in the public sphere, on m atters of public policy) one's faith  in rational 
deliberation above one's ow n m oral com m itm ents, w hen tlrose com m itm ents are not 
sustained by rational deliberation or rational process in  the public s p h e r e . " ™
Leaving aside tire poiirt, well m ade in our second chapter, tirat asking groups and 
iirdiviductis to prioritise 'rational debate' over tireir ow n com m itm ents and  beliefs 
fails to tr uly respect tire dep th  and  particularity of those coiiunitm ents, w e m ight be 
tem pted to agree that tire w isest course for one side of a debate to follow is that of 
attem pting to use lairguage and  reasoniirg witir w hich it expects the otlrer side could 
concur. Yet we m ight also consider that tire otlrer side could be open to  heariirg 
marry or all of tire reasons belrind its opponent's position, even if it doesn't yet find 
tlrem persuasive. It m ight be tirat botlr sides could learn from being exposed to tire 
particularity and  tire tirickness that underlie, shape, and  inspire tire otirer, and  that 
'public' debate is and  should be a place tirat provides the forum  for a deep exchange 
of ideas that has the potential to alter and  change tire positions of botlr sides, a t tlriir 
and thick levels.
This is a crucial poiirt of coirsideration, for contem porary liberal political 
society does no t allow for the type of debate and  interaction tirat w ould enable real 
questions about the good and the true to be engaged. According to the diagnosis of 
Machrtyre, 'liberal individualism ' operates witir a conception of tire good tirat 
supposes, ironically, that there is no overriding good. This m eans tirat tire public 
arena it facilitates is a site for the exchange of 'preferences' and  'choices' ratirer tlrair a 
place of debate about the hum an good or betw een rival conceptions of the g o o d . ' ^ s  
A nd yet, while no t allowing explicit debate over questions of the good, liberalism  
implicitly suggests certain answers (for every law  embodies som e idea of tire good 
and every ruling discloses a norm ative stance) wlrile preventing otlrers from  having 
public presence. As w e have seen, liberalism is afraid of the divisiveness tirat m ight 
em erge w ere questions of the good to be engaged publicly; tiris fear stem s from  
liberalism 's origins in  tire religious w ars of previous centuries. Yet otirer scholars, 
such as Plrilip Quimr, w onder whetlrer tiris fear still needs to be such a driving force
153 Ibid., p. 6.
154 Ibid., p. 8.
155 See MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Witich Rationality? pp. 336-339.
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in lim iting w ha t w e can publicly engage.'so A nd otliers, such as our agonistic 
political theorists, fear th a t by n o t engaging such differences publicly, w e leave them  
no choice b u t to m ake them selves know n violently. Of course, tlrese differences need 
to be engaged n o t only publicly, according to liberalism 's definition, b u t also in tire 
reality of daily living, as iirteractions betw een people and groups witir different 
ontologies inevitably occur. H ow  can individuals, groups, and faiths m eet together 
from w ithin  their substantially different goods and  beliefs? W hat could this coming 
togetirer of particularities look like?
C o n v er sa tio n , R ic h  a n d  D eep
This effort to offer a picture of different particularities com ing together witlrin 
political society needs to be undertaken  witir tw o caveats in m ind. First, tiris does 
not represent an  a ttem pt to offer a picture of air 'ideal' political society or to articulate 
a tlreory that w ould  sufficiently underg ird  tire political realm  of the earthly city. We 
rem em ber Augustine, w ho tlrought tlrat citizens of the Heaveirly City could 
contribute to tire earthly city, b u t certainly did no t prescribe, nor think it possible to 
prescribe, an ideal city or political regime this side of tire eschaton. Christians can 
give w hat tlrey are able to tlreir curren t political situation, w ithout tlrinking they can 
find a solution that will answ er all of its problem s, for m any of its problem s camrot 
be fully resolved in  tire earthly c i t y . ™  O ur current political situation is one m arked 
by rich pluralism , and  so the picture w e offer arises in response to tlrat context. This 
leads to our second caveat, nam ely that w hat is articulated here is no t suggested in 
an  attem pt to achieve tire reconciliation and  the celebration of un ity  an d  diversity 
tlrat are only possible in  the H eavenly City. In the H eavenly City alone can 
differences come togetirer in  love, as its citizens offer each other and  delight togetirer 
in tire hunrility, generosity, hospitality, aird grace tlrey have by virtue of tlreir
156 As Pliilip Quinn writes, "I myself reckon tlrat the probability of reigniting tire Wars of 
Religion by including religious arguments in public political discourse is quite low, and so 1 
think tlrat such fear, however real it may be, is unrealistic" ("Religious Diversity and Religious 
Toleration," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 50 [2001], p. 59).
'57 Tliis view leaves us not far, in certain respects, from Hauerwas, who writes ". ..we have 
wanted to underscore that Christians are called fir st and foremost not to resolve the tension 
between church and state, but to acknowledge tire kingship of Christ in their lives, wlrich 
means leaving church-state relations profomrdly uirresolved, mrtil tire day wherr He comes 
agaiir irr glory" {In Good Company, p. 216).
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participation in tiieir Triune God, A nd yet, precisely because of tiris participation, 
which yields its firstfruits in  tlie lives of Christians and the C hurch in  the here and 
now , w e can m ove from a p icture of reconciliation and celebration in  tiie Heavenly 
City to one in w hich w e see w hat the resources and perspectives of the C hristian 
ontology m ight contribute to the earthly city in  the saeculum. This could perhaps be 
seen as our version of W illiam Comiolly's etiios of critical responsiveness, our 
articulation of w ays in  w hich differences can come together w ith  hum ility and 
generosity, grounded m  a C hiistian rather tlian a post-N ietzschean ontology.
This last po in t is im portant to keep in  m ind. The hope of this discussion is to 
provide a picture of rich conversation betw een tire different constituencies of 
contem porary society. This p icture m ay seem m ost relevant or convincing to tliose 
w ho are already persuaded  by the tiutirs of Christianity, just as Connolly's ethos 
seems m ost applicable to tiiose w ho already accept the beliefs that underlie it. 
Nevertlieless, those w ith  differing ontologies can learn from tire pictures offered by 
ontologies different tiran their own. Indeed, this belief in  our ability to learn  from 
each other in  the m idst of our differences lies a t tire heart of the picture of 
conversation we are here tiy ing  to present. As w e draw  tlris picture, it w ill be clear 
tirat m uch of our discussion is given h'om  tire viewpoiirt of tire C hurch and  of tirose 
w ho adhere, how ever differently in the details, to the overall tru ths of tire C hristian 
faitir. As our post-N ietzscheans have helpfully and clearly rem inded us, no theory 
can divorce itself from its ontological presuppositioirs, even should it so desire. This 
w ork of Clu'istian theology has neither tire aspiration nor tire expertise to provide 
pictures of engagem ent w ith  otlrers that do no t flow from  air understaird ing of tire 
narratives, practices, and  beliefs of the Christian faitir. And yet, if our 
presuppositions are correct, tlris will n o t preclude other faiths, practices, and  'publics' 
from learning from  tire p icture we offer.
Conversation lies a t tire centre of this picture. This is n o t conversation 
restricted to verbal com m unication bu t conversation tirat includes the interaction 
between w ays and m aim ers of life. Both scripturally and IristoricaUy, conversation 
has m ore often been associated w ith  this broader picture of interaction. Indeed, 
'conversation' is never used iir Scripture to m ean verbal com m unication from  one to 
another; instead, it generally refers to tire "goings ou t and in  of social iirtercourse."i58
158 See M.G. Easton, Illustrated Bible Dictionary, 3d. ed. (New York: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 
1897).
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Likewise, the earliest references to conversation as cited in  The Oxford English 
Dictionary have to do w ith  "the action of living"; "Üie action of consorting or having 
dealings w ith  others; living together; commerce, intercourse, society, intimacy"; and 
"mamrer of conducting oneself in  Üie w orld  or in society; behaviour, m ode, or course 
of life."159 These are the richer conceptions of conversation to w hich our accoimt 
appeals, ones th a t involve both  verbal exchange and interaction betw een different 
m anners of life. It is as identities are em bodied and  practised, as narratives are 
incarnated and  lived out, and  as people live togetlier and engage witlr one anotlier 
from  w ithin  die em bodim ent of tlieir differing narratives tliat tlie possibility of ti'ue 
conversation exists. In  this type of conversation, each party  speaks from  w ithin  tlie 
particularity and  fulhiess of its ow n identity and beliefs and  operates w ith  a trust in 
w hat can be learned and  accom plished through interaction, debate, and  deliberation. 
Each party  is open  to being persuaded  by tlie other, to changing its convictions and 
practices, in  small and  large w ays, and  even to  being converted to different beliefs 
and m anners of life.
Let us pause for a m om ent to notice how  different this is from  the theory p u t 
forw ard by John Rawls. For Rawls, public conversation should only take place using 
reasons and argum ents d iat all reasonable people can be expected to understand. As 
witli Gregg's proposal, one can sense the im m ediate appeal of such a view, yet 
underlying it is a disbelief in  die ability of people to learn  h'om  each other and  to 
change tiieir opinions and w ays of thinking and  living in light of being intr oduced to 
ideas that are fundam entally different from  tiieir own. The site of tiie political m ay 
no t be a place w here w e can all get along; it m ay instead be a forum  for airing some 
of our m ost deep-seated differences and  conflicts and learning (how) to live w ith 
them. Yet in  that airing som ething crucial m ay take place: a level of opemiess, 
honesty, and critical engagem ent w ith  'the other' tiiat brings fortii em pathy and 
understanding, tiia t enables genuine, appreciative, respectful relationship w itii 'the 
other,' and tiiat opens u p  the possibility of change in  opinion, belief, and  m anner of 
life m ay be attained. W liat assum ption drives the view that we can only come 
togetlier in the nam e of or for the sake of an  overlapping consensus? W hy m ust we 
hide tiie differences th a t underlie our incom patible viewpoints instead of hoping that 
w e can learn from  each otiier in  the m idst of our differences? W liy m ust we build a
5^9 The Oxford English Dictionary, vol. 3,2d. ed., ed. J.A. Smipson and E.S.C. Weiner (Oxford; 
Clarendon Press, 1989).
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political theory that, instead of encouraging people to keep and  pu rsue their 
identities and  beliefs, relies on their 'comprehensive doctrines' n o t being 
com prehensive? For Rawls' theory depends for its success on the very tiling that w e 
have here been decrying, nam ely tlie alteration of com prehensive doctrines in  tlie 
nam e of and  for the sake of political principles tliat have, w ithou t people realising it, 
w on their prim ary allegiance. W e are here searching for a w ay for com prehensive 
doctrines to come together, to interact as publics and publicly, in  w ays tlia t do not 
involve such covert m anipulation.
For this to happen, engagem ent betw een different identities needs to occur 
no t only in w ords b u t also in  practices. As Cavanaugh, w riting  w ith  the C hurch in 
m ind, com m ents, "die m ost fruitful w ay to dialogue w ith  those outside of the 
church .. .is th rough concrete practices tliat do no t need translation into som e 
putatively 'neutr al' language to be u n d e r s t o o d . T h i s  is integrally related to tlie 
need to understand  Christianity as m ore than a set of private beliefs th a t perta in  only 
to one's values, for Christianity takes shape as an  em bodied narrative, defined by 
practices, disciplines, and sacram ents tliat are rightfully and  authentically public. To 
reiterate our earlier discussion, w e need to discern a w ay to allow other publics to 
exist alongside tlie 'public' of political liberalism, w hich has become tlie only public 
we recognise as such. To briefly follow the argum ent of Reinliard H ütter, w hereas 
our contem porary understanding  of public legitimises only the public of liberal 
political society, H ütter offers a vision of "a structural concept of public" tliat allows 
for "a whole m ultiplicity of different publics that overlap and  com plem ent one 
anodier and  yet also are able to relate to one another from  witliiii positions of 
serious, fundam ental t e n s i o n . ' ' ^ ^ :  W hy is this im portant? Because if die C hurch is 
no t understood fundam entally  and explicitiy as its ow n public, then  it is defined and 
positioned "from die perspective of the norm ative public of m odern, differentiated 
liberal society th a t p rom ptly  effects die church's eclipse as a p u b l i c ."1^2 W hen die 
Church loses its sense of itself as public, it begins to be defined and to define itself by 
an  alien logic, by the logic of, for example, contem porary liberalism, thereby losing 
its ability to stand alongside, apart from, or in  critical relationship to  the public of
Cavanaugh, "Public Theology," p. 120; emphasis added. 
6^1 Hütter, Suffering Divine Things, p. 159.
152 Ibid., p. 169.
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m odem  s o c i e t y X h i s  could, in  fact, be w hat so often leads the (Protestant) Church 
to align itself w ith  the purposes of the nation-state: "this eclipse of die Protestant 
church as public m ight be one reason it is susceptible to becoming the bearer of 
national and  odier identities and  projects, securing for itself dius as a national or civil 
religion a m easure of public relevance w idrin the fram ework of die public arena of 
society a t large.
Just as one of die strengths of post-N ietzschean political tiieory is tiia t it 
allows a questioning of die definitions and configurations of political society 
established by political liberalism, one of the dangers of allowing 'public' to rem ain 
synonym ous w itii die political realm  as defined by contem porary political dieory 
and  practice is tiia t it limits the critical abilities of otiier constituencies w ith in  political 
society. By creating space for m ultiple publics, overlapping yet each m arked by its 
ow n telos, doctr ine, and practices, w e open die possibility of critical interaction 
between tiiese publics. Such intercourse avoids die prioritisation of tiie individual 
d iat is concom itant w itii m uch liberal theory, sometiiiiig w hich Comiolly's political 
dieory tries misuccessfuUy to escape. Those w ho view  tiiemselves pr im arily as 
individuals and  w ho place their identity  first and forem ost in  die public of political 
liberal society continue to be welcome to do so, bu t tiiose w ho find in  other publics 
their m ore form ative identities and  allegiances can be given die space to operate 
from  w idiin  tiiose publics in  interaction w itii die public of political s o c i e t y
Such a reconfiguration of public and private m ay be particularly  timely in 
light of recent diagnoses regarding the disappearance of die public spaces of 
contem porary liberal politics. One could appeal to w orks on the decline of civil 
society sucli as Robert Putnam 's Bowling Alone or to the m ore drastic diagnosis of die 
neo-M arxists Michael H ard t and  A ntonio Negri.i^e H m dt and N egri argue that 
under the conditions of postm odernity  public space has been privatised to such a 
large degree (tiiey cite die transition from  com m on squares and  public encounter to
153 See ibid., p. 171.
154 Ibid., p. 11.
155 Cf. Micliael Sandel, who, in attempting to articulate a renewed version of republicanism 
for OUT' time, and recognising tiiat "most of us organize our lives aromid smaller solidarities," 
writes, "unlike earlier republican visions, ours will have to enable us to live witii multiple, 
overlapping, sometimes contending moral and political loyalties. It must equip us to live — 
tliis is the difficult part—with the tensions to which multiply-situated and multiply- 
encumbered selves are prone" ("The Politics of Public Identity" The Hedgehog Review 2, no. 1 
[Spring 2000], p. 87).
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gated com m unities and  the closed space of shopping malls) that tlie spaces of 
m odern  liberal politics no  longer exist. W itli tlie loss of the clear distinction betw een 
the private w orld of the household and  the public w orld  outside tlie hom e, they 
m aintain th a t n o t only has the place of politics been de-actualised, b u t a deficit of the 
political has arisen.i57 We are here rem inded of Hie diagnosis of post-N ietzschean 
tlieorists w ho likewise notice a  loss of die political, aldiough they tend  to blam e diis 
on political liberalism  itself rather diaii on die conditions of postm odernity. Eidier 
way, a clear concern exists for die need of a re turn  of die public argum entation  and 
interaction that m ark  genuine politics, for die need of space for com m unication and 
conversation betw een people, groups, and  forces tiiat are, at times, antagonistic.
Perhaps die first thing to come to m ind w hen w ords such as 'debate' and 
'conversation' are used is a form al setting in w hich agreed participants exchange 
ideas and share beliefs verbally. This is, of course, one obvious and necessary way 
for such interaction to take place, particularly w hen we tiiink of 'public' dialogue mid 
'public' reason as defined by political liberalism. W hen w e expand our 
understanding of public, how ever, and  see m ultiple 'publics' and  various form s of 
'public' presence, w e also open die w ay for acknow ledgem ent of different types of 
interaction. The em bodim ent of ideas, beliefs, and narratives in  practices, traditions, 
and commimities m eans that conversation occurs through incarnated interaction 
radier than  m erely verbal exchange. Nicholas Healy offers a p icture of debates 
w hich "occur n o t only a t the level of ideas, b u t in  dieir com m unal em bodim ent, 
w idiin and  betw een religious and non-religious bodies w hose concrete identities 
conflict internally and  w id i one a n o t h e r ,  Likewise C avanaugh, as w e saw  above, 
thinks d iat the m ost fruitful kinds of dialogue happen  through die interaction of 
concrete practices. This happens each and  every day in  a p luralist society, as 
different people and  com m unities interact w ith  each odier. It needs no formal 
setting to take place, although it can certainly be augm ented by 'official' forum s and 
discussions. But we m ust n o t forget that "die real public realm," as Alistair 
M cFadyen writes, "has to do w ith  com m unication betw een different fram es of
155 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2000); Hardt. and Negri, Empire.
157 See Haidt and Negri, Empire, pp. 186-190, esp. p. 188.
158 Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life, p. 106.
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tliought."i59 That is to say, the public realm  is defined no t by w ha t is considered the 
'public square' by political liberalism  bu t by places and  conversations m arked by 
com m unication betw een different w ays of tiiinking and living.
W liat does this com m unication look like? It does no t look like tire effort to 
discover consensus and  harm ony at tlie cost of die recognition of genuine 
particularity and  difference. W e are careful to avoid die language of 'dialogue,' 
w hich too often operates w ith  die assum ption d iat the differences d ia t em erge in 
dialogue can be subsum ed u nder larger universal and  unifying categories.^^o We 
prefer die language of 'conversation,' in  w hich people and  groups interact w id i one 
anodier verbally and  th rough  dieir w ays of life. Through such interaction and 
conversation different participants have the opportunity  to learn  from  each other and 
to change dieir beliefs, practices, or stories in  large and sm all ways. The desired goal 
is not discussion or engagem ent over d ia t w hich participants already have in  
common, agree on, or can 'reasonably' be expected to understm id and  accept. Wliile 
trying to find areas of agreem ent and  com m onality is no t undesirable, it is also 
w ordiw hile to try to understand  others in  their differences and particularity. 
U nderlying a position like die one being articulated here is a belief tiia t such 
attem pts a t understanding  and interacting have some positive good, tiia t people can 
learn from  each other, tiia t groups can and  should be open to such learning and  to 
change.
Yes, genuine differences exist w idiin  contem porary W estern society, b u t we 
need not be d riven  by fear w hen  w e contem plate interaction betw een tiiese 
differences. W e need not assum e d iat the only w ay to secure stability and  justice 
w idiin  a p luralist political society is to find language and argum ents u p o n  wliich we 
can all agree. As the post-N ietzscheans have rem inded us, die elem ent of die 
'political' can never be ignored. The recilities of conflict and  pow er are deep and  
pervasive. Everyone m ay no t fit easily and  neatly into a political society. But 
perhaps in  diis current milieu w e should be m ore afraid of ignoring differences tiian 
of w hat will happen  w hen w e attem pt to engage diem. Political liberalism  seems 
fearful of w hat will happen  if w e enter into debate and  deliberation from  w idiin  our
459 Alistair McFadyen, "Trutii as Mission: The Christian Claim to Universal Truth in a Pluralist 
Public World," Scottish Journal of Theology 46 (1993), p. 445.
470 For a particularly strong, and at times refreshingly honest, response to such dialogue, see 
John Milbank, "Tlie End of Dialogue," in Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: The M yth of a
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particularity. We, like the post-Nietzscheans, are m ore afraid of w ha t w ill happen  if 
w e do n o t allow for such form s of interaction. The culture w ars of the eighties and 
nineties and  tlie m ore recent terrorism  and  suspicions of the M uslim  w orld  tow ards 
W estern society involve the deepest ontological differences; they stem  from  
underlying divergent views of the nature of reality and hum an  being and  all the 
beliefs, em bodim ents, and  positions that flow from  tiiose d ivergent views. Engaging 
w ith  tiiose differences, in  formal and  inform al ways, is no longer the 'conversation- 
stopper.' W ithout such engagem ent, no  conversation can even begin, never m ind be 
'stopped.'
Indeed, as Charles M atliewes persuasively argues, religion is no t the 
'conversation-stopper' th a t m any (such as Rorty) have assum ed it to be. The idea 
tliat religious belief is m ore intrinsically comiected to intolerance than  m any forms of 
secular belief (M atliewes th inks of Naziism, com m unism , and liberalism) is m ore a 
reflection of the cultural m ythology of our 'liberal' society than m hinsically  true.
That is to say, all theories, philosophies, and ideologies, no t just those th a t are 
explicitly 'religious,' involve deep and conh’oversial views that have die potential to 
foster intolerance tow ards tiiose w ho hold different views. Furtiierm ore, M atiiewes 
argues tiiat religious discourse provides positive insights tiiat are unavailable outside 
of explicitiy religious language and tiiat to dem and tiie use of 'neuti'al' language 
inevitably w eakens religious convictions because of language's influential role in 
shaping experience and  identity.i^i This is clearly a  different ideal tiian th a t held by 
Rawls, w ho, w hile later allowing for non-shared reasons and  beliefs to be used in 
public discourse, and  even acknowledging die contribution different tiad itions have 
m ade to dem ocratic life, still speaks of this only as a proviso rad ier tiian a positive 
good. We w ould  be m ore inclined to  follow M atiiewes and others, like Paul Brink, 
w ho view our tr aditions and  com m itted positions no t as tilings to be ignored or 
retreated into, bu t as som ces of strengtii and  insight, as m eans of fostering 
relationships and  m utuality, as avenues for learning and change.472
Plnrnlistic Theology of Religions, ed. Gavin D'Costa (Mary knoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1990), pp. 
174-191.
4^4 See Charles T. Matiiewes, A Theology of Public Life During the World (forthcoming), esp. 
introduction, chap. 5.
172 See Paul A. Brink, "Selves in Relation: Theories of Community and tiie Imago Dei Doctrine," 
in The Re-Enchnntnient of Political Science: Chiistian Scholars Engage Their Discipline, ed. Thomas 
W. Heüke and Ashley Woodiwiss (Lanham, Md.; Lexington Books, 2001), p. 114.
222
This returns us again to the importmice of the em bodim ent and  practice of 
Christianity, The Christian narrative m ust be m atched by its enactm ent in a 
Christian practice, the C iuistian  story is inseparable from  its em bodim ent in  a 
Christian polis, and  Christian tru tli is only public as mission, as the com m unication 
and action that occur in  witness to the faith and  hope of C hristianity 's eschatological 
vision, or so M cFadyen a r g u e s . i ^ s  Im portantly, M cFadyen rem inds us tliat die 
"publicness of Christian tru tii cannot be a m atter of com m unicating a fuUy know n 
tr ud i to an  audience; it is also the process of becoming die com m unity w e claim  to 
be,"174 As Christians com m unicate, it  is no t as those w ho fully possess and  incarnate 
die tru th  of w hich tiiey speak, b u t as tiiose w ho are trying to become die com m unal 
em bodim ent of w hat tiiey believe. As citizens of die H eavenly City attem pt to live 
into die gospel story w hich tiiey believe in  faitii, their lives and com m unities should 
offer, partial and  sinful yet nevertiieless graceful, reflections of tiiat gospel story. It is 
in diis em bodied com m unication tiiat the genuine interaction and  conversation 
w hich w e've been discussing happen. "Anodier w ay of putting  this," as Trevor H art 
writes, "is sim ply to say tiiat die w ay in  w hich die Christian com m unity 'interprets' 
its gospel is no t lim ited to intellectual accormts and explanations of die story itself,
.. .bu t extends to die entirety  of die forms of thought and  activity adop ted  by 
C hristian people in  the w orld. The church's attem pts to be the people of God in the 
w orld, that is to say, to continue die story, provide die m ost poignant com m entary 
on die m eaning of die gospel w hich it has to  share w ith  odiers."i75
This p icture of C hristian interaction and m ission as lying fundam entally  in 
die em bodim ent of C hristian praxis, radier tiian, for example, in  universalisable, 
propositional statem ents, reveals an  understanding of tru tii that relies m ore on faitii 
and hope tiian "knowledge in  die strict sense," as M cFadyen pu ts it.4^6 It takes into 
account die epistemic hum ility  engendered by post-Enlightem nent tiiought, avoiding 
die problem atic ingrafting of Enlightenm ent optimism  about h u m an  access to  
universal tru tii into die heart of Christianity. A nd yet it does no t entail the
173 McFadyen, "Trutii as Mission," p. 453.
474 Ibid., p. 455.
475 Trevor Hart, Faith Thinking: The Dynamics of Christian Theology (London: SPCK, 1995), p.
184.
476 McFadyen, "Truth as Mission," p. 448. On die relational radier than propositional nature of 
Cluistianity, McFadyen writes, "Christian Trutii...is not primarily propositional; it is 
relational: it concerns tiie proper relationship of humanity, creation and God, a relationsliip 
which is promised as tiie future fulfilment of the whole of reality before God" (pp. 447-448).
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abandonm ent of universal tru th  itself as a category and  reality, even as it  limits our 
claims to have unequivocal access to it. As H art argues, there is a w ay to recognise 
tlie partiality of our perspectives, to  acknowledge tliat w e stand w ith in  particular 
traditions and  fiduciary com m itm ents, and yet to continue to tliink it  im portan t to 
find the accom it of things that offers tlie m ost satisfactory approach to reality. 
Though w e can never be absolutely certain that w ha t w e know, believe, and  practice 
corresponds to reality, it should  be acceptable to say that we believe w e have 
identified a tiner or m ore satisfactory outlook tlian otliers currently know n, while 
accepting die possibility th a t a m ore adequate outlook m ay exist or be discovered.477 
W ith tills understEinding, the Christian is open to learning from  otliers w ho  stand in  
die particularity of tiieir perspectives and  faith com m itm ents even as he or she 
stands from witiiin the faith, tradition, and disciplines of Christianity.i^s
Healy's description of w hat he term s 'tiieodramatic debate' offers a similar 
picture of participants operating from  witiiin the particularity of tiieir traditions as 
diey seek answ ers to the question of trutii. W hen participants operate w ith  an  
understanding that they seek radier tiian possess trutii, they are open to learning 
from each other. W hen this is com bined w itii die belief tiiat the Holy Spirit is active 
in  people, religious bodies, and  non-religious bodies w ho are no t explicitly Chiistian, 
Christimi participants have the sources tiiey need to engage in  conversation w ith  
hum ility and  opemiess. Yet tills hum ility tow ards and  opemiess to learn from  otliers 
does no t come at die cost of bold and  tenacious w itness to the tru tii as they perceive 
and com prehend it. In  such a picture, participants in  debate stand  w itiiin  tiie 
particularity of their ow n traditions and  beliefs, either as individuals or as 
representatives of com m unal bodies, learning from  die otiier participants, a t times 
changing or adapting tiieir beliefs and  practices as tiiey come to see them  as untr ue
477 See Halt, Faith Thinking, esp. pp. 66-67,222-225. This is, of course, reminiscent of the 
drought of MacIntyre, who notes that "no one at any stage can ever rule out the future 
possibility of their present beliefs and judgments being shown to be inadequate in a variety of 
ways" {Whose Jnstiœ? Which Rationality? p. 361; see also p. 388).
178 WiUiain Placher similarly suggests tiiat tiiose engaging in mterreligious dialogue interact 
from tiie particularity of tiieir faitii traditions and be open to correction and conversion: "...if 
before we beghi I absolutely rule out the possibility that 1 might be right and you might be 
wrong, then our exchange becomes in some degiee superficial" {Unapologetic Theology: A  
Christian Voice in a Phiralistic Conversation [Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox 
Press, 1989], p. 147). And he also, rightfully, draws attention to how significant it is for one to 
change or alter one's faith, noting that one treats faith conmiitments superficially if one thinks 
tiiey can be 'tried out' for a little wliile ("Faith embodies a powerful vision of the world, and 
such visions are neither abandoned nor entered into lightly" [p. 149]).
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or sinful, a t times standing firm  in  w itness to the tru tii as tiiey perceive it and believe 
it has been revealed to them . The Church, witiiin this picture, views tru th  n o t as 
som ething tiiat it possesses or know s in  full, b u t as som ething th a t is received, 
through Scripture, tradition, and  engagem ent w ith  views and  w ays of life different 
from  its own.479 The C hurch is, in  short, "tiie com m unal em bodim ent of tiie search 
for tr uthful w itness and discipleship w itiiin the theodram a. It is a religious body 
w hich know s tiia t tru th  cam iot be possessed, bu t m ust be continually received, and 
witii due hum ility in  face of its sinfulness and fm itude. It is a religious body that 
know s tiia t the gift of tru tii is essentially dependent upon  genuine engagem ent witii 
both the divine Otiier and hum an  others."48o
Despite some prevailing conceptions of A ugustine, hum ility, recognition that 
ti'utli is received as a gift, and  desire for genuine engagem ent w itii o thers are all 
m arks of his life and  tiio u g h t Because of his ow n weakness, A ugustine believes in  
tiie need to proceed carefully in  liis tiieological tasks ("From now  on I w ill be 
attem pting to say tilings th a t cam iot altogetiier be said as tiiey are tiiought by a 
m an —or a t least as they are tiiought by m e .. .For I am  as keenly aw are of m y 
weakness as of m y willingness").484 Because of com m on hum an weakness, 
Augustine believes tiiat w e need to be m ore gentle w ith  each other than  w e m ight 
otherw ise be.4S2 Because of the nature of ti'uth, w hich belongs no t to any one 
individual b u t is shared by all as a public possession and gift, given by G od w ho is 
truth,483 it is possible to be in  conversation w ith  otliers about and  in  pu rsu it of tiie 
h’utli of the m atter. Indeed, A ugustine's belief in  the im portance and  efficacy of such 
conversation is ev ident th roughout liis writings, m any of w hose origins lie precisely 
in tiie perceived need to discuss and  search for tru th  as it related to particular 
matters. Such w ritings are m arked by a desire to proceed w ith hum ility  and  
opemiess tow ards his in tended  audience. As he w rites in one letter,
I have given you an exposition of my considered opinion on tiiis issue, and of my 
deepest wishes. I admit that I do not know what is hidden in the plan of God; I am
479 See Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life, pp. 105-108.
480 Ibid., pp. 107-108.
484 Augustine, The Trinity V, 1, tians. Edmund Hül, O.P., ed. John E. Rotelle, O.S.A. (Brooklyn, 
New York; New City Press, 1991).
482 He appeals to this particularly in the context of moderating tiie harshness of judges and 
judgement in liis letter to Macedonius. See Letter 153 in Augustine: Political Writings, ed. E.M. 
Atkins and R.J. Dodaro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) (pp. 71-88).
483 Augustine, Confessions XII, xxv (34), (35), tians. Hemy Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991).
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only human. However, I am absolutely certain that whatever it is, it is just and wise 
by comparison with any human mind, and very firmly established in incomparable
excellence.484
A nd another example, from  Tlw Trinity:
.. .if anyone reads this work and says, '1 understand what is being said, but it is not 
hue,' he is at liberty to affirm his own conviction as much as he likes and refute mine 
if he can. If he succeeds in doing so charitably and trutlifully, and also takes the 
trouble to let me know (if 1 am stiU ahve), Üien tliat will be the clioicest plum that 
could fall to me from these labors of mine.^ss 
Even if A ugustine's conception of conversation is no t quite as rich as the one w e have 
here been articulating, w e can agree w itli M athewes tliat "Augustine's system  can 
affirm w hat A ugustine liim self m ay never have adm itted, that the C hristian church 
can in  fact engage in  genuine conversation w ith  others, in a w ay wliich leads to a 
deeper understanding for all parties involved,
All of this points to some very different reasons for entering into conversation 
witli otliers tlian tiiose offered by tlie political theorists of our earlier chapters. Such 
differences do no t come together m erely because of the fact of pluralism , nor because 
of a recognition of universal irony. Their forbearance tow ards tiiose w ho are 
different involves a recognition that they are inextricably linked to others in  
contem porary society, no t because of the irreducible contingency and  inevitable 
paradoxicality of tiieir identities and  beliefs, b u t because of their com m on hum anity 
and sinfulness. They are hum ble, patient, and open to learning from  and being 
changed by the differences they encounter not because they believe tlia t tr u th  is a 
harm ful concept and  that life is a chaotic w hirlw ind that exceeds all of our abilities to 
capture it, b u t because tru th  and  life are gifts from God that exceed in  capacity, 
m ystery, and  grandeur tlie ability of any person or group to know  tliem  in  full. To
484 Augustine to Nectariiis, Letter 104,11 in Augustine: Political Writings (p. 17). See also his 
letter to the Donatist Emeritus, in which writes of his desire to meet with him, or, failing tliat, 
to reach and be reached by him thr ough letters (Letter 87,1). N.B. Dodaro provides a 
thorough accoimt of what is happening in the correspondence between Augustine and 
Nectarius, with special reference to Comiolly’s critiques of Augustine that are drawn from 
tliis and otiier applications of Augustine's political tiiought, in "Augustine's Secular- City," pp. 
231-259.
485 The Trinity 1,5. Note also his humility towards interpretation of Scripture and his belief 
that a diversity of trutiis can be found within a given passage or story. See, for example. 
Confessions XII, xxxi (42); On Christian Doctine XXVII, XLI, traris. D.W. Robertson, Jr. 
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1958).
486 Charles T. Mathewes, "Pluralism, Otherness, and the Augustinian Tradition," Modern 
Theology 14, no. 1 (January 1998), pp. 89-90.
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the concept of a 'radical and plural democracy' tiiey offer a radical love for the otiier, 
a radical hospitality and  generosity tow ards those w ho are different, gu ided  no t by 
their ow n strengtii b u t by participation in  tlie God w hose very life w as given freely 
and w itiiout violence for those w ho considered themselves God's enemy. They reject 
exclusion and  choose to em brace those no t like tiiemselves not, as Volf w rites, 
"because of a contingent preference for a certain k ind of society" b u t because "the 
prophets, evangelists, and  apostles tell [them] that it is a w rong w ay to  trea t hum an 
beings, any hum an  being, any w h e r e . . , .  "i87
In short, if tlie H eavenly City on  earth  is being faithful to  em bodying its own 
narratives, it will be m arked no t by conflict, coercion, or intolerance, b u t by love, 
hum ility, hospitality, and  grace. Tliis is n o t a claim tliat Christians have alw ays been 
guided by love, no r tliat tliey have no t misconstr ued  calls to "make disciples of all 
nations"488 as justification for taking m atters of conversion into tiieir ow n hands, or 
mistakenly placing it into tlie hands of civil authorities. Conversion itself, rightly 
conceived, is the w ork of God, no t the w ork of tlie Church or the Chiistian.
Christians are called to love and  serve each other while tliey obey an d  tru st tliat the 
sam e God w ho they believe created tlie eartli; established a covenant w ith  Abraham ; 
called and gathered the people of Israel; becam e flesh, lived, died, and  rose again to 
reconcile hum anity  to  Godself; and  continues to sustain  in  being all tliat is, is always 
already a t w ork in  the w orld. For according to the biblical w itness, it is God w ho 
reveals, calls, and  reconciles, w orking Üirough people w ithout depending upon  tliem 
for die realisation of God's saving love and  purposes. This involves a deep belief tliat 
tlie Holy Spirit is present and  active, sustaining and w orking tlirough those w ho 
know  God as Fatlier th rough  Jesus Christ, and sustaining and  w orking in  those who 
do no t yet participate in  tliis com m union or recognise them selves as sons and 
daughters in God's richly diverse and unified family. Because of this belief, the 
C hurch can view  itself as responsible not for im posing its faitii and  practices onto 
others b u t for being the com m unity in  w hich the narratives of Clu istianity are 
em bodied and  practised.
As citizens of the H eavenly City answ er the call to be and  live as tlie people 
of God, as they come together united  around tlie com m on love of G od and 
neighbour, and  as tliey reside as pilgrim s in the earthly city w itiiout abandoning the
487 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, p. 68.
488 Jesus' parting words to His disciples according to Matthew 28:19, NRSV.
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public of the Church, they can enter from tiieir ow n particularity into conversation 
w itli others in  tiieir particularity. Such conversation, ricli and deep, occurring in 
w ord  and  practice, in  formal and  inform al ways, does no t abandon die hope tliat 
together w e can seek after tru th , guided by hum ility and love. N either does it 
naïvely search for easy com m on ground and  consensus over the m ost potentially 
divisive issues. It m aintains th a t w ith in  tliis conversation one can be persuaded  by 
another, by their m anner of life or tiieir w ords, their practices or their speech, and 
tliis persuasion m ay w ell result in a change of position, belief, w ay of life, and  even 
ontology. Such change does not, generally, happen  easily or quickly, tlirough one 
interaction or a handful of verbal exchanges, bu t its possibility m ust alw ays rem ain 
open. For w itiiout such a possibility, how  are w e ever to learn  an d  grow  from eacli 
otiier as we, in  our differences and our particularities, seek to th ink and  live more 
generously and gracefully w itii each other in a m arkedly pluralist society?
A  Brief C o n c l u sio n
Perhaps, after all of tliis discussion, the response tiiat w e offer to the question 
of how  to live together in  the m idst of difference is n o t very grand. Instead of an  all- 
encom passing political theory w e offer a picture in w hich differences come together 
in  rich conversation in  a p luralist society. W e expand tiie backdrop of this picture to 
include no t only verbal exchanges tiiat address explicitly 'public' questions b u t the 
interactions of groups mid individuals in  various realm s of life, across the variety of 
circumstances and issues tiiat constitute the m any publics of our political society.
This is n o t to say th a t our politicEil life will no t be guided by a tiieory or practice tiiat 
relies upon  some ontology, and  that tiiis ontology w ill n o t be a t odds w ith  m any 
otliers currently in  existence w ith in  our culture. It is to recognise that w e cannot look 
to any one ontology to provide a political tiieory th a t will enable all of the different 
ontologies and  all of the particularities of the earthly city to be respected, reconciled, 
and celebrated. The desire for recognition of particularity and  difference is genuine 
and good, b u t it can quickly become dangerous w hen tiiose prom oting it fail to 
recognise th a t tlie hopes and  dream s th a t guide them  cannot be fulfilled in  tiie 
saeculum. We need to re-discover Augustine's H eavenly City as the place in  w hich 
unity  and diversity, harm ony and  plurality  can come together in  w ays that are not
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possible outside of participation in  tlie Triune God. This does no t m ean th a t tlie 
Heavenly City is to take over or be instituted in the earthly city. Citizens of the 
Heavenly City w ait in  hope for tlie day w hen God will bring the full reconciliation of 
w liich tliey now  taste the firstfruits. They live in  faitii that C lu ist is Lord of all, 
including the political realm s of w liich Üiey are a p art while tliey are on pilgrimage 
in  tliis age. Their concern is no t to take over die political realm  b u t to serve in  it, 
w hen called, w hile retaining their prim ary citizenship in Üie polis of the Church. 
Perhaps the m ost th a t they ask today is th a t w hatever political theory is in  place 
provides a w ay for deep conversation to occur betw een the individuals, 
com m unities, and  publics tliat constitute contem porary pluralist society, so th a t these 
different constituencies need no t alter, hide, or lim it their ow n particularity, and so 
that tliey m ay learn from  and  be changed by one anotlier.
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C h a pter  Six 
So m e  C o n c l u d in g  Rem arks
We have now  reached the end of a  rather long and  w inding journey that has 
taken us through different theories, practices, and ontologies in  an  effort to explore 
w hat pictures eind possibilities are available for a pluralist society com posed of a 
m ultitude of differences. This journey has carried us from liberal tolerance to a post- 
N ietzschean celebration of difference to a C hiistian hope for tlie harm onisation of 
differences in  the H eavenly City. It has taken us from  theory determ ined to be 
stiictly epistemological to theory tliat draw s attention to die ontological dimensions 
a t play w idiin  every belief and practice to theology tliat offers its ow n contestable 
ontology as one that m ight help the Clim-ch navigate die tricky w aters of pluralism , 
tolerance, and  difference a t die sam e time as it helps to augm ent our curren t political 
imagination. For our im agination today is im poverished, as indicated by the limited 
success we have had  in  pichiring how  to m ove beyond liberal tolerance so tiiat tiie 
particularity of differences can be recognised w itiiout difference being venerated  to 
such an extent tiiat any m ovem ent tow ards harm onising differences seems like an  
affront to particularity.
Political liberalism  is undergirded by an  ontology tiiat prioritises tiie 
universal over the particular, post-Nietzschean political theory by an  ontology that 
celebrates diversity a t tiie cost of unity. Every theory relies upon  an  ontology tiiat is 
held as a m atter of faitii, eitiier implicitly or explicitiy invoking deep beliefs about the 
nature of reality and  hum an  being. The ontologies m iderlying our current political 
tlieories have failed to provide persuasive pictures of tlie relationships betw een 
differences in  our political com m unity, leaving us witli tiie need to entertain  otiier 
ontologies and tlie pictures of unity and diversity that tliey present. A ugustine offers 
one such ontology; w ith  this need in  m ind, w e im m ersed ourselves in  the tiieology of 
Augustine so th a t w e m ight enter into his ontology in  its ow n righ t and  then  draw  
his ontology ou t to participate in  our current conversation. W hat contribution does 
Augustine m ake to this conversation? Perhaps m ost im portantly, he rem inds us tiiat 
we need to lim it w ha t w e can expect from  this eartiily city and political theory 
concerned therew ith. Desire for unity  is a w orthy desire, as is a longing for 
differences to be recognised, respected, and  celebrated, bu t neither of tiiese desires 
can be truly fulfilled in a polis th a t is m arked by disordered desires and  confused
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loves. It is possible for unity and diversity to com e together w itiiin  a political 
society, but the only polis in  w liich  tliey can be genuinely reconciled is tlie H eavenly  
City, through participation in  die Triune God. This participation alone can provide a 
sufficient basis from w liich  to engage w itli and respect others, for, as A ugustine  
show s us, fallen hum anity needs its loves to be re-ordered so that it can look to 
otliers not out of its ow n  neediness but for the sake of God, so  tiiat it can love  w id i 
hum ility and grace radier than pride and selfishness, so that it can prioritise justice 
and peace over pow er and dom ination. A ugustine rem inds us diat outside of the 
redem ption and transformation tiiat the m ediating w ork of Jesus C luist enables, 
hum anity has no w ay to overcom e tiie d ivision  that com es w itii each person seeking  
his or her ow n  private, independent, and varying goods and no m eans by w liicli to 
be re-united around tiie one truly public, com m on, and unchanging good, that is, 
God,
Political liberalism  recognises the division and the com peting private 
interests and goods tiiat mark individuals and com m unities. In response, it offers a 
w ay to unite d ivided  citizens w itiiin  a single political society that depends heavily  
upon tiie idea and inculcation of tolerance. As w e have seen, post-Enlightem nent 
versions of liberalism, recognising the fact of pluralism , give tolerance ever more 
prom inence w ith in  their theories, and y et as they do so  they fail to recognise tiieir 
role in defining botli w hat toleration entails and to w h om  it extends. The result is 
that their 'tolerant' political societies, rather tiian giving space to tiiose doctrines and 
persons of w hom  they m orally disapprove, actually exclude m any significant 
constituencies of contem porary society from participation before they even  begin. 
Those w h o are included m ust em phasise the com m onalities tiiey share w ith  others 
w itiiin that political society rather tiian tiieir ow n particularities. H ow , then, can tiie 
tolerance of political liberalism, w hich calls for differences to be eitiier excluded or 
ignored, be considered tolerant at all? If political liberalism  is relying on tolerance as 
the m eans to attain a unified political society in  the m idst of pluralism , then it offers 
us little help today.
If, on the otiier hand, post-N ietzschean political tlieorists are searching for a 
w ay to m ove beyond liberal tolerance to an acceptance or embrace of difference, tiieir 
ow n  ontologies fail to provide tiie resources to sustain such a m ove. If pow er and  
conflict are as pervasive as they think tiiem  to be, surely w e  n eed  som ething beyond  
tiie strengtii garnered by tiie recognition tiiat our relationships, identities, and
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political societies are contingent and paradoxical to sustain the celebration and  
recognition of difference for w hich  they call. On an A ugustinian v iew , die only  
political com m unity in  w liich  this m ove beyond tolerance is possible is the one that 
arises through participation in  Jesus C luist, w h o  enables reconciliation betw een  and  
w itiiin  hum anity mid God. Out o f this participation in God flow s an ethic along the 
lines of that sought by tiie agonists, h i this ethic, people and groups are s lo w  to 
judge and quick to love, unw illing to coerce and eager to respect, because they  
recognise the kinship tliey share w ith  all of creation, a kinship of createdness and of 
shifulness that sim ultaneously engenders care and hum ility. Furthermore, through  
participation in  G od their ow n  loves and desires are re-ordered so  tiiat they can love  
generously and rightly, g iving each person and virtue its proper due. Finally, as tiiey 
participate in  God tiiey becom e a part o f tiie God w h o  loved hum anity and creation  
to such an extent tiiat no price w as considered too large to pay to restore relationality 
w itii tiiose from w h om  God w as estranged. This self-giving and self-donating  
should  be a mark not only of the Triune God but o f tiiose w ho participate in  this 
Triune God.
W e w ant to adm it str aightaw ay tiiat the Church as it exists on earth has not 
often visibly d isplayed the unity, tiie hum ility, tiie love, the generosity, or tiie grace 
w liich  w e  have here described. O n the contrary, as Katiiryn Tanner com m ents, 
"probably m ore often than not over the course of W estern history, Chr istians have  
used beliefs about G od and the w orld to undergird attitudes and actions w ith  a 
highly problematic political import."! A nd yet, as Tanner herself attem pts to show , 
Chiistian beliefs are n ot necessarily and inherently linked to repressive, intolerant, 
and otherwise dangerous sociopolitical practices.^ This has m uch to do w itii tiie 
eschatological nature of tiie H eavenly City, for even  though tiie K ingdom  of God  
m anifests itself in part as tiie Church in  tiie saeculum , the full realisation of God's 
prom ises to God's people w ill not occur until God ushers in a n ew  age. Tliis n ew  age 
w ill occur in  God's tim ing, n ot hum anity's, and it does n ot depend up on  the w ork of
4 Katliiyn Tanner, The Politics of God: Christian Theologies and Social Justice (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1992), p. 1.
2 This point is made especially clear in her chapter on "Christian Belief and Respect for 
Difference," in which she offers Christian grounds for tolerance and the celebration of 
particularity. See ibid., pp. 193-223. Cf. Robert Jewett, Christian Tolerance: Paul's Message to 
the Modern Church (Philadelpliia: The Westminster Press, 1982). Even Stephen Toulmin, who 
is far from offering theological support for toleration, argues that intolerance and 'dogmatism'
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hum ans for its arrival. That is to say, the role of citizens of tlie H eavenly City as they 
live as members of the Church and as pilgrim s in  the earthly city is n o t to inaugurate 
tlie eschatological City o f G od, even  as they em body and delight in tlie firstfruits of 
being part o f this City, and even  as they pray that God's K ingdom  w ill be present on  
earth as it is in heaven. This K ingdom , w hile a po lis, is vastly different from the polis 
of the eartlily city, so  m uch so that it positions the eartlily city w itiiou t need ing  to 
take it over.
W hat does this mean? It means, on one level, tliat entering into citizenship in  
tlie H eavenly City enables one to realise that the political societies and identities of 
tlie earthly city are neither ultimate nor unquestionable. Unlike liberal political 
theory, w hich, according to John Gray, relies upon tlie sovereign nation-state as its 
"great m iexam ined assum ption,"3 and unlike agonistic political thought, w liich  opens 
our eyes to the contingencies and dangers of nation-states and national identities 
w itiiout providing an alternative coim nunity, an A ugustinian understanding of the 
H eavenly City invites us to participate in a tr uly universal society w hile  still abiding  
in our respective eartlily cities, w hich  remain important w hile no longer being seen  
as ultimate. W e need, as O liver O'Donovan writes, "the disclosure of a universal 
society, a K ingdom  of H eaven, a n ew  identity capable of w eaning us from  
dependence upon our varied identities. W ithout it w e cannot envisage those 
identities in  sober clarity, as grounds neitlier of boasting nor shame." Such a 
universal society cam iot be tlie product of mere imagination; instead, as he  
continues, "we m ust becom e actual members of a real com m unity constituted by tlie 
real and present im age of God as uniquely lord, and the real and present im age of 
mankind as subject uniquely to God. Jesus C luist, very God and very man, is the 
double representative around w h om  such a com m unity has com e into being. The 
H eavenly City, thr ough tiie Church as it exists on eartii, provides a com m unity in  
w hich people from all countries and various identities can com e together, united  
through Christ in such a w ay  tiiat tiieir differences do not becom e ultim ate nor their 
political identities decisive, even  as both can be and are recognised. D oes this not
are not inherent to Christianity. See, for example, Stephen Touliiim, Cosmopolis: The Hidden 
Agenda of Modernity (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 135-136,144.
3 John Gray, Tiuo Faces of Liberalism (New York: The New Press, 2000), p. 123.
4 Oliver O'Donovan, Common Objects of Love: Moral Reflection and the Shaping of Community 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002), p. 44.
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provide a w ay betw een the Scylla of liberalism's 'unifying' universalism  and the 
Charybdis of post-N ietzschean difference?
On anotlier level, the difference betw een die H eavenly City and the eartlily 
city m eans that to som e degree they are operating on tw o different planes, so that the 
H eavenly City need not and should  not attem pt to take over the earthly city or its 
political institutions. The H eavenly City calls people out of their eartlily cities to be 
joined togetlier in  tlie City of God, but in  tliis saeculum  this m eans neitlier that their 
eartlily cities are abandoned nor tliat tliey are called to im pose the polis o f tlie 
H eavenly City on tlie earthly city. Instead, they are to see the political realm as part 
of God's providential provision for tlie fallen w orld, a w ay  for G od to m inim ise the 
disorder and dom ination that w ou ld  oüierw ise take over every aspect o f fallen life 
together. This does n ot m ean that tlie political realm is neutral, a place in  w liich  
citizens of tiie H eavenly City Ccui blitliely play a role as they rest in  their belief that it 
is part o f God's provision for tiieir security and welfare. As A ugustine clearly 
demonstrates, tlie eartlily city is alw ays marked by the libido dom inandi and by loves 
that are private and personal rather tlian those that seek tlie highest and greatest 
good for all. A nd yet Christians believe that even  tiiese disordered loves, even  the 
pow ers and principalities of the fallen world, have been placed under the auüiority  
of Jesus C luist. This m ay not be visible this side of the escliaton, but it does engender 
a patient ti'ust in the Lordship of Christ tliat prevents citizens of the H eavenly City 
from tliinking that tliey have to take tlie political reahn of tlie eartlily city into tiieir 
ow n hands and through their ow n  efforts place it into the hands of God.
Citizens of the H eavenly City m ust n ot look to tlie earthly city to be the site of 
the realisation o f God's prom ises or to be the place in  w hich the com m unity and  
people of God are primarily located. If they are going to dedicate them selves and  
tlieii' lives to one polis, it should  be that of tlie City of God. If, how ever, tiieir 
citizenship in the H eavenly City is firmly in  place, if  tluough their participation in 
God tliey have had tiieir loves and goods reprioritised so tliat they can appreciate the 
eartlily city w ithout m aking it their final good, then they m ay have a very helpful 
role indeed to play in the earthly city. For w hat does the earthly city need  more tlian  
people w h o  can botli recognise a degree of contingency in  its arrangements and draw  
upon a source of love and hum ility, a standard of com m unity and grace, a picture of 
peace that involves flourishing and delight betw een God, hum anity, and all of 
creation, as they seek to question current political arrangements and further certain
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political goods? A s A ugustine notes, w liile on pilgrim age in tliis eartlily city citizens 
of the H eavenly City share som e goods w itli citizens of the earthly city, so they have 
reason to contribute to earthly peace and justice. A nd they further contribute 
because tliey desire earthly peace mid justice for the sake of tiieir neighbours w h o  do  
not yet have know ledge of tlie greater peace and justice tliat could be theirs thr ough  
Christ.
W liat m ight tliis contribution look like? It w ill take different forms at 
different tim es, depending on the political and social situations currently in existence  
in  tlie various earthly cities of w hich  these citizens are a part. Christianity does not 
tr anslate directly into any one political theory, for reasons that should  be w e ll clear 
by now . It can and does coincide w ith  a variety of earthly cities, political institutions, 
and social arrangements, even  as it attempts to be its ow n polis  w ith in  these. Perhaps 
the m ost tliat w e  can say in  our current m ilieu  is that whatever political theory is used  
in the com m on places ('politics' in  a popular w ay) to justify com m on practices w ou ld  
ideally be one that accom m odates a deep conversation of com m unal religious 
practices .5 In other w ords, g iven  contemporary conditions of pluralism , tlie political 
realm n eeds to leave space for its mem bers to garner their primary identities from  
other sources and to com e together in political society from w ithin  the particularity 
of those identities in  formal and inform al w ays. This is precisely w hat is precluded  
in  political liberalism, for i t s  ontology requires too m uch of its m em bers as it 
com m andeers or neuters th eh  oilier identities. V eiled in  tlie guise of 'neutrality' and 
draw ing upon such seem ingly universal concepts as 'reasonableness' and  
'overlapping consensus,' this liberalism in  actuality asks die constituents of 
contemporary pluralist society to considerably change tiieir beliefs, practices, and 
identities before it w ill consider them  'reasonable' and tliereby allow  them  to be a 
part o f tlie political society as it searches for an 'overlapping consensus.' Once they  
are included, they are still precluded from being publicly present as tlie particular 
constituencies that tliey are, as are all mem bers of a society governed by a political 
liberalism that em phasises 'public' m iity and 'private' difference.
Here, in its conception of 'public' and 'private,' is precisely w here w e  need to 
ask significant questions of contem porary liberalism. For, as Jean Bethke Elshtain 
notes, "images of public and private are necessarily, if im plicitly, tied to v iew s of
5 I owe tliis sentence to Keith Starkenburg, who helpfully put my own conclusion in tiiese 
words.
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moral agency; evaluations o f hum an capacities and activities, virtues, and excellence; 
assessm ents of tiie purposes and aims of alternative m odes of social o r g a n i z a t i o n . " ^  
This m eans that w h en  w e tiimk about public and private, and ponder w ays of re- 
im agining h ow  tiiey m ight be conceptualised, "if w e  are to avoid the presum ptuous 
and tiie abstr acted, w e  are thinking about a m ultiplicity of moral claim s and about 
com peting hum an values concerning w hat an ideal w ay  of life ought to be."7 W hen  
political liberalism delineates its strict separation betw een public and private, and  
defines public as tliat w liich  pertains to 'constitutional essentials' and 'basic justice,' 
w hen it separates the public political forum, as a place in  w hich citizens can com e 
togetlier to discuss political matters independent of tiieir 'private' com prehensive  
philosophical doctrines, from the rest of the 'background culture,' it enforces its ow n  
deep beliefs and assum ptions about, am ong otiier tilings, the relationsliip betw een  
tiie political realm and otiier com ponents of political society and tiie relationsliip  
betw een citizens emd tiie beliefs and practices of their faitii com m unities. These 
beliefs and assum ptions have becom e so taken-for-granted that they receive scant 
attention, w hile the conception of public and private tiiat they undergird has become 
tiie only conceivable one, even  as people long for m ore public recognition of  
particularity and difference.
W liat if this recognition is not possible outside of a reconceptualisation of 
public and private, a re-im agining of h o w  w e  conceive of public and its relation to 
other facets of life? For liberalism  is problematic in  its failure to provide tiie space 
and tiie m eans for interactions betw een the different particularities that coincide in  
contemporary political society, and this applies to tiie particularity that is 
Christianity as m uch as to any otiier particularity. A nd yet Christians them selves  
have acquiesced to the definitions and parameters provided to tiiem  by liberalism, 
and by allow ing them selves to be positioned and ti ained by the Imiguage and  
practices of liberalism, tiiey have lost tiie im aginative pow er to picture other 
possibilities tiiat are rooted in  the language and practices of Christianity.8 W hat
6 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Womani Women in Social and Political Thought 
(Oxford; Martin Robertson, 1981), p. 4.
7 Ibid., p. 123.
8 Stanley Hauerwas writes similarly of Christianity's current lack of imaginative power in 
reference to Iris Murdoch and the power that her novels and writings can exert over 
Christians as tiiey enter into the ways tiiat she re-imagines our existence (see Stanley 
Hauerwas, Wilderness Wanderings: Probing Twentieth-Century Theology and Philosophy [Boulder, 
Co.: Westview Press, 1997], p. 167). The need for an imaginative capacity to conceptualise
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tiieological resources m ight offer an alternative to the hegem onic control o f 'public' 
held by political liberalism? Here again w e return to A ugustine, for w h om  
Christianity w as nothing if not a public, social ethic em bodied in the life of the 
Church (not, w e  are careful to note, em bodied in tlie political realm of the earthly 
city). Tliis reminder of tlie one-tim e public nature of the Church can help  us pause  
for a m om ent to remember tiiat, by definition, 'public' can refer to any com m unity or 
group of people m iited by a com m on interest or good. It need not refer only to a 
nation or a state, or to the explicitly political realm of nations and states. Tliis means, 
for exam ple, tliat a people united by w orship of God can be considered a public just 
as m uch as a people united by a com m on national allegiance. T luoughout its history 
and tradition, Christianity has been conceived, by botli its participants and its 
opponents, as com m unal, social, and public at its very core. It is only recently, under 
liberalism, tiiat it has distanced itself from its com im m al em bodim ent to becom e 
more a matter of private faitii and belief. Such a transformation has surely im pacted  
not only Christianity but m any otiier constituencies w itiiin  w estern liberal societies 
that have reduced their com m unal claims in order to exist £is 'private' entities, 
com ing togetlier in  tiie public realm of liberalism as alm ost anonym ous entities. 
M ight there be a w ay  for Cluistianity and otiier com ponents o f political society to 
exist as publics w itiiou t this m eaning that tliey w ant to take over w h at w e  com m only  
understand as tiie public square? By creating space for m ultiple publics that overlap  
and yet are marked by tiieir ow n  telos, doctrine, and practices, m ight w e  open the 
possibility of critical and fruitful interaction betw een  tiiese publics? A nd m ight this 
offer us a glim pse of an alternative picture of political ar rangem ents, one in  w liich  
m ultiple publics and different individuals can com e together in rich and deep  
conversation?
This alternative picture relies on an liistorical understanding of conversation  
tiiat involves both exchange o f w ords and interaction betw een different m am iers of 
life. As people converse, tiiey are to speak from w itiiin  tiie particularity and fullness 
of their identities, beliefs, and practices, for it is as identities are em bodied, as 
narratives are incarnated, and as people live togetlier and engage w ith  one anotlier 
from w itiiin  tiie em bodim ent o f tiieir differing narratives, that true conversation  
occurs. Such conversation operates w ith  a trust in w hat can be learned and
and reconceptuaHse that which is received from otiier sour ces in tight of the narratives and 
practices of Christianity seems relevant to all aspects of Ciuistian tiieological inquiry.
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accom plished tlirough interaction, debate, and deliberation, so  tliat each party in  the 
conversation is open  to being persuaded by tlie other, to changing its convictions and  
practices, in  sm all and large w ays, and even to being converted to different beliefs 
and mam iers of life. For w itiiout keeping open the possibility of being persuaded  
and changed through our interactions w ith  each otiier, h ow  are w e  ever to learn and 
grow as w e  seek to think and live more generously and gracefully w itli each otiier in  
a decidedly pluralist society? Such honest conversation, w liich is as eager to 
understand otliers in  their differences as it is to find places of agreem ent and  
com m onality, w ill find significeuit points of divergence and dissimilarity. Should w e  
be afr aid of raising these differences? Perhaps in  our contemporary m ilieu  w e  need  
to be more afraid of ignoring them  tlian of w hat w ill happen w h en  w e  attem pt to 
engage them. Such engagem ent m ay only be possible if w e  considerably re-think our 
conceptions of public and private, so tliat tlie public square is tiiought o f not as the 
forum in w hich  debate over political and constitutional matters takes place but as 
com m unication and interaction betw een different w ays of thinking and living, 
betw een tlie different groups and individuals that togetlier constitute contemporary 
political society.
Is this picture of conversation probable or realistic? To som e degree, such  
conversation already happens as these different constituencies reside side-by-side in  
daily life. In otiier w ays, w e  are far from a society in  w hich rich, deep, honest 
conversation o f practices and w ords occurs in either formal or informal w ays, and 
m uch m ore needs to be developed before such a picture could take root in  our 
current political im agination. A nd yet offering this preliminary picture m ay be a 
w ordiw hile begim iing, even  if at the end of this discussion w e  realise tliat w e are far 
from a place in  w hich  tliis picture can be accepted and embraced. Even Connolly  
writes in  his m ost recent w ork that his 'ethos o f deep pluralism' is not a probable 
achievem ent, although die actual diversity in  contemporary society raises the need  
for just such an etlios. H e offers his contribution because he believes diat "political 
and cultural theory should  focus first and forem ost on possibilities that speak to 
pressing needs of d ie time. Concentration on probabilities alone can be left to 
bureaucrats and c o n s u lta n ts .T li is  project represents our effort to respond to tlie 
sam e needs o f our tim e as tiiose perceived by Com iolly, even  as our discerm nent of
9 William E. Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), pp. 136-137.
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those n eeds and our proposed answers are rooted in  Christian tiieology ratlier tiian a 
post-N ietzschean ontology. W e m ight say that w hat is offered here is an 'etlios of 
gospel participation,' and it is certainly more a work of theology than political 
tiieory. In the end it seeks to offer not a com prehensive political tiieory that w ill 
provide all the answers to our contemporary questions (for such a theory is w ell 
beyond die bounds of a tiieology w hose primary concern is to point to the polis  of the 
H eavenly City radier than die eartiily one), but a picture that represents one w ay  in  
w hich differences m ight com e together m ore richly and honestly than eitiier political 
liberal or post-N ietzschean pictures allow. Tliis picture is m y offering to botli the 
Church and our contem porary political and pluralist im agination.
Such a picture clearly provides a w ay to recognise particularity that goes w ell 
beyond w hat is possible, and deem ed desirable, in political liberalism. A nd it 
provides a w ay  out of tlie hopeless, contingency-based, conflict-ridden alternative 
offered by agonistic political theorists. Otiier contemporary thinkers are likew ise  
drawing attention to the need  tiiat has arisen in  a post-Enlightem nent context to offer 
alternatives to those, like the post-N ietzscheans, w h o  m ost radically try to m ove  
beyond Enlightem nent certainties. A m ong tiiese thinkers are Slavoj Zizek and Alain  
Badiou. In responding to, as Z izek puts it, "tiie absent centre of political ontology," 
they are tiy ing  to provide an alternative to 'postmodern' acceptance of radical 
contingency and m etaphysical uncertainty by resuscitating a politics of universal 
Truth that takes into account contemporary awareness of m ultiplicity and  
contingency.40 A nd yet they assum e, along w itii post-N ietzscheans, tiiat tlie tim e in  
w hich Christianity could make a direct contribution towards these efforts has long  
since passed. W e have argued, on the conti'ary, that Christianity has a considerable 
contiibution to make to political tiieory, m ost importantly by rem inding us that 
m any o f the goals tiiat w e  cm rently hold for the political realm cam iot be realised  
outside of participation in  the Triune God w h o reigns in  the H eavenly City. It is only  
in  tiie Triune God of grace tiiat the desire for a tr ue recognition of difference that 
m oves beyond tolerance to celebrate botli unity and diversity can be met. If w e  look  
for this desire to be realised through liberal or post-N ietzschean political societies, it 
w ill alw ays remain unquenclied, but if w e look to Christ, w e need  never know  tliis
40 See especially Slavoj Zizek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centi'e ofPoliticnl Ontology 
(London: Verso, 1999); Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism  (Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997). For Zizek on Badiou, see Ticklish Subject, pp. 131-143.
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Üiirst again. A nd yet w e  have reason to seek and hope for m ore recognition o f 
particularity w ithin  the earthly city tlian either political liberalism or post- 
N ietzschean political tiiought has tlius far delivered. If w e draw on tiieology to help  
us re-im agine our received conceptions of botli 'public' and 'conversation,' w e  can see 
a picture in  w hich  the different particularities of our pluralist society com e together 
to interact tlirough their w ords and tiieir practices, tlu ou gh  tiieir com m unal 
identities and tiieir individual concerns, in  w ays tliat keep open tlie possibility of 
honest learning, growth, change, and conversion. To m ove from tolerance to 
difference m ay, in a seem ingly  ironic tw ist, require a m ove towards rather tlian away  
from Christianity, towards, that is to say, an im agination inform ed by C iuistian faith, 
a practice inform ed by Christian belief, and an ontology inform ed by Christian  
tiieology.
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